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Abstract
This thesis represents the development and pilot application of a novel method-
ology for the speculative qualitative assessment (or “prototyping”) of new infras-
tructural systems. Its core aim and guiding principle is to make infrastructure legi-
ble: to reveal and narrate its role in everyday life from a more human perspective
than that of the paradigmatic technology-focussed approach. Or, more simply,
the project aims to understand how infrastructures develop, how they evolve and
entangle over time.
The methodology is centred on a novel model of sociotechnical change, known
as the infrastructural trialectic. The trialectic makes a unique relational distinction
between infrastructural systems and the technologies through which infrastruc-
tural functions are accessed, traces vectors of influence between focal actors in the
model, and provides a framework for mapping the articulatory institutions which
are enrolled in the formation and mutation of infrastructural assemblages.
The methodology has two modes of application: the historical mode, and the
speculative. In the historical mode, the trialectic model becomes the lens of a sit-
uated longue duree analysis which explores the historical dynamics of sociotech-
nical change in the assemblages underpinning a particular everyday practice.
In the speculative mode, the findings from the historical mode are used as
the basis for an extrapolative and speculative analysis of a novel technological
intervention into the practice previously analysed. Drawing on techniques from
strategic foresight and critical design, the prospective technology is “prototyped”
against the context of a suite of four divergent near-future scenarios, so as to
“stress test” the plausibility of its deployment under difficult circumstances.
This thesis presents and applies a novel model of sociotechnical change, and
in doing so demonstrates that the shortcomings of paradigmatic models of change
might be addressed through such an approach. It further demonstrates a unique
hybrid method for the assessment and critique of new technologies and practices
alike, which provides a more human perspective upon infrastructure (and indeed
upon change itself) than prevailing approaches to assessment.
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1.1 Everyday magic: the ubiquity of infrastructure
For the vast majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom, infrastructure is an ef-
fectively ubiquitous presence in everyday life, enabling or otherwise underpinning
countless actions and activities, from the technical to the mundane.
Take, for example, the making of a cup of tea—what could be more simple?
But as most often performed, even this deceptively domestic act involves signifi-
cant infrastructural support. Turn the tap to fill your kettle, and you marshal the
resources of a catchment-wide network of reservoirs, pumps, pipes and treatment
works, with little more thought or effort than opening a cupboard. Switch on the
kettle, and an increasingly international network of generation and distribution
springs into action, boiling your freshly provided potable water at no more com-
plex or demanding a signal than a snap of your fingers. And that’s without even
beginning to consider the global logistical networks which brought tea, coffee,
sugar and much, much more to the kitchen tables of a country in which none of
those crops are native...
Making a cup of tea is simplicity itself by comparison to a truly contemporary
action, such as reading the news on a smartphone. With the touch of a finger on
capacitive glass, you send and summon data from locations scattered all across the
globe, linked by a latticework of copper cables and glass fibres, and suspended in
a sea of electromagnetic signals. The routers and data centres and backbones and
base-stations of that network are all by necessity connected to their local energy
networks, which may themselves in turn be managed, in part or in whole, by
means of flows of data passing through the communications systems for which
they provide the power. When you touch the screen of a smartphone, you are
making a request of what is unarguably the largest and most complex machine
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known to humankind—but you do so for a reason most mundane, and with the
simplest of gestures.
Infrastructure is ubiquitous, then—but it is also illegible.
1.2 Everyday illusion: the illegibility of infrastructure
It’s not that we do not see infrastructure—though much of it is hidden from sight,
and quite purposefully so—but that, like fragments of a much larger manuscript,
those pieces which we do see are insufficient to convey the meaning of the whole.
The mechanism of this illegibility is a form of self-effacement: when performing
as it should, infrastructure literally fades into the background or melts into the
walls, manifest only in the ongoing possibility of certain forms of action.
We may turn to science fiction for a metaphor that lets us get a little closer
to infrastructural illegibility, in the form of the third of Arthur C Clarke’s “laws”,
which states:
“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
(Clarke, 1973)
Note that, counter to some contemporary readings—whether journalistic (Dormehl,
2018; Matthews, 2018) or academic (Feied, Handler, Gillam, & Smith, 2009)—
Clarke is not conflating his categories. He’s not claiming that magic and tech-
nology are the same thing, only that those uninitiated to either paradigm would
have no basis upon which to distinguish them.
Likewise, infrastructure is not magic—but then magic isn’t really magic either:
it’s illusion, prestidigitation, sleight of hand. And supporting the illusion of con-
sumerism is exactly what infrastructure does: while you watch the illusionist’s
white gloved hand (your tap, your kettle, your smartphone screen), infrastructure
is busy behind the illusionist’s back (or yours), propping up his patter, setting up
the trick without showing you the workings.
Infrastructure puts the rabbit in the hat. It doesn’t merely provide; it also
provides the illusion of effortless and immediate provision ex nihilo. This illusion
produces the illegibility of infrastructure with which this project is concerned.
1.3 Heavy weather: three challenges to illegible infrastruc-
ture
Why, then, is this a problem? Should we not consider the nigh-magical affordances
of modern infrastructure as both the crowning achievement and just reward of
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technoscientific endeavour? Why need infrastructure be legible to anyone other
than those organisations and institutions whose duty is to build and/or manage it?
Isn’t this rather blissful form of ignorance the proof and product of specialisation
as a civilisational strategy? Or, more bluntly: isn’t this the sort of problem best
left to domain experts?
This attitude to infrastructure has arguably served us well enough to date, but
its efficacy is fading fast in the face of three mutually entangled external challenges
which, considered together, demand that we develop a more comprehensive and
systemic appreciation of these systems of ubiquitous provision.
The first challenge is that of a changing climate, and it’s double-edged—
because not only will infrastructures have to adapt to changes in climate (which
will impact in all sorts of ways upon their operational parameters, and upon pat-
terns of usage and demand), but they must also play a vital role in its mitigation,
given that they are utterly complicit in its (re)production (Raven, 2017a). Or, more
simply: given climate change is in significant part the outcome of human resource
extraction and consumption as amplified and extended by infrastructural systems,
any attempt to address climate change which doesn’t appreciate the role of infras-
tructure is doomed to failure. (Note that resource depletion and pollution are
significant elements of climate change in which infrastructure is also complicit,
and should be treated as being of equal importance to the “headline” phenomena
of temperature change, sea-level rise etc, if not as being causal of them; see e.g.
Steer, 2014, .)
The second challenge is demography. Population growth may be slowing, but
populations are still growing overall, and it’s not just a matter of numbers: climate
change and conflict are generating migration and internal displacement, while
economic factors are driving rapid urbanisation, in the process exacerbating soar-
ing inequalities between different sections of society (Behrens & Robert-Nicoud,
2014), which are manifest in the increasingly fevered contestation of scarce natural
resources. Given infrastructure’s role in the extraction, processing and distribu-
tion of resources (see again Raven, 2017a), a deeper appreciation of these functions
and their (re)production is a prerequisite to meeting this looming socioeconomic
crisis; this is not simply to see infrastructure, then, but to see infrastructure as a
tool for social justice, if only potentially so.
The third challenge to infrastructural illegibility is political, in what is per-
haps a more profound sense than that of the demographic challenge. For while
infrastructure can be seen as the medium of economics—the board upon which
the game of trade is played, if you like—it can also be seen as the medium of
the media (or the metamedium), as the system-of-systems through which “the
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media” are themselves distributed and mediated. All discourse, all debate, how-
ever profound, however banal—absolutely all knowledge exchange with anyone
other than your immediate neighbours is enabled and distributed by infrastruc-
tural systems. It therefore follows that infrastructure is also, in effect, the medium
of democracy—and at time of writing, the last few years have provided a surfeit of
examples of how access to or control over infrastructural systems might be used
to pervert, frustrate and even undermine the democratic principle (Shackelford
et al., 2017), in addition to creating more mundane and immediate forms of dis-
ruption. Therefore if we wish to preserve the practice of democracy, or perhaps
even improve it, it behoves us to reveal and understand the systems which make
it possible.
These three challenges—which are really just three aspects of a far broader
existential crisis for humanity—would all be reduced by a solid understanding of
the dynamics of infrastructural change over the long term. But given that infras-
tructure is costly, slow to build and long to last, the challenges further require
the projection of that understanding into the troubled and uncertain times ahead.
For most people, the ubiquity of infrastructure is only apparent at the moment in
which it fails—which, even in the most low-stakes circumstances, is almost always
too late.
1.4 High stakes, long bets: three constituencies for infras-
tructural legibility
As such, there are three major use-cases for infrastructural legibility, associated
with three different constituencies of stakeholder. For civil engineers, system
managers and the like, infrastructural legibility informs the ability to successfully
manage and maintain extant systems in an ever-changing context.
For policymakers, planners and activists, infrastructural legibility underwrites
the ability to effectively plan upgrades, expansions and reconfigurations of infras-
tructural provision which may take decades to deliver.
For citizens, perhaps most importantly of all, infrastructural legibility is a pre-
condition of an infrastructural mandate, which we might describe as the political
will to support (and pay for) infrastructural reconfigurations. New and/or up-
graded systems will be costly and disruptive, and while citizens may (and often
do) enthuse at the prospect of new or improved provision, the sacrifices neces-
sary to make it happen may prove a hard sell in the absence of a clear argument
for their necessity and utility (Damigos, Tourkolias, & Diakoulaki, 2009; Hensher,
Shore, & Train, 2006). Or, more simply: it’s hard to get people to pay more for
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their magic, or to accept a less magical service for the same cost as before.
Meeting these challenges for these consituencies necessitates an understanding
of how the things people do coevolve with the systems they make use of in doing
them. But it is clearly impossible to study change which has yet to occur—and
therefore a deeper understanding of historic changes in infrastructural provision
offers us the most likely source of precedents for navigating the necessary changes
ahead.
With that said, while this project starts from an understanding that the re-
configuration of infrastructures (and of the actions for which we make use of
infrastructures) is a pressing necessity, it does not seek normative conclusions: the
question is not “how should infrastructure be changed?”, but rather “how does
infrastructure change (or not change)?” We begin with an assertion: it should
be recognised that what little basis exists for normative claims on infrastructural
futurity is alarmingly thin, and that systematic primary research is required in
order to ground such investigations going forward. The project that follows rep-
resents the development and application of a methodology intended to fulfill that
purpose.
A note on style
Before continuing with this thesis, some explanation may be necessary regard-
ing the style and approach thereof. This PhD project was explicitly funded as
an interdisciplinary enquiry, located somewhere between civil engineering on the
one hand, and urban studies and planning on the other. Furthermore, due to its
author’s unusual career path, the resulting work also partakes in ideas and ap-
proaches from social theory, Science and Technology Studies, media theory and
futures studies. As a result, the meta-challenge of the project was that of develop-
ing a novel conceptual language that could be parsed by scholars from both sides
of the disciplinary divide defined by the funding—as well as, ideally, by scholars
from a variety of other disciplines, for whom infrastructure is a terra incognita of
increasing importance.
The conceptual language thus developed (as set out in the literature review
and the methodological explorations to follow) is in turn supported by a style
of analysis (and of writing) which is rather more “literary” in character than is
traditional to civil engineering, the discipline under whose official aegis it was
developed, and perhaps even unusually verbose by the standards of the more
mainstream social sciences. Or, to be uncharacteristically blunt: it is wordy, and
its structure is strongly influenced by narrative and historical approaches, rather
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than by the structured and quantitative rigours of the “hard” sciences.
This does not merit any apology—indeed, the rarity of similarly qualitative
and narrative approaches to sociotechnical change remains, for the author at least,
among the greatest of justifications for taking this approach. But it does perhaps
merit a caveat for those more accustomed to a clear division between data and
analysis, which are necessarily blended together in this project (particularly in
chapters 5, 6 and 7). The necessity of writing the majority of this thesis in the
so-called “passive voice” (avoiding the use of the first person, in other words—
a practice which is more widely accepted in the social sciences, but still largely
considered anathema among engineers) can serve to blur the distinction between
data and analysis still further, as it may not be immediately apparent when the
“I” of the researcher is interpreting on the reader’s behalf, rather than the sources
speaking to them directly. (The use of direct quotations from sources rather than
paraphrasing represents one way, among many, which this more narrative style
attempts to foreground the data/analysis distinction without unduly disrupting
the flow of the narrative being delivered).
Furthermore, with regard to the linguistic style of the work, it bears noting
that all disciplines are reliant upon words and concepts which are familiar to their
initiates, but may be obscure, obtuse or arcane to outsiders; such a lexicon allows
for both concision and precision, even as it demands much of the uninitiated
reader. That the conceptual lexicon developed herein may be unfamiliar to many
of its readers is regrettable, but also unavoidable: therein lies the difficulty of
truly interdisciplinary work, in that it involves not so much the bridging of two
disciplines as the creation of an entirely new one. Likewise for the lexicon more
broadly: this thesis deploys words which are arcane, or at least unfamiliar to the
context of common usage, but it does so for much the same reason that an engineer
might deploy a complicated piece of calculus, or a technical term—which is to say,
for the sake of brevity. This may seem an odd excuse, given that this is a long
thesis even when measured by the standards of the social sciences. Nonetheless, it
would have been far longer still if not for recourse to the precision and concision
offered by particular choices of words.
In summary: because of what it was commissioned to achieve, and due to the
particular methods deployed to achieve those ends, this thesis is neither a short
read, nor a simple one. But nor is it impenetrable—and it is hoped that the ideas





As suggested in the introduction, there are two main aspects to this project: an
attempt to understand historical processes of change in infrastructure, and an at-
tempt to speculate on potential future changes in infrastructure. While the meth-
ods and findings of the former must necessarily inform the latter, the processes
are nonetheless distinct, and thus the relevant literatures are reviewed separately
below.
2.1 Hindsight: studying historical change in infrastructures
To oversimplify more than a little, there are two basic approaches to studying
technological change, distinguished by their primary focus: some look first at
technology, while others look first at people.
2.1.1 Technology-centric approaches
In search of “infrastructure”
It first bears noting that there must be theories or understandings of infrastruc-
tural change within the broader literatures of the disciplines directly concerned
with the construction, management and maintenance of specific infrastructures,
even if they are not formally codified. There is a developmental history implicit
in the self-conception of civil engineers, as there is in any field of human en-
deavour: an in-group understanding of how things got to be the way they are.
Regrettably, but perhaps not surprisingly, these histories are extremely partial, in
both senses of the term. Indeed, it would be no insult to describe them more
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properly as mythologies, the foundations of which may be found in such series
as Samuel Smiles’ Lives of the Engineers (Smiles, 1866)—a sequence of largely af-
fectionate Great Man hagiographies which foreground the actions and talents of
a few prominent individuals at the expense of their context, thus establishing the
dubious narrative of civil engineering as an entirely rational and apolitical project
whose success is as inevitable as it is unquestioned.
But as argued in the introduction, even were such disciplinary origin-stories
factual, they would be of little use in the context of this project, which is oriented
precisely toward inter- and transdisciplinary understandings; if we seek a model
of infrastructural change that is rigorous and not specific to a particular technology
or system, we must therefore look beyond the literatures of the civil engineers.
What, then, of literatures aimed at infrastructure more broadly? The greatest
surprise here might be that such literatures are few and far between, though that
claim deserves some qualification: the use of “infrastructure” as a key search term
in academic search engines returns a great many results, but the vast majority of
these are pertinent only to computer science and IT systems management, which
use the term infrastructure as a catch-all label for the hardware aspect of their
operations. Filtering for these leaves plenty of results, but the majority of those
tend to be highly domain-specific—pertaining only to water infrastructures, for
instance, or to the materiality of oil pipelines—and non-tautologous definitions of
the term “infrastructure” are notable by their absence. This may have something
to do with its comparatively recent rise to prominence in English usage, and the
even more recent specificity of the notion of infrastructure as used in everyday dis-
course, whereby the term becomes concrete rather than relational (see e.g. Raven,
2017a).
Hansman, Magee, De Neufville, Robins, and Roos (2006) is perhaps the earli-
est paper of significance to argue specifically for the study of infrastructure as a
multidisciplinary, multi-system topic, and sets out an ambitious research program
to that end. However, even the journal in which the paper appeared has largely
ignored that call: Critical Infrastructures, as both a journal and a discipline, is
oriented primarily toward maintaining the resilience of specific extant infrastruc-
tures against wildcard threats (e.g. industrial sabotage, hacking, riots: see Lewis,
2014; Pederson, Dudenhoeffer, Hartley, & Permann, 2006), and avoiding so-called
“cascading failure” (Ouyang, 2014). To be clear, these are important issues, but
the way in which they are researched has little to tell us about how infrastructure
changes over time. Or, to put it another way: Critical Infrastructures sees particu-
lar examples of infrastructural obduracy as a tactical goal to be sought, while this
project is more interested in infrastructural obduracy (and plasticity) as a general
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phenomenon to be understood.
Systems: Large / Technical / Sociotechnical
Historically, infrastructures have often been studied through the lens of systems
theory, which rose to prominence in the 1960s before metastasizing into the liter-
atures of many other disciplines. Systems and complexity theory in the abstract
will dealt with later in this section, after first focussing on what might be thought
of as “applied” systems theory specific to the infrastructural domain.
The development of the Large Technical Systems paradigm, founded by Thomas
P Hughes’s study of the evolution of electricity networks in the United States
(Hughes, 1993), represents what is perhaps the first specifically infrastructural
theory of change, and has been applied to other infrastructures (as in Davies 1996,
which looks at telecomms networks). Reviewing his work, Graham and Marvin
observe that Hughes deployed “an explicitly sociological and historical perspec-
tive” in order to show how the combination of technical apparatuses into infras-
tructural systems “involved complex economic, political and social negotiations”,
with a focus on the entrepreneurial struggle to impose systemicity on the net-
work under construction (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p180). As time passes, these
systems become mutually entangled with one another, and with their societal
context. Novel technologies or systems may result in substitutions of service pro-
vision (e.g. air travel replacing rail travel in the United States), but older systems
rarely vanish entirely. Rather, observe Graham and Marvin, they become black-
boxed: “taken for granted, ubiquitous, [and] standardised” (Graham & Marvin,
2001, p181); furthermore, “[b]ecause of the apparent permanence of black-boxed
Large Technical Systems, infrastructure networks thus retain powerful images of
stability” (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p182).
That stability is, as recent events have demonstrated, largely illusory: natu-
ral disasters, terrorism and hacking have all caused damage and downtime to
crucial systems across the world in recent years, as have the slower, more system-
atic catastrophes of underfunding, mismanagement and corporate incompetence.
As such, the black-boxing phenomenon which Graham and Marvin identify in
LTS is reminiscent of Clarke’s Third Law, as discussed in the introduction: vast
systems which cannot slip from our sight, which nonetheless slip from our com-
prehension. So LTS is looking in the right direction—but as Graham and Marvin
point out, the discipline’s “supply-side focus” and its “overwhelming concern
with ‘system-builders”’ betray a fundamentally managerial perspective (Graham
& Marvin, 2001, p184). In aiming to guide system-builders toward the successful
vanishing of an infrastructure—the operationalisation of Clarke’s Third Law, in
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other words—LTS seeks to seal up black-boxed systems permanently. As such, it
stands in opposition to the aim of this project, which is more interested in under-
standing the vanishing process than repeating the trick.
Being something of an evolution of LTS, Sociotechnical Systems is a predomi-
nantly managerial discipline aimed at shaping organisational development, which
takes “the concepts and metaphors of general systems theory, in particular the no-
tion of ’open systems’ [...] as a way of describing, analysing and designing systems
with joint optimisation in mind” (Walker, Stanton, Salmon, & Jenkins, 2008, p5). In
recent years, it has been applied to such infrastructural topics as smart electricity
grids in Korea (Mah, van der Vleuten, Ip, & Hills, 2012) and rainwater harvesting
systems in the UK (Ward, Barr, Butler, & Memon, 2012). The major distinction
from LTS is that Sociotechnical Systems explicitly acknowledges that any large
system has a social dimension as well as a technical dimension.
Sociotechnical Systems theory aims at the identification and reification of a
maximised open system which is both optimal and efficient but, where LTS advo-
cates system management through accretive growth, Sociotechnical Systems ad-
vocates the “design [of] organisations that exhibit open systems properties and
can thus cope better with environmental complexity, dynamism, new technology
and competition” (Walker et al., 2008, p5)—which is to say that, far from being
interested in understanding the process of technological change, Sociotechnical
Systems is in fact focussed on circumventing such dynamics in order to maintain
an overall systemic stability. This focus on organisational design works against
anything other than a highly instrumentalised conception of infrastructural sys-
tems: social factors outwith the organisation are relegated to acknowledged ex-
ternalities, with the result that socipolitical issues are always ‘out there’ in the
externalised world (where they can be safely ignored) while the system under de-
velopment is ‘in here’. Furthermore, a priori values are embedded in the analysis
in the form of the unquestioned primacy of optimal throughput: meaning and
values, while pertinent within the organisational frame, remain utterly subordi-
nate to highly quantitative conceptualisations of optimal function. Again, these
are laudable goals in context, but they orient Sociotechnical Systems theory or-
thogonally to the aim of this project, which is not to avoid, exploit or adapt to
sociotechnical change, but rather to understand its dynamics.
Innovation(s)
Stepping somewhat away from the systems paradigm, Innovation Diffusion the-
ory attempts to understand the take-up of new ideas and/or technologies in terms
of communications between groups and individuals. Rogers defines diffusion as
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“the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels
over time among the members of a social system” (E. M. Rogers, 2010, p5-6),
and “a kind of social change, defined as the process by which alteration occurs
in the structure and function of a social system”(E. M. Rogers, 2010, p6); exam-
ples offered include the uptake of sanitation processes in Peruvian villages, the
Royal Navy’s (slow, and oddly grudging) adoption of citrus fruits as a prophy-
lactic against scurvy, and—by way of illustrating a failed diffusion—the ongoing
marginality of the DVORAK keyboard against the ubiquity of the now-redundant
QWERTY layout.
Innovation is arguably a necessary concept, but also a slippery one: for ex-
ample, there is little agreement (or even discussion) as to whether innovation is
a noun (meaning that “an innovation” is a discrete and identifiable product or
service whose uptake can be studied), or a verb (meaning that “innovation” is
the diffuse process by which technologies change), or both at once; some schol-
ars have even gone so far as to suggest that innovation is basically unmeasurable
(Nelson, Earle, Howard-Grenville, Haack, & Young, 2014). Rogers’s weak concep-
tualisations do the term no favours, either, and in developing distinctions between
diffusion and dissemination (the former being spontaneous, the latter a process
to be managed by professional “change agents”) and between decentralised and
centralised diffusions (ditto), he reveals Innovation Diffusion to be fundamentally
oriented toward the goal of “diffusing” any given product or service across as
wide a market as possible. This reading is supported by the enduring popular-
ity of Innovation Diffusion theory in managerial and marketing-related disciplines
(see e.g. Cho, Hwang, & Lee, 2012; Delre, Jager, Bijmolt, & Janssen, 2010; Kreindler
& Young, 2014; Peres, Muller, & Mahajan, 2010), and by its frankly naive concep-
tualisations of the social system (described, with rather charming optimism, as “a
set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish
a common goal”, E. M. Rogers, 2010, p24). Much as with LTS and Sociotechnical
Systems, Innovation Diffusion is entirely focussed on trying to engender and har-
ness sociotechnical change; in their urgent desire to intervene, these frameworks
overlook the multitudinous actions of others which necessarily contribute to the
dynamics of the change they seek to steer.
Transitions and the Multi-Level Perspective
If popularity is any measure of success, then the reigning theory of sociotechnical
change is surely Transitions, a considerable body of literature clustered around
a model or framework known as the Multi-Level Perspective. The MLP “organ-
ises analysis into a socio-technical system that consists of niches, regimes and
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landscapes”—a terminology which “provides a language for organising a diverse
array of considerations into narrative accounts of transitions”—and defines the
goals of innovation policy as the “need to escape lock-in, deflect path dependen-
cies and transform sociotechnical regimes” (Smith, Voß, & Grin, 2010, p441). Ori-
ented toward achieving ‘transitions’ to more sustainable systems of provision than
currently prevail, the MLP considers both novel technologies and extant “struc-
tural trends in the [...] exisiting regime” (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p1025) from a
policy perspective, while also exploring the “perceptions, strategies and actions”
of other actors with a stake in said regime, such as “firms, utilities, special-interest
groups [and] consumers” (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p1025). As well as less obvi-
ously infrastructural technologies, the MLP has been used to analyse water distri-
bution systems (Geels, 2005a), electricity networks (Verbong & Geels, 2007), road
networks (Geels, 2007), as well as the ‘transitions’ from horse-drawn carriages to
the automobile (Geels, 2005b), and from sailing ships to steamers (Geels, 2002); it
is the de facto standard for infrastructural research, at least in the European context.
But it is not without its flaws, which appear to be endemic to technology-
centric theories of change. Shove and Walker (2007), noting the rapid expansion of
the Transitions literature (and enthusiasm for such) in both the Netherlands and
the UK, observe that “studies of systems in transition are typically distanced, even
voyeuristic” (Shove & Walker, 2007, p764), and that transitions research—along
with the related literature on Transitions Management, which not only analyses
sociotechnical change but proposes policy interventions aimed at steering it—is
haunted by an implicit but otherwise unacknowledged managerial agency which
is somehow supposedly ‘outside’ or ‘above’ the system it proposes to manage.
Furthermore, “important types and agents of change” (Shove & Walker, 2007, p768;
emphasis added) are conspicuous by their absence from the Transitions literature,
such as “rampant” rogue innovations that block off potential pathways of change,
the “trajectories of fossilisation and decay” caused by the abandonment and re-
dundancy of legacy systems, and “fundamental transformations in the the ordi-
nary routines of daily life” (Shove & Walker, 2007, p768). Much like Innovation
Diffusion, the a priori orientation of Transitions toward active interventions actively
precludes the objective understanding of sociotechnical change as a process.
Nonetheless, the MLP represents the current state of the art in technology-
centric theories of change, and therefore offers a point of departure for future
work. With that in mind, there follows a summary of three common critiques
of the MLP and the concept of transition, as generously compiled and partially
defended by its most enthusiastic proponent (Geels, 2011).
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of transition dynamics (from Geels, 2004)
Figure 2.2: Structural framework of the Multi-Layered Perspective (from Geels,
2004)
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Agency & Hierarchy This first objection contains two related criticisms: that the
MLP underplays the role of agency, and that its hierarchical strata would be better
replaced by what is known as a flat ontology—namely a model in which status
and agency are emergent from changing networks of relationships between actors,
rather than from arbitrary conceptual strata.
Geels (2011, p29) defends the MLP against the claim of underplaying agency
by arguing that agency is effectively embedded in the structural concepts of niche,
regime and landscape. While this is true, it addresses the letter of the critique
rather than its spirit: agency is undoubtedly present in the MLP, where constructs
such as “culture” and “markets” reconfigure their interrelationships amid a bliz-
zard of arrows that appear to co-conceptualise actors, technologies, learning pro-
cesses and influences as an undifferentiated flow of something happening (as in
Figure 2.1 on page 13)—but the bearers of agency are nowhere to be seen.
With regard to the critique that the MLP is overly hierarchical, Geels notes that
later iterations of the MLP have downplayed the necessity of a hierarchical rela-
tionship between niches, regimes and landscapes, which was originally intended
to indicate differing degrees of structural stability between the layers. Nonetheless,
it is hard to read the model (as shown in Figure 2.2 on page 13) as anything other
than hierarchical: a higher order of structure or stability remains a higher order,
even if one argues that “higher” structure or stability is not necessarily “better”.
These two critiques can be seen as two sides of the same coin: agency is un-
derplayed through its being embedded in (and thus obscured by) hierarchical
conceptual strata. This abnegation of agency plays out in the accounts generated
by MLP case-studies, wherein inventions and technologies propagate through a
loosely-defined landscape, competing to be the most rational and economically
viable option available. Choices are certainly being made in these accounts—but
who is making them? They are made off-stage by characters we never meet, and
as such the basis of those choices—which is to say, the rationale or motivation
behind the selection of one technology over another—remains unclear.
The problem is compounded by the absence of a teleology of technology use:
beyond an implicit assumption of something close to Rational Choice Theory, and
another implicit assumption that a good technology is one that people decide to
buy, the MLP has surprisingly little to say about why anyone would bother to de-
velop a new technology, nor why anyone might choose to take it up—both of which
are preconditions to its proliferation, and thus surely central to an understanding
of the dynamics of sociotechnical change.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 15
Placelessness & Holism Another related pair of criticisms of the MLP refer
to “the operationalization and specification of regimes”, and “the sociotechnical
landscape as a residual category” (see again Geels, 2011, p31, p36). To paraphrase,
the former critique focusses on the way in which the regime stratum is defined
(which is to say very loosely, particularly as regards distinguishing a regime from
a less specific system); the latter critique accuses the sociotechnical landscape stra-
tum of acting as “a ‘garbage can’ concept that accounts for many kinds of contex-
tual influences” (Geels, 2011, p36)—a convenient dumping-ground for messy and
unquantifiable influences or externalities, such as climate and demography.
Like those bundled under Agency & Hierarchy above, these critiques are also
engaged with the implicit hierarchical structure of the MLP, and with its insis-
tence on creating abstract categories with which to think through the process of
sociotechnical change. But there are two other aspects to these critiques worthy of
closer consideration, namely placelessness and holism.
The root of the critique of placelessness can be found in the MLP’s reliance
on spatial metaphors—e.g. niche, regime, landscape—which give a false and self-
contradictory impression of a spatialised understanding of change dynamics. In-
terestingly, Geels’s (partial) abandonment of an explicit hierarchy for the strata in
response to this critique actually makes the problem more obvious:
“... most niches do not emerge within regimes, but often outside them
(although niche actors are usually aware of regime structures). While
the socio-technical landscape is an external context, the relation with
regimes (and niches) is not necessarily hierarchical...” (Geels, 2011,
p37-38)
In addition to the uncertainty as to whether a niche is “within” a regime or not, it
is unclear whether that “within” refers to a conceptual relationship, a geograph-
ical relationship, or some combination of the two; likewise, if the sociotechnical
landscape is “an external construct”, is the regime therefore conceptually internal
to it, or geographically internal, or some combination of the two? If a niche can
emerge “outside” a regime, how does it get “inside”? On what conceptual plane
is this movement taking place?
This is problematic because sociotechnical change is an inescapably spatial
phenomenon. But as indicated by the critiques in question, the ‘space’ in which
transition is played out is largely undefined in geographical terms: MLP-based
studies tend to be spatially bounded by nation-state (see e.g. Belz, 2004; Geels,
2005b; Verbong & Geels, 2007), which doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable when
the nation-state in question is Switzerland, but rather stretches credibility when
applied to the entirety of the United States of America.
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This is not to say that the MLP assumes a homogeneity of possibility with re-
gard to the adoption of a new technology; on the contrary, its hierarchical levels of
organisation represent an attempt to systematise and understand the heterogene-
ity of possibility. But it does so through spatial terms which remain largely unan-
chored in actual geographical space, and then only through the use of fuzzy and
contestable dichotomies (such as urban/rural, for instance). To discuss technology
usage across a nation as sizable and populous as the United States is geographi-
cally simplistic at best, as regardless of intentions it implies a broad similarity of
sociotechnical trajectory in every city at around the same time—which is barely
credible in the context of a federal nation of fifty distinct states, let alone in the
context of a nation whose geographically distributed inequalities are arguably its
defining socioeconomic feature.
Transitions are also loosely bounded in the temporal sense. Their origins are
fairly easily identified—simply locate and date the earliest prototypes of the tech-
nology in question—but their endings are vague, signalled only by the “domi-
nance” of said technology in the marketplace by comparison to those other options
which it has been assumed to supersede. For instance, Geels (2005b) marks the
USian transition from the horse-drawn carriage to the automobile as effectively
complete by 1930, but at no point quantifies that completion. Had all horse-drawn
carriages disappeared by that point? 90% of them? 75%? 51%? Where were the
first disappearances, and the last? Did the transition complete everywhere all at
once?∗ Given the analysis of transition tends to be bounded by the nation-state,
this is certainly implied, though perhaps not intentionally.
In summary, then, the critique of placelessness observes that, through its use of
spatial metaphors, the MLP actively obscures the actual geography of sociotech-
nical change, and in doing so, weakens it own explanatory and narrative powers
considerably.
The second critique in this bundle (which also applies to many theories and
frameworks other than the MLP) is that it mistakes holistic thinking for systemic
thinking. The distinction between a holistic approach and a systems approach is
well illustrated in Latour’s defence of James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis against
its misreading by earth systems scientist Toby Tyrell (Latour, 2017). In holistic
thought, as used by Tyrell, the constituent elements or actors of a system magically
combine to form an entity or actor of a higher order, which is implied to have
a separate and superior agency and teleology to those of the actors comprising
∗Geels argues convincingly that statistical approaches, such as aggregate logistical curves de-
scribing changing numbers of carriages and automobiles, would run the risk of obscuring the rea-
sons behind the dynamics; nonetheless, some verifiable quantification of the omega point would
make the overall concept of transition notably less sketchy.
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it. Latour reads Lovelock’s approach as being distinct from holism, as Lovelock’s
analysis steadfastly refuses to elevate the system conceptually above its constituent
actors: as Latour’s title puts it, Lovelock’s Gaia is not “a god of totality”. So when
Tyrell paraphrases Lovelock, describing Gaia as “the idea that life moderates the
global environment to make it more favourable to life”, Latour observes that:
“... Life is now written as if it were the agent lording over organisms,
much like the spirit floating over the water. Whereas in Lovelock, there
is nothing in the whole that is not in the parts—and this is precisely the
novelty of not adding a superior [analytical] level. Tyrell falls straight
into the trap, and imagines that Life acts as a Whole distinct from its
parts [... and] shifts unwittingly to a classical distinction between parts
and whole, borrowed straight out of social theories—which, in turn,
have borrowed them off the shelf from theology.” (Latour, 2017, p65)
The MLP makes a similar error in its creation of sociotechnical regimes and land-
scapes: like Tyrell’s “Life”, they’re somehow more than the sum of that of which
they are comprised, possessed of an organisational capacity or agency which acts
on behalf of its member-actors.
To be fair to the MLP, this is a very easy elision to enact, which is why it
is so commonplace. Language itself—producer and product of the subjectiv-
ity of consciousness—struggles to narrate systemic causality, because language
is haunted by the infrastructures of old hierarchies (as Latour points out above);
despite our best efforts, language cannot help but seek an alpha and an omega,
a cause and an effect, a winner and a loser. The MLP’s stated orientation toward
causal explanations merely compounds the difficulty, because causality and sys-
temicity are incompatible epistemologies: in contexts of complexity, then, causality
plays a role akin to a “god of the gaps”, an inexplicable agency invented out of
narrative necessity, and the MLP’s sociotechnical regime is the machina from which
that particular deus can emerge at the appropriate analytical moment.
This is a philosophical distinction, admittedly, but it has considerable relevance
to the study of sociotechnical change, which—just like earth systems science—
tends to perpetuate an oppositional relationship between organisms and their
environment. As Latour puts it, “on Lovelock’s earth, no one is any longer in
any position to ‘mould’ anybody else” (Latour, 2017, p67), while on Tyrell’s, “the
whole has been shifted onto another plane than the parts” (Latour, 2017, p72); in
its desperation to identify a ‘prime mover’ in the innovation narrative, the MLP
mirrors Tyrell’s strategy, and so shuts off the possibility of a truly systemic under-
standing of sociotechnical change.
18 2.1. Hindsight: studying historical change in infrastructures
Generic Reproduction This third critique combines another pair of related criti-
cisms of the MLP. The first of these refers to the MLP’s “bias in favour of bottom-up
change,” (Geels, 2011, p32) which at first blush would seem rather contradicted
by previously-discussed criticisms of its inherently hierarchical structure. The
substance of the critique, however, is that MLP approaches “tend unduly to em-
phasize processes of regime change which begin within niches and work up, at
the expense of those which directly address the various dimensions of the so-
ciotechnical regime or those which operate ‘downwards’ from general features of
the sociotechnical landscape” (Berkhout, Smith, & Stirling, 2004), which reads less
as a complaint about a bias toward bottom-up change, and more as a complaint
about a bias toward a particular and specific conceptualisation of sociotechnical
transition—toward a particular generic narrative of change, in other words.
Indeed, this bias is seen as a feature rather than a bug, as revealed in Geels’s
responses to another criticism, namely that the MLP offers little more to scholar-
ship on sociotechnical change than a heuristic device. Geels interprets this as a
dig at the presumed non-rigour of qualitative/interpretive frameworks in general,
which he rightly defends as being more useful than quantitative approaches to
such broad, multidimensional topics:
“Frameworks such as the MLP are not ‘truth machines’ that automati-
cally produce the right answers once the analyst has entered the data.
Instead, they are ‘heuristic devices’ that guide the analyst’s attention
to relevant questions and problems.” (Geels, 2011, p34)
This seems reasonable, but is rather contradicted when Geels goes on to explain
the MLP’s employment of “process theory” as its “explanatory style”: “process
theories do not explain variance in the dependent variable as ‘caused’ by inde-
pendent variables, but instead explain outcomes in terms of event sequences, and
the timing and conjunctures of event-chains” (Geels, 2011, p34). Hence is justified
the MLP’s use of “narrative explanation”—although, confusingly, Geels goes on to
claim that this is aimed at the production of “causal narratives”, which in light of
his earlier comments would seem to be a contradiction: if process theory doesn’t
profess to explain the causes of variance, it is unclear how it is nonetheless pro-
ducing causal narratives. Contradictions aside, however, the real problem emerges
when Geels states that in order “[t]o develop casual narratives, explanations there-
fore need to be guided by ‘heuristic devices’ such as conceptual frameworks that
specify a certain plot [...] the MLP provides such a plot for the study of transitions”
(Geels, 2011, p35, emphasis added).
To be clear, this project bears no principled objection to the use of heuristics.
The particularity of the problem is best illustrated by further embracing Geels’s
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literary metaphor of the plot: the MLP is, in effect, a generic story-form that re-
lies on pre-established permutations of certain archetypal characters, settings and
events. Much as with an airport thriller novel or superhero movie, you always end
up with the same basic arc of story: in the case of the MLP, that generic story is
known as “transition”, and it follows the journey of a hopeful young innovation
on its adventures through the sociotechnical landscape, struggling against the in-
cumbent regime until it finally achieves the “market dominance” which was its
destiny and birthright.∗
That’s not to say that the generic transition plot doesn’t ever play out pretty
much as specified by the MLP—transitions of this type can certainly be identified
(although the spatiotemporal looseness of the transition concept means that it
can be drawn in such a way as to maximise the chance of proving itself correct).
The problem is the assumption that all transitions must follow a variant of this
standard plot; a related critique of the MLP highlights its inability (or perhaps
just its unwillingness) to deal with stories of innovation and change which don’t
follow a heroic arc, and in particular stories of the decline, suppression or failure
of innovations (Shove & Walker, 2007).
Systems and network theory
The Transitions literature, much like the majority of the approaches discussed
thus far, draws to some degree on network theory for its explanatory power. Orig-
inally a spur of graph theory, which is in turn descended from systems-theoretical
approaches, network theory is foundational to disciplines such as information sci-
ence and communication studies, but it is first and foremost a method for the
abstraction and depiction of complex systems (Newman, 2010). As is also true
for systems theory and the principles of cybernetics, the dominant role of network
theory in infrastructural research is in the building and optimisation of model sys-
tems, be they communications networks (Shakkottai & Srikant, 2008), transport
networks (Caramia & Dell’Olmo, 2008; Marinov & Viegas, 2011) or even multi-
system networks (Varga et al., 2014)—for solutions-oriented short-term planning,
in other words. But if a rigorously quantitative application of network theoretical
principles can produce successful predictive models of complex systems over the
short term, it is implicit that a more abstracted and qualitative understanding of
those same principles should be able to contribute to a description of the dynamics
of sociotechnical change over the longer term. Indeed, this is why concepts from
∗The similarities between the MLP’s account of an innovation’s rise to market maturity and the
so-called Hero’s Journey, the archetypal story-form first identified by Joseph Campbell and relent-
lessly exploited by lazy writers ever since, certainly bear note; the dominance and phallocentrism of
the Hero’s Journey in technoscience is dealt with at length in Haraway (2016a).
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network theory tend to be invoked within innovation narratives—but they are de-
ployed in a rather shallow fashion, most often in the form of a brief genuflection
toward the notional influence of “network effects” (see e.g. Markard & Truffer,
2008, p597), which has become a sort of shorthand or euphemism for the delib-
erate and directed diffusion sought by Rogers and his disciples (see section 2.1.1
above): another “god of the gaps” concept whose offhand invocation supposedly
explains the uptake (or otherwise) of some novelty or another.
To be clear, network effects are very real phenomena, and of great relevance
to infrastructural matters—for while the definition of the term “infrastructure” is
contentious, it’s plain to see that the vast majority of the systems we tag with
that label are networks (Raven, 2017a), which we might therefore expect to behave
largely as described by the theory of the same name. But the relationships between
the various phenomena bundled under the term “network effects” and such quali-
ties of a network as its density and topology (which is to say, its spatial distribution
and connectivity, among other parameters) is subtle and contingent: network ef-
fects are ubiquitous to networks, but their actual expression is always a function
of the topology of the network in that particular location. Or, more prosaically:
while there are general rules or laws of network behaviour, individual networks
(and subnetworks) work differently according to how they’re connected—which
means that looking closely at the spatial distribution and connectivity of networks
may offer another useful parameter for the analysis of sociotechnical change in the
long term.
Complexity theory
Before returning to the topic of spatial network topology, however, the concept and
discipline of complexity bears some exploration. Defining complexity (and/or the
complex systems which definitionally exhibit complexity) is inherently paradoxi-
cal, given the term refers to an essential property of unpredictability, and picking
through the debates that characterise the early years of this (still young) discipline
are well beyond the scope of this project. However, for our purposes here, the
following definition of complexity theory is as good as any other available:
“...one might proceed to define complexity theory tentatively as the
study of non-linear phenomena and bottom-up processes of emergent
self-organisation. Non-linear phenomena or systems are those that do
not display proportionality between input and output and in which
small influences can result in large effects.” (Bousquet, 2012)
Two conceptual phenomena are considered characteristic of complex systems,
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namely self-organisation and emergence:
“Self-organisation is the process by which the autonomous interaction
of individual entities results in the bottom-up emergence of complex
systems, systems composed of many parts that are coupled in a non-
linear fashion. Here the notion of network is vital to describe the pat-
terns of interaction that are constituted by the interplay of entities in
a complex system [...] A key related concept is that of emergence,
the process by which complex structures form on the basis of simple
rules.” (Bousquet, 2012)
It has been axiomatic in complexity scholarship that complex systems, particu-
larly those which are “radically open and contextualised”, are in effect impossible
to successfully model using agent-based simulations; “radically open” systems
are those where the analytical partition between the system and its “ambience” is
impossible to sustain, while a contextualised system exhibits the following prop-
erties: “[it] includes one or more elements that also occur in a different system(s),
or [...] it is itself a shared element between more than one system [...and in] this
other system(s) the shared elements take part in causal processes different from
those included in the original system” (Chu, Strand, & Fjelland, 2003). Much like
the complex ecosystems with which these discussions were initially concerned,
large sociotechnical systems—due to their reciprocal embeddedness with human
societies, and with other sociotechnical systems—would thus seem to be beyond
the possibility of being modelled.
However, that hasn’t stopped people from trying, encouraged in no small part
by the undeniably spectacular advances in computing power since complexity
emerged as a discipline in the 1990s. The result is a highly reductionist and quan-
titative computational approach to complexity, whereby vast statistical aggregates
of individual behaviours are revealed to follow “simple reproducible patterns”
(see e.g. Gonzalez, Hidalgo, & Barabasi, 2008, wherein the journeys of hundreds
of thousands of people are analysed by reference to their cell-phone location data).
It is not for this project to attempt to gainsay the findings of physics and mathemat-
ics, but to observe that this sort of reductionism reveals its “simple reproducible
patterns” at the expense of the agency, meanings and motivations of hundreds
of thousands of people; the modellers have constructed a “closed” system, but in
order to do so they had to shut out the social context (or “ambience”) entirely.
This paradigm has come to a sort of fruition in the last decade or so, with
Barabási (2011) announcing that irreducible complexity is in fact steadily giving
way to network science in the age of “Big Data”:
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“Computer science, fuelled by its poster progenies, such as Google or
Facebook, is mounting a successful attack on complexity, fuelled by the
conviction that a sufficiently fast algorithm can tackle any problem, no
matter how complex.” (Barabási, 2011)
While it may well transpire that “a sufficiently fast algorithm can tackle any
problem”, the question of whether the “solution” so provided will take any ac-
count of such fuzzy and hard-to-quantify notions such as social justice or human
values is left unasked—not, to be clear, due to any conspiratorial malice on the part
of network scientists, but as a result of the inevitable externalisation of unquan-
tifiable social factors from the models they favour. The ethics of these data-driven
epistemologies are increasingly subject to question (see e.g. Hauer, 2018; Mittel-
stadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, & Floridi, 2016), but in the context of this project
the real issue with the computer-scientific approach to complexity is its relentless
reduction and/or exclusion of social factors, which are precisely what this project
seeks to explore. Throwing ever more computing power at the challenge will not
bring “the social” back in, but push it still further to the margins.
Complexity more broadly has many valuable pointers for the would-be scholar
of sociotechnical change, however. For instance, Tainter (2006) takes a highly ab-
stract view of complexity at the historical-civilisational scale, and frames it as an
economic argument:
“Complexity can be viewed as an economic function. Societies and
institutions invest in problem solving, undertaking costs and expect-
ing benefits in return. In any system of problem solving, early efforts
tend to be simple and cost-effective. That is, they work and give high
returns per unit of effort. [...] As the highest-return ways to produce
resources, process information, and organize society are applied, con-
tinuing problems must be addressed in ways that are more costly and
less cost-effective. As the costs of solving problems grow, the point is reached
where further investments in complexity do not give a proportionate return.
[...] A prolonged period of diminishing returns to complexity is a ma-
jor part of what makes problem solving ineffective and societies or
institutions unsustainable.” (Tainter, 2006, emphasis added)
The difficulty here is that the problem-solving done with the aim of addressing
the consequences of complexity also serve to make the overall system yet more
complex:
“Efforts at problem solving, as seen in the examples of producing re-
sources and producing information, commonly evolve along a path
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of increasing complexity, higher costs, and declining marginal returns.
Ultimately the problem solving effort may grow so cumbersome, costly,
and ineffective that it is either terminated, collapses, or requires large
subsidies.” (Tainter, 2006)
If we view infrastructural systems as a “solution” to the complex socioeco-
nomic problem of resource distribution, Tainter’s argument suggests that suc-
cessive additions to the “stack” of systems deployed to this end will be ever
more expensive, ineffective in proportion to their expense, and difficult to de-
ploy; furthermore, they represent seemingly exponential increases of complexity
in a system-of-systems which is already extremely complex and interconnected.
Among Tainter’s set of seven “lessons” regarding sustainability, the fourth is as
follows:
“Complexity in problem solving does its damage subtly, unpredictably,
and cumulatively over the long term. Sustainability must therefore be a
historical science.” (Tainter, 2006, emphasis added)
Given that sociotechnical change can be seen as a paradigmatic mode of problem-
solving in developed societies (and that the evolution of freight distribution sys-
tems can thus be seen as an accumulation of path-dependent sociotechnical solu-
tions to the problem of resource distribution) it follows that, like Tainter’s concep-
tion of sustainability science, any study of sociotechnical change must necessarily
also be a historical project, particularly if it is intended to support and inform
transitions toward more environmentally sustainable reconfigurations.∗
Tainter’s theme is taken up in Urry (2016), wherein the author argues that
complexity theory reveals the old social-scientific distinction between “the natural
and social [aspects of] time” to be illusory, and “emphasises the importance of his-
tory, time and emergence”, the latter of which “stems from interactions between
people and the environment, humans being indissolubly part of nature” (Urry,
2016, p67). Urry also synthesizes numerous studies of networks, including those
of Barabási (mentioned above), observing that most actual social networks (the
relationships between human actors, rather than the commercial internet-based
communication services which are referred to by the same name) follow a Gaus-
sian distribution which is distinctly egalitarian by comparison to the “power law”
∗This argument is made in greater detail in an earlier paper by Tainter: “We have today a
great advantage over the societies of the past-and not just in our technical abilities. Our knowledge
gives us the opportunity to become the first people in history to understand the phenomenon of
evolving complexity, and to learn where we are in this process. [...] An important part of research
into sustainability must therefore be historical research to refine our understanding of our position
today in a system of evolving complexity.” (Tainter, 1995)
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distribution of connectivity observed in networks of websites, wherein a few “ex-
ceptionally well-connected hubs” dominate; this “aristocratic order” is reflected
in complex networked sociotechnical systems such as the global financial system,
from (or rather between) which “innovations” tend to emerge (Urry, 2016, p70).
As shall be shown, contemporary research projects with an infrastructural fo-
cus tend to see complexity and inter-systemic interdependence as an opportunity
to be exploited, but Urry shows this position to be, at best, rather optimistic and
one-sided. As Tainter’s work (discussed above) shows, complexity is indeed a
pathway for problem-solving, but it’s a path of diminishing returns that even-
tually ends in a cliff-edge: relying on emergence is a risky strategy, as a close
reading of complexity theory shows that “systems are dynamic, processual and
unpredictable”, and “emphasize[s] the importance of positive feedbacks that move
systems away from equilibrium [...] while systems can be stabilised for long pe-
riods through ’lock-ins’, certain small causes can prompt or tip the emergence of
new ’paths”’ (Urry, 2016, p59). This phenomenon of “metastability” is strongly
(though not exclusively) social in its origins, and contributes to what we might
characterise as the obduracy of sociotechnical systems (which is, of course, merely
the negative framing of what in other circumstances is described as resilience):
“Such lock-ins mean that the ’surrounding’ social institutions mat-
ter a great deal in how systems develop over the long term, once
they have been set onto a particular path [...] Systems can endure
even though there are strong forces that ’should’ undermine their irre-
versible, locked-in character.” (Urry, 2016, p60)
Again, this is not to gainsay those who see complexity as providing potential
opportunities for transformative change; it is rather to point out that the nature of
the change that results is inherently resistant to forecasting or prediction, and that
while positive feedback may indeed foster the rapid diffusion of new practices, the
change that ends up diffusing may not always be the practices that are supported
and nurtured by “change agents” or “transition managers”—who, despite their
epistemological assumptions to the contrary, are very much subject to (and cogs
captive within) the very systems which they claim to observe and intervene in from
an objective external point-of-view. Furthermore, even in such circumstances as
herding behaviour is successfully transformative in the short term, it “magnifies
the the probability of system failure” (Urry, 2016, p62), as could be observed in the
global financial collapse of 2008: because of the tightly coupled nature of modern
systems-of-systems, such errors propagate too quickly to be corrected. “These
complexity effects mean that one cannot read off, predict or produce a clear and
Chapter 2. Literature Review 25
knowable account of the future” (Urry, 2016, p63); models and algorithms can only
ever extrapolate an approximation of the future in which no serious discontinuity
disrupts the assumptions embedded in them.
Turning his attention to the role of complexity in “innovation”, Urry observes
that “it is not a foregone conclusion that the best innovation will be the one that
ultimately shapes the future. Innovation involves processes that are different from
the the linear notions often spoken about and promoted by policy-makers [...
namely] a top-down process developed and implemented by hierarchical actors”
(Urry, 2016, p74). On the contrary, the emergence of a new systemic configuration
“involves the co-evolution of numerous interrelated elements; there are changes in
both demand and supply sides; many agents are involved; long-term processes oc-
cur over decades; and the innovation is not caused by a single ’policy’ or ’object’...”
(Urry, 2016, p74). Urry concludes that “t[h]is combinatory character of innovation
makes it hard to say exactly when an innovation process begins” (Urry, 2016, p75),
but this could also be interpreted more ambitiously as evidence that “innovation”
is in fact merely an artefact of an analytical attempt to tie down to one particular
place and time (or object, or actor) an always-ongoing process which is in fact
an emergent property of complex systems, and thus distributed (albeit unevenly)
throughout the timespace of said systems. While serving to destabilise not only
the innovation concept but also the notion of “transition” (see earlier in this chap-
ter), this further underlines the necessity for the study of sociotechnical change
to be historical and geographical in nature: to have any hope of understanding
where and when change might manifest in the future, it is necessary to first un-
derstand where and when it manifested in the past, as the obdurate systems of
the status quo were slowly taking shape.
Finally, Urry notes the sometimes surprising system-transformative effects pro-
duced by what initially seem to be very minor or “small” technologies. He cites
as an example the stirrup, whose invention was a necessary prerequisite to first
the success of the Jin dynasty of China, and subsequently the global propagation
of military systems based on cavalry, and of societies wherein equestrian mobility
was the primary mode of non-pedestrian transportation; “[t]his dependency upon
small technologies shows the power of mundane objects in future system change.”
(Urry, 2016, p82-3)
Spatial network science
Network theory and graph theory are by their very nature abstract analytical ap-
proaches, and even when applied to the study of actually-existing systems there
is a tendency to limit the analysis to the pure realm of statistics. But actually-
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existing systems and networks are not purely abstract statistical phenomena: they
have a concrete existence in space and time, which is to say that their topology
has a geography (and also, as such, a sociology). In recent years, the “spatial
sciences”—which is to say, the more quantitative wing of geography, physical
and human—have taken steps to integrate network science into their discipline.
Barthélemy (2011) makes the argument that infrastructural systems (among other
forms of complex network) “are all examples where space is relevant and where
topology alone does not contain all the information”, but nonetheless sticks to the
mathematical modelling paradigm so as to focus on quantitative questions, such
as identifying the “shortest route” between any two nodes in a large network,
for instance; this bias can be seen throughout the analysis in Ducruet and Beau-
guitte (2014) of an evolving relationship between network science and the spatial
sciences, which has proved fruitful for both sides.
However, it is nonetheless apparent that when it comes to network-theoretical
and graph-theoretical approaches, one either studies concrete networks of infras-
tructure(s) as objects in their own right, or one studies social interactions as net-
worked phenomena; no one seems to be using such approaches for analysing the
interaction of social agents with infrastructures as a unified object of study. This
isn’t entirely surprising, given the sorts of behaviours and interactions that under-
pin sociotechnical change are subtle, multi-factoral and highly resistant (and/or
of little interest) to quantitative analytics; while it may turn out to be possible
to quantify and model such sociotechnical phenomena (frameworks for such a
project have been suggested, such as that found in Tsiotas & Polyzos, 2018, but
the resulting model-of-the-model is a significantly and dauntingly complex net-
work in its own right), any such approach will unavoidably provide a supply-side
perspective informed by economic understandings of behaviour, due to the episte-
mological assumptions embedded in the disciplines involved in developing them.
By way of example, Cats (2017) describes a longitudinal investigation of spatial
network topology in a railway system, and reveals some interesting dynamics
(such as periodicities of development that correlate to planning interventions in
the wider urban fabric), but it cannot tell us anything about how “densification”
and other such network phenomena affect (and are in turn affected by) the day
to day behaviours of citizens except in strictly quantitative terms (e.g number of
journeys taken, miles travelled etc.).
Such system-level findings are valuable, of course, but they get us no closer to
the question of how sociotechnical change actually happens as a result of people
doing things; to invert a very old aphorism, they can’t see the trees for the forest.
Which is not to say that we don’t need to understand the forest (the supply-
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side perspective); quite to the contrary. But we need to understand the trees (the
demand-side perspective) as well—and to do that, we must turn to more people-
centric approaches to the study of sociotechnical change.
2.1.2 People-centric approaches
What have heretofore been called people-centric approaches to the study of tech-
nological change might be more properly called anthropologies; they give equal
weight to the social and technical dimensions of the systems under study, whereas
the methodologies outlined above have a demonstrable tendency to privilege the
technical over the social.
Two of these theoretical frameworks or positions—namely Actor-Network The-
ory and Cyborg Anthropology—are associated with the rather broad discipline
of Science & Technology Studies; the third, Social Practice Theory, shares many
assumptions with the other two, but leavens their insistence on a flat ontology
through its focussing on the site of action as the starting point of analysis. All
three can be seen as the qualitative and counter-hierarchical equalivalents to the
network-theoretical approaches already discussed.
Science & Technology Studies
Actor-Network Theory and “sociologies of translation” Primarily concerned
with “the mechanics of power” (Law, 1992, p380), A-NT is intended as a frame-
work through which the world might be studied as “a series of interactions and ne-
gotiations, differences, chains of translation, trials of strength and compromises”
(Dolwick, 2009, p39). A-NT explicitly places individuals and institutions on an
equal footing alongside objects and knowledges, and attempts to trace the net-
work(s) of interactions between them. According to (Callon, 1990, p134), agency
inheres in the interactions between actors, rather than in the actors—human or
otherwise—themselves. As such, A-NT’s approach to innovation or change is to
produce a narrative account of “how actors become interconnected, or [...] fall
apart and become disconnected” (Dolwick, 2009, p39).
Latour’s study of a failed Parisian personal rapid transit project (Latour &
Porter, 1996) is arguably the canonical example of A-NT in an infrastructural con-
text, wherein he observes that the realisation of such a project depends on its
ability to “recruit new allies and at the same time make sure that their recruitment
is assured” (Latour & Porter, 1996, p71); these acts of recruitment are referred to as
“enrolment”, and are achieved by the deployment of intermediaries: texts, speech
acts or media “sent out” into the world and empowered to act on the network’s
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behalf. The process is far from automatic: some entities may resist enrolment, or
seek interactions with alternative actors (Callon, 2007, p71). However, dominant
or powerfully-placed actors can reduce the likelihood of their enrolment attempts
being rejected by engaging in a process of centering-through-translation, or “es-
tablishing themselves an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships
they [are] building” (Callon, 2007, p69). In this manner, agency accretes more
around certain central nodes in the network—actors who are able to reformulate
the interests of other actors in a way that insists they be enrolled if they wish to
achieve their own goals; in other words, it is the actor or node “who is able to
translate others’ interests into his own language [who] carries the day” (Latour,
1983, p144).
When this centering-through-translation is successful, the network “can be as-
similated to a black box whose behaviour is known and predicted independently
of its context” (Law, 1992, p152); having achieved this unity of action, the network
effectively disappears from view, “to be replaced by the action itself and the seem-
ingly simple author of that action” (Law, 1992, p385). So, phrased another way,
A-NT is a tool for prising open black boxes and studying their inner workings; per
(Jolivet & Heiskanen, 2010, p6748), A-NT is ideally suited to exploring “the kind
of hybrid problems that we encounter today in an increasingly connected world
where the global and local, the human and the technical, interact constantly”.
Some critics, such as Amsterdamska (1990), have accused A-NT’s accounts of
being description rather than analysis, and lament A-NT’s dissipation of causal
agency and flows of power across the network; enthusiasts for the theory would
counter that the distinction between description and analysis is highly contested,
and that A-NT’s dissipation of agency and power across networks of actors is what
makes it so useful. Graham and Marvin concur, drawing on Latour’s theories to
describe infrastructure networks as “vast collectivities of social and technical ac-
tors blended together as sociotechnical hybrids that support the construction of
multiple materialities and space-times” (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p185), noting
that constant work is required to maintain such complex arrays of social and tech-
nical actors over long distances, and that A-NT “undermines the notion that we
can simply and unproblematically generalise a single ‘thing’ called an infrastruc-
ture network” any more than we can do the same for a city (Graham & Marvin,
2001, p186). They observe also that A-NT dissolves one more dichotomy specific
to infrastructure networks, namely that between the global and the local: a given
network is not bigger than another, only “longer and more intensely connected”,
and “[i]n this sense a network must always remain continuously local, as it in-
evitably touches down in particular places” (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p189).
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Cyborg Anthropology Cyborg Anthropology is an anthropological approach
which emerged from the feminist writings of Donna J Haraway, with her Cyborg
Manifesto (Haraway, 1991) considered to be the founding text. Haraway positions
the Cyborg Manifesto as “an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism
and materialism”, in which the cyborg is the central figure of faith; a cyborg is “a
cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality
as well as a creature of fiction” (Haraway, 1991, p149). Haraway uses the metaphor
of the cyborg to construct a collective subjectivity for the body as suspended in
the global web of technoscientific production.
The central idea is that contemporary humans are all cyborgs, in a fundamental
way: the organic basis of our body is surrounded, supported and interpenetrated
by the networks and systems of technoscience. Cyborg anthropology is distin-
guished from broader anthropological practice by this ontological position, rather
than by any methodological differences. Much cyborg anthropology, in keeping
with its parent field of Science & Technology Studies, has specialised in looking
at medical technologies, and the way in which they (re/de)construct their subjects
(see e.g. Dumit, 1997; Rapp, 1997).
While there are no studies of infrastructural change specifically informed by
cyborg anthropology, there is a significant current in urban political ecology that
uses Haraway’s cyborg as a way to talk about cities as systems-of-systems. This
tradition begins with Swyngedouw’s argument for the city-as-hybrid, wherein he
states his desire to narrate “the city in a cup of water”:
“The rhizome of underground and surface water flows, of streams,
pipes and veins that come together in urban water gushing from the
stand-pipe is a powerful metaphor for the socio-ecological processes
that produce the city and become embodied in city life.” (Swynge-
douw, 1996, p66-7)
Further publications have stayed close to the question of urban water provision
(e.g. Swyngedouw, 2006; Swyngedouw, Kaika, & Castro, 2002), while others have
moved more toward a more general interpretation of the city as system-of-systems
(e.g. Gandy, 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), but such studies tend rather toward
the theoretical and the conceptual. However, Haraway has provided supplemen-
tary methodological advice which seems particularly pertinent to the more empir-
ical study of infrastructural change, namely her advocacy of situated knowledges:
“Situated knowledges are about communities, not about isolated indi-
viduals. [...] The science question in feminism is about objectivity as
positioned rationality. Its images are not the products of escape and
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the transcendence of limits (the view from above) but the joining of
partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that
promises a vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living
within limits and contradictions—of views of somewhere.” (Haraway,
1988, p590)
The “view from above” Haraway mentions—which she also calls “the god trick”—
is the voyeuristic and managerial perspective previously identified in the Tran-
sitions literature: it is a doubling down on placelessness, whereby not only is
the “transition manager” or “change agent” granted an omniscient objective out-
sider’s perspective on the system under study, but the situatedness of the system
itself—its position in geographical space, for starters, but also its position in geo-
graphical space in relation to other actors—is largely overlooked, also (such as with
the MLP’s geographically incoherent treatment of the American transition from
horse-drawn buggies to automobiles, described above). Haraway’s insistence on
situatedness and “positioned rationality” can be seen as a reiteration of the way
in which Graham and Marvin claim that A-NT is able to reconcile the local with
the systemic (see above), and suggests that grounding studies on infrastructural
change in specific sites may, counterintuitively, be the best route toward gener-
alisable conclusions: as she says, “[t]he only way to find a larger vision is to be
somewhere in particular” (Haraway, 1988, p590).
Social Practice Theory
Social Practice Theory is a comparatively young social theory rooted, much like
A-NT, in a flat ontology—which is to say that it admits of no hierarchical strata in
its model of behaviour. It is distinguished from other social theories by its focus on
practices as the unit of analysis. There are various aspects to the conceptualisation
of practices, some of which are contested, but there are two stable and broadly
accepted elements which are of particular relevance to this project.
Aspects of the practice: beyond Rational Choice The first relevant element is
behavioural. Staunch advocates of SPT such as Shove (2010) have argued that
dominant models of sociotechnical change, particularly the MLP, are rooted in
crude and discredited models of human behaviour (such as so-called Rational
Choice Theory), and that SPT can provide a superior model which addresses these
shortcomings. A popular formulation of such a model presents the practice as an
essentially tripartite entity, comprising a combination of meanings, competencies and
materials—or, more simplistically, the model argues that the things people do are a
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function of their abilities to do them, their reasons for doing them, and the things
with which they work to get them done (Spurling, McMeekin, Southerton, Shove,
& Welch, 2013).
Again, this conceptualisation of action and change is not dissimilar to that
which informs A-NT and Cyborg Anthropology, in that action is seen as emerging
from networks of actors, whether human, non-human or hybrid. But the concept
of the practice provides what we might describe as a manageable front-end heuris-
tic through which the complexity of networks might be entered and explored: in
short, the concept of the practice gives the analyst a clear site at the human scale
from which to begin the process of tracing connections and relationships.
SPT has come under fire for what seems to some to be a fetish for paying at-
tention to the small, the mundane and the domestic (see e.g. Geels, 2011), but it is
notable that this granular demand-side perspective successfully does without the
plethora of hierarchical strata and imaginary entities that populate so-called “mid-
level” theories such as the MLP. And in avoiding such clutter by approaching the
practice directly and working outward from there, SPT offers the possibility of a
deeper understanding of the human desires and decisions that result in sociotech-
nical change.
Aspects of the practice: entity / performance The second important element
of the practice concept is the distinction between the practice-as-entity and the
practice-as-performance, which is not a simple either/or. Paraphrasing the theo-
rist Ted Schatzki, it is explained in Shove, Watson, Hand, and Ingram (2007) that
the practice-as-entity can be considered as a sort of constellation of all the mean-
ings, competencies and materials which are, were or might yet be associated with
the fulfilment of a particular teleological goal, while the practice-as-performance
is:
“[...] the active process of doing through which a practice-as-entity is
sustained, reproduced and potentially changed. A practice-as-entity
has a relatively enduring existence across actual and potential per-
formances, yet its existence depends upon recurrent performance by
real-life practitioners. Accordingly, practices cannot be reduced to just
what people do. Equally there is no such thing as ‘just’ doing. Instead,
doings are performances, shaped by and constitutive of the complex re-
lations—of materials, knowledges, norms, meanings and so on—which
comprise the practice-as-entity.” (Shove et al., 2007, p13)
As such, were one engaged in analysing practices of personal hygiene, for exam-
ple, the practice-as-entity would comprise all the possible ways of washing oneself,
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all the possible reasons to wash oneself (or not), and all the material things which
might be used in the course of washing oneself. Specific performances of the prac-
tice of personal hygiene, however, are therefore comprised of a specific sub-set
of the elements comprising the entity, due to the unique contextual and individ-
ual circumstances in which any given practice takes place: there are thousands of
ways to wash in the practice-as-entity, but in a specific performance, this person
washes in this way using these things for these reasons.
For this project, which is concerned with the legibility of infrastructure, the
utility of SPT lies in its engagement with obduracy and path-dependency not as
goals to be sought, but as emergent systemic phenomena to be understood. For
example, in a canonical analysis Shove (2004, p101-116) shows how contemporary
trends in bathroom design and furnishing are normalising or ‘locking in’ a daily
showering practice while ‘locking out’ the practice of taking baths less regularly,
which—when scaled up across regional populations—results in changed patterns
of demand on water infrastructures. Let us consider [daily showers] and [non-daily
baths] as two potential performances of the personal hygiene practice-as-entity: we
can see that not only do we have a model of sociotechnical change wherein the
teleological goal of the practice-as-entity (getting clean) which is currently being
fulfilled by one particular practice-as-performance (daily showers) might instead
be fulfilled by another performance consisting of a different set of elements en-
tirely (non-daily baths), but we also have a model of sociotechnical change which
explicitly connects people and the things they do to the technological systems with
which they do them, and (crucially) vice versa.
Indeed, many other consumptive behaviours—which is to say everyday prac-
tices which draw or otherwise rely upon the provident capacities of infrastructures—
have been studied through the lens of SPT (see e.g. Watson, 2012, transportation
practices; Browne, Pullinger, Medd, & Anderson, 2014, domestic water-consuming
practices; Gram-Hanssen, 2010, energy consumption in domestic devices with a
stand-by mode; see Spaargaren, 2011 and Sahakian & Wilhite, 2014 for applica-
tions to the more broad notion of “sustainable consumption”). This suggests that
SPT’s explicitly materialist demand-side focus is the best available counter to the
supply-side holism of dominant models of sociotechnical change.
2.2 Foresight: speculating on future change in infrastruc-
tures
The preceding sections of this chapter have explored a variety of approaches to the
analysis of sociotechnical change occuring in the past and/or the present. In this
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section, we turn to the question of analysing and exploring potential sociotechnical
change in the future—change which has yet to (and might never) happen, in other
words, meaning that any such analysis is inherently speculative.
It first bears noting that civil engineers and planners have many established
techniques for analysing and assessing newly proposed infrastructure projects:
predominantly (and understandably) quantitative, they include the Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment (see Glasson and Therivel 2013 for an introduction to EIA,
and Morgan 2012 for a critical assessment of its utility) and Cost-Benefit Analysis
(see Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, and Weimer 2017 for an overview of CBA in
practice, and Masur and Posner 2011 on the limitations of CBA, particularly with
regard to political questions and "contested normative issues"). These processes
are concerned primarily with the viability of the proposal as an engineering project
(and, more often than not, as an investment vehicle). They are also important and
necessary—but they are nonetheless insufficient for a full exploratory assessment
of a future infrastructure. For while quantitative models of this sort can speak
clearly to the feasibility of the project, they cannot speak to its plausibility—which is
to say that quantitative studies can tell you whether a thing might be buildable, but
it cannot tell you what might nonetheless impede or prevent you from building it;
all externalities remain resolutely externalised. Furthermore, quantitative models
routinely submerge the assumptions and heuristics which inform their outputs
beneath a veneer of mathematical objectivity which is largely unearned (Porter,
1992). As such, while it would be foolish to suggest that quantitative planning
and assessment techniques are useless or irrelevant, it nonetheless seems clear
that they cannot provide an accessible, human perspective on their subjects; more
qualitative and imaginative approaches are necessary. (Some exemplary contem-
porary projects concerned with infrastructure futures will be explored in greater
detail at the end of this section.)
This is not to claim that there is a dearth of infrastructural visions, however.
To the contrary, such visions are proliferating, whether they originate from gov-
ernments (such as the leaflet campaign, ongoing at time of writing, promoting the
HS2 rail project in the UK), consultancies and corporations (whose current pre-
ferred genre is the “smart city” prospectus website—in spite of, or perhaps due
to, the nigh-complete lack of a rigorous definition of that concept in the academy
or elsewhere; see e.g. Cavada, Hunt, and Rogers 2014), or indeed from hotshot
entrepreneurs with little expertise or knowledge about infrastructure, but rather
more familiarity with the speculative marketing strategies of venture-funded tech-
nology start-ups. Sometimes derided as “infrastructure fictions” (Raven, 2013), the
sine qua non of the genre is surely tech billionaire Elon Musk’s much mocked (but
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nonetheless popular) Hyperloop mass-transit concept, which hand-waves away
the political practicalities (and an assortment of problematic laws of physics) with
all the blithe facility of a science fiction author (R. Bradley, 2016). However, less ob-
viously crazy examples, such as a Chinese project based around a traffic-straddling
super-bus concept, are smaller in profile, more commonplace, and more successful
at attracting inward investment—if frequently unsuccessful at delivering on their
promises; the Chinese super-bus project collapsed, revealing what appears to be
an investment scam; see Hincks (2017). Such infrastructural visions can be useful,
but the genre tends toward blithe assumptions, quick estimates, and an almost
total lack of reflexivity or critical thinking. They are speculative pitch documents,
trial balloons—raw bait for the investment sharkpool. They are adverts, first and
foremost—and it is exactly these uncritical (if not outright deceitful) narratives of
infrastructural futurity which must be pushed back against.
2.2.1 Futures and scenarios
When it comes to more systematic approaches to to infrastructural foresight, the
majority of established techniques and frameworks for medium- to long-term
planning fall under the broad disciplinary umbrella of futures studies (see Brad-
field, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & Van Der Heijden, 2005). This field grew out of
the post-ww2 “operational research” paradigm founded by the RAND Corpora-
tion, and as Yanow (1993) has shown, futures studies in general retains many of
the positivist and managerial epistemologies intrinsic to the Pentagon’s particular
take on systems theory; furthermore, the field remains sorely undertheorised in
academic terms (Curry, 2013), which reflects its bias toward the needs of consul-
tant practitioners. Which is to say that futures studies is predominantly oriented
toward using closed-system models to support the development of business strate-
gies, meaning that it is a poor fit with the multi-systemic, open-system challenges
of infrastructural deployment; there is a mismatch not only of scale (the average
infrastructural system outscales the average firm by several orders of magnitude
as regards complexity), but also of teleology, of purpose. That said, the tools of
futures studies are increasingly being brought to bear at the infrastructural scale,
whether working with existing systems (Elliott, 2000, renewable energy; Lake &
Bond, 2007, water) or more nakedly speculative assemblages (e.g. McDowall &
Eames, 2006, “the hydrogen economy”), as the need for strategic thinking at an
existential level becomes increasingly apparent.
Among the most popular futures methodologies is scenario-building (Lind-
gren & Bandhold, 2003), a process wherein a number of potential future situations
(known as scenarios) are developed in order to support strategic decision-making
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in under uncertainty. In the echt application of the method, one creates a 2x2
matrix based on two axes which represnt the entanglement of two potentially di-
vergent contextual trends, which in turn is used to generate a suite of four futures,
each of which has different contextual circumstances; one quadrant (typically the
upper right) comes to represent the organisation’s “preferred future”, and the oth-
ers represent futures best avoided if at all possible, an the exercise serves to point
the way ahead for the client (which, particularly in consulting contexts, is tanta-
mount to endorsing strategic choices which have already been made, but which
lack justification or a mandate among the workforce or shareholders). In other
words, scenario development tends to be a highly normative practice, designed
to pick winners ahead of time (or to “predict” them, which amounts to the same
thing).
2.2.2 No maps for these territories: back-casting
Scenario generation processes are sometimes combined with a technique known
as “back-casting”, a name chosen for its deliberate contrast with “forecasting”.
In their survey of scenario development techniques, Bishop, Hines, and Collins
(2007) characterise back-casting as being conceived as an antidote to conceptual
“baggage” which “limits creativity and might create futures that are too safe, not
as bold as the actual future turns out to be”; to counter this perceived risk, back-
casting directs the practitioner(s):
“... to leap out into the future, jab a stake in the ground, and then
work backward on how we might get there. The first step then is
to envision a future state at the time horizon. It can be plausible or
fantastical, preferred or catastrophic; but having established that state
as a beachhead, it is easier to ’connect the dots’ from the present to
the future (or back again) than it is to imagine the events leading to an
unknown future.” (Bishop et al., 2007)
While there are arguably earlier precedents, particularly in the corporate space
rather than the academic, backcasting is generally traced to its origins in Robinson
(1990), and through an iterated variant outlined in Robinson (2003), “where the
desired future is not determined in advance of the analysis but is an emergent
property of the process of engaging with users and project partners”; this latter
“second generation” backcasting methodology is seen as “contribut[ing] to a pro-
cess of social learning about possible and desirable futures”, rather than as a tool
for developing a “roadmap” to be followed in order to realise the future(s) por-
trayed in the scenarios. However, it is the “roadmap” approach that has proved
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most popular for researchers engaged in projects related to infrastructural plan-
ning and/or sociotechnical transitions (as shall be discussed later in this chapter).
In Börjeson, Höjer, Dreborg, Ekvall, and Finnveden (2006), the authors pro-
pose three broad categories of scenario, through the production of which such
methodologies might be characterised; these categories (Predictive, Explorative
and Normative, respectively) are related to “the principal questions [the authors]
believe a user may want to pose about the future. These are What will happen?,
What can happen? and How can a specific target be reached?.” The authors clearly
identify backcasting with the transforming type of scenario, which belongs to the
normative category, and identify the value of these “elaborate images of the fu-
ture as a foundation for discussing goals and taking decisions in policy-forming
processes” (Börjeson et al., 2006). While plentiful reports on the utility of back-
casting methodologies for successfully producing “roadmaps” can be found in the
literature (see e.g. Quist & Vergragt, 2006; Salter, Robinson, & Wiek, 2010), reports
on the success of the roadmaps thus generated (which is to say: whether follow-
ing those roadmaps was possible, and/or whether following them produced the
hoped-for outcomes) are conspicuous by their absence from the academic corpus
or elsewhere; many recent studies (see e.g. Vergragt & Quist, 2011) still describe
the backcasting methodology as potentially useful rather than demonstrably so.∗
Furthermore, some some scholars (most notably Wangel, 2011) have highlighted
the paucity of social dimensions in back-casting as commonly practiced.
The transforming category of scenarios to which backcasting belongs can be
productively contrasted with the explorative category, which is
“defined by the fact that they respond to the question What can happen?
We distinguish between the two types, external scenarios and strategic
scenarios. External scenarios respond to the user’s question: What
can happen to the development of external factors? Strategic scenarios
respond to the question: What can happen if we act in a certain way?”
(Börjeson et al., 2006)
Despite the proclaimed strategic orientation of many projects focussed on in-
frastructure futures (as shall be shown), they tend to make use of normative sce-
nario processes such as back-casting far more often than they make use of explo-
rative scenario processes, which have a special utility “in cases when the user may
have fairly good knowledge regarding how the system works at present, but is
∗The author made enquiries with fellow members of the Association of Professional Futurists via
its listserv discussion board in search of non-academic evidence in support of backcasted roadmaps
as successful-in-hindsight guides to action, but received no evidence of such, whether substantial or
anecdotal.
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interested in exploring the consequences of alternative developments.” (Börjeson
et al., 2006) As a subtype of the explorative category, external scenarios:
“...focus only on factors beyond the control of the relevant actors. They
are typically used to inform strategy development of a planning entity.
Policies are not part of the scenarios but the scenarios provide a frame-
work for the development and assessment of policies and strategies.
The external scenarios can then help the user to develop robust strate-
gies, i.e. strategies that will survive several kinds of external development.”
(Börjeson et al., 2006, , emphasis added)
The redeeming merit of scenario techniques is that they allow for the con-
sideration of contextual uncertainty: by turning four sets of contextual parame-
ters into four more thoroughly imagined and realised future “worlds”, and by
(re)presenting those worlds using narrative techniques rather than numbers and
graphs, a qualitative (and far more human) perspective might be brought to the
critical assessment of a future project. In short, scenarios techniques can be used
to generate more plausible and reflexive visions of future infrastructures than are
commonly produced, and provide a framework for dealing with contextual uncer-
tainty in the process of deployment.
2.2.3 Telling tomorrows: narrative prototyping and design fictions
There is some precedent for more explicitly narrative-driven methods in technol-
ogy foresight, most notably that known as science fiction prototyping (Johnson,
2011, SFP hereafter), wherein the writing of speculative fictions is used as a way
to explore the ramifications (and the potential derivative products) of a new idea,
invention or scientific discovery. Regrettably, however, SFP is largely devoid of
theoretical grounding, which reflects its origins in commercial product develop-
ment and corporate organisational foresight; it could certainly be used in more
reflexive ways (see e.g. Burnam-Fink, 2015), but as it stands, it’s little more than a
visioning technique being promoted significantly above its abilities. Nonetheless,
attempts have been made to extend this thinking-with-fiction technique so as to
accommodate issues at the infrastructural scale, which demonstrate the potential
utility of fictions as a space in which complex systems and their complex problems
might be explored from a human perspective (Merrie, Keys, Metian, & Österblom,
2017; Raven, 2014).
Perhaps the only explicitly critical futures tradition is the still-nascent field
of design fiction (a.k.a. speculative design, critical design); founded by Dunne
and Raby during their tenure at the RCA in London (Dunne & Raby, 2013), this
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tradition draws on design thinking, critical theory and creative practice in order to
develop prototypes for future products or services. But these prototypes are not
intended to ever be produced—to the contrary, the prototype performs instead as
an imaginative prop (or a diegetic object, in cinematic terms—see e.g. Kirby, 2010)
that draws the observer into an implied understanding, or at least consideration,
of the implied future world in which such a product might exist. Or, more simply:
while scenario methods develop a series of future contexts (backgrounds) which
suggest new strategies or products (foregrounds), design fiction does the inverse,
by developing strategies or products which imply, and thereby critique, future
contexts:
“Suspending disbelief about change is in line with speculative design—
an approach on which design fiction draws—and relates to a primary
focus on generating understanding and insights rather than finished
products [...] So a design fiction is (1) something that creates a story
world, (2) has something being prototyped within that story world, (3)
does so in order to create a discursive space.” (Lindley & Coulton,
2015)
This “discursive space” is limited only by the imaginative capacity of those
involved in the worldbuilding process:
“Design fictions have the ability to experiment with technologies or sit-
uations that do not currently exist. They can also play with limitless
varieties of interface, form-factor, user group, or any other relevant
property. Further, as design fictions are self-contained worlds they ex-
tend traditional prototyping approaches by demonstrating both the concept
and the context simultaneously.” (Lindley & Coulton, 2015, emphasis
added)
Thus a narrative-driven version of design fiction practice would be able to
explore large, complex sociotechnical systems under contexts which would other-
wise be impossible to simulate. Such a practice would also share some methods
(as well as some ideals) with the emerging discipline of Transition Design, which
seeks to bring the best out of transitions theory, Social Practice Theory and design
thinking by combining them in a speculative-critical modality aimed at thinking
about future infrastructures:
“Transition design could be used to mediate between socio-technical
transition theories with their top-down hierarchical approaches and,
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and social practice theories with their bottom-up focus on everyday
life and flat ontology [...] what is specific in transition design is the
connection to more macro-scaled societal structures and processes.”
(Hesselgren, Eriksson, Wangel, & Broms, 2018)
As has been shown, both scenarios and design fiction rely on the creation of
fictional futures in order to do their work, whether that work is constructive/nor-
mative (scenarios) or critical-speculative (design fiction). Elements and strategies
from both methods might therefore be combined productively, so as to sustain the
critical thrust of the design fiction tradition within the framing of an uncertain,
divergent future provided by scenarios. Indeed, the convergence of design think-
ing with established traditions of scenario practice is resulting in the development
of methodologies that are explicitly speculative rather than normative—less in-
terested in making predictive claims, in other words, than in the exploration of
possibilities (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008).
2.2.4 A brief survey of leading-edge infrastructure futures research in
the UK
The preceding sections of this literature review have highlighted a lack of qual-
itative approaches to the assessment of proposed future infrastructures, and a
tendency for those which are deployed to operate in the Predictive or Norma-
tive paradigms, before introducing some cutting edge alternatives algned with
the Explorative paradigm which might be fruitfully put to use in this space. But
what roles are currently being played by foresight approaches in state-of-the-art
research projects concerned with infrastructural reconfigurations? A closer look at
three such projects, recently or imminently completed at time of writing—Liveable
Cities, MISTRAL, and the International Centre for Infrastructure Futures—will show
that, while such projects are plentiful and generously funded, they are for the
most part focussed on quantitative modelling and predictive futures paradigms.
This project does not contend that these endeavours are pointless; rather that they
are all missing an explicitly demand-side and situated perspective on sociotech-
nical change, such as this project aims to provide, and they further assume that
the outputs of their models and strategic exercises are deliverable, without testing
that assumption against the possibility of radically divergent contextual circum-
stances capable of generating difficulties or obstacles to delivery (or amplifying
latent ones) which, by methodological necessity, are externalised in the course of
their modelling processes.
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The International Centre for Infrastructure Futures
The International Centre for Infrastructure Futures (ICIF) was an EPSRC-funded
project (reference EP/K012347/1) based at University College, London that ran
from June 2013 to April 2017. The framing of the project in the grant application
summary makes it clear that the focus is very explicitly supply-side:
“The Centre will focus on the development and implementation of in-
novative business models and aims to support UK firms wishing to ex-
ploit them in international markets [...] Beneficiaries from the Centre’s
activities include existing utility businesses, entrepreneurs wishing to
enter the infrastructure sector, regulators, government and, perhaps
most importantly, our communities who will benefit from more effi-
cient and less vulnerable infrastructure based services.” (EPSRC, 2013)
The ICIF project outline is distinctive in that it chose to focus in systemic inter-
dependencies, but these are largely seen as opportunities for cost-reduction with
regard to utility company business models, rather than as a challenge to under-
standing the dynamics of sociotechnical transitions. Despite the modal gesture
toward community benefit in the project summary, the bulk of publications result-
ing from ICIF are focussed on the management and/or “delivery” of large infras-
tructure projects (e.g. Davies, MacAulay, DeBarro, & Thurston, 2014; Hartmann,
Roehrich, Frederiksen, & Davies, 2014; Worsnop, Miraglia, & Davies, 2016), and
the quantitative modelling of failure risk and/or operational efficiency in inter-
dependent infrastructures (e.g. Daneshkhah, Stocks, & Jeffrey, 2017; Rigas, Ram-
churn, & Bassiliades, 2015); very little of the project’s published output considers
communities or citizens as anything more than a statistical market of service users,
and in such cases as “futures” are explicitly engaged with, they are the futures of
governance—particularly as it “relates to the interactions and decision-making
amongst multiple actors that result in the delivery, financing and payment for
infrastructure services” (Hiteva & Watson, 2016).
However, one of a handful of ICIF publications with an explicitly social-scientific
perspective concludes by advocating a strategy not dissimilar to that outlined in
the previous section of this literature review. After outlining a “comprehensive”
(and fairly complex) framework through which “inefficient energy habitual be-
haviour” might be studied and better understood, the authors conclude with the
following suggestion: “In order to capture micro-trends, it is suggested that re-
search should commence from local scale and move towards the regional scale.
Thus, the proposed framework and potential intervention methods would be more
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effective first to be applied within a micro-scale (e.g. households)...” (Pothitou, Ko-
lios, Varga, & Gu, 2016). Though described using very different terminology, this
would nonetheless appear to be advocating in favour of a granular demand-side
research perspective on the formation of consumptive practices. A similar point is
made by Varga (2013), who observes that “[t]he fruitfulness of these recommenda-
tions [to address demand expansion] is impossible to predict because the system
is complex, that is evolutionary and adaptive, and depends on future contexts...”
ITRC-MISTRAL: Multi-Scale Infrastructure Systems Analytics
MISTRAL is an EPSRC-funded project (reference EP/N017064/1) of the Infras-
tructure Transitions Research Consortium (ITRC) led by Oxford University, which
started in February 2016 and is due to complete in August 2020. The project sum-
mary is succinct regarding its objectives:
“Our vision is for infrastructure decisions to be guided by systems
analysis. When this vision is realised, decision makers will have access
to, and visualisation of, information that tells them how all infrastruc-
ture systems are performing. They will have models that help to pin-
point vulnerabilities and quantify the risks of failure. They will be able
to perform ’what-if’ analysis of proposed investments and explore the
effects of future uncertainties, such as population growth, new tech-
nologies and climate change.” (EPSRC, 2016)
Much as with ICIF (with which credit is shared on a significant number of pub-
lications), MISTRAL’s published output to date is strongly oriented toward sys-
tem management and simulation through quantitative modelling—which, given
its founding intentions, is not at all surprising; it further appears that any signif-
icant engagement with “futures” in the project is intended to take place within
these models (see e.g. Hall et al., 2016). Whether the final modelling system will
include sociopolitical uncertainties alongside “population growth, new technolo-
gies and climate change” is unclear, but given that sociopolitical non-linearity is,
by definition, largely intractable to quantitative modelling, it seems reasonable to
assume that they will not feature; indeed, it would be surprising if they did, given
the epistemological context.
As for the matter of sociological perspectives, MISTRAL’s output thus far—
again, unsurprisingly given its aims—seems entirely focussed on the quantita-
tive supply-side perspective, dealing with topics such as “population synthesis”
(Smith, Lovelace, & Birkin, 2017) and the “predict[ion of] future [transport] de-
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mand ... using an elasticity-based simulation approach” (Lovric´, Blainey, & Pre-
ston, 2017).
Liveable Cities
Liveable Cities was an EPSRC-funded project (reference EP/J017698/1) which ran
from May 2012 to December 2017, executed by a consortium of universities led by
investigators from the University of Birmingham. By comparison to both ICIF and
MISTRAL, its orientation is markedly more social, but where the others focussed
on infrastructural systems as their research object, Liveable Cities took the city as
its unit of analysis and intervention. However, the emphasis was very much on
“solutions delivery”:
“Our ambition is to create an holistic, integrated, truly multidisci-
plinary city analysis methodology that uniquely combines engineered
solutions and quality-of-life indicators, accounts for social aspirations,
is founded on an evidence base of trials of radical interventions in
cities, and delivers the radical engineering solutions necessary to achieve
our vision.” (EPSRC, 2012)
The City Analysis Methodology at the heart of the Liveable Cities Project
makes some use of a futures framework that includes some social factors, but
because of the timescales and demographies in the analytical frame, the social
aspects of demand for infrastructural services are (again, by epistemological ne-
cessity) reduced to collective rational choices made en masse, with no engagement
as to the question of how those choices might have come to be made, how they
might have been shaped and constrained by earlier decisions (infrastructural or
otherwise), and how those decisions propagated throughout “society”. For in-
stance:
“... an electrical demand exists only because society has chosen to
adopt and use a range of technologies in the home (e.g. the TV, wash-
ing machines, dishwashers, the microwave) [...] Economics influences
individual choice through a trade-off between running costs and the
cost of investment in the technology (e.g. I may choose to use my TV
less because fuel prices have increased or I may wish to purchase a
more energy-efficient TV).” (Hunt, Rogers, & Jefferson, 2013, p259)
This is precisely the economic “rational choice” understanding of consumptive
practices that this project aims to replace (see again section 2.1.2). The scenario
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methodology described in this paper does allow for changes in this social factor,
but the dimensions of that potential change are an axis running from “a significant
improvement to a significant worsening”. There is no engagement with the possi-
bility that existing practices and/or infrastructural regimes might be contributing
to the obduracy of current levels of consumption, or indeed to their “significant
worsening”; rather, it is implicit that “society”, in aggregate, just doesn’t know
what’s good for it. (This in spite of nearly two decades of research demonstrating
that the “information deficit” model of behavioural change “lacks both empiri-
cal and theoretical support”—see e.g. Marteau, Sowden, & Armstrong, 2002). A
similarly reductive approach to “user behaviour” (and the potential modification
thereof) with regard to consumptive practices is found in Zadeh, Hunt, and Rogers
(2014), though here the authors concede that “complex relationships influencing
household water use make underlying patterns of behaviour are difficult to de-
tect [sic]”, and note that the inherent subjectivity of qualitative research presents
a challenge to the quantitative analysis which is their goal.
That said, a number of papers (e.g. Hunt, Jefferson, & Rogers, 2012; Hunt et al.,
2013; C. D. F. Rogers, 2018) show that Liveable Cities engaged much more directly
with futures methodologies than either ICIF or MISTRAL. However, there was an
early decision, as evidenced in the grant application project summary, to take a
supply-side perspective and to work with the “preferred future” or “back-casting”
paradigm of foresight:
“A roadmap is required to chart the path from here to there, iden-
tify potential tipping points and determine how to integrate radical
engineering strategies into norms. However, this roadmap can only
be considered once that alternative future has been established, and a
’back-casting’ exercise carried out, to explore where the major barriers
to change lie and where interventions are needed.” (EPSRC, 2012)
As noted above, back-casting is a popular methodology with considerable suc-
cess when it comes to generating strategies or road-maps with “stakeholder buy-
in”, but little in the way of documented assessment of the success (or failure,
for that matter) regarding the road-maps thus produced. More pertinently, the
back-casting approach amounts to putting all of one’s strategic eggs in a single
basket: if at some point the direction of travel in reality goes off the edge of the
mapped route, you’re lost. The idealism of this approach is explicitly stated in
Ortegon-Sanchez and Tyler (2016), though it does represent a move away from, as
the authors succinctly put it, the “all-too-common ’political wish list’ ” approach
to setting out the preferred future, relying instead on empirical situated studies in
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a variety of global settings, and a literature review of “exemplary urban transfor-
mations”.
Liveable Cities also shows a much deeper engagement with social dynamics
than either ICIF or MISTRAL: its outputs include papers on citizen aspirations
(see e.g. Joffe & Smith, 2016) and urban “liveability” (see e.g. Hunt et al., 2014), as
well as a rather unique typology of future-city visualisations (Dunn, Cureton, &
Pollastri, 2014). It is also notable that, while not using the Harawayian terminol-
ogy or justifications described previously, Liveable Cities nonetheless engaged in
situated research (i.e. tending toward the use of real data from real locations rather
than abstracted models or simulacra of “the social”), and also engaged with sys-
tems interdependency through the “energy-water-food nexus” approach (see e.g.
De Laurentiis, Hunt, & Rogers, 2014, 2016).
Liveable Cities also supported a number of publications by the late John Urry,
whose work is cited elsewhere in this literature review, and whose position on
paradigmatic futures practices was broadly in line with (and indeed influential
upon) that taken by this project. In Urry (2013) he engaged with a form of scenario-
based “black-sky thinking” intended to problematise paradigmatic notions of pro-
gressive development through the depiction of futures where things don’t work
out according to plan, while in Urry (2014) he deals with the matter of obduracy
(or “technological lock-in”) with regard to the decarbonisation of the energy sector.
However, Urry’s position appears to have been marginal within the context of the
project, and indeed within the urban transitions paradigm more broadly: Liveable
Cities certainly represents a sort of sociological “best practice” among projects of
this type, but it’s still a long way away from sustained engagement with sociotech-
nical change as a demand-side phenomenon, or an engagement with futures that
goes beyond the optimistic idealism and limited social dimensionality of the back-
casting approach.
The infrastructure futures paradigm
In general, all three of the projects surveyed—while in some cases harbouring el-
ements of more qualitative and/or sociological enquiry on their margins—tend
to: see infrastructural interdependency as an opportunity to be exploited, rather
than as a source of problematic complexity which generates emergent obstacles
to the successful management of “preferred” sociotechnical transitions; propose
the use of agent-based or other such quantitative simulacra for advanced varia-
tions on the predict-and-provide model of infrastructural planning, design and
“delivery”; generate visions, solutions and “preferred futures” for infrastructural
reconfigurations through the use of the back-casting approach.
Chapter 2. Literature Review 45
On the basis of their published outputs, none of these three projects: ask
how or why citizen practices might (or might not) change, beyond their standard
assumption of the rational choice model of demographic behaviour; recognise
the role of interface technologies in inextricable interaction with domestic prac-
tices and/or infrastructural systems as contributing to the obduracy or practices
deemed problematic or over-consumptive; question the deliverability of their so-
lutions and visions under potentially divergent sociopolitical contexts; or engage
with sociotechnical change as the fundamental question underlying the challenge
of infrastructural reconfigurations, in the manner of transitions theory (see again
section 2.1.1).
In the preceding sections of this literature review, it has been argued that there
is a significant bias in infrastructure futures research toward quantitative, norma-
tive and supply-side-oriented analytical paradigms, and that the balance might
be redressed by recourse to the deployment of an alternative blend of qualitative,
explorative and demand-side-oriented approaches. As exemplars of the leading
edge of research into infrastructural futures, the three projects surveyed above
highlight this persistent research gap: the prevailing paradigm in infrastructure
futures is strongly (though not exclusively) quantitative, managerial, technologi-
cally determinist and oriented toward supply-side concerns, and lacking in sus-
tained engagement with the question of the dynamics of sociotechnical change as
a phenomenon on the demand-side of the system. Recognising this gap in the
contemporary research landscape as a site for genuinely novel scholarship, this
project aims to produce and demonstrate a methodology which might serve to
fill it—and in doing so provide a vital qualitative, demand-side supplement to
prevailing academic approaches to infrastructural futurity.
Summary
This chapter has explored two distinct literatures. In the first section, it examines
models and methodologies for the study of sociotechnical change, looking first at
technology-centric approaches, and then at more human-centric, anthropological
approaches. The second section discusses methodologies for strategic foresight,
planning and prototyping which might be appropriate at the infrastructural scale.
Regarding existing scholarship on sociotechnical change, it is concluded that
the Multi-Level Perspective (and the associated Transitions and Transitions Man-
agement literatures) represents the dominant paradigm and the state-of-the-art in
technology-centric approaches, but it is increasingly hampered by its failure or
inability to address a series of long-standing critiques, including:
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• its poor handling of agency and adherence to arbitrary hierarchies;
• its placelessness and holism;
• and its relentless reproduction of a generic and heroic innovation narrative.
In order to improve upon the MLP, therefore, one or more of these shortcomings
must be addressed.
With regard to anthropological approaches, it is concluded that Actor-Network
Theory, Cyborg Anthropology and Social Practice Theory are all rooted in the
assumption of a flat ontology, and are distinguished by the metaphors through
which that ontological assumption is framed; as such, methods, theories and
strategies for studying sociotechnical change might be productively drawn from
all three literatures without significant risk of contradiction. However, it seems
clear that SPT, through its relentless focus on the practice as the site of study, pro-
vides the most suitable heuristics and models from which to start an investigation
into infrastructural change: flat ontologies are challenging precisely due to their
lack of hierarchy, but the relational structure of the practice concept allows for
a structured entry into the assemblage at the site of agency. Furthermore, SPT’s
intimacy with the human scale, sometimes dismissed as its greatest flaw, positions
it optimally for an examination of the dynamics of sociotechnical change, which
inescapably emerges from individual human choices and desires.
Regarding methodologies for infrastructural foresight, it is concluded that
some methods are particularly suited to dealing with the challenge of uncertainty
and divergence in long-term planning (scenarios), while others possess the capac-
ity, whether implicit or explicit, to subject proposed ideas or systems to the sort
of qualitative critique which is largely absent from most infrastructural visions
(design fiction, science fiction prototyping). Some combination of these narrative-
driven methods might therefore unify qualitative critique with contextual uncer-
tainty, thereby providing a sort of prototyping process to support and complement
the established methods of qualitative assessment traditionally applied to infras-
tructural projects.
Chapter 3
Aim and Research Questions
This chapter sets out the overarching aim of the thesis, and defines three research
questions which will serve as its orienting objectives.
Statement of Aim
It is the aim of this thesis to make infrastructure legible: to narrate it from a more
human-centric perspective than that which prevails in the majority of contempo-
rary research in the field. In less lyrical terms, the project aims to understand how
infrastructures develop, how they evolve and entangle over time.
Research Question 1
The first research question is as follows:
Starting from a materialist and practice-oriented perspective, how might one
model and analyse the mutually influential and longitudinal relationships be-
tween everyday consumptive practices and the infrastructures which enable
them?
The literature review illustrates the potential for social practice theory to inform
new models of sociotechnical change and address the shortcomings of prevailing
theories, and highlights particular calls for the application of such models to the
understanding of consumptive behaviours supported by infrastructural systems.
The first objective therefore involves the development of such a model, and using
it to perform a longitudinal analysis of the sociotechnical evolution of a particular
practice.
Put more simply, the first objective is to advance a theory of sociotechnical




The second research question is as follows:
Drawing on the model and analysis developed in fulfillment of Objective 1,
how might such findings be used as the basis of a speculative exploration of
the advantages and obstacles associated with the deployment of proposed future
infrastructures?
The use of futures methodologies in infrastructure planning is fairly well estab-
lished, but such exercises are rarely rooted in longitudinal context, and tend to-
ward assessments rooted in predominantly economic and technical terms. The
second objective therefore is to take the insights acquired in fulfilment of the first
objective, and use them as the basis for a prototyping process that focusses on sys-
temic contextual challenges to proposed infrastructural reconfigurations, rather
than technical feasibility or return on investment.
Put more simply, the second objective is to develop creative techniques for
extrapolating from an understanding of how we ended up with the infrastructure
we have in the present, so as to better understand how we might influence the
infrastructure we get in the future.
Research Question 3
The third research question is as follows:
How might this methodology improve or expand our understanding of the
concept of sociotechnical transition?
Contemporary research into sociotechnical change at the infrastructural scale is
dominated by the literature on transitions, and by the Multi-Level Perspective
model from which that field stems. As shown in the literature review, there are
three lingering shortcomings associated with the MLP:
• it obscures the role of agency, is heavily reliant on theoretical abstractions,
and presupposes arbitrary hierarchical structures;
• it relies on geographical metaphors (e.g. niche, landscape, regime), but
largely disregards the geographical distribution of the phenomena with which
it is concerned;
• it (re)produces the a generic (and heroic) narrative of innovation, and ap-
pears unconcerned or unable to explain failed or stymied changes.
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The third objective, therefore, is to assess the outputs produced in response to
the first and second objectives, in order to determine whether they successfully
address any or all of these shortcomings, and thereby shed further light on the
concept of transition itself.
Chapter 4
Model and Methodology
Introduction: specification of requirements
This chapter introduces the novel methodology at the heart of this project. The
overarching aim of the project is to understand the dynamic relationships which
underpin the sociotechnical reconfigurations commonly referred to as “transi-
tions”, and to use that knowledge as the basis for speculative assessments of the
challenges facing the deployment of technologies and infrastructures of the future.
This project is primarily a methodological enquiry, aimed at developing and
testing a new approach to the study of sociotechnical change. In the preceding
chapter, we specify a requirement for a two-part methodology which will be used
in fulfilment of RQs 1 and 2: RQ1 requires a methodology for the study of histor-
ical sociotechnical change, while RQ2 requires a methodology for speculating on
the sociotechnical changes of the future.
As such, the first section of this chapter will develop a novel model of so-
ciotechnical change, which:
• approaches the question of sociotechnical change from an explicitly demand-
side perspective, as informed by social practice theory;
• is based in a flat, materialist ontology, eschewing the arbitrary hierarchies
and abstract entities which populate the Multi-Level Perspective model;
• and is universally applicable to any practice, and thus to any sociotechnical
assemblage, at any point in timespace.
The second section of this chapter will then use the model as the core of a novel
methodological framework for the historical analysis of sociotechnical change,
which:
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• directs the researcher toward the networks of relationships through which
particular sociotechnical assemblages are (de)constructed;
• pays explicit attention to the situatedness (in time and space alike) and sub-
jectivity of practices and the systems that enable them; and
• thus allows for the systematic comparison of a variety of sociotechnical as-
semblages, successful or otherwise.
The model and methodology thus described are a partial fulfillment of RQ1, to
be completed through the experimental application of the methodology as docu-
mented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The third section of this chapter will present a methodology which builds on
the historical analysis by switching the model into a speculative modality, so al-
lowing the findings generated by the analytical mode to inform a narrative proto-
typing method through which proposed sociotechnical assemblages of the future
might be assessed in terms of the plausibility of their deployment, and tested
against a variety of potential socioeconomic circumstances. This second method-
ological mode is a partial fulfillment of RQ2, to be completed through its applica-
tion.
4.1 Constructing the model: the infrastructral trialectic
4.1.1 The evolution of the assemblage
The trialectic model is at the core of a novel theory of sociotechnical change which
is concerned with the enrolment of new technologies and systems into the as-
semblages which enable and shape everyday consumptive practices. A brief (and
necessarily generic) rehearsal of the evolution of potable water supply will demon-
strate the sort of dynamics it seeks to explore.
So, consider a small settlement with no infrastructure at all: how would its
residents obtain clean water for such practices as drinking, cooking, or bathing?
Such an early settlement would likely be founded close to some sort of water
supply: a spring, a river or a well. Prior to any infrastructural intervention in
the landscape (making an exception for the bucket-pulley which might be fitted
to the well), residents of the settlement would have to either fetch water from
source and carry it back to their home, or perhaps make use of the water at source
(e.g. washing clothes on the river bank). This is the simplest relationship possible
between a performer and a resource, mediated by little more than a bucket (or the
local analogue thereof); see item a, Figure 4.1 on page 52.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the assemblage—potable water provision
Now consider a later settlement, something like a minor town of the Roman
empire (item b, Figure 4.1). Population growth will have resulted in the over-
abstraction of locally accessible water, necessitating the construction of an aque-
duct to channel water into the town from further away. But it would be wasteful
(not to mention destructive) to simply have the aqueduct debouch into the town
square unimpeded—and so something like the public fountains of Rome would
be developed, so as to capture as-yet-unused water (possibly redirecting it to other
uses), and to make it easier (and safer) for citizens to either fetch water and take
it home, or use/consume it on site.
Now consider a yet more modern settlement (item c, Figure 4.1). The aqueduct
(which may or may not have been replaced, fully or in part, by a network of pipes)
draws water from the abstraction source (which may be natural or artificial) and
channels it to a treatment works, from where it is pumped into a water distribu-
tion network which connects to individual buildings and homes; those buildings
will be fitted with some sort of plumbing system, however rudimentary, so as to
prevent the water simply flooding out from the delivery network. The plumbing
system may also allow for the direct connection of water-utilising appliances, such
as washing machines.
4.1.2 Elements of the trialectic
As illustrated above, what we see is a gradual profusion of technologies and sys-
tems interposing themselves between the performer and the resource they wish
to consume. In each case, the performer has to make use of some sort of inter-
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face technology: bucket, fountain, faucet, washing machine. As technology pro-
gresses, the interface used by the performer allows them to access the potential
of an increasingly complex system of resource distribution and transformation.
In accordance with social practice theory (see Literature Review), new infrastruc-
tures (re)shape the performance of practices; it follows, therefore, that new perfor-
mances of practices (re)shape the infrastructures on which they depend. Interface
technologies mediate the mutual influence between performer and infrastructure: they are
the site where the parameters of a given performance are negotiated and con-
structed. As such, we can construct a simple tripartite model based on the three
elements which persist across every configuration, from the simplest to the most
complicated: those three elements are the performer (or protagonist), the interface,
and the infrastructure (see Figure 4.2 on page 53).
Figure 4.2: Three elements of the infrastructural trialectic
Note that the interface may be a physical device with which the performer
interacts directly, or it may be a service within which a device or set of devices
is packaged for the performer: so, a faucet is an interface to a water distribution
infrastructure, but so is a corner-shop selling bottled water, or indeed an online
service which delivers bottled water to your home. The interface is whatever the
protagonist interacts with directly, and with intention.
4.1.3 Vectors of influence
In order to develop a theory of sociotechnical change, it is necessary to trace
and account for the mutually shaping influences mentioned above: performances
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shaping infrastructures, and infrastructures shaping performances. With very few
exceptions, performers never interact directly with infrastructures: all interactions,
and therefore all influences, are mediated through the interface layer. Therefore
we can introduce four vectors of influence into the model, as in Figure 4.3 on page
54. These vectors are (moving clockwise from top right):
• Hacks, Kludges & Jugaad (HKJ hereafter)
• Invention & Iteration (I&I hereafter)
• Standards & Regulations (S&R hereafter)
• Design Protocols (DP hereafter)
Figure 4.3: Infrastructural trialectic with vectors of influence
These relationships are complex and non-causal: no element necessarily takes
the precedent or upper hand over another, and all four vectors of influence are
active at the same time. We can characterise the relationships by considering one
pair of elements at a time, and describing the interactions between them in more
detail.
The Protagonist/Interface relationship (upper dyad)
The most immediate relationship is that between the protagonist and the interface:
it is, in essence, a negotiation (or contest) between the protagonist’s preferred
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performance, and the idealised performance as it is (pre)conceived in interface
designer’s use-case.
The design of an interface (whether device or service) constrains the manner
in which it may be used. Design is, at least in part, a process of limiting and
simplifying user choice to a greater or lesser degree—particularly in the case of
consumer technologies, where it is assumed that a lack of expertise in the user
necessitates the limiting and streamlining of potential function down to to a more
simple set of choices. Think of a washing machine: rather than requiring the user
to select each and every parameter of the wash, those options are bundled up and
simplified into preset programmes based on the type of fabric to be washed, the
extent of soiling, etc.
No matter how comprehensive the design, circumstances will inevitably arise
in which the defaults or presets provided by the designer do not fully meet the
protagonist’s desired parameters of performance. So, returning to our hypothet-
ical washing machine: perhaps an otherwise suitable programme lacks an extra
rinse or spin cycle. In such a circumstance, the user may simply accept the lim-
itations of the design, especially if there is no more suitable design available (or
affordable) on the market. But human beings are not noted for their ability to
accept what appears to them to be second best. This desire for a more suitable
interface manifests in three related types of response: hacking, kludging, and ju-
gaad.
• Hacking: drawing on the figure of ’the hacker’ from computer culture, hack-
ing is defined in this context as the deliberate circumvention of designed
limitations in a device: think of motor scooters made faster (and louder) by
the removal of the exhaust system’s silencers and baffles, for example, or of
the deliberate misuse of a water fountain’s trigger in order to obtain a faster
flow. Hacks are not necessarily destructive, though hacking for one particular
optimum may end up restricting or breaking other aspects of functionality
(or, indeed, the entire device, or even the system(s) to which the device acts
as interface).
• Kludging: the kludge is related to the hack, but where the later seeks to
circumvent design, the former attempts to extend or augment it: to return to
the motor scooter, fitting it with a home-made parcel rack would be a kludge,
particularly if doing so went strictly against the spirit of the original design.
(In practice, the distinction between a hack and a kludge can be difficult to
discern, but given both responses belong to the same vector of influence, the
point is largely moot in the present context.)
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• Jugaad: from the Urdu, in which language the word refers to what we might
describe as preferential procurement: “to procure (x), rather than buying
(x); to make a temporary or ersatz (x)”. In its colloquial usage, it makes a
broader signification of ingenuity, but with particular reference to that in-
genuity which is born of poverty and limited opportunities. The jugaad
response to an absent or not-fit-for-purpose interface is to build one’s own
from whatever materials are available to hand—so if one fitted a set of re-
purposed blades to the back of a motor scooter in order to use it to plough
furrows in a field in the absence of draft animals or a “proper” tractor, one
would be doing serious jugaad.
These three strategies are widespread, if not ubiquitous, in daily practices all over
the world, all throughout history. While design involves the limiting of options,
it also responds to the use-case—that is, to a particular idealised performance
which represents a commercial opportunity to the designer or their business. As
such, hacks, kludges and jugaad observed “in the wild” form an influence on the
designer, as they signify a use-case that is not yet being provided for.
But the use-case for which the designer has provided (or attempted to pro-
vide) has a complementary influence upon the protagonist and their performance,
precisely through the protocols of usage designed into the device or service. This
produces another vector of influence flowing in the opposite direction to HKJ, as
these design protocols effectively determine what it is possible to achieve with the
device or service in question, and as such present a set of limits to the performance
which the performer may try to work around. This relationship between product
and/or service design and the protagonist is a perpetual negotiation, driven by
the protagonist’s desire to fulfil a particular performance of a practice, and by the
designer’s desire (or that of the organisation for which they work) to supply more
devices or services at a better profit margin.
The Interface/Infrastructure relationship (lower dyad)
The interface layer acts as a mediator between the protagonist and the infrastruc-
ture layer; as such, the relationship between interface and infrastructure shapes
and informs the relationship between protagonist and interface, and vice versa.
Both of these dialectical relationships share a similarly agonistic structure, which
is to say a struggle or conflict in which each actor (or element, in this case) seeks
to get the better of the deal. However, it should be noted that these struggles are
not zero-sum—or at least not necessarily so.
As discussed above, designers seek to develop interfaces (be they devices or
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services) which fulfill the desire for an as-yet unfulfilled performance, or improve
on an existing performance in some way. As industrial and service design are
inherently commercial practices, the iteration of new designs are motivated, at
least in part, by a desire to sell more devices or services. In order to sell a new
interface, then, it is necessary for it to better meet the desire represented by the
protagonist’s use-case than the available alternatives. This most often manifests
as an interface which somehow exceeds the parameters of the existing best-choice
performance: bigger, faster, cheaper, and so forth. (Design strategies rooted purely
in aesthetics and/or “reinventions of the wheel” are anathema to this model, and
indeed to the study of innovation more generally.)
So, consider a car manufacturer: they compete with other manufacturers across
a variety of different parameters, e.g. maximum vehicle capacity, maximum speed,
fuel economy, safety. But considered as a market, the nature of the competition
is to provide the greatest amount of use-of-the-road possible at any given price-
point: through a motor car (interface), the protagonist accesses the mobility poten-
tial of the road network (infrastructure), and the design protocols of the specific
vehicle they use serve to mediate that potential, often through trade-offs in func-
tionalities: for instance, one might sacrifice safety and vehicle capacity to gain
higher top speeds.
At the same time, the infrastructural layer will be seeking to limit the param-
eters of the way in which it is used (which is analogous to a design problem at
the scale of the network). This is partly about demand management—avoiding
brownouts, traffic jams or hosepipe bans—but also about maximising revenues
and minimising wear and tear so as to keep overheads as low as possible.
So, while the interface is trying to get the best out of the transaction on the
protagonist’s behalf, the infrastructure must impose limits on the parameters of
the transaction—or at least attempt to. Such limiting strategies are of two broad
types, which are labelled as standards and regulations: with the acknowledge-
ment that many strategies may straddle the distinction, standards are defined as
restrictions which are a function of the material constitution of the infrastructure
in question (e.g. standard railway gauges, which effectively prevent the use of
non-standard rolling stock entirely), whereas regulations are social rules and norms
against performances whose parameters exceed necessary limits (e.g. laws regard-
ing maximum dimensions for road vehicles, speed limits); standards are usually
difficult (or obviously dangerous) to circumvent, while regulations can be more
easily flaunted (despite the real risks which they were designed to prevent). Much
as the protagonist pushes against the design protocols baked into the interface,
interface designers, in their attempts to provide a product or service which better
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fulfills the protagonist’s desire, push against the hegemony of infrastructural stan-
dards and regulations, either by developing new products or services (invention)
or improving and optimising existing ones (iteration).
In relation to the fourth and final vector, which flows from the interface layer
to the infrastructure layer, iterational design seeks out as-yet-unexploited marginal
gains and tradeoffs in transaction parameters (e.g. tweaking the design of an in-
ternal combustion engine to improve power and efficiency), while invention seeks
to literally re-invent the transaction to the protagonist’s perceived advantage (e.g.
replacing the internal combustion engine with some novel, and presumably supe-
rior, source of motive power). As with standards and regulations, the distinction
between iteration and invention is not always clear, and new products and services
may involve some aspects of both approaches. Both have the effect of maximising
(or at least improving) the infrastructural potential which can be accessed by the
protagonist in fulfillment of their performance, and/or providing interfaces which
allow new protagonists to access an infrastructure to which they were previously
excluded by lack of the appropriate interface. As such, the influence of innovation
and invention upon the infrastructural layer is predominantly experienced as in
increase in demand, which can be responded to through adjustments to standards
and regulations, or capacity expansion (or both).
4.2 Methodology: historical mode
Having built the model and explained the dynamics it captures, we can move on
to explaining how it is used as part of the methodology, starting with the first of
two modes, the historical. To reiterate: the role of the historical mode is to explore
the dynamics of historical changes in the constitution of the assemblages which
underpin a particular practice. Or, more simply: the analytical mode uses the
trialectic model as a lens for studying sociotechnical change over long periods of
time.
4.2.1 Populating the model
This methodology seeks to understand the variety of potential assemblages which
might fulfil a performance of a given practice-as-entity at a given location in times-
pace. As such, the practice-as-entity under study must remain constant across the
entire analysis: it is the independent variable. The protagonist element in the
model represents an individual (or their proxy, performing on their behalf) and
their desire to perform the practice under analysis; as such, the protagonist is also
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fairly stable throughout the process, allowing somewhat for the way in which ex-
trinsic factors (e.g. sociocultural, commercial/economic, political) may modify the
particular parameters of performance which they seek to maximise.
Having determined the practice under analysis, the next step is to determine
which infrastructure(s) might be involved in performances thereof. In many cases
(if not most), there are multiple possibilites—for example, a personal mobility
practice could be performed across the road network, the rail network, rivers and
canals, or the commercial airline network. Furthermore, it may be that any given
performance might make use of multiple infrastructures. Consider the (idealised)
map in Figure 4.4 on page 59:
Figure 4.4: Idealised transport network map
As can be seen, a protagonist wishing to transport themselves from Town A to
Town D has more than one possible route open to them; furthermore, each route
involves the enrollment of more than one infrastructure. The aim of this method-
ology is not to describe the options and parameters of specific journeys, however.
Rather, it is aimed at exploring the range of choices available to a range of pro-
tagonists seeking to fulfill a particular practice-as-entity in a particular location in
timespace; in this case, the practice is personal mobility, or getting oneself from
A to D. The model is therefore applied to a single infrastructure at a time: the
practice-as-entity remains the master independent variable throughout the analy-
sis, while each deployment of the model also treats the infrastructure layer as an
independent variable. This leaves the interface layer as the dependent variable.
Of course, considered over historical timespans, the infrastructural layer un-
dergoes changes of its own, in response to accumulating changes in performances
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and interfaces that make use of it. Given that this methodology is particularly
concerned with the dynamics of sociotechnical transitions at the level of the en-
tire assemblage, and further given that research resources are limited, the next
stage is to look at the historical development of the infrastructure currently under
analysis with the aim of identifying moments at which significant changes in the
assemblage took place, and at which significant changes were resisted or deferred.
Having identified these moments, they are taken as temporal anchors for a more
detailed study of the infrastructure’s constitution at that time, and of the array of
interfaces which were available for use.
In such situations where there is only one interface-type through which the
infrastructure could be enrolled, the analysis would be a simple case of following
a linear succession of ever-better devices and/or services as they replaced their
obsolete predecessors. However, such situations are extremely rare, if not entirely
absent: rather than there being a single interface option, there is instead what we
might think of metaphorically as a ‘market’ of options, each catering to different
performances by emphasising certain parameters and de-emphasising others. As
such, the interface layer most often represents a range of possible interface choices
for the protagonist of any given specific performance, as shown in figure 4.5 on
page 60.
Figure 4.5: Unpacking the interface layer
As discussed in the literature review, “transitions” are a phenomenon pertain-
ing to populations rather than individuals. The concept addresses an aggregate of
choices rather than discrete changes of habit or practice: one person selling their
car and buying a bicycle does not mark a transition, but a significant proportion
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of a population taking to two wheels rather than four represents something with
more systemic significance. As such, we can unpack the model still further, so as
to show what the interface layer represents in analytical terms, as in figure 4.6 on
page 61.
Figure 4.6: Interface layer considered as distribution of traffic types
However, recall that the practice-as-entity (e.g. “getting from A to D”) is the
master independent variable, and that the infrastructural layer is effectively stable
within the context of each analytical moment. As such, the vectors of influence
upon the interface layer (HKJ, S&R) are likewise fairly stable within the context of
any given analytical moment. HKJ influences are bound up with the teleology of
the practice-as-entity, which is to say with the fulfillment of a specific goal or pur-
pose, and can as such be considered in the abstract throughout the analysis (while
making allowances for cultural-contextual modifications to that teleology where
appropriate), but each moment necessitates a close study of the infrastructural
standards and regulations which pertained at the time.
So the next step is to make a close study of the interface-types available in
the moment under analysis, paying particular attention to the manner in which
their design parameters respond to particular protagonist use-cases (thus cater-
ing to particular performances over others), and how their invention or iteration
responds to the standards and regulations which pertain to the supporting infras-
tructural layer(s). These dialectics of desire between the the elements of the model
will thus illustrate the performance parameters which inform the choices being
made.
Having populated the model for a given analytical moment, we can move to
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the second step of the analytical mode, in which the model is used as a framework
upon which to map the social articulations which mediate the vectors of influence
and stabilise the assemblage. Or, by way of simplification: with the model having
captured the vital material elements of the assemblage and traced the vectors of
influence between them, the next step is to capture and represent the interlock-
ing control and influence exerted over the elements by organisations, institutions,
communites, and other (predominantly, but not exclusively) social actants.
4.2.2 Mapping the articulations
The objective of the articulatory mapping process is to capture the most significant
social actants involved in structuring the the sociotechnical assemblage which is
represented by the the trialectic model, and to indicate the relationships between
those actants, within which the dynamics of influence and change are negotiated,
and the assemblage (de)stabilised.
Through close study of historical sources, the pertinent social actants are iden-
tified: these will include infrastructure trusts and companies, institutions of gov-
ernance, craftspersons and manufacturers, communities-of-practice and alliances-
of-interest... and even, in some cases, other infrastructural assemblages. These
actants are then “mapped” in overlay upon the model of the assemblage, so as
to indicate which elements and/or vectors the actant has control of or influence
upon. As more actants are mapped onto the same diagram, the areas in which they
overlap are indicative of relationships between those actants which are specifically
concerned with the assemblage under study. By way of demonstration, refer to
Figure 4.7 on page 63.
In Figure 4.7, Actant A [green] is shown as having considerable influence over
the infrastuctural layer, some influence over the interface layer, and further in-
fluence over both of the lower vectors (S&R, I&I); that sort of strong influence
would likely belong to a state agency of some kind. Actant B [mauve] has less
influence over the protagonist than it has over the interface layer, and its influ-
ence is focussed on the DP vector; this might be a regulatory body or a consumer
group seeking to influence the design of technologies or services in use in the as-
semblage. Actant C [yellow], meanwhile, exerts more influence over the interface
layer than it does over the infrastructure layer, but its influence is expressed only
over the I&I vector; this might be a vehicle manufacturer. Considered together, it
becomes clear that all three actants are in negotiation with the other two, and that
those negotiations are at their most intense and tangled around the interface layer
and the S&R and I&I vectors; the infrastructure layer, positioned as it is entirely
within Actant A but no other, is effectively under the exclusive control of Actant
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Figure 4.7: Articulatory mapping (generic example)
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A (while still influencing and being influenced by the interface layer itself).∗
The areas of overlap are of particular interest, because they indicate those
relationships within which the possible parameters of a performance are nego-
tiated, and through which the assemblage is articulated: the character of these
negotiations—their success or failure, their antagonism or co-operativism—contribute
to the stability or instability of the assemblage. These relationships make for the
obduracy or plasticity of a sociotechnical assemblage; they are where change is
born, or strangled.
And this is why, if one were to do a full “production run” with this method-
ology, the articulatory map would be only the beginning of the research, rather
than its final output. To put it in the terminology of Actor-Network Theory, the
actants represented in the diagram are only the very outermost “black boxes”
within which the networks of relationships which constitute the assemblage are
concealed; it is through prising open these black boxes with the crowbar of re-
search, and zooming in more closely on those relationships—by “reassembling the
social”, as Latour would put it—that the dynamics of sociotechnical change can be
traced. And in doing so, one also prises open the black box labelled “transition”—
which may permit a more thorough understanding and definition of that term.
To reiterate an earlier point: this methodology is necessitated by the plurality
of practices, interfaces and infrastructures, and by the requirement for analyti-
cal portability across a variety of cases. The front-line research methods to be
deployed within it – which is to say predominantly desk-based and/or archival
ethnographic enquiry, closely informed by the epistemology of Actor-Network
Theory – are well established; however, the model and methodology themselves
are a novel alternative to the prevailing modes of enquiry in the study of so-
ciotechnical change, not least in their ability to direct qualitative research toward
the material relationships between actants which are ignored by prevailing mod-
els, such as the Multi-Level Perspective.
4.2.3 Historical method
The trialectic model and methodology outlined in the previous sections of this
chapter necessiates a base process of historical research from which the required
data might be gathered. This section defines a method for guiding that process,
and explores the choices which had to be made prior to beginning it.
∗It bears repeating that the trialectic model and the articulatory map are relational representa-
tions, and in no way spatial; influence can, and often does, work at considerable distances (which
is, ironically, itself an infrastructural phenomenon). Spatial proximity certainly has a role to play in
transitions, but it is too granular a phenomena to be captured at this highly abstract level of analysis.
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Site selection: why Sheffield?
Given this project’s stated fidelity to Haraway’s notion of situated research, it is
necessary to first select a site upon which the study should focus. The trialectic
model implicitly assumes a universality regarding the relationships it describes,
but given the background of its architect, that universality should perhaps be
delimited to the context of the "developed" or “Western” world, or even to that
of the British Isles. Within that contextual delimit, however, there is an extent to
which the selection of a specific site is arbitrary: it doesn’t matter where you pick,
so long as you pick somewhere.
As such, the city of Sheffield (and its surroundings) is no better or worse than
any other—except in terms of ease of access for a researcher located within the
city, where it obviously scores very highly. That said, the comparative paucity of
attention paid thus far the infrastructural history of what was undeniably one of
the great industrial cities could be taken as further justification: it seems likely
that few would deny that Sheffield has shaped and been shaped by infrastructural
development, but the story has yet to be told in those terms.
Practice selection: why freight logistics?
Having selected a site for the study, the next step is to identify the independent
variable, namely the practice-as-entity in whose reconfiguration over time we are
interested.
To reiterate: the practice-as-entity is a constellation of all of the meanings, com-
petencies and materials which might possibly combine in the course of fulfilling
a certain aim or purpose; a practice-as-performance, by contrast, is one particular
and distinct combination of meanings, competencies and materials which fulfils
a particular and distinct expression of a certain aim or purpose. In other words,
the practice-as-entity, being defined by its teleology or purpose, is persistent over
time, but the ways in which that practice are actually performed will change across
timespace, due to the differing availability of the appropriate meanings, compe-
tencies and materials. Or, more simply still: the practice-as-entity is the sum
total of ways and means relating to what the protagonist wants to do, while the
practice-as-performance is the way they actually do it.
This project’s aim is to make infrastructure legible, which implies a systemic
consideration of infrastructure as a category rather than the consideration of a
single discreet system: it seeks to understand something fundamental. As such,
freight logistics seems a valid choice of practice-as-entity, given it is the earliest
and most fundamental of the infrastructural functions, and—in the British isles,
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at least—it was the first non-gubernatorial practice to be substantially affected by
infrastructural development. Freight logistics are foundational to the vast majority
of contemporary practices, whether domestic or commercial, yet that very ubiquity
leads to the illegibility with which this project is concerned; turning the analytical
spotlight onto this understudied yet fundamental practice thus feels eminently
appropriate.
The breadth of freight logistics as a practice-as-entity has an additional advan-
tage, the first aspect of which is that it allows for the basic stability of the pro-
tagonist entity throughout a long historical analysis: put plainly, this means that
the protagonist’s motivations are essentially the same, regardless of where they’re
located, what they’re trying to ship, or what period in history they’re working in.
(In practice, as shall be shown, there is a need to differentiate between the desires
and preferences of protagonists involved with different freight types, but working
through these more subtle differences is exactly what the trialectic is designed to
do.)
The second advantageous aspect of the breadth of freight logistics as a practice-
as-entity is that it forces the analysis to work with more than one infrastructural
system, which in turn opens up the possibility of following sociotechnical change
not only within any particular infrastructure, but across multiple infrastructures
at once. This helps to avoid the generic heroic narratives of innovation generated
by models like the MLP which, through their focus on the technology rather than
the practice, cannot help but produce accounts of the success or failure of one
particular way of doing things: by focussing instead on a broad and infrastructure-
agnostic practice such as freight logistics, more complex narratives detailing the
changing variety and distribution of different performances in timespace can be
produced.
Sources, sampling and structural strategy
In essence, the strategy governing the research process is an archival equivalent
to the snowball sampling method of informant recruitment: a gradual “drilling
down” to specific local details from regional or national generalities. The first
stage is to use general top-level sources to construct and populate a rough time-
line or history which charts the rise and fall of infrastructures and interfaces of rel-
vance to the practice-as-entity under study: this provides a frame through which
to search for and analyse more local and specific expressions of the dynamics of
sociotechnical change. So, by way of example, having identified the major eras of
roadbuilding and road vehicle development in Britain, those eras may then pro-
vide a periodisation through which road and road vehicle developments specific
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to the site of the study might be identified.
While this methodology is historical, it is not aimed at producing history, but
rather at generating productive anthropological readings of history; as such, it es-
chews the use of primary archival sources, thus avoiding the highly specialised
work of assessing and interpreting original historical documents. By way of main-
taining faith with the situatedness of the trialectic methodology, the strategy is
to always seek out the most localised and specific secondary historical sources
available. This means that a source directly germane to Sheffield and surrounds
will always take first preference, but where such is not available, the nearest avail-
able approximation must suffice—so, in the absence of a Sheffield-specific source,
sources specific to South Yorkshire or Derbyshire would take next preference, fol-
lowed by sources dealing with “the East Midlands” or regions of a similar scale,
followed by sources dealing with a more nebulous geographical distinction such
as north/south, and with national-scale sources being the final recourse in the
absence of anything more specific.
Within this broader strategy of data surveying, the trialectic model serves as
its own sampling strategy: the secondary sources are scoured for references to the
specifics of a performance which might provide evidence for the competing de-
sires and influences that the trailectic model describes. Such details may include
the physical standards of a given infrastructure, the design features of a given
interface, the options available in a given service, or the particular way in which
a particular commodity is dealt with in a particular place and time—any detail
whatsoever which allows the researcher to truly envisage the practice in the mo-
ment of its performance, and thus interpret it from the perspective of the actors
enrolled in it.
With the sampling process complete, the analysis may begin. Historical anal-
yses tend to be structured chronologically, for obvious reasons; time is central to
our understanding of narrative, after all. The obvious way to proceed would thus
be to identify a series of historical “moments” in which the articulated trialectic
appears to be, if not stable, then in a state of balance or equilibrium: the articu-
lations and contestations in play during these moments would therefore speak to
the consequences of the previous state of equilibrium, and to the preconditions of
the subsequent state.
However, in a case such as freight logistics—a practice in which at least three
major infrastructures are implicated—a single chronological narrative which had
to span multiple systems would quickly become complicated and hard to follow.
Furthermore, a multi-system narrative would be obliged to select for analytical
moments which were relevant across all the systems in the frame, thus presenting
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a methodological restriction which might necessitate the jettisoning of otherwise
valuable and pertinent data.
Therefore the chronological approach is applied instead to each implicated
infrastructural system in turn, following the chronological order of their devel-
opment: systematic intervention in the roads preceded the systematic building
of waterways, which in turn preceded the systematic building of railways. This
order further reflects the observation that any given infrastructure or interface
implicitly includes the existence of all the other preexisting infrastructures in its
design brief—or, more simply, that what came before informs and shapes that
which comes next, and no invention of significance takes place in sociotechnical
vacuum. Again, while this strategy adds complexity to the methodology, it simul-
taneously frees it to range more broadly in search of patterns and precedents than
prevailing approaches, and opens up a space for exploring intricate narratives of
sociotechnical contestation and/or cooperation not only between the elements of
one particular assemblage, but between different assemblages.
That said, it bears noting that this separation of systems is entirely an arte-
fact of the analytical method, and that in producing a rigorous account of the
development of any one infrastructural system implicated in the freight logistics
practice-as-entity, it will at some point become necessary to consider its linkages
and contestations with other such systems. Therefore while the analytical chapters
that follow are titled in such a way as to tie them to a specific infrastructure (i.e.
roads, waterways, railways), the chapter on the roads is not “just about the roads”;
rather, it’s about the performance of freight logistics as a multi-systemic practice
as it appears when seen from the perspective of the roads assemblage. All three
chapters will necessarily and productively speak to one another, but their chrono-
logical ordering means that this analytical crosstalk will become more obvious as
the reader progresses through them.
One final thing bears noting about freight logistics as a practice, however: it is
a practice in which the protagonist rarely performs the practice themselves, and
instead passes responsibility for fulfillment of the performance over to a commer-
cial agent (or agents) who perform the logistical operations on their behalf. To use
a modern example, the production controller of a a widgets firm might dispatch
five batches of widgets to various clients in various locations over the course of a
week, but the extent of his own involvement (or even that of his own warehouse
staff) in the actual logistics probably goes no further than boxing, weighing and
labelling the goods to be shipped, and requesting a collection from a courier com-
pany on the appropriate day. Therefore the courier firm, by way of its drivers and
warehouse staff and vehicles, acts as a proxy agent for the protagonist: while the
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latter instigates the performance, it is the proxy which executes it.
What this means for the use of the trialectic model is that, when exploring
the Design Protocol (DP) vectors of influence as they affect the Protagonist, the
immediate physical affordances of the interface technologies being used to fulfil a
freight logistics performance are not as important as the design protocols inform-
ing the commercial service within which the use of said technologies is bundled
up. Our production controller may well see the first of a succession of vehicles
which will carry his widgets when it arrives to collect the shipment, but that’s as
much contact as he will have with the tangible materiality of the sociotechnical
stack which does his bidding. The top speed of the lorry or the comfort of the
cab are anathema to him; of far greater interest are such configurational factors as
cost, collection times, delivery speed, simple booking procedures.
Of course, the configuration of a service is intimately related to the affordances
of the system which is used to deliver said service, and that relationship is one
of many which the following analysis intends to reveal. But it bears noting that
proxy practices therefore present a little more of an explanatory challenge to the
trialectic model than would a simpler practice performed directly by its instigating
protagonists, and that in a number of cases notions of service design and technol-
ogy design will require some sustained untangling in the analysis to follow.
4.3 Methodology: speculative mode
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the second, speculative mode of
this methodology is a partial fulfillment of RQ2: it allows the findings generated
by the analytical mode to inform a narrative prototyping method through which
proposed sociotechnical assemblages of the future might be interrogated from
the perspective of the people who might use them, and tested against a variety
of potential socioeconomic circumstances. Or, more simply: by drawing on the
historical dynamics of change revealed by the application of the analytical mode,
scenario-creation and narrative techniques can be combined so as to “stress test”
the deployment of a novel infrastructural system.
It should be emphasised at this point that the speculative mode of this method-
ology is not in any way intended to be predictive, despite its deliberate détourne-
ment of some tools and techniques often used for predictive forecasting and strat-
egy development wherein a “preferred future” or strategy or vision is generated as
a potential policy or business goal. On the contrary, rather than asking “what will
happen?” or “what should happen?”, the speculative methodology asks instead
“what might happen, and what difficulties might result?”. (For an explanation of
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the distinction between Predictive, Normative and Exploratory scenarios, please
refer back to section 2.2 of this thesis.) The speculative methodology is not in-
tended as a replacement for Predictive or Normative futures practices, but as a
supplement to them—a process that fulfils an evaluative role related to that of the
cost-benefit analysis or the physical prototype, but operating in the qualitative and
non-linear dimensions of possibility. The speculative mode is designed to take the
outputs of Predictive or Normative futures processes and subject them to stress-
testing through exposure to the sorts of improbably but not implausible contextual
constraints which are, by epistemological and methodological necessity, excluded
and externalised from projections and models rooted in the extrapolation of linear
trends.
The speculative mode therefore might be thought of as a constructed encounter
with non-linearity—and while non-linear outcomes, by definition, cannot be pre-
dicted, they can nonetheless be imagined; they cannot be planned for, but they can
be planned against by recourse to simulations of worst-case contexts, just as a new
material or device is routinely exposed to physical and operational stresses far
and beyond those which its designers expect it to ever encounter in deployment.
(Another analogy might be to training in the martial arts: one cannot predict the
sequence of attacks an opponent might deploy in the ring, but by training oneself
against a hypothetical selection of the worst possible attacks one can imagine be-
ing deployed, one thereby increases one’s likelihood of responding with a suitable
defence when faced with an unexpected combination of moves.)
As such, the speculative mode relies on the sort of dramatic exaggeration of
circumstance that is familiar to readers or viewers of science fiction: the point is
not to imply that the scenarios so generated will happen, but to consider the types
of outcomes that might result if that type of non-linearity did indeed manifest.
This is not pessimism or Luddism, but critical thinking applied to the context (or
“ambience”, to use the language of complexity science) which is necessarily as-
sumed to be “outside” of any quantitative model or simulation; it is an attempt
not to predict the unpredictable, but to allow an imagined scenario to stand as
a proxy for the unpredictable. The “trigger story” or plot which informs the se-
lection of the axes used to generate the scenario parameters is merely a narrative
convenience, a frame that helps the parameters hang together in a coherent, dis-
tinctive and dramatically engaging manner. It should have some basis in reality, in
that it should root its non-linearity in a breach from contemporary trends, but the
scenarios thus created should be deliberately extreme: not worst-case in the sense
of an asteroid strike coming out of nowhere, but worst-case in the sense of things
diverging drastically beyond the projection of linear trends. Such projections of
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linear trends are already “baked in” to the Predictive or Normative modelling
processes which the speculative methodology is intended to supplement—going
beyond those trends, using the Exploratory approach to futures in order to venture
into the uncharted badlands where the models cannot go, is entirely the point of
the speculative mode outlined herein.
4.3.1 Building the speculative assemblage
The first stage of the speculative mode is similar to the handling of a single his-
torical moment in the analytical mode: the model is populated with pertinent
elements and influences, and the articulatory actants are then mapped around the
model of the assemblage. The crucial difference is that the speculative mode, deal-
ing as it does with possible future configurations, relies upon a mix of informed
speculation alongside the findings gleaned from the historical-analytical mode.
However, the process is not one of invention sui generis, not a mere making-it-up.
It is instead analogous to the engineering practice of “running the numbers” on
a complex project—a qualitative equivalent to the paper prototype, in which the
speculation is grounded in precedent.
The building of the assemblage has two phases, just as in the historical mode:
the iteration of the trialectic model (see section 4.2.1 above), and the mapping
of the articulatory entities (see section 4.2.2 above). While these processes are
broadly similar in both modes, a closer look at the specifics will reveal that there
is a clear movement of structured knowledge from the analytical mode and into
the speculative, even as the methodology eventually gives way to pure fabulation.
This is an unusual approach to an increasingly commonplace challenge. Spec-
ulation on the rate of uptake of new technologies is far from uncommon—on the
contrary, it’s a lively industry, with the detailed findings derived from proprietary
frameworks such as Gartner’s “hype cycle” approach (see e.g. Fenn, Raskino, &
Burton, 2017) often held up as paradigmatically rigorous. But Gartner’s approach
is in fact paradigmatic in other respects: firstly, it always focusses on the technol-
ogy or “innovation” as the subject (and hero) of its (explicitly standardised and
generic) narrative; secondly, it focusses on technologies in isolation, rather than
as an element within a system-of-systems context in which all the other elements
are constantly changing in interaction with one another. Furthermore, such ap-
proaches usually consider historical data in order to support their extrapolatory
trends, but that data is rarely situated or specific to a certain location.
The trialectic approach to speculating on sociotechnical change, as outlined be-
low, differs on all these fronts: it is concerned more with the practice to which the
technology is being applied than with the technology itself; it thus considers new
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technologies as just one option among a number of established and/or compet-
ing alternatives; and it situates that consideration within a spatial understanding
of the infrastructural underpinnings available to technologies both new and old,
which might affect their viability on a number of factors.
To put it another way, the “hype cycle” approach sees a notion such as “the
driverless car”, and attempts to position this seemingly discrete invention within
a near-term future context based on the extrapolation of market trends. The argu-
ment of this thesis is that such an isolated treatment of technology is missing an
important point, namely the mutual entanglement of multiple infrastructures, as
well as the inescapably social aspects of technological and infrastructural reconfig-
urations. By contrast, the trialectic approach sees “the driverless car” as a number
of pre-existing technologies (supported by their attendant infrastructures) being
combined into a novel “bundle”, which is then considered as a potential entrant
into the array of well-established interface options already available to protago-
nists seeking personal transportation functions; the trialectic approach then at-
tempts to situate the fulfilment of the protagonist’s performance through that new
bundle within the context of the technological and infrastructural configurations
already available in the location in question. Or, to speak more generally, the tri-
alectic framework allows for a explicitly metasystemic sociotechnical analysis that
considers multiple infrastructural systems and interfaces simultaneously in a spe-
cific locational context, rather than the more isolated, placeless and extrapolative
techno-economic analysis offered by approaches such as Gartner’s.
Populating the model
Having identified a proposed technology (or technologies) for assessment, the first
task is to introduce it into the trialectic model.
This is simple, in some respects, but it is dependent on having already per-
formed a historical analysis of the practice-as-entity with which one’s speculation
is concerned. In other words, in order to explore the possible reconfiguration of
personal hygiene practices, one must have already traced their development both
generally (i.e. at the scale of nations), and in the specific situated context (i.e. in
a particular city or region); as a result, one will already have a model of the con-
temporary assemblage, to which the new technology under study can be added.
Also, the majority of such new technologies occupy the interface layer, not only
because genuinely novel infrastructural systems are notable for their absence (e.g.
fibre optic broadband is, functionally speaking, an iteration of the telegraph line,
and never truly succeeded telegraphy so much as evolved from it), but because
they are increasingly improbable, due to the sunk costs of building new networks
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to a scale that would enable them to compete with a deeply incumbent system,
and to the path-dependencies of practices within which infrastructural function
has become completely habituated (which is to say the vast majority of practices).
Put simply, intervention in the contemporary assemblage increasingly happens at
the interface layer because that’s the only point in the assemblage where swapping
one element out for another is remotely practical, let alone profitable.∗
Furthermore, many “new technologies” are actually convergences of two or
more existing technologies, or represent devices (whether old or new) reconfig-
ured as part of a service offering. Take, for example, the “self-driving car”, which
is routinely presented as a spectacular irruption of the novel into personal and
public transport futures alike: with reference to the trialectic model, the self-
driving car represents little change in purely technological terms; the core teleol-
ogy of the practices in which it would be enrolled (namely the personal-mobility
bundle) is still fulfilled through the same basic device-type (small vehicle, inter-
nal combustion engine) running on the same infrastructures (road network plus
global petroleum supply chain). If we then consider the extant ubiquity of satnavs
or other devices with mapping and navigation funtions, the self-driving car’s per-
manent reliance on wireless telecomms, cloud computing and the GPS system is
revealed not to be novel, but merely a degree more acute.
Indeed, the change that the self-driving car truly represents for personal mo-
bility practices in any realistic scenario of deployment will manifest in the artic-
ulation of the assemblage as much as in its elements, if not much more so: a
significant step toward the vehicle being hired as a material component of a con-
tracted service, and a departure from the paradigm of personal vehicle ownership
which has pertained in the UK for at least half a century.
In terms of the speculative trialectic model, then, the significant changes are
not to be found in the elements themselves—which, recall, will still contain all
the “legacy modes” for the fulfilment of personal mobility performances, along-
side the new or novel option under study—but in the relationships between the
elements (as expressed through the vectors of influence), and the mediations and
contestations of those relationships by a reconfigured network of articulatory ac-
tants.
As such, having introduced the novel element or elements into the model, the
∗However, this is not at all to say that one couldn’t use this methodology to prototype a gen-
uinely novel infrastructure; it is merely to point out that any such speculation would be necessarily
far less grounded in clear precedents of sociotechnical stucturation, and would furthermore describe
a circumstance whose realisation is exceptionally unlikely. Lessons might well be learned from
such projects—indeed, the EPRSC project “All in One” involved the development of prototypes for
highly speculative infrastructural constitutions—but those lessons would not have the same bearing
on questions relating to sociotechnical change as a process, which are the core concern of this thesis.
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vectors of influence must be reconsidered in light of the new or changed relation-
ships arising from that introduction. Returning to the example of the self-driving
car: its more acute connection to (or reliance upon) wireless telecomms infrastruc-
ture and GPS represents a significant pressure for increased capacity and reliabil-
ity (I&I vector), to which those infrastructures would need to respond, and which
they would inevitably counter to some extent through new standards and regu-
lations for use (S&R); likewise, the vehicle-as-a-service business model represents
a significant change in design protocols (DP) as experienced by the protagonist,
which in turn will shape (and be shaped by) the parameters of the protagonist’s
desired performance (HKJ). An appreciation of the character and dynamics of
these agonisms provides part of the evidence base for the speculative articulations
of the second phase: by understanding the contestations of the past, we are better
placed to speculate upon the contestations of the future.
Articulating the assemblage
Much as in the analytical mode, the articulation process involves identifying high-
level actants involved in the mediation of the influences and contestations atten-
dant on a particular assemblage; the principle difference is that, given the as-
semblage in question is itself speculative, the articulation is likewise an act of
imagination.
But it is not a creation ex nihilo. As remarked above, the speculative assemblage
is a response to a consideration of the relational consequences of an assemblage
which, while partly reconfigured (whether through the introduction of novel tech-
nologies or services), is nonetheless preexisting; many existing articulatory actants
will persist into times yet to come, even as the introduction of new ones (and the
demise and diminishment of older ones) results in the reconfiguration of the re-
lationships between them. Novel technologies find their place in the assemblage
among and alongside the technologies which we’ve been using for years; no mat-
ter what the word “transition” may imply, assemblages are not replaced whole-
sale overnight, but reconfigured piecemeal over years, if not decades. As such,
knowing what (and who) is currently involved in the articulation of any given
assemblage is the best guide for speculation on possible future configurations and
articulations of that assemblage.
Furthermore, the speculative articulation is informed by broader precedents of
articulation; this is why a situated longitudinal analysis holding the practice-as-
entity as an independent variable (i.e. the analytical mode already described) is a
necessary precondition for success (or at least rigour) in the speculative mode. The
stability of the model throughout such an analysis provides a stable set of relation-
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ships between elements, and this abstraction allows for comparisons regarding the
manner of their mediation, wherein the exact technologies and systems enrolled
are less important than the functions which they exist to fulfill. This can be seen as
refusal of the solutionist impulse to privilege the role of technology in sociotech-
nical change, and as honouring the demand-side focus implicit in social practice
theory (see literature review).
Or, more simply: the speculative articulation process, while anchored to a
materialist model based on a relational ontology, indulges necessarily in the ab-
straction and comparison of functionally similar but technologically dissimilar
systems—but it does so only because there is no other realistic recourse. In the
absence of verifiable data, futures can only ever be generated from the projection
of abstractions; if the historical structuration of assemblage relationships turns out
not to provide useful examples of precedent for the future articulation of assem-
blages, it is hard to imagine wherelse, if anywhere, one might seek for such.
But in order to compare such different assemblages as those pertaining to
the fulfilment of a given practice throughout history—which is to say: multiple
performances involving multitudinous interfaces, and a variety of infrastructures
which may well be incomparable on a purely material level—the researcher must
abstract out to the level of inter-assemblage relationships and contestations in or-
der to identify possible precedents without getting tangled up in their technical
specifics. Or, more plainly: while abstraction is both a risky strategy and some-
what counter to the letter of materialist research paradigms such as social practice
theory and A-NT (though not, I would argue, counter to their spirit), it nonethe-
less offers what might be the only useful way in which one might compare what
was and what is with what might yet be.
And so, returning to our exemplary self-driving car: the articulation process
would involve examining the vectors of influence as altered by its introduction
into the contemporary assemblage, determining which existing actants are impli-
cated in mediating the resulting relationships, and identifying any influences that
remain unmediated; these latter unmediated relationships may then be accom-
modated by a change in the territorial “shape” of one or more existing actants as
mapped over the trialectic model, or by the introduction of new actants to the map,
or both. These speculative articulations should refer, where possible, to precedents
found in earlier articulations, particularly those in which the relationships between
elements, influences and existing actants can be seen to share characteristics with
the speculative system under study. In other words, if the speculative assemblage
contains a new contestation between an infrastructure company and a product-
design community-of-practice (as might well be the case with the self-driving car,
76 4.3. Methodology: speculative mode
for instance), the analyst should then refer to those historical moments in which
contestations arose between elements or actants of a similar kind, and thus to the
character of the resulting relationships, the asymmetries of their agonisms, and
so forth. For example, the advent of driverless cars promises to involve the entry
of a number of new and powerful industrial players into the roads assemblage;
as such, useful precedents for the resulting contestations might be found in other
eras (or indeed other assemblages) which feature a similar influx of “disruptor”
actors.
The output of the speculative model and articulation will therefore be a model
assemblage, based around the same elements and relationships used in the historical-
analyticial mode—but unlike the historical models, it will necessarily lack a con-
text. Generating a context (or contexts) against which to prototype the assemblage
is the second stage of the speculative mode.
4.3.2 Setting the speculative assemblage in context
In one sense, the entire speculative mode of this methodology can be described as
a prototyping process: the purpose is not merely to imagine a possible assemblage,
but to test it.
However, it is not a technical prototyping process, intended to uncover design
flaws in new devices or services; nor is it an evaluation akin to the cost-benefit
analysis. Quantitative methodologies of evaluation are plentiful, but many fail
to consider the social alongside the technical—and those methodologies which
do consider the social often do so in problematic ways. Historical analyses of
infrastructural change, even as performed within the framework of the Multi-
Level Perspective, make it clear that sociotechnical change takes place in a broader
social, political and economic context, and is ineluctably shaped by that context—
particularly with regard to prevailing attitudes to institutional interventions, and
to the dynamics of inter-actant relationships. By way of example, the earliest
infrastructural revolutions—turnpikes, canal and navigations, and the first decade
or so of the railway boom—took their forms due, in some significant part, to the
laissez faire economic doctrine which prevailed across Britain as mercantilism gave
way to early capitalism; similarly, the post-ww2 transport systems were (re)shaped
in a context of muscular and interventionist state socialism.
“The future” is uncertain and unknowable, only “a plastic possibility imma-
nent in the present” (Raven & Elahi, 2015). All that we can be sure of is that things
will be different in some way, and to some degree; that the context will have
changed. The purpose of this prototyping process, then, is to take the technical
prototypes of the proposed new technologies at their own word (i.e. assuming that
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their technical offer is both plausible and buildable, if not necessarily profitable),
and then to ask whether an equally plausible articulation of that technical offer
can be identified. But while technological devices perform in much the same way
regardless of the social context, the same is not true of social and sociotechnical
actants—and so the task at hand is to assess the speculative assemblage against the
socioeconomic and political circumstances in which it might end up operating: is
it, in other words, compatible with the context? And if not, in which relationships
or actants might that incompatibility or dysfunction be manifest?
The matrix: generating a suite of divergent futures
The simplest way to prototype a system against future change would be to test it
against a context based on predictive trends and extrapolations from the present
day. However, if we understand “the future” as being plastic and uncertain, pro-
totyping against a single projected future is both short-sighted and unambitious;
testing against many possible futures, by contrast, offers the opportunity for a
more thorough assessment that accounts for the “risk” represented by the uncer-
tainty of future circumstances. By testing against multiple futures, one gets more
than a simple “pass” or “fail”; rather, one acquires an awareness not only of the
possibility of success or failure, but also of the parameters and conditions of success
or failure—in other words, in what sort of future is it more likely to succeed or fail?
This “divergent futures” approach is well established in scenario practices from
futures studies and strategic foresight (both within the academy and without), to
the extent that simple off-the-peg methods for generating suites of related-yet-
divergent futures are commonplace, as discussed in section 2.2 of the literature
review. One such method, often known as the “2x2 matrix”, is a simple yet versa-
tile way to generate a suite of four related yet divergent futures for such a purpose.
Due to that versatility, it is more easily demonstrated in action than in the abstract,
and so the discussion that follows draws upon a matrix prepared for Raven (2014),
reproduced here as Figure 4.8 on page 78.
The 2x2 matrix plots the interaction of two high-level contextual trends. Each
axis represents a spectrum of outcomes related to a particular dimension of con-
textual change, broadly understood. In this matrix, which was developed for a
global-scale project, the two dimensions of contextual change are Energy Availabil-
ity (x axis) and International Interaction (y axis). The dimensions are intentionally
broad and fuzzy, and intentionally mutually entangled: the breadth allows for
maximum interpretive room-to-maneuvre (which say to say that both the causes
and manifestations of Energy Availability are open to imaginative interpretation,
within the scope of plausibility), while the entanglement is intended to reflect the
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Figure 4.8: Example 2x2 scenario generation matrix prepared for Raven (2014)
inescapable multidimensionality of contextual change (which is to say that con-
text is intensely systemic, and the isolation of dimensions or variables from one
another is not reflective of real processes).
The axes have a positive and negative direction, representing trend divergence
from the origin-point of the status quo: thus the x axis extends out to Scarcity
(negative) and Abundance (positive), while the y axis runs between Co-operation
(negative) and Isolationism (positive). The valence of the trends is not necessarily
reflected by the valence of the axes—meaning that appearing on the negative side
of an axis does not necessarily correlate with a negative valuation of the trend in
question.∗
If this matrix were retooled for a national- or regional-level project, some ad-
justment of the dimensional definitions might be required. Energy Availability
could likely survive such a scalar shift without alteration, but International Inter-
action might be better reframed as Foreign Policy, thus reflecting the unilateral po-
sitionality of a national project; the phenomena and conditions represented by the
∗While there is no necessary heuristic of valuation implicit in the 2x2 matrix, some combination
of tradition and habit has resulted in the upper-right quadrant being typically the more desirable
or “preferred” future of the four, toward which the project is often (if only implicitly) attempting to
propel its participants; the matrix illustrated was a deliberate attempt to break this pattern.
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axis would likely not change a great deal, but the choice of label should nonethe-
less frame the dimension in such a way that it illustrates and echoes the contextual
scale with which the dimension is concerned.
Having determined the axes, the base properties of the four quadrants are es-
tablished: [energy scarcity + isolationism], top left; [energy abundance + isolation-
ism], top right; [energy scarcity + co-operation], bottom left; [energy abundance +
co-operation], bottom right. At this point in a more quantitatively-oriented study,
the quadrant properties might then be fleshed out with data and trends to give
the resulting scenarios a sense of rigour from extrapolation—indeed, in any “full
production run” of this methodology, it would be an opportunity missed not to
develop the scenarios more thoroughly, not least so that they might be used as the
basis for complementary analytical approaches.
For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to assign a series of parameters
to each axis which will define the basic circumstances of each scenario quadrant.
So, by reference to the example matrix above, the parameters of the Energy Avail-
ability axis might include Domestic Energy Prices (low for the quadrants on the
right, high for those on the left) and Population Mobility (low for the quadrants
on the left, high for those on the right), while the parameters of International
Interaction might include Diplomatic Style (warm and cooperative for the lower
quadrants, cold and standoffish for the upper quadrants) and Intervention Style
(unilateral for the upper quadrants, multilateral for the lower quadrants). When
collected together, the parameters for each quadrant thereby form the basis for the
scenario the quadrant represents.
The next step is to name each of the quadrants, much as one might name a
short story or film. Again, and as with the deliberate broadness of the dimensions
of change, the point is to create an imaginative space—to literally conjure a world
using words alone. The resulting titles might be accompanied by a brief pen-sketch
of the scenario properties, but ideally they should have sufficient affect that they
suggest future images and circumstances without too much further prompting.
To use a regrettably topical and slightly flippant illustration: if one quadrant were
labelled Trumpistan and another Hillaryville, most audiences would have a fairly
instant idea of what would be going on in those particular futures! Though they
need not be so pointed or direct as that: the quadrant names in the example matrix
above were intended to allude to the state of the worlds to which they applied,
but in a manner that invites further curiosity rather than sating it. The point is to
provide a ready-made cognitive package or box into which the reader can easily
fold up the complex parameters of each quadrant without losing its narrative
essence: ideally, the title becomes an apposite and memorable placeholder for the
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scenario as a whole. Once named and defined, a brief account of how each future
came about should be produced; a simple timeline of major events will compound
the sense of verisimilitude, and make the futures depicted a bit more believable.
Note, however, that the quadrants should represent the plausible extremes of
the entangled dimensions—not quite the very best- and worst-case scenarios, per-
haps, but the divergence from the status quo should be deliberately drastic and
dramatic. This can be thought of as analogous to stress-testing a structure using
loads significantly beyond its designed operational parameters: drastic circum-
stances may expose problems (or, conceivably, advantages) which might not come
to light in a context less distant from the status quo within which the assemblage
was designed or proposed. The plausibility of the scenarios is very much subordi-
nate to their purpose, which is to provide a series of stress-test environments for
assessing the plausibility of the assemblage—and the most plausible assemblage
is that which can “survive” the greatest number of divergent, perhaps-not-so-
plausible contexts.
4.3.3 Narrative prototyping
Here at the end of the process, methodology must give way to something closer to
an artist’s statement-of-intent. By drawing upon the precedents for sociotechnical
change (or stasis) revealed by the analytical mode, and on the trialectic analysis of
the disruptor technology, the researcher’s next task is to imagine the consequences
of an attempt to deploy said technology in each of the four divergent futures
generated by the scenario matrix. There are two possible stages to this process of
fabulation: the first (and simplest) is what we might call a deployment sketch, and
the second is a full-blown short story.
The deployment sketch is just that: a high-level (third-person-omniscient) nar-
rative account that describes an attempt to deploy the disruptor, and the obstacles
and difficulties attending to it. As a genre, this form is stylistically similar to
historical accounts of sociotechnical change, such as are found in the Transitions
literature; the only difference is that the deployment sketch is an account of imag-
ined future sociotechnical change. (It might even be considered as equivalent to a
speculative discussion of the results gathered in the course of the analytical mode.)
The deployment sketch is sufficient to generate a critique of the disruptor tech-
nology which is understandable and plausible to experts, but in order to truly
return to the human perspective mandated by Social Practice Theory, the deploy-
ment sketch might become the basis of a short story which depicts the disruptor
technology from the perspective of protagonists making use of it (or trying to).
This would be a time-consuming end-game, but it offers the potential of present-
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ing the prototype to a far wider audience, thus despecialising a specialist topic
at the same time as providing a critical end-user’s perspective on sociotechnical
change which is so often lacking from infrastructural futures work.
Summary
This chapter began by developing a novel model of sociotechnical change known
as the infrastructural trialectic, and then used that model as the basis for the de-
velopment of a methodology for the historical analysis of sociotechnical change.
In the third and final section, the trialectic model and the historical methodology
were reconfigured from a historical modality into a speculative modality, which al-
lows the findings from the application of the historical mode to inform a narrative
prototyping exercise through which possible future (re)configurations of infras-
tructural assemblages might be assessed and critiqued in an accessible qualitative
form. The experimental application of the historical modality (thus completing
fulfillment of RQ1) will be documented in Chapter 5, while the application of the




A—Coordination: the evolution of
road freight
A preamble on sources
As described in section 4.2.3, the aim of the analytical portion of this thesis is
to generate an anthropological reading of sociotechnical history: to describe, in
other words, the specifics of the freight distribution function as informed by the
technologies and the social systems which combine to provide it and, as far is as
possible, to couch that description in the perspective of the person making use
of the service (whether directly or by proxy), rather than that of the technicians
providing it. This is an inherently interpretive and speculative enterprise in some
respects, and it is made somewhat more so by the paucity of sources specific to
the cases with which it is concerned.
As such, it was necessary to lean very hard on the limited sources which were
available, which were for the most part either broad histories of the infrastructures
in question; while there is no shortage of academic literature on infrastructural
topics, their disciplinary narrowness (and hence their highly specific analytical
focus) made them for the most part useless in the context of this project. Fur-
thermore, and in reflection of the cross-systemic perspective of this project, it was
necessary to synthesise the historical facts and dynamics found in the available
sources into a single coherent narrative.
Therefore any statement of broad or contextual fact in the analysis chapters of
this thesis (namely chapters 5, 6 and 7) which do not bear an inline citation should
be taken to be drawn from a synthesis of the sources pertinent to the chapter
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in question; in the case of this chapter, those sources are Albert (1972); Barker
and Gerhold (1995); Copeland (1968); Crofts (2006); Guldi (2012); Hey (1980) and
Hey (2010) in particular, though some degree of contextual information may have
been drawn from or corroborated by those sources with more direct pertinence
to chapters 6 and 7. Direct inline citations, therefore, should be taken to indicate
the sourcing of a unique and precise detail upon which the analysis is particularly
dependent.
While it would be desirable in some respects to provide direct references for
every statement of fact in what follows, actually doing so would render the results
all but unreadable. As such, the rigour of referencing has to some extent been sac-
rificed on the altar of readability. To describe the development and change occur-
ring in these systems at this scale and over such long periods of time necessitated
a narrative approach; that such an approach has limitations—particularly in rela-
tion to disciplinary expectations regarding form and style—is granted; however, it
is hoped that the resulting accounts demonstrate its unique advantages, also.
The structuring of the subsections serves to assist in the distinction between
data and analysis, as much as said distinction is practicably possible in such an
approach. The introduction and “Elements” subsections of each historical mo-
ment should be considered to represent statements of fact, to the extent that such
are possible regarding the period in question, except where the narration clearly
indicates a supposition or conjecture on the narrator’s part.
By contrast, the “Influences” and “Articulations” subsections of each histori-
cal moment should be considered to be predominantly speculative analysis based
upon the materials already cited and discussed; where it adds clarity, the intro-
duction of further specific data within these sections is accompanied by a direct
reference to its source wherever such is realistically possible.
For a discussion of the epistemological and methodological challenges inherent
in this research, particularly in regard to the the availability of and reliance upon
pertinent sources, the reader is directed to section 9.4.5 of the discussion chapter
of this thesis.
5.1 The Old Roads (early 1700s)
The early 1700s saw the first significant and systematic efforts at roadbuilding in
Britain since the Roman invasion; known as (General) Wade’s Roads, they were
built by the military to the purpose of putting down those parts of Scotland which
had risen up in the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, and effectively seeded the pro-
fessions of surveying and civil engineering. Outside of this highly instrumental
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Figure 5.1: Infrastructural trialectic with vectors of influence
military network, however, Britain’s roads were rarely worthy of the name.
Figure 5.2: Roads in the Sheffield region, early 1700s
The constitution and condition of the roads of this period will be discussed in
more detail below. But first, a brief summary of the distribution of those roads in
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the Sheffield region is provided, making reference to figure 5.2 on page 84.
The only road marked explicitly on figure 5.2 is what was then still known as
the Great North Road, the traditional and ancient overland route from London to
Edinburgh via the east midlands and York; the modern A1 follows pretty much
the same route. Prior to turnpiking, the Great North Road was the only north-
south overland of any significant capacity that passed close to Sheffield, but as
can be seen, it was never any closer than 15km from the town centre—and that
would be as the crow flies.
But why not simply send goods directly southwards from Sheffield? Figure
5.2 also features four grey arrows, which serve to indicate general vectors of trade
flowing out of (and into) the city. Counting clockwise from the upper left, the
first arrow indicates flows over the salt routes of the Longdendale Valley toward
Manchester and Liverpool. The salt routes were so named due to their long history
of being used to move salt and other such agricultural commodities across the
Pennines.
The second arrow indicates goods moving toward the Humber estuary, whence
they might travel on by ship to Europe, or to the southern counties. Prior to the
advent of turnpiking, to move a ton of coal—or indeed a ton of anything—10km
from its site of extraction or production would be to effectively double its price
(Barker & Gerhold, 1995, p18). Pure overland carriage all the way to the Humber
was hence possible in theory, but in practice overland carriage to Bawtry and
onward shipment by water starting on the River Idle was a cheaper and faster
option for those shipping goods with a high mass-to-value ratio, such as coal or
building stone.
The third arrow indicates goods moving southward on the Great North Road
after having first moved directly eastwards out of Sheffield proper. This route
would have been more popular with those shipping goods southwards with a high
value-to-mass ratio, such as the fine cutlery and bladeware for which Sheffield was
already well famed in this period: the higher unit price on such goods meant that
the expense of overland shipping was a much smaller fraction of the overheads
than would be the case with cheaper commodities.
The fourth arrow indicates goods moving southwestwards across the Pennines
toward Chapel-en-le-Frith, Buxton and Leek, and to the rich agricultural lands of
the west midlands, which provided many of the staples that couldn’t be produced
in Sheffield and much of the surrounding area: salt came to Sheffield by these
routes, as the old road names sometime betray, but so did dairy products, for
example.
Indeed, despite the omnidirectionality of the illustrative arrows, these flows
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are duplex: they represent flows into the city as well as flows outward. But again:
why no vector of flow directly south from Sheffield, toward Chesterfield? Because
of the terrain: the area between Sheffield in the north, Chesterfield in the south,
Dore in the west and Killamarsh in the east is particularly hilly, to the extent that,
prior to the advent of vehicles powered by anything other than animals, it was
quicker and easier to come overland to Sheffield from the south by following the
Great North Road to Tickhill (just west of Bawtry) and joining the local routes
westward from there.
There are no local routes marked on this map—but that’s not to say there were
no local routes. Quite to the contrary: as in much of the rest of the country at the
time, local routes were plentiful, if not ubiquitous. But they were all also of much
of the same poor quality, as shall be shown. They go unmarked here because to
mark them all would impossible, while to mark but a few would be to misrepre-
sent the topology of the network at that time (which might be thought of as being
highly dense and decentralised—or rhizomic—in structure, but with appalling
bandwidth and availability). Certainly there were more important, dominant or
well-trafficed routes—but as it is those routes which tended to get the turnpike
treatment later on, their illustration will be deferred until that point for the sake
of making the illustrations easier to follow.
5.1.1 Elements
Protagonist
As remarked in the introduction to this chapter, the Protagonist is effectively the
stable element throughout the process of historical analysis, representing a popu-
lation’s desire to fulfill a variety of performances of the freight logistics practice-
as-entity—or, more simply, the Protagonist always represents someone who wants
to send some mass of stuff from one place to another place, and has a variety of
options available as to how this might be achieved. Because freight logistics over
any significant distance is almost inevitably a commercial operation, the domi-
nant desires for change in the parameters of available performances will therefore
be rooted in efficiencies that affect the bottom line. This is compounded by the
likelihood that the instigating protagonist ends up securing the performance as a
third-party service, and handing fulfillment over to a proxy performer acting on
their behalf: someone sending goods via a shipping service will surely be both-
ered if poor waggon design results in late deliveries or broken merchandise, but
is unlikely to care much about the ergonomics of the driver’s seat.
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Interfaces
In the region around Sheffield, much as elsewhere in the country at the time,
there were two main modes of freight transport that made use of roads: the pack-
horse, sometimes solo but more usually roped in a train of multiple animals; and
assorted variations on horse-drawn carts and waggons.
There is regrettably little data on the pack-horse, despite its ubiquity during
this and subsequent periods, but they are assumed to have been a small and sturdy
breed, reared for a stolid and calm temperament, and likely to have had hooves
which splayed on soft ground, lending them a sureness of foot in wet conditions.
The animals were fitted with custom-made panniers designed to accommodate the
various loads they might carry, which could be anything from bushels of wheat or
finished cutlery to raw coal or unfinished millstones.
Drawn by horses or oxen, cart and waggons were the cutting edge of transport
technology, most likely introduced to Britain by Dutch settlers (Hey, 1980): carts,
with their single axle, were used for lighter loads, while waggons, with two or
more axles and multiple draft animals, took larger, heavier loads.
Infrastructure
The simplest way to describe the bulk of British roads during this period would be
“unmade”. As such, their condition was highly variable, depending on the local
climate, the local traffic types (and density), and the local maintenance regime:
since Tudor times, responsibility for the upkeep of roads fell to the parishes the
road passed through, but the implementation of this statute was piecemeal, and
the indentured labour it required could be a cause of resentment among the locals
(who were themselves highly unlikely to see any significant improvement in their
personal circumstances as a result of the roads being more easily travelled—the
majority of agricultural trade with which they might be involved was still highly
localised, and the peasantry didn’t travel for fun).
In the south of the country, dryer weather and chalkier ground meant that,
while roads and tracks eroded due to the impact of weather and cartwheels alike,
wet weather didn’t necessarily turn the roads into an impassable morass; hence
carts and waggons were already well established in the southern counties, with a
significant modal share advantage over the pack-horse.
But the Sheffield region has a peaty soil which soaks up rain and turns into
a glutinous mud during the inevitable periods of wet weather. This resulted in
a phenomenon known as the “holloway”: long-standing routes across the dales
which, thanks to continued traffic and rainfall, slowly eroded away and sank into
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the landscape around them (thus becoming ever-more effective channels for fur-
ther pluvial erosion). The other regional route type was known as an “edge”,
which would follow the dry, rocky ridges of the Pennines and their foothills;
these were far from smooth or short routes, and utterly unsuited to anything with
wheels, but they could at least be relied upon to be solid underfoot for much of
the year.
Notwithstanding General Wade’s military surveying techniques, which were
only applied north of the border with Scotland, the most common intervention
into rutted roads and holloways was the “causey” (causeway), which involved
paving the routes with large slabs of stone. However, given that oxen hitched to
waggons could get better purchase on softer going, most of the width of causey
routes was actually left unpaved, with a narrow paved section providing firmer
footing for horses (Crofts, 2006, p7). As one can imagine, making and maintaining




Deriving as it does directly from the desires of the protagonist, the HKJ influence
is fairly consistent over time and space, as it represents the protagonist’s gener-
alised desire for the improvement of one or more parameters of the performance
they seek to fulfill. In the case of a broad and basic practice such as freight logis-
tics, the HKJ influence is likewise broad and basic: as freight logistics is almost
always a commercial operation (and, even when not, tends to be governed by bud-
gets and bottom lines), the protagonist is looking to exceed any parameter which
might push down costs, streamline procedures, or allow for economies of scale.
However, protagonists with very particular goods or commodities to ship may
have correspondingly particular desires for parameter excession, and these will be
specified as necessary in the analysis that follows.
As remarked above, the pack-horse was still the hegemonic road interface for
freight in the Sheffield region at this point, because it tended to be able to provide
a performance with superior parameters to that of carts and waggons—but the
reasons for that bear further examination.
Those routes most needed for carrying heavy loads were inevitably also the
most likely to suffer the consequences of heavy traffic: as such, the more carts
and waggons which passed a particular way, the worse the way would be for
those that came behind them, as the wheels cut deep ruts into the wet soil. As
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such, waggon usage in what is now South Yorkshire and Derbyshire was actually
restricted—whether by tradition or by statute—to the carriage of certain freight
types at certain times of year, such as the few weeks either side of the annual
hay harvest, when it was assumed they would be both more effective and less
damaging to the roads. This meant that, despite the obvious efficiencies of scale
achievable with carts and waggons over pack-horses, there were large parts of the
countryside (and large parts of the calendar) where they were effectively useless.
The major downside of the pack-horse was that of capacity: a waggon might
use a team of four to move a ton or more, while a single horse would struggle to
take a tenth of that load. But a pack-horse was nimble and patient on soggy, rutted
routes; furthermore, a waggon would need to regularly replace its team with fresh
animals on a long trip, while a pack-horse could put in day after day of steady
plodding; yet furthermore, a waggon needed a crew of at least two, while a single
packmaster could lead a train of a dozen horses on his own. As such, among the
rocky edges and muddy dales around Sheffield, the pack-horse reigned supreme:
of all the options available, it best met the general needs of freight protagonists in
the area.
But it was clear enough to see that waggons would be a far better option, if
it weren’t for the condition of the roads—and this observation manifested itself
in continued attempts to use carts and waggons in any circumstance where one
might have a chance of getting away with it, and indeed in a documented practice
of overloading vehicles (and thus exacerbating the problem of rutted roads), as
shall be seen.
DP
As mentioned above, freight logistics practices were (and still are) often performed
by proxy: rather than a merchant saddling up and leading a pack-horse train
himself, he’d have turned the work over to a carrier (or, more rarely, to his own
personal packmasters). As such, the physical/technical design protocols of the
interfaces used in the fulfillment of freight practices are of little concern to the
protagonist-instigator of the practice; for the instigator, they interact not with the
interface device itself, but with a service within which the use of the interface is
bundled.
While there had presumably always been long-distance traders and merchants,
the role of the carrier starts to formalise in this period, likely in response to the
first economic stirrings of what would become the industrial revolution. What
we now describe as “local carriers” probably didn’t think of themselves as carri-
ers at all; they were simply a local person with a spare cart or waggon and the
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time to make a few deliveries (and some extra coin) in between their artisanal or
agricultural activities. The “common carrier”, on the other hand, had a status in
common law which, among other things, required him to accept any commission
from any customer provided the appropriate fee was offered—which goes some
way to explaining why many of those who carried were not always keen to be
known as carriers, as one thereby became liable for any losses of things entrusted
to your care. Such carriers were often family businesses, and tended to accumulate
around or along a particular route: rather than providing an end-to-end service,
they would instead cover a significant stretch of a major route, and hand off any
forward deliveries to fellow carriers who might complete the route. Regional carri-
ers specialised in regional routes, while London carriers plied their trade between
the regions and the capital. Evidence can be seen of attempts to formalise and
regularise the service in order to further accommodate protagonist desires, but
the seasonal uncertainties of road condition meant that schedules were sparse and
loose, and better considered as optimistic estimates than promises of service.
As such, it’s likely that most carrying commissions were bespoke arrange-
ments rather than regular contracts; in other words, the service offered to the
protagonist is built afresh each time, customised to their requirements. For such
arrangements to be made, the itinerant carriers needed locations at which to trans-
act their business—places where they could be found, in other words. Given the
nature of their business kept them close to stables (so as to procure fresh horses),
and that stables were often associated with inns, the public spaces of the latter
soon became the semi-official offices of carriers.
I&I
The pack-horse holds hegemony during this period, which goes some way to ex-
plaining why the innovative focus was elsewhere; no amount of improved pannier
design was going to transcend the fundamental strength and endurance limita-
tions of a biological organism. Anyone wanting to intervene in the freight logistics
assemblage was therefore looking to carts and waggons for improved parameters
of performance.
The narrow cartwheels which were commonplace at the time were an already
embedded adaptation to the conditions: narrow wheels focus the weight on a
smaller area, thus increasing traction, but this also has the effect of increasing the
extent of rutting produced by the wheel’s passing. Laws insisting upon wider
wheels and maximum laden weights were either ignored or circumvented by cun-
ning cartwrights: one such iteration featured wheels of the new regulation width
whose customised profile meant that only two narrow strips of the wheel were
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in contact with the ground, thus (marginally) improving performance, and fur-
ther enhancing road damage (Crofts, 2006, p18). Another tactic involved studded,
bolted or toothed wheels, which acted much like snowchains on a modern vehicle
(Crofts, 2006, p19); needless to say, these made even more of a mess of the roads,
and the majority of civic authorities did their best to ban their use. However, such
was the crude effectiveness of these iterations that “they remained the bane of En-
glish traffic until [...] the turnpike companies taxed them out of existence” (Crofts,
2006, p19), as shall be shown.
Not all iterations were locally applicable, however: waggons with a movable
front axle were easier to steer, which made the design catch on in the southern
counties, but the movable axle is a disadvantage in muddy, rutted soil, which
explains why it got little traction (pun fully intended) in the Sheffield region.
These inventions and interations, whether successfully applied or nor, combine
to produce a pressure of influence for change upon the infrastructure layer with
which they are enmeshed.
S&R
As has been remarked, the roads of this period are distinguished by their lack
of coherent physical standards; as such, their influence upon the interface layer
might best be conceived of as the degree of difficulty they present to the transit
of any given vehicle. Therefore these standards (or lack thereof) serve to uphold
the packhorse hegemony, because they make the routes impassable to wheeled
vehicles for much (or all) of the year.
Regulations on road usage, on the other hand, long predate this moment: for
example, the 1618 proclamation banning the use of heavier waggon types and lim-
iting loading to one ton per vehicle. However, these regulations merely “tempted
the carrier to load upon two wheels [i.e. a cart] what ought to have been car-
ried on four [i.e. a waggon]” (Crofts, 2006, p18), and the resulting overloading
ensured that the damage continued; likewise with the 1662 proclamation insisting
on wider cartwheels, as mentioned above, which was later withdrawn as a result
of being universally flouted and impossible to enforce. So while there is a pressure
of influence upon the interface layer in the form of S&R, it’s weak and ineffective
in its attempts to counter the reciprocal excessions of the I&I influence—and this
imbalance creates the conditions for change.
5.1.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 5.3 on page 92.
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Figure 5.3: Articulated trialectic model for section 5.1 (The Old Roads)
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Wainwrights’ community-of-practice
The role of wainwrights (an Old English term for a waggon-makers) in the artic-
ulation of the assemblage is clear, but also delimited: as can be seen, they have
significant influence over the interface layer, and dominate the I&I vector, but little
influence elsewhere.
Carriers community-of-practice
The influence of carriers considered as a community-of-practice is omnipresent:
this reflects their role as bundlers of interfaces into services, which is to say that
they effectively provide the organisational connective tissue that connects the pro-
tagonist to the infrastructure. Through setting their schedules and their conditions
of carriage, and the lack of alternative options, they have the whip hand over the
DP vector (i.e. the shaping of the service), which dominates the HKJ vector: put
simply, you could tell them you’d like a faster or more frequent service, and they’d
just shrug and suggest you go find yourself one. Note also their considerable in-
fluence over the wainwrights, the latter of whom were likely listening closely to
what the carriers wanted from their interface devices.
Parishes
Parishes are represented due to their responsibility for the upkeep of the roads, but
their influence is hence weak and marginal, limited to the infrastructural element
itself, and to the S&R vector.
Inns and stables
As mentioned above, carrying over any significant distance required regular feed-
ings and changes of draft animal, and carriers were accustomed to transacting
their business in inns. This would have been the case for packhorse operator as
well as those using carts and waggons, for while packhorses didn’t need chang-
ing so regularly as teams pulling carts or waggons, they’d still need a good feed
from time to time—and their drivers would need places to get their own rest and
to meet with clients and colleagues, perhaps even more so than the waggoneers,
whose routes were a little more regular. As such, these two related businesses,
inns and stables, can be considered as a sort of secondary infrastructure, without
the support of which the early road freight assemblage would collapse.
But that support is not passive; it’s about more than the simple provision of
space for carriers to make deals. By providing horses and feed, stables were acting
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as a secondary infrastructure for the distribution of motive power units and fuel,
thus funtionally binding together the infrastructure and interface layers. Further-
more, inns played a role analogous to that of a railway station: not merely a site to
transact, but a node on a network of knowledge and communications that makes
longer routings possible.
5.2 Surfacing Trust: the turnpike era (1760—1820)
Turnpiking was arguably the first infrastructural revolution in Britain, which ef-
fectively upgraded the major overland trunk routes of the road network to a far
higher standard than had been seen since the Romans first laid down their post-
conquest routes around the country.
Figure 5.4: Roads in the Sheffield region, circa 1820
The era of turnpiking covers roughly a century, from around 1750 to around
1850. The pioneer routes were the radial roads of London, which were turned
over to trust control in the early decades of the 18th century, but by the middle
of the century the same theory was being applied to the Great Roads connecting
London to the regions, and other trade-vital routes. There were two waves or
pulses of turnpiking, the first of which was the initial boom in the creation of
trusts: between 1750 and 1772, more than 400 new trusts were established, out of
what would be a national total of around 1,000, and it was during this first pulse
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Table 5.1: Table of major turnpikes in the Sheffield region
Road ID Route Build date
T1 Duffield to Sheffield 1756
T2 Wakefield to Sheffield 1758
T3 Sheffield to Chapel-en-le-Frith 1758
T4 Bawtry to Tinsley 1760
T5 Rotherham to Pleasely 1764
T6 Worksop to Attercliffe 1764
T7 Tinsley to Doncaster 1764
T8 Halifax to Sheffield (3rd district) 1777
T9 Sheffield to Gander Lane 1779
T10 Wadsley to Langsett 1805
T11 Ecclesall to Dore (and Mosborough) 1812
T12 Sheffield to Glossop (aka the Manchester Road) 1818
that the majority of routes were established. The second pulse might be better
thought of as an upgrade to the form: a "turnpike 2.0", if you will, which was
based around the innovative surfacing improvements that bear the name of their
inventor, the civil engineer John Loudon Macadam, and began around 1820. The
second pulse of turnpiking thus represents a general enhancement of bandwidth
and availability on existing trunk routes, rather than the creation of new trunk
routes through upgrading heretofore unimproved routes. The turnpiking boom
came fairly late to Sheffield, with the first regional turnpikes appearing in the
1750s—hot on the heels of Enclosure, of which turnpiking could be considered a
tacit component.
The major turnpikes around Sheffield are illustrated in 5.4 on page 94, and are
numbered in order of their completion; table 5.1 on page 95 lists the routes and
their dates of construction. The list is not exhaustive, but illustrative, not least
because the routes illustrated correspond very closely to the dominant regional
road routes that still prevail in the area: in other words, these are the routes that
became the A-roads of the present, and those routes were surveyed and set down
two centuries ago, if not more.
With that in mind, note that the earliest turnpikes to and from Sheffield are
connections directly north and south: these are a clear attempt to address the
difficulties which had long prevailed in trying to ship goods overland in these
directions. But they are swiftly followed by upgrades to routes carrying the flows
identified in the previous section: the Sheffield to Chapel-en-le-Frith turnpike, for
instance (T3), was an upgrade to the southwestern salt routes, while the Bawtry
to Tinsley (T4) and Worksop to Attercliffe (T6) are attempts to ease the overland
routes to the waterway connections to the east. (Note also that the Don Navigation
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to Tinsley opened around the same time as the first turnpikes; the Don Navigation
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.)
5.2.1 Elements
Protagonist
The Protagonist, and their desires, remain stable. However, the nascent industrial
revolution can be felt during this period in the form of a general speeding-up and
thickening of economic activity, and in the gradual extension of trade networks
from local to national and international. Therefore parameters such as delivery
speed and reliability begin to matter more, particularly in the context of a com-
mercial practice such as freight logistics.
Interfaces
The pack-horse is still very much in play in the Sheffield region, as are carts and
waggons. During the latter of the two pulses of turnpiking, we also see the rise of
the light, horse-drawn leaf-sprung van.
Infrastructure
The imbalance of the previous moment caused the government to develop a new
institution called the “turnpike trust”—a body comprising local notables with a
stake in the road and its trade, which was responsible for building and maintain-
ing a properly surveyed and surfaced road surface, and for collecting tolls to pay
for the upkeep. While a far cry from modern road surfaces, and considerably vari-
able by region (not least due to a statutory reliance on local materials and labour),
turnpikes had superior drainage, and the stones used for the surfacing were of a
uniform size, making the going far more amenable to wheeled vehicles.
However, at this point it bears noting that even after both pulses of turnpiking
were complete (around 1840), the vast majority—80%—of routes were not turn-
piked (Copeland, 1968, p61-62); the process was reserved for major trunk routes
where the improvements would most quickly be recouped through the collection
of tolls (or so the theory went). Turnpiking occured in parallel with the latter
phases of Enclosure, and indeed played a role in it: prior to agricultural enclousre,
there would have existed a great number of narrow paths across local areas, but as
the fields were consolidated and turned over to landowners, many of these rights
of way were erased (which would have driven ever more local traffic onto those
that remained, thus accelerating their demise).
Chapter 5. Historical analysis A—Coordination 97
In the terminology of network theory, then, we might say that turnpiking con-
sidered as a whole involved both a bolstering of the bandwidth of trunk connec-
tions and a massive pruning of “last mile” routes. In one sense, this can be seen
as a rationalisation and a simplification of the network. On the other hand, how-
ever, it can be seen as a profound reordering and restriction of mobility options
for ordinary people: having lost many free local routes, they are now increasingly
obliged to use the turnpikes and pay for the privilege.
5.2.2 Influences
HKJ
As remarked above, the HKJ influence remains fairly stable throughout the anal-
ysis, as it is so closely related to the teleology of the practice under study. As
such, HKJ manifests here as a continuing desire for greater speed and reliability
of delivery, and is amplified by the implicit promise of the turnpikes to provide
exactly that.
DP
Given the predominantly commercial nature of freight logistics, the “interface-
as-a-service” model continues to apply, which is to say that the design protocols
facing the protagonist are not those of the vehicle being used, but of the service
being offered.
As such, there is little change from the previous moment, merely an intensi-
fication of the process of formalisation in carrier businesses, which during this
period start to resemble an early form of the logistics and delivery companies we
know today; indeed some, such as Pickfords, can be traced back to this period.
This formalisation and consolidation was in no small part enabled by the advent
of the turnpike, whose improved surfaces meant that the roads were more reliable
for a greater portion of the year, which in turn meant schedules could become
more frequent and more reliable, hence encouraging more merchants to deal ever
more further afield.
This regularity served the common carriers more directly, as longer faster jour-
neys meant ever more changes of draft animals, and an ever greater need for
coordination with other carriers and factors to ensure hand-overs happened when
expected; however, local/casual carriers would have suffered from the loss of
countless free-to-use local routes, with the new (and hard to avoid) tolls eating
into what had once been a fairly healthy profit margin. As the carrier sector pro-
fessionalised and expanded, so did the network of inns and stables, which still
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served as places for carriers to transact their business (whether with customers or
one another), alongside the newer crop of exchange buildings which were start-
ing to appear in busy trading towns. This is all in response to a growing volume
of trade, and a corresponding swelling of desire for the excession of practice pa-
rameters: more merchants looking to ship more goods on better terms than ever
before.
I&I
While there were quite likely a number of new vehicle types developed in response
to the improved affordances of the turnpikes, the one that stuck around was the
horse-drawn van, which emerged during the second pulse of turnpiking, around
1815. Essentially an evolution of the horse and cart, and likely looking something
like a small, light stagecoach, these vehicles had narrow wheels and leaf-sprung
suspension, developed by wainwrights so as to maximise the speed parameter
on freight performances by getting the very best out of those improved surfaces.
While lacking the heavy capacity of the waggons (still very much in operation),
vans could carry smaller loads of more delicate goods much more quickly: they
replaced waggons on Pickford’s main routes at a rate which clearly indicates a
massive superiority for purpose (Copeland, 1968, p83-84). This in turn increased
the influence upon the infrastructure layer, as ever more vehicles needing a decent
surface came into operation.
S&R
It bears noting at this point that while most turnpikes came with standards and
regulations, these were not uniformly applied across the country: for instance, the
Acts of Parliament establishing the turnpike trusts frequently stipulated surfacing
techniques and materials to be used, in order to exploit local materials wherever
possible. However, as a rule of thumb, it can safely be assumed that all turnpikes
were considerably more passable than the unimproved routes in the region, and
the S&R influence of this more open set of physical standards upon the interface
layer thereby encourages the increased usage of wheeled vehicles throughout the
year.
The influence is not entirely open and permissive, however. Accompanying
the material standards of the road surface were the rates and regulations imposed
upon traffic by the turnpike trusts, and a secondary infrastructure of fences and
tollbooths designed to prevent anyone shirking their pecuniary obligations. Regu-
lations specified limits such as a maximum load per axle, or a maximum number
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of draft animals per team. Toll rates were, by and large, designed so as to compen-
sate the trust for the wear and tear of the traffic to which they applied, while also
sustaining the affordable local circulation of essential resources. For example, one
can frequently find toll exemptions or reductions for certain sorts of load taken
as “back-carriage”, which refers to loads carried on a return journey for which
the vehicle would otherwise have been empty. By exempting loads such as coal,
quicklime or hay, local notables could ensure that tolls didn’t prevent vital ma-
terials circulating in the local economy. Quicklime in particular was vital for the
regeneration of agricultural land, which is particularly poor in the Sheffield region,
but without the inducement of waived tolls on the back-carriage of quicklime, no
one could have covered their costs by carrying it.
Other regulatory concessions betray the considerable influence of local landown-
ers and industrialists with loads from certain mines, mills, factories or estates al-
lowed to pass at reduced rates. While the character of this influence varies from
trust to trust, it is clear that the regulatory role of the trusts gave them great influ-
ence over every aspect of the traffic profile that passed through their jurisdiction:
vehicle types, cargo types, and even the seasons during which carriage was per-
mitted. As such, they were finally able to achieve what earlier legislation had
signally failed to do, namely stamp out the modified cartwheel types that tore
up road surfaces—but they could only do so by first improving the surfaces in
question.
It bears noting that tolls and tollgates existed before the turnpike system, and
that for the most case the tolls imposed by the turnpike trusts were considerably
higher than those imposed on the earlier, unimproved routes. Regrettably, much
of the primary sources to do with turnpikes—the accounts and transactions of
the trusts, for instance—disappeared long ago, and there are no sources particular
to the Sheffield routes upon which we can draw. However, the general evidence
pertaining to the regional turnpike network suggests that the higher tolls were
more than compensated for by the surface improvements: noting that standardised
rates for carriers legislated in the early 1700s were reconfirmed by further law
in 1773, Hey (1980, p220) remarks that “if they were at all realistic, they must
mean that the early Derbyshire turnpike roads that led toward the capital made no
difference to transport costs”, which in turn implies that sufficient efficiencies were
found by the carriers (e.g. speed, seasonal availability, reliability) to counteract the
increased outlay.
5.2.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 5.5 on page 100.
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Figure 5.5: Articulated trialectic model for section 5.2 (Surfacing Trust)
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Incumbents: Carriers; Inns and stables; Cartwrights
These articulatory entities largely retain and retrench the relationships which they
established in the previous moment, while developing new relationships with new
actors entering the assemblage.
Turnpike Trusts
The basic form of the Turnpike Trust was a sort of investment vehicle through
which a collection of local notables and industrialists could invest in road im-
provements in the knowledge (or, in some cases, the unwarranted assumption)
that the running costs would be met by the resulting increase in traffic. They were
not private or joint-stock companies, and permission to form a trust had to be
obtained from parliament; this meant they could be blocked outright, or simply
loaded down with exemptions and caveats, due to vigorous lobbying by influen-
tial local gentry. But they effectively displaced the role of the parish with regard to
road maintenance, even as they initially inherited the habit of using local bonded
labour to get the work done.
Landowners and Industrialists
As noted above, the political nature of the turnpike trust meant that the constitu-
tion of the road networks became a political question: this allowed for the pos-
sibility of concerted action, in the form of the trusts themselves, but also for the
possibility of reaction from those opposed to change, for whatever reason. Dur-
ing this period, political lobbying remained the predominantly the province of
the landed gentry, though the rising stars of industry were also beginning to make
their influence felt locally and nationally, as indicated by the inevitable exemptions
and concessions scattered through the majority of Turnpike Acts. Hence this en-
tity has something close to a dominant position over the infrastructural layer: civic
organisations, and even the turnpike trusts themselves, were frequently forced to
provide concessions or exemptions for the powerful or well-connected.
Civic Organisations
Town councils and city corporations retained the power to regulate behaviours
within their jurisdiction, such as vehicle usage; as noted above, however, regula-
tion was not necessarily very effective. Nonetheless, there is a clear (if marginal)
influence over the infrastructure layer and the S&R vector from these entities.
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Exchanges
Exchanges here play much the same role as the incumbent inns and stables, being
a secondary infrastructure for the increasingly formalised carrier organisations
within which the service is transacted; they also form a linkage between civic
organisations and the carriers.
The Civil Engineer
The civil engineer community-of-practice deserves to be a distinct articulatory
entity at this particular point in history, as it is during the turnpiking era that the
role of the civil engineer coalesces from a mixture of related competencies such as
surveying and mapping, earthworks, basic mechanics, and what we would now
describe as basic project management. As Guldi (2012) has shown, turnpiking—
along with other contemporary feats of infrastructural engineering—provided an
opportunity for a disparate group of men largely outside of the normal hierarchies
of power to quite literally talk their way into a crucial role. Put more simply:
turnpiking brings with it the birth of the expert industrial consultant, whose role
is to advise parliament (and, later, local government) on matters technical. The
civil engineer will not appear in many further articulatory maps—but not because
the role disappeared. To the contrary, over the course of a few decades, civil
engineers went from being largely unknown, to being incredibly useful, to being
utterly ubiquitous. The civil engineer did not disappear, then, so much as he
became distributed throughout the assemblage.
5.3 Off the Boil: the failure of the steam waggon (1820—
1840)
In this third moment, there arises an opportunity to explore what might be de-
scribed as a failed transition: inspired by the earliest successes of the railways, the
steam-powered waggon was the exciting innovation of the moment, but it strug-
gled to compete on major routes against seemingly inferior incumbent technolo-
gies. According to Copeland (1968, p163-183), most experiments into the prospects
of steam vehicles for passenger transit on the existing roads network took place
in London or the south, and were broadly unsuccessful; if there were experiments
with steam-waggons local to Sheffield or specific to the carriage of freight during
this period, then we have no record of them. But nonetheless we have clear evi-
dence of the idea being worked on for a considerable period of time, and (perhaps
more importantly) during a period in which the intercommunication of gentlemen
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engineers was noted for its frequency and enthusiasm (if not also a degree of com-
petitive animosity and paranoia). Therefore, and further given the preponderance
of early steam technologies (and steam engineers) in the Sheffield region during
the time (as shall be shown in section 7.2), it does not seem unreasonable to spec-
ulate that someone in or around Sheffield might well have been making similar
experiments with steam locomotion on regular roads during this period. Further-
more, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume that any such experiment would
likely have met a similar fate to those undertaken elsewhere. As such, while it is
admittedly a speculative exercise, it should be possible to use the trialectic model
to explore the constitution and circumstances of the early steam-waggon, and thus
explain why it would have been as unsuccessful in Sheffield as it appeared to be
elsewhere.
As discussed in the previous section, the major roads of the Sheffield region are
all established by this point, and the second pulse of turnpiking—which was about
resurfacing established routes rather then building new ones—is beginning; as
such, we may refer back to the map in Figure 5.4, which captures pretty much the
same moment. That means that while there’s still a great deal of packhorse traffic
in the region, particularly on the unimproved “last mile” routes in between the
turnpikes, carts, waggons and vans would have been very much in the ascendancy,
taking advantage of the faster, smoother road surfaces.
5.3.1 Elements
Protagonist
Again, the protagonist remains stable.
Interfaces
All prior interface technologies (pack-horse, cart, waggon, van) are still very much
in play. The novel invention in the frame is the steam waggon, a steam-powered
vehicle designed for use on roads rather than rails. It bears noting that these
earliest steam waggons were largely developed with passenger services in mind,
though parallel attempts at establishing freight services bring the vehicle into the
analytical frame of this project. Furthermore, as shall be shown below, steam wag-
gons for freight eventually ended up being fairly successful for local and regional
freight purposes, particularly agricultural, which suggests that their failure to gain
traction early on cannot be blamed exclusively on their being a poor invention.
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Infrastructure
By this point in history, the second pulse of turnpiking is largely complete, result-
ing in a network of trunk routes with fairly consistent and reliable surfaces; how-
ever, as noted above, turnpiked routes count for at most 20% of the network, with




As remarked above, the imperatives of commerce ensure that the HKJ influence
is largely consistent across all freight practices, manifesting predominantly as the
protagonist’s desire for faster delivery of more goods at a lower cost.
DP
Given the expense in developing and constructing a steam waggon, they were al-
most from the outset offered as as service rather than an interface for personal use;
as such, the business model drew strongly on established routes and schedules, a
strategy already adopted by the carrier companies.
I&I
I&I is the big push in this particular iteration of the trialectic, in that the steam
waggon represents a bold innovation, an attempt to pick up the steam engine
technology at the heart of the railways and apply it to the pre-existing (and far
more accessible) road network. It might be thought of as a sort of leap of maximi-
sation: if I&I is all about designing an interface so as to get the best parameters out
of any given performance, then why not leverage steam power for a massive in-
crease in maximum loaded capacity? Better yet, a steam waggon required no draft
animals (and hence no fresh teams), thus potentially reducing one of the carrier’s
biggest operational overheads, and the initial investment was comparable
It bears noting that steam power at this point was trendy and exciting, and
already identified clearly with the ongoing transformation of British society; as
such, it was also considered threatening and revolutionary, in both senses of that
latter term.
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S&R
Despite the improved standards represented by the turnpikes, the poor state of
the majority of unimproved roads was a barrier to early steam waggons; the first
viable models emerged around 1820, marked by Hancock’s introduction of coach-
sprung suspension to his designs: “an important development, since so many of
the earlier carriages had their engines damaged by the rough state of the roads”
(Copeland, 1968, p168-182).
Expert opinion, alongside that of their inventors, believed that steam waggons,
with their wide wheels, would be fairly forgiving to the turnpike surface by com-
parison to horse-drawn vehicles; so the famed civil engineer Thomas Telford told
Parliament in 1831, at any rate. However, not for the first or the last time, popular
opinion would differ, and the viability of steam vehicles on roads meant little to
those concerned about the risks of exploding boilers, or worried that encouraging
the steam revolution would rapidly devalue horses, leading to a knock-on collapse
in the price of feed, and hence a more general economic ruination. These concerns
were sufficient to result in mob action against early steam vehicles in some loca-
tions. But “by far the most serious opposition came from horse-coach proprietors
and turnpike trustees”, who “feared that the heavy steam carriages would damage
the surface of their roads and drive away horse-drawn traffic. Some [...] resorted
to placing rocks and stones in the path of the steamers, and many imposed much
higher tolls than were levied on stage-coaches” (Copeland, 1968, p174-175); out-
right bans and arbitrary fines were commonplace, also.
So heavy-handed regulation, if not outright technophobia, seems to have played
a role in sidelining the steam waggon as a viable interface option—but that’s not
the only difficulty that the technology faced. While the steam engine did away
with the need for fresh teams of draft animals at regular intervals, it replaced it
with an equally imperative need for supplies of coke and water at equally regular
intervals. This was never much of a problem for the railways, which (as shall be
shown) in effect started out as a coal distribution system; wherever the railways
went, they inevitably had the ability to get fuel and water there in bulk, because
that provision was a fundamental component of the rail infrastructure itself.
The steam waggon entrepreneurs, however, found themselves in dire need
of a secondary infrastructure for the distribution and storage of water and fuel:
in terms of the trialectic, the physical standards of the infrastructure layer were
way below their requirements. The inns and stables network had grown up in co-
evolution with the carriers, meaning that their secondary infrastructure developed
of its own accord without any need for direct investment. But in order to establish
a similar network of coke and water provision, the steam waggon entrepreneurs
106 5.3. Off the Boil: the failure of the steam waggon (1820—1840)
would have needed to build it (or underwrite it) themselves—or perhaps gone to
the railways in search of a deal.
But the railways weren’t likely to give a possible competitor any advantage,
and as their ballooning share prices were already attracting the majority of in-
vestment money; by the time the worst technological flaws of the early steam
waggons had been addressed, investors had eyes only for the railways, which as
a result hoovered up most of the freight traffic—and passengers, for that matter—
which might have used the challenger mode. (Steam vehicles would not become
commonplace on the trunk road network until the short-lived late Victorian phe-
nomenon of the passenger steam car.)
5.3.3 Articulations
Given that the steam waggon is a failed transition, it cannot be articulated: indeed,
the lack of articulation explains the failure to achieve stability in the assemblage.
As such, the articulations cannot be illustrated—but we can refer back to the artic-
ulation map for the prior moment (see Figure 5.5 on page 100) which effectively
pictures the incumbent assemblage into which the steam waggon attempted to
impose itself. Here we can observe the entities whose influence has successfully
held the steam waggon (and its developers) out of the network. If successful, the
steam waggon intervention would enter from the middle right (the same region
of influence as the cartwrights and carriers, as they are taking on the role of both
developer and operators of the interface) with its developers and operators re-
sponding to HKJ desires by producing a new vehicle type, thereby gaining some
influence over the Interface element, and over the I&I vector. But that part of the
assemblage is already tangled up in a complex set of relationships between coach-
makers, carriers and the turnpike trusts—the latter two of which entities have
already been shown to have actively prevented the steam waggon’s accession into
the assemblage. Metaphorically speaking, the steam waggon was unable to elbow
its way past the incumbent articulations, whose strong interdependencies caused
them to unite in defence of their mutual interests.
But it bears noting that the steam waggon in fact went on through the 19th cen-
tury to become a commonplace vehicle at the “last mile” extremities of the trans-
port network, particularly performing short-range logistics of a predominantly
agricultural character, along with whatever odd carrying jobs might crop up in
their owner’s local area. With many towns and villages still a fair distance away
from the nearest turnpike or railway, nimble modern vehicles such as the horse-
drawn van would still face the same old problems on the unimproved roads of
the rural boondocks, but the steam waggon’s great power and broad wheels made
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them suitable replacements for oxen teams doing agricultural work. All across the
British Isles, these “agricultural engines” survived well into the twentieth century,
and remain popular on the heritage circuit today; as such, it seems reasonable
to assume that they were just as popular in the Sheffield region—if not in fact
more so, given both the cheapness of coal and the peatiness of the local soil, both
of which would have worked in their favour. As such, rather than seeing the
steam waggon as a failed or even deferred transition, it might make more sense
to see it as an interface technology that gravitated successfully toward a very spe-
cific application niche—which rather upends the standard transitions narrative,
wherein innovations are nurtured in niches before emerging to conquer the entire
sociotechnical landscape.
5.4 Man with Van: the inter-war years (1920—1939)
From the end of the turnpike era (circa 1850) until the first world war, there was
little significant change in the constitution of road freight assemblages in the UK;
as shall be seen, this is due to the phenomenal success of the railways at capturing
medium- and long-distance traffic. But the war changed everything—and not just
close to home.
Figure 5.6: Roads in the Sheffield region, circa 1930
Figure 5.6 on page 107 shows the major roads in the region, as established
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during earlier periods; it also shows the extension of the Don Navigation via
the Sheffield canal and (faintly) the major rail routes in the region, as they were
between the two world wars. What is perhaps most noteworthy is the topology
of the roads network, which remains largely unchanged from the turnpike era
in terms of its extent and connectivity: the old routes live on, in other words,
though their bandwidth is being improved in fits and starts. It should be plain
that the arrival of waterway and railway connections served to effectively block
the development of new road routes, particularly to the east. The golden era of
personal powered transportation for work or pleasure had yet to arrive, so new




Again, the protagonist is essentially stable.
Interfaces
Pack-horses and horse-drawn vehicles (cart, waggon, van) are still very much in
use up to and during the first world war, particularly once agricultural and in-
dustrial steam waggons were requisitioned for military purposes. The design of
steam waggons had much improved since the previous analytical moment, mak-
ing them safe, reliable and effective, if necessarily slow; the steam waggon had
thus slowly consolidated its ubiquity for taking heavy loads over short to medium
distances, which is to say those routings for which rail transport was unavailable
or impractical.
The challenger interfaces of the era are the first generations of road vehicles
powered by the internal combustion engine (ICE hereafter). The ICE had been
around for a while, but it took the ferment of the first world war for its potential
as a replacement for animal horsepower to be fully realised and exploited—and
that exploitation was only made possible by Churchill’s earlier securing of British
access to Persian oil supplies, from which the fuels might be refined.
Infrastructure
As mentioned above, there was little change to the physical constitution of the
road network until after the first world war, though responsibility for them had
changed hands a few times. With the now debt-burdened turnpike trusts being
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merged, consolidated or wound up through the 1870s, the 1888 Local Government
Act gave over responsibility for the upkeep of the roads to the newly formed
county and borough councils.
The improved road surfacing process known as tarmaccing had been patented
by a British civil engineer at the turn of the century, but was not widely applied
until the 1920s, by which time an explosion of new traffic drew attention back to
the parlous state of the roads; the ready availability of bitumen—another fraction
derived from Middle Eastern oil—as an alternative to tar made it more affordable.
The 1920 Roads Act saw central government reclaim responsibility and created a
Roads Fund, to be topped up with vehicle excise duty and license fees for horse-
drawn and ICE vehicles alike, from which money for improvements might be
drawn; widespread unemployment offered an affordable workforce who were put
to building bypasses and upgrading trunk routes. In 1930, the government handed
the roads back to the county councils, only to reclaim the trunk routes in the Trunk
Roads Act of 1936, to a backdrop of (unsuccessful) popular technocractic lobbying
in favour of a network of high-speed roads, much like the new autobahns being
built in Germany; all such plans were sidelined by the second world war.
5.4.2 Influences
HKJ
As remarked above, the HKJ influence remains consistent in nature throughout
the analysis, but becomes ever more intense as trade and competition expand: the
protagonist seeks to exceed the parameters of the prevailing performance.
But this takes a very particular form with a certain group of actors during this
period, namely the burgeoning community-of-practice of one-man carrier oper-
ators. Steam waggons requisitioned during the war were subsequently sold off
as military surplus, often to freshly demobbed servicemen seeking a return to a
productive civilian life. These new carriers were able to scrape a living by system-
atically exceeding the manufacturer’s speed and loading limits of their vehicles,
and just as systematically turning a blind eye to the established laws and customs
of the carrying business (Barker & Gerhold, 1995, p85-88); this is the birth of the
particularly British socioeconomic phenomenon of the “man with van”.
As discussed above, freight practices tend to involve a proxy performer who
acts on the behalf of the actual instigating protagonist; put more simply, the man-
with-van is most likely to be carrying on someone else’s behalf. Therefore his
overloadings of the interface can be seen as expressions of the HKJ influence, be-
cause even though they are not carried out by the protagonist themselves, the very
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direct nature of the relationship between protagonist and proxy in such a transac-
tion suggests that the instigating protagonist would be knowingly complicit to at
least some degree—you’d have to be fairly innocent to not realise how these op-
erators were undercutting the standard rates. This is therefore clearly indicative
of the ever-increasing desire to exceed performance parameters, even though the
HKJ influence is actually expressed at one remove from the protagonist.
DP
Freight interfaces are still being bundled up as a service during this period, and
the range of organisational styles is still largely unchanged from the pre-turnpike
era: large and increasingly formalised carrier companies operating as common
carriers, and smaller firms (right the way down to the independent man-with-
van) taking the more marginal and local work out in the last mile. In both cases,
logistical tasks are essentially outsourced by the protagonist to another organisa-
tion entirely; the entire appeal of the service is that you don’t need to know how
best to get your shipment from A to B, you just need to hand it over to an organi-
sation that does. However, there is also a clear interaction between vehicle design
and service design, because by this point the ICE vehicle has become a platform
technology upon which supplementary functions can be stacked, such as refriger-
ation; this in turn allows the design of services which feature the supplementary
function in distinction from the regular offer.
Things are slightly different when a business such as Sainsburys effectively
sets up a carrier company as an internal division of the firm. In such a case, the
protagonist has a more direct interest in the technical affordances of the vehicle it-
self, as they are no longer concealed behind another organisation’s service design,
and must therefore be integrated into the sub-assemblage of the company through
the development of internal protocols for usage which suitably accommodate the
new vehicles.
Put more simply, this means that vehicle design can, in such cases, be a direct
influence on the protagonist and their choice of performance. If the driver who
acts as the protagonist’s proxy tells the protagonist that he could do a longer or
faster day behind the wheel if he had a more powerful or comfortable vehicle,
that’s a strong vehicle design DP influence in action—perhaps the strongest exam-
ple of such influence to be found in any assemblage specific to freight practices,
given how common it is (and always has been) to outsource logistics to external
firms.
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I&I
If we consider the interface layer as representing an array of possible road vehicle
choices (see Chapter 4, Model and Methodology), the inter-war period sees the
modal share of horse-drawn and steam-powered vehicles start to decline, while
ICE vehicles surge. That this was fertile ground for invention is indicated by the
proliferation of vehicle manufacturers, all seeking to meet a variety of demands
for improved performance parameters, whether in the form of speed, capacity,
safety or comfort—though perhaps not as markedly as in the United States, the
general trend was for larger, faster vehicles, and many more of them.
This in turn meant far greater wear and tear for the roads themselves, the best
of which were still surfaced with horse-drawn vehicles in mind, and the worst
of which were still effectively unimproved: faster, heavier ICE vehicles literally
pounded such roads to dust in hot weather, and tore them into ruts in the wet
season.
S&R
In terms of physical standards, tarmaccing was a huge leap beyond the sim-
ple madacam process which preceded it, with the application of tar or bitumen
producing a road surface of heretofore unprecedented solidity and durability—a
needful response to the rapid expansion of fast, heavy traffic. But surfacing alone
was not sufficient to enable the network to handle this new intensity of traffic:
also needed were physical subsystems for managing the flow of traffic around the
system (e.g. signals and signage, junctions and roundabouts), and for preventing
accidents. National standards emerged not only for the quality of surfacing but for
carriageway width and camber, or the maximum heights of bridges—and while
these physical standards were fairly open and permissive, they nonetheless helped
to reinforce tacit norms around vehicle size and maneuverability, and to shape the
practices of driving (which are subordinate to the practice of freight logistics, but
nonetheless influential upon it).
Even as improved road standards opened up the possibility of larger, faster
vehicles, regulatory interventions applied by earlier governments to the road net-
work had been working over decades to side-line the steam waggon. The 1896
Locomotives on Highways Act recategorised vehicles weighing under three tons
unladen as “light locomotives”, exempted them from the requirement to have a
crew of at least three, and set a new speed limit of 14mph (or 12mph at local au-
thority discretion); this was followed by the 1903 Motor Car Act, which raised the
limit to 20mph. While still restrictive for steam vehicles (which had finally enjoyed
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a brief period of faddish popularity as recreational sports vehicles for wealthy Vic-
torians), these laws were predominantly aimed at curtailing the popularity of the
still nascent ICE vehicle.
It was a different story after the war, however: through the 1920s and 1930s,
regulations and taxes were stacked upon steam vehicles, eroding their ability to
compete with ICE on operational costs, despite the significant taxes levied on
imported oil by comparison with domestic coal supplies. An axle-weight tax fol-
lowed in 1933, then more taxes on steam engines and a reduced import duty on
oil fractions in 1934, with the result that fewer than 1,000 steam waggons were still
in operation in 1938 (Barker & Gerhold, 1995, p85-86).
5.4.3 Articulations
In order to capture a particularly complex moment, this articulatory map will
focus on 1936, by which time all the legislature discussed above had been enacted.
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 5.7 on page 113.
Incumbents:
Vehicle-makers, Carriers
Rather than considering vehicle manufacturers as a new articulatory community-
of-practice, they are here considered as having inherited the position held by their
predecessors, the wainwrights. Likewise the carriers entity is seen as a continua-
tion of that which went before, given that the two main subtypes—the formalised
carrier firm, and the informal local carrier or man-with-van—perform broadly
contiguous roles throughout the period of analysis, namely using available ve-
hicle technologies to provide a freight logistics service. Unpicking the variances
between the different business models would serve only to clutter the model fur-
ther.
Company fleets
The company fleet gets a separate billing to the carriers, because it represents a
different configuration of the assemblage in which freight logistics performance
are not outsourced, but provided in-house. As discussed above, this configuration
results in vehicle design having a more immediate influence on the protagonist
than in previous articulations, as there is no service design behind which the
affordances of the vehicle can be occluded.
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Figure 5.7: Articulated trialectic model for section 5.4 (Man with Van)
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This results in a closer relationship between fleet operators and vehicle-makers
which, while it doesn’t entirely exclude the protagonist’s HKJ influence, certainly
relegates it to second place: if vehicle-makers are to sell more vehicles, they need to
be influenced by those who buy the most vehicles, and this enshrines the influence
over vehicle design of operators—whether of company fleets or carrier firms—
above that of drivers or instigating protagonists.
Central government; County councils
Always an implicit player in the road network, in 1936 the central government
reclaimed responsibility and control over the trunk routes. Non-trunk routes—
which is to say the “last mile” routes—remained the responsibility of county coun-
cils, but the lion’s share of decision-making powers remained with parliament.
Fuel distribution infrastructure
Effectively replacing the old network of stables, the emergence of a system for the
refining and distribution of oil-fraction fuels in the UK was a prerequisite for the
success of the ICE; this network would have started as refineries and fuel stations
linked by tanker trucks on road and rail routes. But it bears noting that this
infrastructure did not (and does not) not end at the border: indeed, it stretched
all the way to the oilfields of the Middle East, and incorporated such massive and
contentious overseas infrastructures as the Suez Canal—which is to say that even
prior to the second world war, the supporting assemblage of freight logistics in
Britain necessarily extended halfway around the globe.
Outgoing:
Inns and stables; Exchanges
As traditional carrying using horses begins to decline, the importance of inns, sta-
bles and exchanges to the assemblage likewise begins to fade; hence their absence
from the articulatory map, so as to make space for other more vital relationships.
By this point, business can be transacted more efficiently by mail or telegram, and
carriers increasingly provide either an end-to-end service or goods yard facilities
of their own.
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5.5 The Long Boom: the motorway era (1955—2000)
The arrival of the ICE vehicle in the interwar years established a paradigm which
is only now showing signs of ending, but that paradigm was largely stabilised and
“locked in” by decisions made in the second half of the twentieth century.
Figure 5.8: Roads in the Sheffield region, circa 1972
Figure 5.8 on page 115 shows the road network as it was in the early 1970s,
which—with the exception of some improvements and widenings—was much as
it still is today. The M1 was completed as far as Sheffield by 1967, and while
only junctions 1 to 2 (Sheffield to Doncaster) and 5 to 6 (Scunthorpe to Thorne)
of the M18 were complete by this date—the M18 began life as a spur to the M1
that provided a direct connection to the A1(M) at Retford, but was extended in a
rather piecemeal and contingent fashion so as to link up a number of other small
motorways in the north-east—this direct overland route from to Goole and Hull
would be completed by the end of the 1970s.
5.5.1 Elements
Protagonist
Again, the protagonist is essentially stable.
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Interfaces
Much like the first war, the second world war set domestic transportation stan-
dards back a few decades, as all potentially useful machinery was requisitioned
by the state, and petrol severely rationed. But war tends to foment technologi-
cal iteration: the durability and versatility of ICE vehicles over steam-powered or
horse-drawn vehicles had been made apparent by a diversity of challenging cir-
cumstances, with the result that new vehicles were almost invariably ICE-based
thenceforth. Personal passenger vehicles came in the most plentiful variations, but
freight vehicles also diversified: the paradigmatic chasing of capacity efficiencies
which has resulted in today’s articulated HGV begins here, with a succession of
larger vehicle types, but the pool also diversified down to freight vehicles which
would be hard to distinguish from passenger vehicles based on size alone.
As remarked above, the steam waggon is already a marginal anachronism by
this point, though it will survive as such out in the rural badlands of the last mile
until the fag-end of the 20th century. Horse-drawn vehicles likewise hung on into
the 1970s in similar circumstances, but gradually declining into predominantly
“heritage” roles.
Infrastructure
As mentioned above, the notion of a national network of high-speed roads, in-
spired by European and American advances, had been kicking around in British
discourse since before the second world war; however that war, and the financial
restrictions which followed it, effectively prevented any such thing occurring for
some time. In 1949 the Special Roads Act was passed, which enabled the building
of roads to which access was limited by vehicle type, but it wasn’t until the late
1950s that the first motorways and bypasses began to open, and the M1 did not
reach Sheffield until the late 1960s; lesser roads were also improved during this
period, not least so as to make the motorcar as practical on the last mile as on the
trunk routes, but the difference in bandwidth between local roads and motorways
is comparable to that between turnpikes and unmade roads in the late 1700s. Net-
work expansion stalled in the 1970s, due in part to the oil crisis (thus indicating
a dependency on global supply chains), but surged again under the Thatcher ad-
ministration, only to peter out in the late 1990s in the face of a sustained protest
movement and a general antipathy to roadbuilding among the general populace.
Numerous sources and documentaries attest to the novelty of the motorway’s
affordances: wide, well-surfaced, fairly straight, optimised for smooth flows of
traffic, and all but unrestricted with regards to top speed. Best of all, they were
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all but empty—for a little while, at least. Much as had the railways in a previous
era, the motorways—in combination with personal vehicle ownership—became a
tangible symbol and product of modernity; to make use of them was not merely
advantageous, it was progressive, trendy. To drive on the motorway was to partake
in the future, in a real and visceral sense.
Such cultural significance was likely of secondary concern to those involved in
freight, however, who would have seen motorways pragmatically as the turnpikes
of their era: a massive improvement to the bandwidth and availability of major
trunk routes in the national network, which was particularly beneficial to heavy
goods vehicles. Although it was never stated in so many words, it seems likely that
this was very much in line with government intentions—note, for instance, that
the beginning of the motorways program coincides with the infamous Beeching
Report, which recommended the downsizing of the then-struggling British Rail
network; then note further that it was Ernest Marples, Tory minister for trans-
port from 1959 to 1964, who appointed Beeching—a friend and business partner
of some standing—to the role, and that Marples himself owned a construction
business which specialised in road-building.
5.5.2 Influences
Note that the analysis which follows is focussed on the state of the system as it
was in around 1972, by which time the M1 was complete as far as Sheffield (or,
more accurately, as far as Tinsley), but the motorway network more broadly was
far from complete. After 1972 the motorways program first continued to expand
under a succession of Conservative governments, before shrinking again in the
wake of the protest movement that sprung up against it in the early 1990s. As
far as substantial changes to the assemblage are concerned, what follows 1972 is
a further consolidation of the assemblage, and a stability rooted in its dominance
over the alternatives in terms of not only funding but political willpower; the ebb
and flow of quangos and regulatory bodies notwithstanding, the road assemblage
of today was articulated in 1972, and has changed little since.
HKJ
As before, the essence of the HKJ influence is the desire to exceed performance
parameters; in the case of commercial freight, this tends to mean changes which
make a delivery faster or cheaper. However, other priorities may attend the trans-
portation of more specialist items—and the late twentieth century in Britain is
arguably defined by the explosion of consumerism, and the plethora of specialist
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goods that underpin it. Put simply, there’s ever more stuff to be transported ever
more urgently, of ever more diverse sizes and weights and fragilities.
DP: Service design
There was no paradigmatic shift in the way that road transportation services are
offered as services within this period, merely a continuing diversification of oper-
ators (so: plentiful men-with-ven, but also plentiful formalised carrier firms, the
latter having an increasingly international remit as EU trade slowly opens up).
By this point, the process of formalisation means that some carrier companies
are indistinguishable from any other large corporation, but for their actual line of
business; these larger firms tend to be generalists, to find their efficiencies in scale,
and to offer a very simple turn-key service. This is a response to HKJ desires for a
more “magical” service: protagonists with a lot of freight to move about want to
get it moved with the minimum of input or concern on their part, because time is
money.
However, there remains plenty of space for operators focussing on a particular
locality, or a particular type of freight; due to their niche specialisations, these
organisations tend to be smaller and less formal, and hence have a more bespoke
service model. This is in response to the HKJ desires of protagonists who are less
concerned about speed or affordability, and more concerned about other parame-
ters, such as fragility, awkward sizes or shapes.
DP: Vehicle design
The design protocols of the vehicles themselves have some limited influence over
the protagonist during this period. This is due to an increase in company fleets,
and in specialist carrier operations, both of whom would have a much more spe-
cific performance in mind when selecting a vehicle by comparison to a bulk carrier
such as Pickfords, where the focus would be on leveraging the maximum capacity
from a fleet of largely identical general-purpose vehicles. Specialised vehicles are
therefore a response to specialist forms of the HKJ influence, where the emphasis
is on the improvement of a parameter other than speed or efficiency: for instance,
an operator specialising in moving heavy engineering components might happily
trade off the maximum capacity and top speed of their vehicle against its having
a loading crane fitted to it.
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I&I
We have already discussed those elements of vehicle design which “face” the
protagonist (or their proxy) in DP above; these tend to address very particular
variations of performance parameters, so as to accommodate the needs of niche
protagonists, which can fall between the cracks of generalised corporate freight-
as-a-service.
The reader may recall that the Invention and Iteration influence “faces” the
infrastructure layer: it represents the efforts by interface makers to develop inter-
faces that maximise the infrastructural capacity accessible through their use. By
way of a related example: as mentioned above, the new motorways presented as
long, empty stretches of largely unregulated road, implicitly offering almost limit-
less speeds to the user—an offer which was enthusiastically taken up by motorists,
particularly the young (a form of HKJ influence in the passenger sector). Their ex-
periments quickly revealed that the ICE technology of the time couldn’t actually
sustain the sort of speed that motorway travel involved; as a result, vehicle makers
begun improving engines (and running gear, suspension, brakes and bodywork)
in order to produce vehicles that could fully exploit this new infrastructure.
Speed was certainly important to freight vehicle manufacturers, but signifi-
cantly less so than capacity, particularly once speed limits were established; as
such, the real I&I influence in this assemblage expresses as a continual escalation
of freight vehicle capacity, which involves both optimisation within the frame of
pre-existing regulatory vehicle categories (i.e. “just how much stuff can we cram
into a vehicle that obeys these rules?”), and the development of new larger (or,
occasionally, smaller) vehicle categories; this is a direct response to the increas-
ing formalisation, globalisation and quantification of commercial manufacturing,
which encouraged firms to see the transportation functions they outsourced as
a component of their own logistics system, and hence to optimise for efficiency
as ruthlessly there as they did everywhere else. This influence thereby pushes
at the infrastructural layer: by soaking up the capacity made available, filling the
roads with ever more trucks of ever greater maximum load, it provides an ongoing
rationale for the expansion of infrastructural capacity in response.
S&R
The motorways are hence probably best seen as the manifestation of a commitment
to respond to the I&I rationale of increased demand by providing greater capac-
ity: as suggested above, the government’s commitment to further developing the
roads network was unswerving, and may also have been seen as a progressive
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(and economically beneficial) counter to the struggling rail sector (if not as the
nails for its coffin lid). It is uncontroversial to describe ICE vehicles as essentially
hegemonic in Britain from the 1960s to the present day, and the reasons for that
are fairly plain to see: the ICE hegemony was established by the government’s
commitment to expanding the infrastructural layer upon which it was dependent
(and abetted by its lack of commitment to expanding or supporting others). Or,
more simply: Britain became saturated with cars and lorries because the state did
everything that could possibly be done to encourage and enable such a circum-
stance. In terms of physical standards, this meant building ever more motorways
and bypasses (and the gradual improvement of A and B roads), plus bridges tall
enough for large vehicles to pass beneath, and surfaces capable of enduring the
passage of thousands of heavy, multi-axle vehicles.
As the physical standards of the motorways were generous and accommodat-
ing, so too did the regulations respond encouragingly to increases in goods vehicle
capacity, resulting in an expanding array of goods vehicle classifications (and their
corresponding licenses and tax brackets) permitted to make use of the network.
However, other aspects of freight performances began to be subject to regulation:
the introduction of tachometers and restrictions on the maximum number of hours
a driver might stay behind the wheel, for instance. The roads in general, and the
motorways in particular, are notable for the openness of their physical standards,
but for the complexity of their regulations.
5.5.3 Articulations
The articulatory map for this period is essentially unchanged from the map for the
preceding moment (see Figure 5.7 on page 113); the dominant players, and their
essential relationships and spheres of influence, have stayed stable for decades. In
truth, there are many more actors bound up in the assemblage than are shown
here, from the small (e.g. road safety campaigners) to the large (e.g. distant
regulatory authorities such as the EU), but their role is akin to that of mortar in
a brick wall: far from pushing aside or interposing an incumbent actor in the
assemblage, these actors fill out chinks and niches in the assemblage, binding it
together and making for a more stable articulation.
However, it bears repeating that this stability seems entirely dependent upon
the government’s commitment to the network—an impression supported by the
observation that, once the public mandate for further roadbuilding dried up in the
mid-1990s, the total amount of goods moved by road vehicles peaked, though it
has not declined significantly in the two decades since. This suggests that the mas-
sive growth in the modal share of road freight recorded from 1953 onwards corre-
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lates clearly with the continued expansion of network capacity during that period;
or, more plainly, that the stability and growth of the road freight assemblage is
inseparable from the political will to underwrite it. It further serves to validate
the time-worn observation that traffic inevitably expands to consume whatever
network capacity is available.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has deployed the trialectic model and methodology in order to per-
form a historical analysis of the evolution of freight logistics assemblages based
upon the road network in the Sheffield region.
The analysis has shown that the topology of the road network was formalised
and fixed during the first pulse of turnpiking in the late 1700s, thus producing
a web of major routes which went largely unchanged and unsupplemented until
the motorway era in the late twentieth century. While the topology of the network
has changed very little since turnpiking, however, its capacity has developed in
sympathy with the vehicles through which it might be made use of.
In terms of the trialectic model, we observe that the roads are a consistently
open system: open in the sense that anyone can use them (within regulatory
parameters, of course), and open in the sense that their physical affordances have
tended to allow for the accommodation of a wide variety of different vehicle types.
Phrased another way, the road network is a protocol: a network with fairly open
provisions and rules, upon which third-party players are welcome, if not encour-
aged, to build services and businesses using commercially produced interface de-
vices.
In terms of the articulation of the trialectic, it is notable that while there are
strong vertical entities providing a supportive spine to the assemblage, there is
no entity which can make a claim to having dominance or control over the as-
semblage. It is clear that the ability of central government to push through im-
provements in the infrastructural layer plays an important role in sustaining the
roads assemblage and ensuring its dominant modal share of freight traffic, but
the contestation around the interface layer—while bounded by standards and
regulations—has proved capable of producing vigorous (if exploitative and oc-
casionally criminal) new models for the business of providing freight logistics as a
service. But those new business models are almost invariably iterations of a very
old model indeed, namely that of the common carrier, and the experience of the
instigating protagonist of such a practice has really changed very little: one gives
over one’s goods, and one pays the going rate for the relevant destination. How-
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ever, the assemblage through which that service is performed has been through
several substantial reconfigurations, some more successful than others. Further-
more, the success or failure of new entrants into the assemblage is shown to be at
least as dependent upon social, political and economic factors as upon the validity
of the technology in question.
Chapter 6
Historical analysis
B—Cooperation: the evolution of
waterways
A preamble on sources
As explained in greater detail at the beginning of chapter 5, the narrative approach
of this thesis to its blending of data and analysis precludes the referencing of ev-
ery fact that follows in the manner that might be considered traditional to some
disciplines. Therefore any statement of broad or contextual fact in the analysis
chapters of this thesis (namely chapters 5, 6 and 7) which do not bear an inline
citation should be taken to be drawn from a synthesis of the sources pertinent to
the chapter in question; in the case of this chapter, those sources are Ball, Crossley,
and Flavell (2006); Boughey and Hadfield (2012); Burton (1995); Guldi (2012); Had-
field (1972); Hey (2010); McIvor (2015) and Shell (2015) in particular, though some
degree of contextual information may have been drawn from or corroborated by
those sources with more direct pertinence to chapters 5 and 7. Direct inline cita-
tions, therefore, should be taken to indicate the sourcing of a unique and precise
detail upon which the analysis is particularly dependent.
The structuring of the subsections serves to assist in the distinction between
data and analysis, as much as said distinction is practicably possible in such an
approach. The introduction and “Elements” subsections of each historical mo-
ment should be considered to represent statements of fact, to the extent that such
are possible regarding the period in question, except where the narration clearly
indicates a supposition or conjecture on the narrator’s part.
By contrast, the “Influences” and “Articulations” subsections of each histori-
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cal moment should be considered to be predominantly speculative analysis based
upon the materials already cited and discussed; where it adds clarity, the intro-
duction of further specific data within these sections is accompanied by a direct
reference to its source wherever such is realistically possible.
For a discussion of the epistemological and methodological challenges inherent
in this research, particularly in regard to the the availability of and reliance upon
pertinent sources, the reader is directed to section 9.4.5 of the discussion chapter
of this thesis.
Figure 6.1: Rivers, navigations and canals in Derbyshire and South Yorkshire
Sheffield grew up around the point of confluence of the River Don and the
River Sheaf. In exploring the story of waterway freight in the Sheffield region,
this part of the analysis will predominantly focus on the River Don. This is less
of a choice than an inevitability rooted in the fundamental differences between
the two rivers: arriving in Sheffield after a long flat run roughly southwards from
Penistone, the Don is broad and slow, while the Sheaf clatters down a rocky valley
directly from the foothills of the Pennines to the south-west of the city. In short,
the Sheaf was never a viable transport route: too narrow, shallow and fast for even
fairly small boats. As such, it is of little immediate relevance to this analysis, as
are the numerous minor rivers in the area—many of which, though not all, have
disappeared from view due to a combination of over-abstraction, pollution, and
culverting.
However, looking at the uses other than transportation to which the Sheaf has
been put will help clarify the story of transportation on the Don, and further
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illuminate the stories of road and rail transportation in Sheffield, also. As such,
a brief examination of the industrialisation of the River Sheaf will follow the four
analytical moments examining the River Don, the first of which begins below.
The sections of this chapter will refer to Figure 6.1 on page 124, which is an
illustrative and not-to-scale map of the waterways and major river systems to
which Sheffield is connected; rivers and navigations (natural waterways enhanced
by human intervention) are shown as blue lines, while canals are in black. What
should be immediately apparent is Sheffield’s isolation in the context of water-
ways: jammed up tight against the Pennines to the West, at the point before any
rivers were made navigable or canals dug, Sheffield was a good 20km overland
away from the nearest point at which it could connect to the national network of
waterways transport, namely Bawtry on the Idle to the east.
6.1 The Dutch River: early experiments in inland naviga-
tion (~1700)
Sheffield’s axis of economic orientation was traditionally East-West, thanks to the
local topography preventing easy movement southwards. The eastern link was
to Europe via the port of Hull, at the mouth of the Humber estuary: long prior
to the industrial revolution, steelmakers in the Sheffield area had been importing
Swedish iron, rather than making use of the inferior local resource, and finished
products flowed back in the opposite direction, whether they were ultimately
bound for the continent or for the south of England.
The Upper Don is that part of the river which begins in the Pennines and
ends where it joins the Sheaf; this section has never been made navigable in any
significant sense (and is hence not illustrated in Figure 6.1), though it played a
significant role as a source of water and power for many mills, forges and factories
along its banks, as well as being a handy dumping site for unwanted industrial
byproducts. The Lower Don flows north-east out of the city, passing through
Tinsley and Rotherham and Doncaster; prior to any improvements or interventions
(circa 1620), it debouched into both the River Aire and the River Trent, around the
location of what is now the town of Goole.
In the late 1620s, a Dutch engineer named Cornelius Vermuyden was hired to
drain Hatfield Chase, and closed off the Don’s connection to the Trent as part of
the work; this resulted in repeated floods (and riots) in the Fishlake region, and
Vermuyden’s sponsors demanded another channel to fix the problem. The result
was what is known as the “Dutch River”, which joined the rechanneled Don to
the Ouse (see again Figure 6.1); the village of Goole was founded at this location.
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Sluice gates had been fitted to the Dutch River, but they were washed away in 1688
and never replaced, allowing the tide to flow into the channel, thereby making it
wider and deeper than it had been previously. As a result, barges of between 10
and 30 tons could travel between Fishlake and the estuary in all seasons, while
smaller craft could make it as far as Doncaster “during three-quarters of the year”
(Hadfield, 1972, p64-65). This was of little advantage to makers or merchants
in Sheffield who, if they wished to transport goods by water, were obliged to
send them overground as far as Bawtry, which was the nearest head-of-navigation
through which they could link up to the growing national waterways network.
6.1.1 Elements
Protagonist
The protagonist’s desires remain essentially stable: to move goods around the map
and make a profit doing so. However, there is a specificity to their demography
that bears noting. Shipment by water appealed to different businesses for differ-
ent reasons—the potteries of what is now Stoke-on-Trent, for example, realised
that porcelain shipped by water was less likely to break than pottery shipped by
pack-horse or cart, providing it was loaded and unloaded with caution. The busi-
nesses of the Sheffield region, by contrast, were bulk commodity producers (e.g.
mines, collieries, quarries) and/or bulk commodity consumers (mines again, but
also forges and mills) and weren’t worried about breakages so much as bulk cost
efficiencies: put simply, what they had to sell would only be worth selling if they
could move it more cheaply over long distances than could pack-horses, carts or
waggons. This was of much less concern to producers of more expensive products,
such as Sheffield’s famed cutlery and blades, which were still profitable when sent
by more expensive (but faster and more direct) overland modes of transport.
Interfaces
That the Lower Don was not considered “navigable” is certainly not to suggest it
had no boat traffic; it is merely to emphasise that what boat traffic there was would
have been minimal, and considerably constrained by the prevailing conditions of
the river. Detailed records for the period are unavailable, but it seems reasonable
to suggest that an array of small rivercraft might have been in use: given we know
that a 10-ton barge could travel no further than Doncaster, we can therefore assume
that most if not all boats in use between there and Sheffield would necessarily have
a capacity lower than 10 tons.
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It is an interesting to note that for waterway transportation in the Sheffield
region, the local state-of-the-art in interface technology was way behind that avail-
able further down the waterways to which they aspired to connect. Ships and
boats are a venerable branch of technology, and time-honoured and traditional
designs were well established long before the era of navigations and canals: the
design still known (and in use today) as the “Humber hull” dates back to the
13th century, and successfully meets the special requirements of sailing on both
the Humber estuary itself, and the inland waterways to which it was connected.
For inland operations, a deep keel is anathema, but boats with a shallow keel will
drift when exposed to sidewinds out on the open waters of the estuary, so the
Humber hull came with lee boards to be deployed against this risk. Two different
sail configurations pertained: a square rig was traditional for boats based on the
northern bank of the estuary, and a sloop rig on the south. But the square rig was
particularly suited to inland waterways: it was more easily raised and lowered
(so as to pass under bridges), and was tall enough to catch the wind that might
otherwise be blocked by buildings or trees along the riverside. Rather than having
a rigid standard size, Humber hull variants emerged to adapt to the particular
waterways they plied: by way of example, Sheffield-class hulls were 18m long by
4.5m beam with a capacity of 100 tons, while Trent-class hulls were up to 5 meters
longer (Burton, 1995, 121). (At this point, of course, the Sheffield class does not
yet exist, as there is not yet a route to Sheffield that such a boat could pass.)
Infrastructure
While the Don had not yet been meddled with to the end of making it navigable, it
was already subject to plenty of other interventions, many of which contributed to
compounding its being considered unnavigable. Boats using the Don were obliged
to share the river with the water-powered mills and factories that had sprung up
along its banks during the early pre-steam phases of the industrial revolution.
These mills required weirs and millponds to impound a large head of water, by
which could power their machinery; boats could pass these obstacles by way of a
“flash lock” or side-sluice, but mill owners were often reluctant to allow them to
do so, as operating the locks diverted the water supply for the duration of passage,
which could means hours of lucrative production lost to each passing barge.
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6.1.2 Influences
HKJ
Given the stability of the protagonist’s role, the basic qualities of HKJ influence are
likewise consistent across time and across systems: the parameters to be exceeded
are those which will most affect the profit margin. However, more specific logics
come into play in this particular moment, which bear some closer examination.
Cost is inescapably important, but there are other factors which might recommend
a practice be performed through the use of one technological mode rather than
another.
Given the established overland flow of goods from Sheffield to Bawtry for
onward shipment by water (whether to Europe or the southern counties), the ad-
vantages of waterborne transport were obvious to local traders, particularly those
dealing with cheap-but-bulky commodities such as coal. For example, during this
period the cost of carting coal ten miles overland was reckoned to effectively dou-
ble its price by comparison to that at the minehead, which is why only colliers
based in Newcastle, with its direct access to littoral shipping, could make a profit
selling it in London despite the tax placed on it at the end of the 17th century (and
why Sheffielders of this period burned coal at home, but no one shipped it far
from where it was found).
Or, more simply: if you could load coal straight onto some form of boat, you
could make good money selling it, but if you had to send it even a few dozen
miles overland beforehand, you were literally better off burning it yourself. With
higher value goods, the profit margin could absorb the overland costs to some
extent—hence the established overland connection to Bawtry. But that overland
connection would only ever have presented itself as a drain on profits, which goes
some way to explaining the existence of an influence in favour of developing the
waterways assemblage in Sheffield, even when alternative modes of transportation
were available to complete the route.
DP
Given the extreme informality of the sector, there was likely little in the way of ser-
vice design: barge operators on the Don presumably operated in much the same
manner as the informal “local carriers” who worked the roads, being restricted
to small loads and short journeys by the unimproved condition of the river itself.
Regular schedules in particular would have been impossible to maintain while
dealing with fractious mill-owners for passage through weirs; likewise, capacity
and costs would have depended on the affordances of the particular barge in play,
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the boatman’s availability, and other such factors.
I&I
In this case, the I&I influence upon the infrastructural layer comes not from a new
technology, but a pre-existing technology already in operation not very far away,
but which has yet to be deployed here: namely, the Humber hulls (and indeed
more capacious vessels elsewhere in the country). Very simply, the existence of
larger boats travelling inland waterways elsewhere is a precedent which anyone
involved in trading or shipping would have been very much aware of, and which
revealed the commercial possibilities of an improved river; thus the long-standing
busyness of the port at Hull (to which some Sheffield businesses were likely al-
ready shipping, by way of the overland link to Bawtry), and the early success of the
nearby Aire & Calder Navigation would inform and strengthen the I&I influence
upon the infrastructural layer, manifesting as calls for improving the navigability
of the Don.
S&R
At this point, the “standards” of the infrastructural layer are the innate and unim-
proved conditions of the river itself—its depth, breadth, speed of flow, sharpness
of turns, seasonal variances—plus the design of the flash locks. These are the main
influences on the material form of the interface, which manifests as the presumed
hegemony of small, shallow barges: no other types of boat would have been at all
practical, because they simply wouldn’t fit.
Likewise there were few of what we would now think of as “regulations”, not
least due to the lack of activity to be regulated. However, the leasing of mooring
points and riverside property, and the tolling and/or licensing of local waterborne
carriers are actions with a distinctly regulatory character. Other such regulatory
activity of a more mutual kind would include the negotiation of fees and customs
around the use of the locks (such as waiting for a suitable number of boats to
arrive, and then passing them through as a batch), which mediated between the
competing interests of the mill-owners and the boat operators—interests which
were presumably not always in opposition, given the need to ship the goods that
the mills produced (and the raw materials they consumed).
6.1.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 6.2 on page 130.
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Figure 6.2: Articulated trialectic model for section 6.1 (The Dutch River)
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River carriers community-of-practice
The presence and placement of the community of river carriers—inferred to be
broadly similar in operational style to the informal local and regional carriers op-
erating on the roads during the same period—should be self-explanatory: any
protagonist seeking to fulfill a performance using the waterways assemblage nec-
essarily has to deal with the operator directly, leaving said operator considerable
leeway to adjust the service on offer as they see fit.
Boatbuilders community-of-practice
Likewise, the influence of boatbuilders is clear—although, as mentioned above,
their influence on the I&I vector arrives as if from a distance. Boatbuilders along
the Don would have no cause to build boats which could not be used upon it,
but would doubtless be well aware of the various hulls being made and used
elsewhere—a knowledge likely shared with the river carriers, if not actually trans-
mitted through them.
Civic organisations
The Hallamshire Cutlers and the other Sheffield authorities would as yet have
little reason to get involved in the waterways, given they did not yet extend into
the town. However, the corporations and councils of Doncaster, Rotherham, and
other regional towns with conflicting or competing interests (whether as transport
hubs or rival producers of commodities) were already making their influence felt,
and would continue to do so (as shall be shown).
Landowners and industrialists
Much of the land alongside the Don was owned by either members of the landed
aristocracy or early successful industrialists. For the former, the river represented
both drainage and irrigation opportunities (or simply bounds upon lands they
liked the way they were), while the latter saw the river as a source of power
(as well as a source of water for industrial purposes); for both, the status quo is
predominantly satisfactory. However, this articulatory entity should not be seen as
in any way unified or monolithic in its concerns: on the contrary, landowners and
industrialists were as likely to dispute amongst themselves as with any other actor,
and some of them could see personal advantage in more general improvements,
as shall be shown.
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Implicit: Roads
At this point it bears noting that the existence of the road network as a potential
alternative assemblage (even if not a particularly good alternative in many cases)
must have exerted an influence on not only the uptake of waterway performances,
but on their form: put simply, road transport would have been the performance
mode against which water transport was defined in contrast. As such, the influ-
ence of the roads is universal across the whole waterways assemblage, but in an
implicit and distanced way: hence its listing here as an implicit articulation, and
its absence from the articulatory map.
Rather than considering the road assemblage as an entity intruding into the
waterways assemblage as pictured here, it is perhaps better conceived of as being
in something not unlike a quantum superposition with it: for any given perfor-
mance (or sub-route of a performance), both assemblages await their potential
enrollment, but only become relevant when (if) the performance enrolls them.
Hence the lack of visual representation; there is no way to show both assemblages
at once without one effectively obscuring the other (which, metaphorically speak-
ing, is what happens at the moment of assemblage selection).
6.2 The Don Navigation (~1770)
Much as with turnpiking, the fad for making rivers navigable came fairly late to
Sheffield, but that was not for want of local efforts in that direction. The scale of
those efforts bears consideration, as they inform and illuminate later events—and
while this account and those that follow may seem complex, they in fact represent
a significant simplification of the actual sequence of events, and of the cast of
significant actors.
As with turnpikes, navigation projects required an Act of Parliament before
they could proceed. The first Bill filed in favour of improving the Don came in
1698 from Sir Godfrey Copley of Sprotbrough, and was backed in Parliament by
notable figures in Leeds and the West Riding, but it was opposed by Sheffield,
the Doncaster corporation (due to worries about damage to mills), and those with
vested interests in shipping on the Idle and the Trent. The 1704 Bill came from
Doncaster itself, but quickly ran afoul of riparian landowners. Another emerged
from a coalition between Sheffield (the town authorities in alliance with the Hal-
lamshire Cutlers) and Rotherham in 1721, making a clear argument not just for
the enhancement of regional and national connectivity, but for an improved ability
to export manufactured goods; backed by the already-established Aire & Calder
Navigation, it also encountered resistance from riverside landowners and mill-
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owners.
The Bill introduced in 1726 by Sheffield and the Cutlers did the trick, despite
continued opposition from landowners, interests on the Idle, and their former
allies in the Aire & Calder. The Bill only passed after it dropped the idea of
extending the navigable stretch beyond Tinsley, replacing it with a short turnpike-
esque road between Tinsley and Sheffield proper; the resulting Act, once finally
passed, came loaded with a uniquely extraordinary number of concessions to local
business interests as a condition of its passing, including a promise to build no
new weirs (meaning locks would have to be integrated into existing millponds),
nor alter the height of existing ones (Hadfield, 1972, p61). Construction began soon
after, but the trust struggled to secure enough funding, and eventually had to go
back to Parliament for permission to become a joint-stock company (the creation
of which had been constrained in the wake of assorted speculative “bubbles”,
most notably the infamous South Seas Bubble, resulting from enthusiastic over-
investment in the transAtlantic slave trade), as well as battling with mill-owners
and other interests over land rights, water supply and concessionary toll schemes.
By 1740, the river had been made navigable as far as Rotherham for vessels
of up to 20 tons, and the company petitioned Parliament again for the rights
to extend their remit downriver to Fishlake—another proposal whose acceptance
came loaded with concessions. By 1751 the navigation had reached Tinsley, and
the Tinsley-Sheffield road stipulated in the original Act was completed in 1755.
The original lease to the shareholders expired in 1759, and the company took over
management of the navigation itself. Through the 1760s, the regional trade in
coal was picking up (thanks to other navigations elsewhere, and also turnpiking,
which was opening up the roads to heavier loads), and the navigation experienced
year on year growth in receipts taken (and in dividends paid) right through to the
1790s (Hadfield, 1972, p80).
6.2.1 Elements
Protagonist
The role of the protagonist remains stable. However, as happened with the roads,
the general level of economic energy is increasing everywhere, lending a growing
intensity to commerce and competition. Note also the bubble phenomenon in
the broader socioeconomic context, indicative of what economists euphemistically
refer to as “irrational exuberance” in financial decisions—and a prelude to the
speculative booms that will underwrite the railways and canals to follow.
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Interfaces
There is no detail to be found regarding the constitution of the small craft operat-
ing on the completed Don Navigation, other than that they could carry up to 20
tons—twice the earlier limit—as far up the river as Tinsley (at which point goods
bound for Sheffield proper would be transferred onto the Tinsley-to-Sheffield turn-
pike), and would have been either powered by sails or pulled by horses.
But as before, a whole selection of other hull variants are implicitly in play, due
to their ubiquity elsewhere in the waterways system to which the Don Navigation
is connected: boats such as the Humber hulls thereby act as a sort of “absent
presence”, an unrealised yet nonetheless easily perceived potential for improved
performance parameters.
Infrastructure
The main work in making a river navigable was dredging to a consistent depth,
and broadening and straightening the route to accommodate longer vessels, but
some secondary infrastructures were also necessary, such as new or replacement
bridges, towpaths and wharfage facilities. Also crucial were the development of
the two-gated pound-lock, which allowed for faster throughput of longer, broader
vessels while allowing any mills on the weir to continue working as the shipping




As discussed in the previous moment, the HKJ influence is broadly consistent.
DP
The shape of the service as experienced by the protagonist changes considerably
with the arrival of the Navigation, not least because the navigation company itself
acts as the interface to the service: the company would accept goods for transit in
exchange for standardised tolls and fees, and then farm out the work of carrying
the goods to river carriers who were either contracted to the company or who
took pick-up work on a more ad hoc basis. This enabled a sort of arbitrage of
capacity, which in turn meant greater regularity and reliability of service, as well
as regularised (or at least predictable) pricing; that reliability would in turn have
attracted more traffic.
Chapter 6. Historical analysis B—Cooperation 135
Note however that this period sees the emergence of the earliest corporate car-
riers, and that these organisations could and did use subsystems like the Don nav-
igation as components of multimodal services across much longer routes, trans-
ferring goods (and sometimes passengers) from carts and waggons to rivers and
coastal shipping (and vice versa) whenever doing so offered their clients an advan-
tage in speed, cost or reliability. In such cases, the carrier company is acting as a
proxy for the protagonist, whose contract would have been with the carrier alone;
the carrier would then subcontract such sections of the journey as they could not
perform themselves. But these arrangements are obscure to the protagonist, con-
cealed behind the opacity of a turn-key delivery service: they pay the tolls, hand
over the goods, and forget about it.
I&I
As before, there’s little opportunity for innovation in the interface layer to push
against the infrastructural layer in an attempt to extract more capacity: the lim-
itations of the infrastructure form a hard ceiling on vessel capacity, and there is
no other parameter on which a boatbuilder could compete with the hegemonic
designs (which, in the cases of river barges, had already been optimised to pur-
pose by the passing of time). However, the larger vessels known to be operating
on other waterways—and, indeed, further toward the coast on the same system—
would serve as an influence in favour of infrastructural improvements which could
accommodate their like.
S&R
As mentioned above, rivers are restrictive upon the interfaces that use them in
ways that roads are not: put plainly, if your boat is too deep, broad or long for the
river at any point along the route, you simply cannot use it. This limits the extent
to which interface innovations which focus on size or capacity can exceed the
current configuration of the infrastructure layer. That said, there would be little to
prevent the ongoing use of vessels which were smaller than the now-standard size,
at least in purely practical terms. But smaller boats would find themselves at a
disadvantage regarding economies of scale alongside boats of the maximum size,
which would have restricted their use to jobs involving short routes and small
loads; as such, while the standards of the river enforce an upper bound on vessel
capacity, they consequentially generate an economic pressure that raises the lower
bound of capacity.
As with turnpikes, toll schedules—mandated by Acts of Parliament, and often
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tailored to support local economic dynamics—regulated what was carried, and
when. Meanwhile, the old informal agreements and customs around lock usage
and other such activities become codified into operational rules and regulations,
and it is these shifting norms and customs to which minor innovations in vessel
design and organisational practices would be best able to react.
6.2.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 6.3 on page 137.
Incumbents: River carriers; Boatbuilders; Civic organisations; Landowners and
industrialists
All these players from the previous moment are still very much in the game. Note,
however, the increased influence of the Civics over the DP vector (reflecting the
increased but still partial influence of Sheffield authorities over an infrastructure
for which they agitated).
The Navigation Company
The role of the Navigation company itself—initially a trust, much like those which
managed turnpikes, but ultimately a joint-stock for-profit company—is self-explanatory.
Note, however, the way in which its centrality positions it as a site of conflict and
mediation between other interests: it forms a sort of spinal column at the heart of
the assemblage, and holds the system together.
Mining concerns
The coal trade was the main impetus behind the Don navigation: as mentioned
above, transporting coal by road was unprofitable on anything but the shortest of
local routes, but the prospect of connecting directly to the coast by barge made
the local coalfields look like a viable business. And of course, that export channel
could also act as an import channel for mining supplies, such as wooden pit-props
from Scandinavia. There were more strictly functional benefits to this relationship,
also: the closeness of canals to mining comes in part from the former’s maintaining
its depth by using water pumped out from the latter.
Colliery owners (and other such extractive producers of heavy materials, e.g.
of slate, lime, millstones, building stone) get their own articulatory entity due to
their closeness to the navigation—a closeness that was both spatial and commer-
cial. The arrival of the navigation prompted many mine owners to run tramways
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Figure 6.3: Articulated trialectic model for section 6.2 (The Don Navigation)
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down to their own wharves on the riverside, so as to take advantage of the ability
to get their goods onto the water as soon as possible; avoiding overland carriage
entirely cut costs to such an extent that entirely new markets opened up to them
outside the local region, particularly for coal, and the sheer volume of their busi-
ness ensured them a sympathetic ear within the navigation company.
Note that this irregularly-shaped grouping connects to the interface layer, and
also to both of the influence vectors between the interface and the protagonist.
Mining concerns influenced the vessels they used primarily through their need
for ever-greater capacity, but they also influenced service design: in a very early
manifestation of what we would now describe as containerisation, mine operators
pushed for their coal to be loaded onto ships while still in the trucks that carried it
to the riverside, as this would simplify and speed up the loading process consid-
erably (at least from their perspective), and make for easier intermodal transfers
further along the journey.
But note further that these powerful protagonists also generated HKJ influ-
ences at the same time, through their attempts to secure ever more capacity at
lower prices: after the Don company agreed to the more convenient loading pro-
cedures and started charging mines by the truckload, it became apparent that the
mines had been quietly increasing the standard size of their trucks, necessitating
a readjustment of the appropriate tolls (Hadfield, 1972, p80).
6.3 The Sheffield & South Yorkshire Waterways (1840—1900)
If the negotiations and wranglings required to make the Don Navigation a reality
seemed protracted, they were nothing by comparison with the internecine dis-
putes which were to come. The next moment in which a fairly stable assemblage
might be sketched does not occur until around 1880, but in order to understand
that assemblage, it is necessary to cursorily sketch out the extensive conflicts which
shaped its constitution.
The 1790s saw increased calls for an extension of the navigation beyond Tins-
ley and into Sheffield, thus bypassing the overland turnpike and getting goods
straight onto the water at their point of origin. This was also the period in which
the fad for navigations gave way to full-on “canal mania”, a phenomenon which
was as much financial and political as it was technical: as such, what follows is
a massive simplification of events by comparison to the actual corporate combat
that characterised canal development in general, and canal development around
Sheffield in particular.
The increase in the industrial and domestic use of coal within the region meant
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that coal traffic on the Don and other local systems was actually falling. The ar-
rival of the Navigation had resulted in a profusion of tramways and waggonways
connecting mines and quarries directly to the banks of the river; traffic might be
sustained if production could be ramped up to meet the demand further afield.
This provided the impetus for the development of the Barnsley coalfield, in which
the Don Navigation company had a clear and direct interest (in the form of a stake
in what would become the Dearne & Dove canal).
A meeting in Sheffield in 1792 saw the first serious proposal of extending the
Don Navigation to Tinsley, as well as the plans which would become the Dearne &
Dove, but while the Don company’s shareholders agreed on the plans, they were
frustrated once again by the interests of local landowners. However, the Stainforth
& Keadby Canal was launched in Oct 1792, entirely under the control of the Don
company, and an agreement was reached with the Aire & Calder Navigation over
what would become the Dearne & Dove and the Barnsley canals, and a connection
between them; the Aire & Calder’s remit stretched roughly between Huddersfield
on the Calder in the west and Goole on the Humber in the east (and is not labelled
in Figure 6.1 on 124 so as to avoid cluttering). While separate on paper, there
was a great deal of overlap of funders and personnel within these organisations;
the Stainforth & Keadby and Dearne & Dove “obtained their Acts in 1793 and
became separate companies, though with much common shareholding, control
and management” (Hadfield, 1972, p208-209); the Stainforth & Keadby started
operations in 1802, the Dearne & Dove in 1804.
The Sheffield to Tinsley link stayed on the drawing board for a long time due
to the continued resistance of land-owners, and the first decade of the century
saw numerous proposals being batted back and forth across the parliamentary
net with no success. The idea of a canal connection was revived in 1813, but
the Don company had by then cooled on the idea, so an independent company
was formed in 1815, and the canal connection finally opened in 1819; the Don
company’s judgment may have been sound, as “the canal proved expensive to
build and only moderately profitable” (Hadfield, 1972, p221).
The 1810s and 1820s saw the first rumblings of railroad competition, with the
Don company initially aiming to enter the intermodal game with some branch-
line connections of its own, only to dial back its ambitions, rationalise the system
it already had, and link the navigation directly to the Sheffield canal. There were
also legal and logistical squabbles, such as that with the engineering company
Walker’s of Mosborough, who would draw on the water supply to the extent that
the navigation became too shallow to operate, and were eventually bought off
with a doubling of their water fees, as well as the dropping of improvement plans;
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also, influential local coal owners “forced the concession that a ton of coal should
in future be reckoned as 25 and not 20 cwt.” (Hadfield, 1972, p215).
Water supply was a particular problem for canals and navigations alike, and
the Sheffield systems often relied on waste water pumped out of coal mines. This
source became unreliable and insufficient, leading to clashes such as that with
Walkers and other owners of abstraction rights, and eventually to an agreement
with the recently-incorporated Sheffield Water Works Company in 1836 (Hadfield,
1972, p274). The 1830s are marked mostly by attempted deals and buy-outs in-
tended to forestall or mitigate the inevitable arrival of the railways. By the 1840s,
with railway mania in full swing, attention turned instead to the possibilities of
intermodal connections and collaborations, and the Don company absorbed the
Stainforth & Keadby, Aire & Calder and Sheffield canals, only to be itself amalga-
mated into the South Yorkshire Railway and River Don Company in 1850, which
was in turn leased to the Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway in 1864.
Despite pressure from the railways (which could compete relentlessly against
the canals, due to the lack of regulation on their rates), the canals managed to sus-
tain decent levels of coal traffic (and hence receipts) for the rest of the century—
though their modal share of the total traffic by comparison to the ever-busier rail-
ways was declining steadily. It is only here at the end of the 19th Century that the
articulatory churn outlined above results in a significant shift in the constitution
of the infrastructural layer. Likely inspired by the nascent Manchester Ship Canal,
plans were floated to upgrade the network, now known as the Sheffield and South
Yorkshire Navigation Company, to accommodate seagoing ships, and an Act of
Parliament was secured to that aim in the early 1890s. The Act’s promoters “were
proposing to rebuild the Don and the Keadby Canal to a 300 or 400 ton standard”
and “to enable both it and the Dearne & Dove to take compartment boat trains”
(Hadfield, 1972, p417).
Unfortunately, the promoters were far from unified, and caught in a national
crossfire of infrastructural investment speculation: deals on land, water and shared
access fell through, investment failed to materialise, and the Manchester Ship
Canal turned out to be less successful than expected, all against the backdrop of by
a general decline in the national passion for building waterways. As a result, the
Sheffield network was only improved to the extent of being able to handle 110-ton
boats (see below); despite efforts at straightening the route, compartment boats
could only pass in threes, which represented little or no throughput increase, but
the opening of the New Junction Canal did result in a slight increase in tonnage
up to the start of the first world war.
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6.3.1 Elements
Protagonist
The role of the protagonist remains stable. Indeed, by this point the business of
carrying has already formalised to such a point that the instigating protagonist
may not actually take any part in the choice of assemblage(s) to be enrolled in
the performance, leaving such logistical matters to the organisation performing
on their behalf.
Interfaces
By 1900, there are a considerable array of different interface options for the Sheffield
waterways assemblage, with the bottom tier still populated by assorted small
barges (10—20 ton) and other such craft.
The abortive improvements achieved by the Sheffield & South Yorkshire af-
ter finally conglomerating the local waterways came nowhere near its ambition
of accommodating 400 ton ships, but it was by this point finally possible for a
Sheffield-class Humber hull (110 tons) to sail from Goole to the Sheffield canal
basin.
(It bears noting that steam-powered variants of both small and large hulls were
in production, and had been in use on the Aire & Calder since around 1830.
However, steam-powered boats were still banned from use on the Sheffield &
South Yorkshire six decades after that date.)
Compartment boats, meanwhile—also known as “tub boats” or, locally, “Tom
Puddings”—were barely boats at all. Little more than an open-topped iron con-
tainer capable of floating 30 tons of coal, and of being strung together into trains
(not unlike pack-horses), these were developed on the Aire & Calder with the aim
of completely mechanising coal transshipments all the way from the mineheads of
the Barnsley fields to the growing port at Goole. They were a forerunner of 20th
century containerisation: highly modular, and accompanied by bespoke wharfage
infrastructures optimised for swift loading and unloading of the cargo.
Infrastructure
The final canal link between Tinsley and Sheffield opened in 1820, but was still
only suitable for small barges, and went underused due to disputes over own-
ership, abstraction rights, and competition (whether between different canals, or
between canals and the emerging railways). By the turn of the century, however,
the Sheffield waterways had been dredged and improved and fitted out so as to
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accommodate anything up to the size of a Sheffield-class Humber hull (110 tons
capacity).
This is in contrast, however, to the constitution of the Aire & Calder waterways—
a separate waterways system, but very much interconnected with the Sheffield
system due to its commanding position at the end of the Humber estuary. The
Aire & Calder had gone down the route of full mechanisation very early, devel-
oping the “Tom Pudding” compartment boats and their associated loading and
unloading systems around 1860, and subsequently lengthening their locks so as
to accommodate seven compartment boats at a time; even by 1900, the Sheffield
system’s locks could only handle three at most.
6.3.2 Influences
HKJ
The dominant form of HKJ influence still applies, but it bears noting that the
Sheffield waterways were oriented toward specialising in coal very early on: other
types of goods were carried on the waterways, certainly (not least the Scandi-
navian logs used as pit-props in the mines) but the exploitation of the Barnsley
coalfield provided the initial impetus. Therefore the HKJ influence on this partic-
ular assemblage is itself particular, in that it is dominated by a desire for perfor-
mance parameters that are optimal for the transportation of a commodity with a
very high mass-to-value ratio: put simply, bulk capacity with a minimum of in-
termodal shifts (i.e. transfers between one interface or infrastructure and another)
always trumps speed of delivery and delicacy of handling.
DP
Much as with the Navigation, the canal companies published standard fares and
tolls (as mandated by the Parliamentary Acts which created them, and by subse-
quent legislation), and presented as a turnkey carrying service: goods for ship-
ment were given over to the company, which then parcelled out the actual carry-
ing to its own fleet of vessels, and to freelance operators. Alternatively, one might
transact with a cross-system carrier company, such as Pickfords, which specialised
in point-to-point deliveries rather than regular shipments: that carrier company
might then employ the canal company to handle one or more legs of the full jour-
ney. Reviewing the tumultuous history of the Sheffield waterways with regard to
matters of ownership and responsibility, as outlined above, it seems fair to sug-
gest that anyone who could realistically avoid dealing with the byzantine tangle
of canal companies would have good reason to do so; simply turning over your
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shipment to a carrier company would be a lot less effort than negotiating with a
succession of different organisations in order to complete the same shipment. That
the organisations in question would have been publicly known to be struggling fi-
nancially (not to mention feuding with one another) likely did little to improve
their public standing. This served to effectively double down on their commit-
ment to coal: of all the possible protagonists in this assemblage, the colliery is the
one least able to make an alternative choice of assemblage. Or, more plainly, the
waterways were obliged to stick with gratifying those customers who didn’t have
any other choice.
Or rather that would have been the case, were it not for the arrival of the rail-
ways in the middle of the century, who were able to provide bulk capacity and
minimal intermodal shifts and delivery speeds literally unheard of a few years
previously—and who were easily able to undercut the canals and the overland
carriers, given that the latter were obliged to publish (and stick to) their regulated
fares and tolls, while the railways were still savouring the vertiginous thrill of un-
regulated laissez faire business practices. And the problem with going specialist
is that, once you’re left with only the clients in whom you specialise, the boot is
upon the other foot, and suddenly your clients hold the advantage, as illustrated
by the successful renegotiation by the collieries of what a ton of coal actually
weighed, described above: the DP influence ends up in permanent thrall to the
HKJ influence, in other words.
I&I
As before, what passes for the I&I influence in this assemblage is the knowledge
of the existence and availability of superior interfaces and infrastructures in oper-
ation in neighbouring waterways. But it is clear by comparison with the Aire &
Calder that this is not a problem endemic to canals in general: as shown above, the
Aire & Calder was experimenting with new iterations of old interfaces (e.g. steam-
powered barges) and with genuinely novel inventions (e.g. the compartment-boat
system), and was extremely successful as a result. There is little or no data to
tell us why the operators of the Sheffield system were content to follow decades
behind in the technological wake of other waterways in the region, and then to
attempt only watered-down versions of their successful strategies.
But the way in which the system changed hands repeatedly over the course of
a half century suggests that they were simply too busy trying to knife one another
in the back over ownership (and hence operational and financial control) of the in-
frastructural layer to lavish much attention (or funds) upon contemporary changes
in the interface layer. This undistinguished squabbling, coupled with attempts to
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either head off new competition from the railways or get into the railway game by
the back door, saw the canal companies acting like absentee landlords, the slow
decline of their assets being a direct result of their attempts to sweat them over
the short term. Superior interface options were always exerting a pressure on the
Sheffield waterways to expand, but that pressure failed to outweigh the narrow
self-interest of the institutions controlling them, resulting in a “too little, too late”
upgrade to the infrastructure at the end of the century.
S&R
By the end of the 19th century, the Sheffield waterways could accommodate the
Sheffield-class Humber hulls and, presumably, any vessel smaller than that. This
represents a considerable increase in the “bandwidth” of the connection between
Sheffield and Goole, with every “packet” shipped potentially five to ten times as
large as those shipped 80 years previously. However, it looks rather less dramatic
when held up against the Aire & Calder, whose locks could handle more than
twice as many compartments at once, and whose wharfage infrastructure was
carefully developed to minimise costs related to the loading and transhipment of
coal. To oversimplify (but not to excess), the Sheffield waterways system had al-
ways lagged behind the regional state-of-the-art regarding its physical standards,
and this final half-hearted attempt at upgrade served only to entrench that back-
wardness. After all, why do your business on a network which is seemingly so
wedded to the past?
The regulatory regime likewise reflects what might charitably be described as
technological and commercial myopia, with the enduring ban on steam-powered
barges on the Sheffield system standing as a synecdoche for the ongoing failure of
its succession of owners to move with the times. And it’s not as if there weren’t
clear reasons to change: even as late as 1906, a Humber hull carrying 100 tons and
drawing 6’ 6” would sail up the canal as far as Thorne or Mexborough, at which
point they were obliged to take down their sails and arrange for horse-haulage into
Sheffield proper, because otherwise they couldn’t pass under the bridges (Had-
field, 1972, p423). In terms of the trialectic model, then, the company has failed to
mediate between the desires of the protagonist and the affordances of the infras-
tructure layer: that “signal” of influence needed to be picked up and acted upon,
but the opportunity was lost amongst all the inter-organisational horse-trading.
6.3.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 6.4 on page 145.
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Figure 6.4: Articulated trialectic model for section 6.3 (The Sheffield and South
Yorkshire Waterways)
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Incumbents: River carriers; Boatbuilders; Civic organisations; Landowners and
industrialists; Mining concerns
The majority of incumbent actors are still in play, albeit with some slight rear-
rangements of relationships.
The Canal Company
The canal company (in this case and at this point the S&SY) inherits the central
controlling influence of the Navigation company thanks to its direct control of
the infrastructural layer. However, note that its influence over the protagonist by
comparison to that of the carrier companies and mining concerns is somewhat
diminished: this reflects the greater flexibility of the carrier company’s service
offer by comparison to that of the canal company, and the controlling influence of
a sector which the canal company has specialised in serving.
Recall, however, that while there was at almost every point “a canal company”
in charge of the majority of the Sheffield waterways system, there were throughout
the 19th century a succession of different organisations taking that role, many of
whom have been shown to have been more concerned with blocking rivals (or
buying them up) than developing the business itself; furthermore, fragments and
subsections of the network fell in and out of the main company’s remit over time.
In terms of the trialectic, this implies a particular sort of instability, rather akin to
that attendant upon a company that replaces its executive management team every
year: while the structure of the assemblage stays broadly the same, one central
articulatory element is repeatedly swapped for another one. This means that while
the other articulatory entities, whose position and relationships have been broadly
consistent over long periods of time, develop and retain an institutional knowledge
of the assemblage, the crux entity of the canal company is always a late-comer, a
new arrival faced with the difficulties of negotiating its way into a pre-established
web of relationships while trying to avoid the fate of displacement which befell
its predecessor. As a result, the canal company is a weak point in the articulatory
web, not in spite of its spinal position in the assemblage but entirely because of
it: this is illustrated by its failure to successfully translate HKJ influence into the
I&I influence that would have resulted in earlier, more thoroughgoing upgrades
to the infrastructural layer.
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Implicit
Other Infrastructure Companies
Another implicit articulatory entity—or, more accurately, a cloud of them. As
outlined above, the irrational exuberance of the railroad boom created a climate
in which companies competed savagely to own, control and extract profit from
transportation systems. As such, the canal company is necessarily always looking
over its shoulder, keeping an eye on the rivals which could elbow it aside and
take its place, and those rivals will always be jockeying for position and advan-
tage, whether over the canal company or one another. This is the other side to
the instability and weakness at the centre of the assemblage: not only does a vital
central articulatory entity keep changing, but it is surrounded by other entities
actively encouraging that rapid turnover in the belief that making this assemblage
less stable might make the assemblage in which they have a stake more stable.
The problem might be made more clear through metaphor: a young prince sur-
rounded by rivals hungry for his throne necessarily and inevitably spends less
time thinking about policy and more time worrying about courtly intrigues.
The account above touches only on the most major events in the Sheffield &
South Yorkshire’s history, which during this period—much as for other water-
way companies—describes an arc that starts with attempts to forestall or protect
against the imminent disruption of the railways, through efforts to collaborate
with their increasingly evident power, and ends with the waterways as little more
than parked assets of the railways, bought up as much for the sake of neutralising
their competition with new rail services as for seeking the rents that came from
the complete control of established freight systems (and their incumbent and de-
pendent client base, who might then be either sweated on tariffs or encouraged
onto a different, more lucrative assemblage). The repeated changes of ownership
over what ended up as the Sheffield & South Yorkshire Navigation Company (see
Hadfield, 1972, p410-428) to an instability of priorities in that succession of or-
ganisations, despite some surprisingly consistent continuities of personnel at the
boardroom level: while the running and upkeep of the Sheffield waterways was
always on the slate, deals with (and attempts to block) competing systems were
evidently a major distraction from the main business.
This was not a phenomenon unique to the Don: all across the country, railway
companies bought up canals and waterways, but there was little clarity regarding
their continued obligations toward them. On pain of fines and worse, most rail-
ways fulfilled their “statutory obligations relating to tolls and keeping the canals
in good order”, but a kind of malicious neglect was common, which had the
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advantageous side-effect of pushing traffic onto the more reliable railways (Bur-
ton, 1995, p158-159). However, many canals would have gone bust if not for the
railways—”[i]n some cases being bought out [...] was the best news shareholders
had had since they made their first investment” (Burton, 1995, p158-159)—and de-
caying canals (e.g. those more minor waterways in the Sheffield region suffering
from subsidence, due to being literally undermined by local coal extraction) were
only kept up because of the statutory obligation to do so. Legislation in 1845 freed
the canal companies to run their own fleets and vary tolls, and the parliamentary
Commissions of 1872 and 1883 found that tolls on railway-owned canals were up
to five times higher than those on the still-independent waterways, while other
figures for the period suggest that the independents were also carrying five times
as many tonnes per mile of network than those owned by the railways.
6.4 The Long Decline (1900—present)
The previous moment, as the 19th century gave way to the 20th, was the last
substantial reordering of the Sheffield waterways assemblage—and as remarked
above, it was too little, too late. As such, there is no new assemblage to model—
but it is worth following the story to its end nonetheless, precisely because the
Sheffield waterways are unique among the region’s transport infrastructures by
merit of their nigh-total decline into commercial irrelevance in the context of
freight practices.
The first world war saw the Admiralty take control of not only the canals
and navigations themselves, but also the majority of the steam trawlers operating
between Hull and Sheffield. After war ended, “traffic offered, but many of the
canal barges [and] the lighters that had worked in Hull docks, had been sunk”—
and those that hadn’t sunk were now being used as floating warehouse space “in
order to avoid paying demurrage on ships” (Hadfield, 1972, p424-425); as a result,
there simply weren’t enough interface vessels to make use of the system’s capacity,
which likely pushed local freight traffic onto the railways and, increasingly, the
roads, which were now starting to fill up with early ICE vehicles.
Sheffield City Council had already been considering an upgrade of the water-
ways system before the war started, and had drummed up support from manu-
facturers and other local councils; it was proposed that the government effectively
nationalise and fund the waterways, though Sheffield “were in principle willing to
contribute if the navigation were to be freed from railway interference” (Hadfield,
1972, p423). The plan included deepening the channel (from 6’ 6” to 8’) as well as
widening and straightening, and upgrading to larger locks comparable to those
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on the Aire & Calder, capable of handling one 300-ton vessel, or three 110-tonners
side by side, or a decent train of compartment boats. The government declined to
buy the company out, and Sheffield decided not to take the risk on its own; these
inactions served to compound the tardy development that had preceded them.
Trade revived somewhat in the years after the war, but the railways and roads
were eating into flows of all but the heaviest and cheapest commodities. The
system survived by doubling down on its focus on coal, facilitating what flows
were still ready and waiting, and cutting away what was already withering; the
Elsecar branch of the Dearne & Dove closed in 1928, and the Bradford link in
1934. An ever-narrower focus and failures to invest meant that the writing was
on the wall: “Coal traffic had dwindled because old and relatively small mines
[close to Sheffield] had been worked out, and new ones sunk further east” and,
furthermore, “the canals used smaller barges than the main waterway, which the
company thought no longer worth building” (Hadfield, 1972, p426). The resulting
mismatch between the infrastructure and interface layers eroded interconnective
and multimodal capacity as well as flexibility regarding load types, leading to the
fracturing and decline of the broader regional network.
The second world war saw the waterways return to direct state control once
again, and the Sheffield and Tinsley sections were badly damaged by bombing.
After the end of hostilities, however, “the company found that oil traffic was
increasing”—as they had with coal in the 19th century, the canals found them-
selves becoming part of the fuel distribution subsystems of the assemblages with
which they were competing—”and immediate prospects were more hopeful. In
1946, in conjunction with the carriers, they started to collect goods from works
in Sheffield, carry them, and see them loaded into steamers at Hull or Goole”
(Hadfield, 1972, p426).
The Transport Act of 1947 nationalised all the country’s waterways: “[a]ll the
canal company fleets went with the canal, and major private operators dropped
out,” selling their fleets on directly to the newly established British Waterways,
which promptly set about dismantling the traditional lifeways (and associated
visual culture) of the boat-people (Burton, 1995, p164-165), who had been the sub-
ject of sustained campaigns of vilification and Victorian do-goodery for decades
(Shell, 2015, pp86-94). In a form of triage, British Waterways prioritised water-
way upkeep by assessing networks into one of three categories on the basis of
their existing traffic profiles: networks which were good investments, networks
which could be saved, and networks worth only selling off; the Sheffield water-
ways most likely fell into the middle category. But in 1952, the National Coal
Board transferred all of its coal and tar traffic outbound from Swinton onto the
150 6.5. The Sheaf
roads, effectively killing off the Dearne & Dove’s remaining traffic source, and
leading to its nigh-total abandonment in the 1961 British Transport Commission
Act; by 1954, meanwhile, the Sheffield & South Yorkshire was dependent on coal
for 84% of its traffic, leaving it vulnerable to a similar fate.
Further minor improvement works—likely little more than repairs and main-
tenance, with perhaps some more modern secondary infrastructures added to fa-
cilitate intermodal transfers—took place in the late 1950s, but in 1960 the British
Waterways Board moved the main waterhead of the system to Rotherham, effec-
tively leaving the Sheffield end to wither and die. 1961 saw another proposal for
enlargement (though only to 250-ton vessels), and 1966 saw the British Waterways
Board submit a plan to rebuild the main line, but it was rejected. A deep decline
in tonnage and receipts continued through into the 1970s, with Sheffield Basin
ceasing operations as a cargo port at the start of that decade; despite the basin
being redeveloped for leisure uses in the 1990s, today the canal experiences little
in the way of recreational use, and carries zero freight.
In terms of the trialectic model, the decline of the canals throughout 20th cen-
tury might best be represented by the shrinkage and outright departure of vital
articulatory entities: for example, given the incredible dominance of mining con-
cerns in the preceding articulation (see Figure 6.4 on page 145) the articulation
would be considerably weakened when those mining concerns closed up and left
the area; likewise, the Sheffield Corporation’s decision not to intervene can be
seen as a withdrawal from (or decreased engagement with) the assemblage, thus
removing another important structural prop which had been a part of the water-
ways assemblage right from the start. Without these entities being in a position to
negotiate and mediate the various vectors of influence, those vectors will redirect
themselves toward another assemblage where their influence might have greater
effect—and without the vectors to channel influence and bind the assemblage to-
gether, the trialectic itself disintegrates, just like the system which it is being used
to model.
6.5 The Sheaf
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Sheffield’s second major river, the
Sheaf, never saw significant use as a transport infrastructure; by comparison with
the Don, it had entirely the wrong hydrological properties, being fast-flowing
and shallow, and having a bed of sandstone, clays and coal seams which made
dredging all but impossible.
However, the properties that made the Sheaf unsuited to a transport role made
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it ideal for other infrastructural purposes; and while it played no transport role, its
location—in a rocky-bedded valley that provides the shallowest grade of route into
the city from the south—meant that it nonetheless played a significant role in the
configuration of the city’s transportation assemblages. Furthermore, the story of
the Sheaf also serves to illustrate some of the influential contextual sociotechnical
transitions happening at the same time as the freight transport transitions with
which this project is concerned; as such, a brief rehearsal of that story is warranted.
Beginning at the point where the Redcar and Old Hay Brooks meet, the Sheaf
descends 120m before it joins the Don in the very centre of Sheffield; this spectac-
ular head of potential power meant that from as early as the 15th century, much
(if not most) of the Sheaf between Totley and the junction with the Don com-
prised a series of dams and millponds, powering a variety of early heavy indus-
tries predominantly focussed on the metalworking for which Sheffield had long
been known. Indeed, it is estimated that during its heyday, more water-generated
energy was being harnessed for industrial purposes along the Sheaf and its tribu-
taries than at any other site in the world (Ball et al., 2006, p xvii) The succession
of dams ensured that transportation uses were out of the question: there would
have been flash locks and sluices that would have theoretically allowed for the
passage of small boats along certain sections, certainly, but to carry any significant
load any significant distance would have taken a long time, given the need to wait
on the mill-owner’s favour before one could pass. Even as far south as Totley,
it would probably have been faster to send goods down the valley and into the
city centre by loading them onto packhorses and driving them down what would
eventually become Abbeydale Road.
It is widely understood that the availability of reliable and affordable steam
engines eventually signed the death warrant for water-powered mills. However,
less attention has been paid to the timing of this transition as it took place in
different locations, and the millponds of the Sheaf provide an interesting exam-
ple. Newcomen’s famed steam-engine was built in 1712, and Watt’s refinements
thereof started to appear in the mid-1760s, but these earliest engines were huge,
inefficient devices, suited only to tasks such as pumping water out of mines (and
into canals). Boulton and Watt’s “Lap Engine” in 1788 was the first to be installed
directly into a mill, thus kickstarting the mechanisation of the cotton industry, and
the industrial revolution more broadly; in fairly short order, cotton mills all across
the north of England were driven by steam.
Sheffield was never a textiles town, however; its reputation for iron and steel-
work, and particularly blademaking, was well established even prior to the in-
dustrial revolution. As such, a great number of the mill-wheels along the Sheaf
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were used to power grinding wheels, on which blades could be sharpened and fin-
ished. Sheffield’s bias toward finished iron and steel products compared with the
raw metal orientation of other “steel towns” was a response to its topographical
location: as has already been shown, it was slow, difficult and expensive to trans-
port goods with a high mass-to-value ratio (such as coal or unfinished metal) even
a short distance out of the city, while one could actually make a profit shipping
out finished goods, which had a lower mass-to-value ratio.
We might therefore reasonably expect steam engines to begin replacing water-
wheels along the banks of the Sheaf in the last decade of the 18th century; how-
ever, it would be another six or seven decades before any such transition took
place. This must have been in no small part down to opportunity costs: if you
already had a functioning water-powered mill, replacing it with a steam-powered
one would be expensive, and you’d lose production during the downtime for con-
struction; furthermore, given the incredible generosity of the Sheaf’s head, steam
would have to get pretty cheap (and industry ever more demanding of power)
before it could compete on cost with the water power you already had on hand.
But there is another factor which surely contributed, which also contributed
to the rapidity of steam’s adoption in the textiles industry. Put simply, a steam-
powered factory tends to have a steamier atmosphere—and this was an outright
advantage if your factory worked with cotton, because a slightly damp atmo-
sphere made it easier to work with the threads. (Indeed, this explains why the
very earliest steam-engines were introduced to cotton mills long before they were
sufficiently powerful to provide power directly to the machinery: instead, they
were used to pump water to turn a water-wheel.) But a damp atmosphere was
a huge disadvantage if you were working with iron and steel, for it would cause
them to rust. All of these factors combined to stabilise the Sheaf’s role—like that
of the Upper Don, the Porter Brook and the other lesser rivers of the region—as a
power infrastructure, long after steam power is traditionally thought of as having
triumphed over water power.
Indeed, there are indications that it could have continued even longer, but for
the rise of the railways. In the 1860s the Midland Railway finally built a line
that entered the city from the south (starting from just north of Chesterfield),
which was to replace the “old road” that looped westwards from Chesterfield
through Rotherham and approached Sheffield along the Don valley. The building
of the new line was vigorously opposed for many reasons: it necessitated the
demolishing of some recently-built worker’s housing (a problem that even today’s
new railway lines can’t seem to avoid), and threatened to spoil one of the the Duke
of Norfolk’s favourite spots (that section of the route was put through a tunnel and
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concealed with an ornamental garden), but most of all it meant that most of the
millponds that covered the valley floor would have to go. Unfortunately for the
mill-owners, while the economics of water rights had worked in their favour for a
long time, the game was up. Flush with heaps of investment cash at the height of
railway expansionism, the Midland railway simply bought up the water rights for
the land it wanted along the Sheaf valley and literally built over everything—as a
result, the last kilometer of the Sheaf before it joins the Don is almost completely
culverted, and runs beneath the concourse of what is now Sheffield Station.
Further south, however, some water-powered mills hung on: Abbeydale Works,
now a working industrial museum, supplemented its water-wheels with a steam
engine in 1855, presumably having seen the writing on the wall, and struggled on
until the turn of the century; likewise the grinding shop at Little London Works
lost some of its dams to the railways, but retained enough that it was still operating
water-powered tilt-hammers up to 1951.
On the face of it, the story of the Sheaf seems to stand in complete contrast to
the story of the Don, with the former retaining a primary role as an energy infras-
tructure, while the latter became predominantly a transportation infrastructure.
But when we consider that the vast majority of traffic carried on the Don was coal
(and the materials required for the extraction of coal, e.g. pit props), and that the
coal it carried was sold in order to fuel steam engines and household fires, then
there is an argument to be made that the Don, along with the Sheffield waterways
system, is as much an energy infrastructure as it is a transport infrastructure: in
very different ways, they both served to contribute to the flow of readily available
power upon which industrialisation floated.
6.6 Summary
This chapter has deployed the trialectic model and methodology in order to per-
form a historical analysis of the evolution of freight logistics assemblages based
upon the waterways network in the Sheffield region.
The analysis has revealed Sheffield’s topological isolation in the context of the
regional (and hence the national) waterways network: with the impassable Pen-
nines to the west and only the shallow and sluggish Lower Don offering any
waterborne connections eastwards, Sheffield was quite literally a backwater for
heavy commodities shipping until the advent of the Don Navigation—and even
after that, the city struggled with substandard connections to larger, more inno-
vative networks, thanks in no small part to the speculative antics of the owners,
investors and directors in charge of the waterways during the frantic cut-throat
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capitalism of the late 1800s. This may go some way to explaining why the demise
of Sheffield’s waterways began so early, and took so thoroughly.
In terms of the trialectic model, we observe that the waterways are a partly-
open system, in they offered a turn-key freight service to clients, but also allowed
subcontractors and carrier firms to integrate the waterways invisibly into their
own service offerings. However, the physical affordances of the waterways are
rather less forgiving and flexible than those of the roads, and the network (local
and regional alike) less densely connected than the roads by several orders of
magnitude, even as it trumped them effortlessly on capacity. This initially resulted
in a sort of cooperative coexistence between the roads and the waterways, with the
former playing the “last mile” to the latter, while the latter picked up the traffic
too bulky and inconvenient for the former—but this intersystemic mutualism was
unable to survive the twinned pressures of predatory railroad competition and
laissez faire speculative capitalism.
In terms of the articulation of the assemblage, we note the enduring presence
of a spinal entity throughout the evolution of the system, and further witness the
way in which such an entity’s becoming weak or ineffectual will in turn affect the
pass-through of influences from the protagonist and the interface layer, with the
result that the infrastructure layer falls behind the development curve, and ends
up unable to compete with or even match the performance of other parts of the
network to which it belongs, let alone that of an alternative competitor assemblage.
Chapter 7
Historical analysis
C—Competition: the evolution of
rail
A preamble on sources
As explained in greater detail at the beginning of chapter 5, the narrative approach
of this thesis to its blending of data and analysis precludes the referencing of ev-
ery fact that follows in the manner that might be considered traditional to some
disciplines. Therefore any statement of broad or contextual fact in the analysis
chapters of this thesis (namely chapters 5, 6 and 7) which do not bear an inline
citation should be taken to be drawn from a synthesis of the sources pertinent to
the chapter in question; in the case of this chapter, those sources are S. Bradley
(2015); Chapman (2013); Gourvish and Anson (2004); Guldi (2012); Hey (2010);
Wolmar (2001, 2009) and Wragg (2016) in particular, though some degree of con-
textual information may have been drawn from or corroborated by those sources
with more direct pertinence to chapters 5 and 6. Direct inline citations, therefore,
should be taken to indicate the sourcing of a unique and precise detail upon which
the analysis is particularly dependent.
The structuring of the subsections serves to assist in the distinction between
data and analysis, as much as said distinction is practicably possible in such an
approach. The introduction and “Elements” subsections of each historical mo-
ment should be considered to represent statements of fact, to the extent that such
are possible regarding the period in question, except where the narration clearly
indicates a supposition or conjecture on the narrator’s part.
By contrast, the “Influences” and “Articulations” subsections of each histori-
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cal moment should be considered to be predominantly speculative analysis based
upon the materials already cited and discussed; where it adds clarity, the intro-
duction of further specific data within these sections is accompanied by a direct
reference to its source wherever such is realistically possible.
For a discussion of the epistemological and methodological challenges inherent
in this research, particularly in regard to the the availability of and reliance upon
pertinent sources, the reader is directed to section 9.4.5 of the discussion chapter
of this thesis.
7.1 Origins: tramways and plateways (~1770)
The direct antecedents of the railways were known as tramways or plateways or
waggonways, emerging as a solution to the problem of carting coal and other min-
erals to the nascent canals and navigations. The first recorded (and all-wooden)
waggonway in Sheffield dates from 1729, and ran from the coal pits of Park Hill
to a coal-yard in the town, and was replaced by what is believed to have been
the very first cast iron plateway in 1770; other early examples connected collieries
at Tinsley Park and Handsworth to the developing waterways of the Don valley
(Chapman, 2013, p4).
At this point, therefore, there is no network to illustrate—but the distribution
of tramways and plateways in the region might be imagined by referring to the
map of the road and waterways network in Figure 5.4 on page 94, and imagining
that the Don Navigation (blue diagonal line, upper center of image) is limned
with a series of short tramway and plateway links into the land to either side of it,
sticking out from the Navigation like bristles. At this point, tramways are acting




As always, the protagonist role is essentially stable. Note, however, the strong
specificity of the protagonist in this moment: tramways and plateways are direct
adjuncts to the business of mining, and in the case of Sheffield, coal mining specif-
ically. As such, this assemblage has a fairly narrow set of performance parameters
to fulfill: it doesn’t need to be all things to all comers.
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Interfaces
The interface layer consists of some sort of wheeled container or truck, and some
form of motive power; the latter may be provided by horses or oxen (whether
pulling the trucks directly or through some sort of mechanism), by gravity (loaded
trucks descend the grade, thus raising the unloaded trucks at the bottom), or
even by very early stationary steam engines (e.g. pumping engines temporarily
repurposed to pulling a load uphill by rope or chain).
Infrastructure
The infrastructural layer is fairly crude: little more than a set of rails—wooden for
a waggon-way, metal for tram- and plateways—laid along the route, or channels
cut directly into the stone, depending on the local geology.
7.1.2 Influences
HKJ
The HKJ influence is particularly pure and simple in this moment: as noted above,
the protagonist is almost invariably a mining concern, and as such they’re seek-
ing improvements to a specific set of parameters of their freight transportation
performance, namely reduced costs and faster bulk handling. The influence is
also largely unmediated, given that the protagonist is also the developer of the
interface layer: there is no other actor with whom it is necessary to compromise.
DP
Given that the protagonist and the developer of the interface are one and the same,
there is no service layer within which the interface is bundled up for access. As
such, the DP “influence” over the parameters of the performance is effectively
null; there is no agonism to resolve between the performance and the interface,
as the latter has been developed very specifically to address the former. In such
a case, DP responds as fully to the protagonist’s HKJ desire as the state of the
technological art permits.
I&I
Considering the interface technologies in play, we may observe that, with the
rare exception of those tramways whose trucks were pulled by steam power, they
are essentially the same as those available on the roads during the same period:
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wheeled vehicles, drawn by animals. As remarked above, pack-horses, carts and
waggons would have been employed to move coal from the minehead to the near-
est waterway, which was not only slow, but economically inefficient when dealing
with a commodity with a high mass-to-value ratio: to carry a load of coal over-
land a mere ten miles from the minehead was to double its price. The vehicles and
animals would also contribute to the further degrading of routes over the peaty
soil of the region, or struggle where the going was rocky underfoot.
Much as these difficulties applied pressure for the improvement of road sur-
facing, the I&I influence thus seeks an improved infrastructural layer which will
alleviate the specific difficulties attendant on the use of heavy wheeled vehicles on
steep grades. And just as in the upper dyad of the trialectic for this moment, here
in the lower dyad we can observe that the interface developer and the infrastruc-
ture developer are actually the same actor (which is to say the mining company
in question), meaning that the I&I influence is effectively unmediated, and no
compromise is required.
S&R
The best way to stop wheels sinking into mud or clattering over uneven rocky sur-
faces is to put something strong and rigid underneath them, in order to support
the weight and guide the vehicle where it needs to go. While different materials
were used in various locations (e.g. wooden guide-rails on a waggon-way, chan-
nels cut directly into the stone, or iron rails), the basic principle is the same every-
where: the way is exactly as wide as the gap between the wheels of the vehicles
to be used. This immediately necessitates a system-wide standard for track gauge
and other such physical parameters. But given that there is no agonism or conflict
between the elements in this particular moment (because the entire assemblage
belongs to and serves only its developer, who is also the protagonist), the only
compromises to be made are those that will keep down costs. As such, at least
in theory, the makers of tramways in the Sheffield region might have settled on
almost any standard gauge; at this point, there was no expectation of systemicity,
meaning that thoughts of compatibility between different tramways would been
unlikely to occur.
But in practice, pressures for standardisation were already there: for a start,
it has already been shown that the shipping of coal on the waterways resulted
in the rapid standardisation of truck sizes; furthermore, considering the size and
complexity and number of tramways operating at this time not just in the Sheffield
region but all around the country, there would already have been a number of off-
the-shelf standard designs to pick from, which would have been cheaper than
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specifying your own permanent way and rolling stock designs to an engineering
firm, or hiring an engineer to do so on your behalf. As such, while there may in
hindsight be reasons to argue that the widespread adoption of Stephenson’s 4’8”
standard gauge, as established on the nearby Stockton & Darlington, was not the
optimum choice from a technical perspective, it would have been optimal from a
pragmatic perspective: put simply, you knew it worked, and you knew you could
get the appropriate rolling-stock without too much fuss or expense.
As the resulting assemblage is a closed system, accessible only to the protago-
nist themselves, there is little or no need for regulations restricting usage, which
are predominantly intended as ways of limiting or rationing the capacity of a sys-
tem which can be accessed by any given user at any given time. If you’ve built a
tramway for yourself, you can use it whenever you fancy it without getting in any-
one’s way, and you would presumably set it up in such a way as to accommodate
the best performance parameters possible with the technology to hand. As such,
and much as with the DP vector discussed above, the S&R “influence” is no such
thing in this particular moment, because there is no agonism between actors in
need of mediation: as with DP above, the “standards” of the infrastructure layer
are in this case an accommodation of the parameters made manifest in the inter-
face layer. Or, more simply still: the infrastructure and interface layers develop in
parallel under the same engineering aegis, and are thus mutually constituted.
7.1.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 7.1 on page 160.
Mining concern
A tramway system presents us with the most simple articulatory map possible,
because all three elements are under the influence of a single actor, namely the
mining concern which has built a tramway for itself; it is about as close to a closed
system as an infrastructural assemblage can ever be.
Waterways company
But of course it is not a closed system: it exists to get coal to the navigation, and
other goods from there back up to the mine. And so the waterways company ex-
erts an influence over the infrastructural layer that is primarily to do with location:
put simply, the rails have to run to where the barges can be loaded.
But there is also some influence over the interface layer, which reflects the first
stirrings of what we now think of as intermodal transport technology. Even at
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Figure 7.1: Articulated trialectic model for section 7.1 (Origins)
Chapter 7. Historical analysis C—Competition 161
this early stage, some collieries in the Don valley made arrangements for their
coal to be loaded onto barges while still in the trucks that had carried it down
the tramway; this was great logistics, streamlining the loading and unloading pro-
cess, but it also helped to standardise load sizes, and thus tariffs. (Furthermore,
and perhaps unsurprisingly, we can also observe during this period the first at-
tempts by protagonists to game a standardised system, with some collieries quietly
upping the capacity of their “standard” trucks without informing the waterway
carriers of the change—a classic example of HKJ in action.)
Colliery engineers community-of-practice
Tramways and plateways had their hey-day during the same period that the turn-
piking and waterways booms enabled the self-creation of the civil engineer as a
powerful and autonomous expert agent—and they were also nurturing the civil
engineer’s successor in fashionable expertise, the railway engineer. Restricted in
their experiments on more advanced steam engines by the ludicrously punitive
patents granted to Boulton and Watt on their early designs, these pioneers re-
treated to work on the internal logistical systems of mines and collieries, trying
to produce a viable self-propelling steam vehicle to replace the animal power still
required for moving materials and containers. While they were producing few
viable engines during this period, their manufactories were certainly producing
hundreds of trucks and miles of rail, thus establishing the economic and prag-
matic precedents for certain standards which would be unknowingly adopted by
subsequent builders of tramways and plateways. As such, they are shown here
to have some considerable influence over both the interface and the infrastructure
layers, and both of the vectors which connect them.
But note that tramways and plateways, while effectively small networks in and
of themselves, were not yet a network in the collective sense that the roads and
(albeit to a less extent) the waterways were: there was no direct communication or
exchange between tramway systems, in other words—for what would one colliery
want to buy from another? But the evidence for the exchange of standards be-
tween tramways and plateways is clear, which in turn implies that tramways and
plateways were effectively networked, in the sense that ideas and configurations
are being exchanged between them even if freight is not, and that the connective
tissue of that network is formed by the community of engineers who design and
produce the hardware for the systems in question.
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7.2 Expansion: the Permanent Way (1850–60)
The first commercial railway to use steam locomotives, the Stockton & Darling-
ton, opened in 1825; a direct evolution of tramways, its purpose was to carry coal
directly from the minehead to the coast for onward shipment, but quickly diver-
sified to other loads, including the first passengers. However, much as with both
turnpiking and the earlier waterways mania, the Sheffield region got its railroads
rather late when considered in the context of the boom more broadly.
The history of the railway boom is replete with failed projects, disputes, hostile
takeovers, grudging mergers and high financial skullduggery, and it is far beyond
the scope of this project to recount the development of the Sheffield region’s rail-
ways in full detail. However, brief sketches of the development of the dominant
systems in the region are necessary, so as to illuminate the dynamics of the assem-
blage itself; these descriptions will refer to the map in Figure 7.2 on page 162.
Figure 7.2: Railways in the Sheffield region, 1850—1860
While the Don Navigation company was fending off nascent railway threats
during the 1820s, the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway—the region’s first line, oper-
ating between its two titular towns—didn’t open until 1838, and focussed predom-
inantly on passengers until onward connections (to the North Midlands Railways,
which crossed the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway near Masborough in 1840) and
links to the coal mines at Greasbrough were established. The economic slump of
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the early 1840s saw the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway struggle with low receipts;
eventually it was decided that expansion was the only way to survive, resulting in
a new connecting line to the Sheffield, Ashton-under-Lyne & Manchester Railway,
which opened the line running northwest from Sheffield toward Manchester via
Woodhead midway through the decade. The Sheffield & Rotherham Railway hung
on long enough to be sold to, and rolled up within, the newly amalgamated Mid-
land Railway in 1845, thus linking Sheffield to a major north-south rail route, but
nonetheless leaving it as something of a topological backwater in network terms.
Rotherham Masborough was, at the time, on the Midland mainline, and so a
convenient hub; trains could connect to Sheffield from there, but Sheffield was the
end of the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway branch, which required coming off the
main line and into a subnetwork. Effectively, this meant that trains for all points
south of Sheffield would initially leave the city heading north-east up the Don
valley, before joining the Midland network at Masborough (south of Rotherham).
The very same hilly topography which made the Sheaf valley an ideal source
of power served also to prevent railways running into the city from the south
until considerable advances had been made in railway technology, surveying and
construction, and even then they would have to wait until the price of land rights
in the valley fell with the decline of water power, as described in section 6.5.
Before that, a train approaching Sheffield from the south would pass through
Chesterfield, curve eastward around Sheffield to arrive at Rotherham, and then
take a dog-leg route south-west from there to reach the city—a route still known
to railway staff as “the old Road”, and occasionally used to reroute trains when
improvement works or other factors are causing congestion northbound on the
Sheaf valley route into Sheffield.
Construction began on the Sheffield, Ashton-under-Lyne & Manchester Rail-
way in 1838 on the western (Manchester) side of the tunnel through the Pennines
upon which it would depend, but the eastern side—connecting Bridgehouses Sta-
tion in Sheffield (very close to the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway’s Wicker Sta-
tion, where the Don flows north-eastwards out of the city) to the tunnel mouth
at Woodhead—didn’t open until 1845. After a series of failed or stalled negoti-
ations over mergers and extensions, the Sheffield, Ashton-under-Lyne & Manch-
ester Railway’s shareholders agreed to merge with the Sheffield & Lincolnshire
Junction, the Great Grimsby & Sheffield Junction, the Grimsby Docks Company
and the (as yet unbuilt) East Lincolnshire Railway. This merger received royal
assent in 1847, resulting in the formation of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lin-
colnshire Railway which, as it name implies, controlled track running through
Sheffield between Manchester and Lincoln (i.e. running from the upper left corner
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to the middle right side of the map in Figure 7.2), providing the first straight-
through rail link to support the long-established east-west flow of trade across the
Pennines.
Many of these lines would be subsumed into the expanding behemoth which
was the Midland Railway: founded in 1844, one of its first moves was to buy up
the Sheffield & Rotherham, and it slowly bought and built its way southward to
London, and southwest to Bristol via Birmingham, and thus gradually bringing
Sheffield into an extensive national network of railways with a north/south ori-
entation, of which the major spine was the East Coast Main Line (shown as a
dashed black line running top to bottom in right-hand half of the map in Figure
7.2). This was in addition to the traditional and long-standing east/west connec-
tions which Sheffield had long enjoyed, as a node on the skein of routes passing
over the Pennines between Hull and Liverpool; this included a complex tangle
of railways under the aegis of the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, reckoned to
be the most densely trafficked of all the pre-consolidation railways, whose lines
predominantly passed on an east/west axis somewhat to the north of the region
illustrated..
In addition to these major railway companies, by the latter half of the 19th
century Sheffield and the surrounding areas also featured dozens if not hundreds
of smaller railways and plateways devoted to either distributing industrial prod-
ucts directly onto the railways, or supplying those same industries with their raw




As always, the protagonist remains essentially stable. However, by comparison
with the tramways before them, these early railways were handling a broader
range of freight types, which widens the range of performance parameters that
the protagonist may potentially desire to exceed.
Interfaces
Steam locomotion was a developing technology during this period, with the result
that there were a wide array of different engine types available, each designed to
meet specific needs (e.g. high torque for heavy loads on steep inclines). However,
while the steam locomotive is part of the interface layer, in that it is at the head of
the chain of vehicles in which the protagonist’s shipment must sit, it makes more
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sense to consider it as part of the infrastructural layer. Beyond the fact that its
existence makes the railway assemblage possible, the exact nature of the engine
is largely irrelevant to the protagonist, because the affordances of the engine are
bundled up in a service: the protagonist doesn’t care how the train makes the
speed to meet its schedule, so long as it meets the schedule.
Rather more important to the protagonist are the trucks in which their freight
is to be carried; this affects their interaction with the service far more profoundly
than would a variation in engine type. For instance, one’s own goods-outward
practices would need to work around the standardised loads implied by the ca-
pacity of standard waggons, and any in-house “last mile” tramways or railways
built so as to facilitate goods coming in from the railways or going out upon them
would need to be a close match so as to minimise transhipment issues—this being
less an innovative approach than an extension of the proto-intermodal strategies
developed by the operators of the earliest tramways, as described above.
Put more simply: the freight trucks matter more than the steam loco in this tri-
alectic because the trucks are the site within the assemblage where the protagonist
has the greatest leverage or opportunity to exert HKJ influences; this is indicated
clearly in the previous moment, wherein it was observed that colliers reacted to
standardised truck sizes by quietly trying to exceed their capacity without paying
more. Admittedly the scope of influence here is limited, and far more so than it
was in the previous moment, for reasons which will become clear. However, as
limited as it is, the scope is far wider than that which the protagonist might apply
to the design of the locomotive; that component is deeper within the assemblage,
far removed from direct interactions with the protagonist, and thus largely beyond
their influence.
Having made the case for the truck as an important site of contestation in
the context of freight performances, it must now be reported that freight trucks
don’t really change in any significant way during this moment (particularly by
comparison to passenger carriages, which underwent a frantic evolution). But
while the trucks themselves are fairly stable, the assemblage around them is in a
state of flux, as shall be shown.
It this point it bears noting that steam locomotion in fact went through some
fairly rapid iterations during this period, as did some particular types of rolling
stock. However, these developments were almost exclusively driven by the new
demand for passenger transportation which, in addition to being more particular
about scheduling (unlike truck-loads of coal, passengers tended to object to wait-
ing on a siding for three hours, or travelling at unsavoury hours of the day or
night), also insisted upon smoother, safer, more comfortable and luxurious travel.
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The direct link between charismatic and powerful famous locos and passenger
ticket sales would reach its apogee in the era of the Big Four (see below), but
during the boom years of this moment, passenger rolling stock evolves at a fran-
tic pace in response to safety issues, economics and (perhaps most importantly)
issues of social class.
The link between passengers and their rolling stock is far stronger than that
between freight protagonists and their rolling stock, for the simple reason that
the passenger actually experiences the rolling stock first hand: it directly affects
their experience of the service they are paying for. By comparison, the freight
protagonist cares nothing for the details and affordances of the trucks carrying his
goods: so long as the whole shipment arrives at its destination in good time and
good order, the internal sociotechnical constitution of the performing assemblage
is anathema to him. Indeed, this “magical” service is exactly what they’re willing
to part with their money for.
Infrastructure
In a simple sense, the infrastructural layer of a railway—referred to by insiders as
“the permanent way”—is much the same thing as a tramway or plateway: a set of
rails that guide the engines and trucks of the interface layer along a predetermined
route. But where the plateway needed little more than the rails themselves, the in-
creased technological sophistication of the assemblage meant that the permanent
way acquired a raft of extra requirements: not just stronger sleepers and rails, but
points and sidings, bridges and tunnels, improved drainage, more clearance to
either side (which in turn had to be denuded of plant life so as to minimise the
risk of trackside fires), and of course fences to keep livestock (and perhaps the
occasional Luddite) away from the trains. By the mid-1850s, the permanent way
also increasingly featured telegraph cables, which initially served as the nervous
system of the railways by allowing communication between stations and signal
boxes. The requirement for running a faster communications network in order
to coordinate a large logistical network is not novel, of course: carriers and mer-
chants had long used foot- and horse-posts and dispatch riders for much the same
purpose. But the near-instantaneous communication across great distances en-
abled by telegraphy gave the railways an advantage that was hard to beat, and
enacted a profound transformation on society that is perhaps best summed up
by the introduction of standardised time across the UK—a change almost entirely
necessitated by the need to coordinate railway schedules over a nation in which
time had heretofore been a largely local matter.
There is also a sort of secondary infrastructure involved with the permanent
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way, but it has an interesting status by comparison with secondary infrastructures
from other assemblages, because of its direct technical relationship with the in-
terface layer. Consider the secondary infrastructure of stables that supported the
road carriers (see section 5.2 above): though bolstered by the growth of the carrier
economy, this network of animal-power provision was already widely established
around the country, allowing the carrier’s business to “plug in” to it as and when
required. The point being: carriers didn’t have to carry their own fuel for the en-
tire journey, as they could “fill up” (or replace their motive units with fresh ones)
at multiple stops along the way.
By comparison, the railways had no such pre-existing system of fuel distri-
bution. But at the same time, as has already been shown, the railways were
acting primarily as a system of fuel distribution by moving coal around the re-
gion, having evolved from the internal logistical systems of collieries. As a result,
the railways bootstrapped themselves in a manner which no other infrastructure
has quite matched: a technology for transporting coal evolved into a system for
transporting coal which was also powered by that which it transported. Because
railways started out working with coal, they were capable of taking coal to any
location where their tracks would take them—meaning that (at least in the strictly
distributive sense) railways in the age of steam acted as their own secondary in-
frastructure. There was a further necessity for storing coal in the appropriate
locations (as well as water and sand, regular supplies of both of which were nec-
essary to keep steam locos working), and the resulting bunkers and water-towers
also became part of the permanent way.
As such, in this moment and those following, the locomotive involved in
pulling a freight train is considered to be part of the infrastructural layer, as in
this context it bears a far more intimate technical relation to the constitution of the
permanent way than to the constitution of the rolling stock.
7.2.2 Influences
HKJ
As noted above, the protagonist is essentially consistent in nature throughout the
analysis, but there has been a broadening of the potential base of protagonists
since the last moment: tramways and plateways were predominantly in-house
mining logistics systems, and thus catered closely to the parameters that the min-
ers, their owners and operators, most desired to exceed. Railways, however—even
those originally intended for moving coal or other minerals—soon came to offer
transportation for pretty much anything.
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That said, most early freight types weren’t particularly demanding, as they
tended to be bulk commodities: a container that didn’t spill its contents or slip
the rails, as part of a train that made its published schedules, would perform
just as well for limestone, slate or grain as it would for coal. Given that freight
practices are predominantly performed by proxies, the protagonist has little reason
to care about the internal constitution of the assemblage, as they never encounter
it directly; they care only about the parameters of the service they are buying,
particularly capacity and speed and cost. Therefore the protagonist of a freight
performance has little or no influence on locomotive design, except inasmuch as
their desires for greater capacity or lower costs might be mediated by the railway
companies and channeled into engine improvements.
This stands in contrast to the previous moment, where there is an unbroken
and unmediated line of influence between protagonist, interface and infrastruc-
ture: the colliery owner could intervene at any point in the tramway assemblage
so as to assert their preferences. In this moment, however, the protagonist can take
either the service as offered or leave it; only a serious bulk operator, or a collective
thereof, would have a chance of dictating technical terms to a railway (and history
indicates clearly that most such operators, rather wisely, tended to defer to the
expertise of engineers on such matters).
Note also that in Sheffield during this period, there is little or no direct compe-
tition between different railways—not least because it had already become appar-
ent that a railway was what economists refer to as a natural monopoly, in that
there was little logic in two lines competing to cover the same route. If you
wanted to ship goods west across the Pennines, you sent them on the Manchester,
Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, or perhaps on a service using lines shared
with or owned outright by the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway; if you wanted to
send northwards, eastwards to the coast, or to the southern counties, those goods
would more likely depart on the Midland Railway, heading first north-east up the
Don valley on what was previously the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway’s line be-
tween Sheffield and Rotherham, and then onward via other networks. There is a
choice of service providers, in other words, but one’s choice is almost exclusively
informed by the origin and destination of the goods one wishes to ship.
DP
While the railways may not have been in operational competition with each other,
they were very much in competition with the roads and the waterways—particularly
with the latter, in the case of Sheffield, given the regional bias toward coal. As dis-
cussed above, the railways had no need to compete or otherwise accommodate
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protagonist desires with regard to rolling stock, because the freight protagonist’s
desires are not particular in that regard, and furthermore had been largely pre-
established by the emergence of de facto regional technical standards regarding,
say, truck capacity or axle length.
That means the railways were obliged to compete to offer a more appealing
freight service by comparison to that of the road or waterway carriers. The road
carriers had the advantage of being able to expedite point-to-point routings, while
a railway could only carry goods to other locations with a railway station—and
despite the vast capacity advantage of rail over road, the waterways were still
way out in front on that particular parameter. The railways had two main ad-
vantages, however, besides their undeniable (and influential) aura of excitement
and modernity. The first of these is the earliest rail transport moved at what were
even then utterly unprecedented speeds, and thus opened up rapidity of supply
as a parameter on which businesses might begin to compete. But the second, and
perhaps the most important, was their vast reserves of investment cash, and their
unrestrained ability to undercut the regulated and publicly-posted rates for road
and waterway carriage, effectively making a loss on countless shipments in order
to capture as much traffic from other systems as possible—a strategy that survives
to the present day, in the form of the “disruptive” taxi alternative known as Uber.
So while the development of such service add-ons as last-mile linkages (i.e.
horse-drawn vehicles moving goods between origin and railhead, and/or between
railhead and final destination) would have surely sweetened the deal, the most
crucial DP influence over the protagonist was that of price: by ruthlessly driving
down the cost-to-protagonist of the service within which the rail assemblage is
bundled up, the railways attracted even those protagonists who were heretofore
perfectly satisfied with the services they’d been getting from other systems, the
waterways in particular. After all, if slow but cheap transport is good, faster
transport at an even lower price is a deal that’s hard to refuse.
I&I
Here we encounter what is perhaps the most important distinction between the
railways and the other two transportation systems with which this project is con-
cerned. In the case of both the roads and the waterways, there is a significant
organisational separation between the interface and infrastructure layers: with the
former, the roads are open to all comers, but each operator is obliged to pro-
vide their own vehicles; with the latter, waterway access is parcelled out by the
controlling company to a community of contractors and carriers specialising in
such operations. But in the case of the railways, following the precedent set by
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the colliery tramways from which they evolved, ownership of—and hence control
over—both the infrastructure and the vehicles to be used on said infrastructure
is the norm. Or, to put it another way: the organisation in control of the rolling
stock does not have an agonistic relationship with the organisation in charge of
the permanent way itself, because they are the same organisation. If they want
a certain type of truck, they can insist that the permanent way (which they own)
must accommodate it.
As such, the I&I influence at this point doesn’t have to “push” at the infras-
tructure layer, because it’s in the railway company’s best interests that the rela-
tionship between the two layers be as accommodative of one another as possible,
albeit within the constraints of the engineering of the time. Furthermore, as al-
ready discussed, the late arrival of the railways in Sheffield meant that the centres
of technical innovation had already been established elsewhere (e.g Derby, home
of the Midland Railway), and de facto standards thus embedded—all of which is
to say that while the freight rail assemblage is a direct evolution of the earlier
tramways, railways in the Sheffield region were effectively built using standard
and established designs already in use elsewhere, transplanted wholesale. Or, to
put it another way: rather than imagining Sheffield’s tramways to have expanded
outwards and grown together organically into a region network, it makes more
sense to imagine instead a set of isolated systems being deliberately swallowed
up and subsumed by a new, larger network which shared many of the same basic
physical parameters.
The point being that, as with the tramways, the lower dyad of the trialectic
becomes a sort of virtuous circle: with no significant oppositional entities in play,
there’s nothing other than the limits of contemporary technology (and the com-
pany engineering budget) to prevent the relationship between the two layers being
as accommodative of one another as possible. That means there’s a sense in which
both I&I and S&R aren’t influences in this moment, so much as they are are mu-
tually constituted and complementary flows of desire occurring almost entirely within
the organisation of the railway company.
S&R
And so, just as if the organisation decided it wanted a certain sort of truck, they
could insist that the permanent way accommodate that design, then if the same
organisation made a decision about the constitution of the permanent way, they
could insist that all trucks conform to that standard. (In practice, both points
would be moot, as explained above: with the railways, interface and infrastruc-
ture tend to come as a single package, co-developed in parallel—a sort of pre-
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assembled assemblage, if you will.)
The downside of this lack of agonism between infrastructure and interface is
inflexibility. Through their mutual accommodations of one another, the closeness
of the layers makes it harder for any alternative configurations to break through,
forming a sort of path-dependency or technological lock-in: when standards are
both very tightly defined (as the physical standards of railways were, by necessity
of engineering) and rigidly obeyed, there is little possibility of organisational or
technical flexibility. This rigidity is a clear advantage in this particular moment,
as evidenced by the incredible success of the rail assemblage in spreading across
the country. Rigidity of standards meant not having to worry: the assemblage
had demonstrated its stability, and could simply be re-applied (with some minor
adjustments) to a new spatial context. But it would become problematic further
down the timeline, as shall be shown.∗
Regulatory regimes are effectively twofold by this point, including as they
do both the railway company’s own rules and regulations of operation, and the
first hints of regulatory pressure from the state in the form of the Railway and
Canal Traffic Act 1854. However, both of these regulatory pressures were still
very light at this point, and much of the external demand for regulation was
principally informed by the growth in passenger numbers (and the regrettable
but inevitable concomitant increase in the deaths and injuries thereof); as such,
it had little impact on freight operations, except in the more general sense that
improvements in signalling and safer shunting practices would have resulted in
less disruption to freight services overall.
But as mentioned above, the most important aspect of railway regulation in
this period is the absence of regulated fares: they were already considered com-
mon carriers in the eyes of the law by this point, but the aforementioned Act of
1854 placed further obligations upon the railways in recognition of their status
as de facto monopolies, and subjected them to the full regulatory requirements of
common carriers: they must take any shipment offered to them, and they must
“set and publish the same levels of fares to all in respect of any particular service”.
Sadly, setting a law was easier than enforcing it, and the courts were unwilling
∗It bears noting that there was in fact a competing standard for both the permanent way and
rolling stock in the form of the Great Western Railway, for which Isambard Kingdom Brunel had
insisted upon his favoured broad gauge. However, Brunel did so under the assumption that railways
would never link up into a national network—a surprising failure of systemic thought from one
of the great network builders—and would thus never need to be technically compatible. Events
rapidly proved him wrong, but Brunel stubbornly clung on to broad gauge in spite of the growing
expense of inter-network linkages and line-sharing deals between the two incompatible standards,
and in defiance of assorted acts of parliament in the 1850s which enshrined the regular 4’ 8” gauge
(as established by Stephenson at Stockton) as the national standard; the GWR’s final broad-gauge
service ran in 1892. (S. Bradley, 2015, p264-267)
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or unable to get a handle on the railway companies, which by this point were ex-
panding ruthlessly into other peripheral sectors and businesses, and had become
very accustomed to the laissez faire approach to business that prevailed at the time;
it would take a Royal Commission in 1865 and an 1873 Act of Parliament before
the Court of the Railway & Canal Commission was created, and order begun to
be more successfully imposed. But these ineffective regulations helped establish a
pattern of Byzantine complexity in rail company tariffs, whereby they published
hundreds and then thousands of fares, each of which would apply to a particular
combination of route, load and train constitution—meaning they not only contin-
ued to undercut other services quite blatantly, but also began to make their service
offer increasingly confusing and complex, which would cause problems later on.
Indeed, this could be seen as a precedent for contemporary infrastructural “splin-
tering” (Graham & Marvin, 2001).
7.2.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 7.3 on page 173.
Incumbents: Mining concerns; Railway engineers community-of-practice
The continued dominance of coal traffic in the region ensures that the mining
concerns retain their strong influence over the railway assemblage, though it is
obviously diminished in comparison with that held over the tramways, which
they owned outright.
Likewise the figure of the railway engineer retains an important and highly vis-
ible role in the articulation of the assemblage, given their huge influence over the
technical parameters of the systems they built and maintained. However, as with
the civil engineers who rose to prominence and influence due to their involve-
ment with the early turnpiking projects (and their requisite parliamentary inter-
rogations), engineers are already losing some of that man-of-the-moment glow,
increasingly absorbed into the organisations for which they work, which in turn
are increasingly identified with the businessmen and financiers who manage them
rather than the engineers who build them.
Railway company
It is presumed that the inclusion and placement of the railway company in the
assemblage should require no justification. Much like the canal or waterway com-
panies mapped previously, it acts as a central organisational spine, though its
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Figure 7.3: Articulated trialectic model for section 7.2 (Expansion)
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greater breadth indicates the greater extent of its control over the interface layer,
as shall be discussed below.
Heavy industry
By the mid 19th century railways were carrying all sorts of cargo, but traffic in
the Sheffield region was always dominated by coal and metal products. As such,
the “heavy industry” entity bundles up the influence of this sector as being allied
with, but nonetheless distinct from, that of the mining concerns.
Other Railcos / Central Clearing
By merit of their competing within distant manifestations of the same network, all
other railway companies would be implicitly involved in any assemblage featuring
one particular railway company; there is, in other words, a sort of community-of-
practice of railway companies, and during this period it was a lively and fractious
one.
But there was also an explicit functional interlinking of the railway compa-
nies in the form of what came to be known as Central Clearing, an organisation
initially established in 1842 by George Hudson, the nigh-legendary baron of the
London & Birmingham Railway, for the purpose of calculating and distributing
the appropriate portions of fares and tariffs charged on any given shipment to the
operators of the lines on which that shipment travelled. Its remit soon expanded
to the provision of universal network-wide ticketing systems, and—perhaps most
importantly, in the context of freight—the recirculation of a large shared pool of
basic freight wagons, which might be rotated into the operational stock of any
given participating railway on any given day, depending on where they were next
needed. By the mid 1850s the majority of the significant railways had joined the
scheme, but it bears noting that the freight-intensive railways of the north east
and east Midlands—including those serving the Sheffield region—were the earli-
est and most enthusiastic joiners, which implies that they had the greatest need for
these interconnective facilities. This compares interestingly with the phenomenon
of “back-carriage” in the era of turnpiking, when empty vehicles were incentivised
through low or suspended tolls to carry essential commodities on journeys which
would otherwise have been made empty: Central Clearing therefore represents
the very early emergence of systemic logistical thinking among railway operators,
and also presages the centralisations which were to come.
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Central government
The building of railways, like most other infrastructures, was meant to require
Acts of Parliament, but as the railway boom built up a head of steam (and a reser-
voir of investment cash), railway companies began to embrace the laissez faire spirit
of the age by indulging in speculative projects, wherein construction might begin
before Bills had been posted or permissions from landlords sought. For example,
the short-lived South Yorkshire Railway became notorious for such guerilla ex-
pansion, and at one point in the late 1800s decided to run a new line underneath
that of the Midland Railway by using an existing underbridge; understandably
peeved, the Midland simply ripped the rails up, only for the South Yorkshire to
replace them, and then the Midland to rip them up a second time, by which point
the South Yorkshire had managed to prove its right of way without recourse to an
Act (Chapman, 2013, p13).
The point being: central government is certainly involved in the railway as-
semblage at this point, but in a very hands-off and distant way, with its most
significant non-regulatory intervention of the period being its ban on railway in-
vestment schemes, which finally brought the torrent of new railways to an end in
the late 1840s.
Waterways
As suggested previously, there is a significant extent to which all other freight
assemblages are implicitly present in whichever assemblage with which one is
concerned; this is due in no small part to the inescapable fact that all three as-
semblages are transport assemblages, and therefore to some extent functionally
interchangable and interconnected.
But the waterways deserve an explicit position in the rail assemblage of this
moment, because they were so closely entwined with the same mining interests
who are now enthusiastically dealing with the railways, and because waterways
(as has been shown) were often treated as pawns, proxies and cat’s-paws in the
railway company’s game of securing land rights and flows of traffic. The direct-
ness of this influence, and the extent to which a well-placed railway could render
a canal utterly redundant, can be seen in the closure of the Greasborough Canal, a
coal-specific branch of the Don Navigation, almost immediately subsequent to the
opening of the Sheffield & Rotherham Railway.
176 7.3. Consolidation: the Big Four (1920—1930)
7.3 Consolidation: the Big Four (1920—1930)
Various individuals had been arguing in favour of nationalising the railways al-
most from their very inception, but it took the first world war, during which the
railways were in effect commandeered by central government and managed cen-
trally as part of the war effort, to demonstrate the sort of logistical advantages of
a unified system devoid of wasteful internal competition. It was further recog-
nised that an overhaul of the network—which had been needful before the war,
but became a clear necessity in its aftermath—could never be achieved by chivvy-
ing and wrangling the manifold private-sector railway companies, many of whom
had been making heavy losses on freight for decades, into investing money they
simply didn’t have to spare. The government and the railway companies alike
both balked at the thought of full-on nationalisation, however, and so instead the
Railways Act of 1921 sidled somewhat in that direction, forcing a series of amalga-
mations that resulted in the formation of four large organisations with a particular
regional remit, all of which were anchored to one or more of the great London ter-
mini.
Figure 7.4: Railways in the Sheffield region, 1850—1860
During this period, the railways in the Sheffield region were predominantly
under the aegis of the London, Midland & Scotland Railway, but because of
Sheffield’s liminal position on the eastern edge of this, the largest and most un-
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gainly (but at the same time most successful) of the Big Four subnetworks, traffic
in, through and around the area was also of interest to the London & North East-
ern Railway, resulting in a fair amount of line-sharing. It bears mentioning that of
all the pre-consolidation companies, the Midland Railway—the railway company
with the greatest influence over the assemblage in the Sheffield region, and the
one around which the newly consolidated London, Midland & Scotland Railway
would be based—had been a consistent innovator with regard to both interface
technologies and service design (they pioneered the third class carriage, to the
ridicule of their competitors), and—more remarkably still—had never failed to
turn an operational profit. As shown in Figure 7.4 on page 176 (and discussed in
section 6.5), they had also by the late 1870s bought up much of the rights to the
riverside land in the Sheaf valley, the acquisition of which property—combined
with improved surveying and constructions techniques, and improved engines—
allowed them to finally run a line into Sheffield from Chesterfield to the south,
which is now part of the Midland Main Line, controlled by the London, Midland
& Scotland Railway; the East Coast Main Line, previously the dominant north/-
south rail route in the region, is the spine of the London & North Eastern Railway’s
network. Meanwhile, the Hope Valley line between Dore and Manchester—now
the route of the optimistically named Trans-Pennine Express service, and shown
in the middle right-hand side of figure 7.4—was opened around 1890 as part of the
Midland Railway’s network, and was thus accessioned into the London, Midland
& Scotland Railway in the course of consolidation.
The fate of the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway was rather different. Given
the reorientation of the national network into what was essentially a star forma-
tion centred on London, the original and organic remit of the Lancashire & York-
shire Railway—a uniquely east/west oriented railway system that recapitulated
and strengthened the traditional pre-industrial flows of traffic across the north of
England—was hard to accommodate; the new overarching mission of the com-
pany was implicitly counter to this older duty. It, too, was largely subsumed into
the London, Midland & Scotland Railway—but in the process became something
of an annexe to the core of the business, which became ever more oriented around
flows of traffic to and from the capital (north/south), as opposed to the historically
established flows between the northern regions (east/west), to which Sheffield had
always been connected, albeit in a somewhat liminal or marginal fashion.
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7.3.1 Elements
Protagonist
As always, the protagonist is essentially stable, and still fairly diverse in terms of
the types of goods being offered up for shipment by train.
Interfaces
As before, the railway assemblage for freight practices is encountered primarily as
a service: for the more casual client, one simply gave over one’s goods for ship-
ment, and gave little or no thought to the technical details of its carriage, beyond
supplying a destination address, and perhaps opting for a faster (and hence more
expensive) service; the routing of the shipment, as well as the operation of the
network on which that routing occurs, is entirely within the remit of the railway
companies. Protagonist organisations with sufficient influence or money, mean-
while, could negotiate new services with the railways, up to and including the
provision of private sidings and rolling stock; the railways were fairly unified by
their enthusiastic accommodation of client needs in the name of capturing flows
of traffic, regardless of profitability,
And also as before, while passenger comfort and safety encouraged a contin-
uing evolution of carriages and engines—the era of the Big Four was the apogee
of the charismatic locomotive, with household name engines competing for speed
records and aesthetic impact alike—freight trucks still hadn’t moved much beyond
a rather protean form: loose-coupled boxes, with independent braking if they had
any braking at all. In short, from the protagonist’s perspective, few if any aspects
of the service have changed in the last half-century, with the exception of a grow-
ing proliferation of highly specific tariffs, and a far denser national network of
destination stations.
Infrastructure
In the Sheffield region during this period, the railway infrastructure was almost
exclusively oriented around a secondary infrastructure which provided coal as its
fuel, as it had been for decades; decisions made during the process of consoli-
dation were to effectively double down on this cheap (and, in the east midlands
particularly, readily available) source of motive power.
However, both diesel and electric alternatives were being developed at this
time, particularly in Europe, and some experimentation with both forms of loco-
motion had already taken place in Britain. Indeed, the Midland railway had plans
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for the electrification of what would become known as the Woodhead line prior
to consolidation, and began the infrastructural work between the two world wars,




In addition to noting the usual continuity regarding HKJ influences over time, it
bears pointing out how limited was the protagonist’s scope for hacking or kludg-
ing a better performance out of the railway assemblage. As described above, the
railways established themselves by giving bulk commodity-producing entities ex-
actly what they wanted: having evolved from the internal logistical systems of
such businesses, fulfilling their (admittedly simple) desires was absolutely funda-
mental to the design protocols of the railways. By so doing, the railways effectively
captured and enabled entire industries, which in turn grew to a scale which would
be impossible to sustain in the absence of railways for carrying their goods: they
were totally functionally dependent on the rail assemblage, in other words.
That’s not to suggest that freight clients never tried to pull the operational wool
over railway eyes: rare would be the successful industry which never tried biting
the hand that feeds it. But the point is that there’s no point of leverage, no room
for the sort of maneuvering that might wring a slightly improved performance
out of the existing system: one might conceivably have tried overloading one’s
freight trucks, or passing off one expensive-to-ship commodity as something to
which a lower tariff applied, but the effort and risk would have outweighed any
likely gains. And if hacking or kludging a railway is difficult, then jugaading one
is effectively impossible: negotiation is the only game in town.
DP
That’s not to say that the interface layer was incapable of responding to protagonist
desires, however; if anything, its willingness to accommodate was perhaps too
enthusiastic.
As mentioned above, the railways had responded to early, slipshod attempts to
regulate their tariffs by producing an ever-growing list of fares, each specific to a
particular type of load on a particular composition of train over a particular route.
Many of these fares were in effect cooked up as an agreement between the railway
company and a business with particular needs: years of ruthless competition had
produced a culture wherein the early capture of traffic flows was a top priority,
180 7.3. Consolidation: the Big Four (1920—1930)
and this reached its inevitable full expression in the form of railways offering what
were in effect private lines and sidings to new industrial start-ups, complete with
a sweetheart tariff that, as likely as not, would barely cover the costs of running
the service, let alone that of the building the extra infrastructure.
In the Sheffield region, this willingness to accommodate extended still further,
as exemplified by highly specialised service offers tailored to the heavy indus-
tries which now populated the Don Valley. One such practice, known to railway
workers as “hotdogging”, involved moving massive ingots of metal, still hot and
in the process of being worked upon, between different factories and forges by
rail. Hotdogging was sufficiently commonplace that in the 1930s the LMS had an
established standard set of procedures for hot ingots up to 80 tons in weight (any-
thing larger needed special permissions), and for transfer routes between works
that were more frequently used than others (Chapman, 2013, p37). There had
thus grown up in the preceding decades a set of local lines known as the Sheffield
District line, largely focussed on these hyperlocal movements of freight. The ma-
jority of these lines, and the sidings and secondary infrastructures which sup-
ported them, were found within or around the triangle of major lines connecting
Sheffield, Rotherham, and Woodhouse; see figure 7.4.
So while there was little opportunity for protagonists to hack an improved
performance out of the assemblage, there was also little need to do so: for the
most part, the design of the service could be–and was—stretched so as to fit even
the most extreme requirements.
I&I
In addition to the consolidation of the Big Four, the Railways Act also brought
much needed investment, aimed at replacing exhausted and highly variable rolling
stock (including hundreds of different engine types) with a new, narrower range
of engines, coaches and trucks. However, while the consolidation that resulted
from the Act stands as a clear (and indeed very deliberate) social reordering of
the railway assemblage, it also stands, with the benefit of hindsight, as a missed
opportunity for technological change.
European railway builders were already embracing the opportunities of diesel
and electric locomotion in their new networks, but while isolated examples of such
alternative technologies could be found scattered around the UK network in the
interwar years, the Act did nothing to push for the transition away from coal and
steam. The Southern Railway, smaller and more nimble than its northern cousins,
was unique in that it already made the bulk of its receipts from passenger traffic
rather than freight, and it pushed rapidly and successfully for electrification; by
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the outbreak of the second world war, it had all but eliminated steam from its
networks.
The northern networks, particularly those whose predecessors had effectively
evolved as an extension of the coal industry, largely stuck with steam, and for
obvious reasons: for starters, British coal was plentiful, cheap and (most impor-
tantly) already moving all around their networks, while oil-derived fuels were still
scarce and heavily taxed, and effective electricity generation still in its infancy.
But path dependence or “technological lock-in” also plays an important role, as
do straitened circumstances: by sticking with steam, the railway companies could
avoid the staggering costs (financial and temporal) of replacing the secondary in-
frastructure of coal with diesel or electric systems. Given that freight protagonists,
with their limited exposure to the constitution of the assemblage, would have had
no reason to advocate for such a change; and given further that their desires were
being effectively met by changes to the design of the service, there is therefore
no mediation of HKJ influences through the interface layer which might produce
I&I influences. In the short term, at least, it was in the interest of no significant
entity in the Sheffield region rail assemblage (other than the Midland Railway it-
self, and even then perhaps only certain parts of that organisation) for there to be
any pressure for change exerted on the infrastructure layer by diesel and electric
technologies. And even the Midland’s own enthusiasm for new technology would
have been dampened by its straitened financial circumstances in the wake of the
first world war; it’s hard to rebuild and be a pioneer at the same time.
S&R
As a result of investment after the decision to stick with steam, there was an
overhaul and enhancement (and a simultaneous simplification) of the physical
standards of the railway—but only to the limited extent that was possible within
the affordances of a steam-based system. The era of the Big Four is fondly re-
membered by railway enthusiasts precisely because its engines and rolling stock
represented the absolute pinnacle of steam technology; the flip-side of that status
is that it also represents the point at which there is no operational headroom left
in the steam paradigm, after which further improvements are impossible without
a simultaneous (and extremely costly) upgrade of the secondary infrastructure to
accommodate new sources of propulsive energy. As there is little change in the
physical constitution of the permanent way, its influence over the interface layer
is likewise all but unchanged. The accommodative dialectic between the layers,
which was established in the earliest incarnation of the railways, has by this point
thoroughly ossified: there has been so little substantive change for so long that
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things have become firmly locked in place, in a manner analogous to a joint seiz-
ing up after not having been moved for a while.
That this locking-up of the assemblage was not technologically determined is
shown by the counter-example of the Southern Railway’s successful electrification
project: the steam deadlock could have been escaped, had the required resources
and political will been applied to the problem. And the claim of absent resources
deserves reconsideration in the context of the Big Four’s enthusiastic diversifica-
tion into other assemblages, which saw them buying up local and regional bus
companies, overland carrier firms and even early air carriers: much of this can be
seen as an attempt to address the railway’s “last mile” problem (by making it eas-
ier to get people and goods to and from the nearest railhead), but it also suggests
that the tendency toward monopolisation demonstrated in networked systems,
when restricted or regulated within one particular assemblage, may simply spill
over into another assemblage to which it is functionally connected.
For while the consolidation Act made little change to the railway’s physical
standards, it tightened up the regulatory regime significantly, boosting the power
of the Railway & Canal Commission, establishing the Railway Rates Tribunal,
and—perhaps most significantly—setting out the rights of railway employees, who
to this date (and, in truth, for many years subsequent to it) were the most frequent
victims of procedural mishaps and dangerous practices on the rails. However,
although these changes undoubtedly affected the manner in which freight was
handled on the railways, their effects would have gone largely unnoticed by the
protagonist of a freight performance, as they would be mitigated by behind-the-
scenes adjustments to the design of the service being offered to them.
7.3.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 7.5 on page 183.
Incumbents:
Railway company
The inclusion of the railway company should, again, require no justification. Note,
however, its increased overlap with Central Clearing, which represents the tight-
ening of operational relations between the consolidated companies.
Consider also the change implicit within the Railco entity during this moment.
As described above, the London, Midland & Scotland Railway is in no small part
an amalgamation of the Midland railway and the Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail-
way; the former had a traditional bias toward north/south flows of traffic, while
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Figure 7.5: Articulated trialectic model for section 7.3 (Consolidation)
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the latter had a traditional bias toward east/west. But it was the character of the
Midland that prevailed in the newly consolidated organisation, and thus also the
biases and priorities of the Midland that prevailed when it came to running this
new, far larger network—and the results of this shattering of organisational ex-
perience and operational bias would manifest as the slow decline and neglect of
east/west traffic in the north of England, in favour of ever greater flows of traffic
to and from London.
So while the position of the Railco entity within the assemblage has not changed
significantly, that entity’s perception of what represents best function for the net-
work under its remit has changed considerably, even though on the most simple
quantitative levels it has not changed at all. Which is to say that what seems
at first blush to be an organisational continuity is, in some respects, a profound
organisational disjunction when considered over the long term.
Mining Concerns; Heavy Industry
The railway’s biggest freight customers are still very much in the frame and, what
with post-war reconstruction and the first stirrings of nationalisation, increasingly
influential; if anything, the role of railways in supporting heavy industry was
made more explicit than ever before.
Central Gov’t
Central government looms far more largely than before, as is appropriate in this
early moment of state intervention. Note its almost complete enclosure of Central
Clearing (which, among other functions, served as a convenient point of leverage
for regulation), and its increasing overlap with the interface layer; the latter reflects
the increasing reach of external regulation over not only operating procedures (i.e.
how the railways are run) but service design (i.e. terms and tariffs for shipments).
Central Clearing
The Clearing House is still a very important entity during this period in terms
of supporting the nationwide network function—perhaps more important than
ever before, given the consolidation down to four companies from well over a
hundred, in that the shared rules and practices for which Central Clearing stands
as a synecdoche would serve to draw these organisations tighter together; fewer
players means fewer opportunities for factions and rivalries, which in turn means
fewer opportunities for (or reasons to) differentiate.
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Outgoing: Waterways
The waterways have by this point slipped out of the assemblage entirely, even as
an external influence, because—in the Sheffield region, at least—they had been
effectively written off as a lost cause by anyone with the influence and/or funding
to consider their rehabilitation, as shown above.
Implicit: Roads
As the waterways go out, the roads come in—and not as a new host for rail-
way parasitism, but as an implicit parasite of the railways. Note that, as has
been explained, the road network was always in the position of supplying last
mile connectivity for the railway network, but that provision was essentially non-
competitive: in the early days of rail, the roads took over only where the rails
couldn’t go, and even then, moving anything bulky was a slow and expensive
business. But now the arrival of the ICE and tarmacadam have drastically recon-
figured the road assemblage in such a way as to make it a viable competitor with
rail on capacity, speed and cost on all but the heaviest of bulk commodity flows;
combined with the inherent upside of the road network, namely its density and
its control over the last mile of a majority of routings, these present a clear threat
to the freight-centric railways of the Sheffield region as they attempt to rebuild
themselves, yet again, in the wake of war.
7.4 Modernisation: the axe before Beeching’s (1965—1970)
The glory days of the Big Four were cut short by the second world war, during
which time the railways were once again requisitioned wholesale for the home-
front war effort, and all but run into the ground in the process. The nationalisation
that happened in the wake of the war was as much pragmatism as socialism: all
the problems that had prompted the earlier consolidation had returned in spades,
and rebuilding capacity was an absolute priority if the national industrial economy
was to be successfully rebooted. It was clear by this point that diesel and electric
options would necessarily play a part in this process of rebuilding, and British
Rail, formed from the bones of the Big Four through the 1947 Transport Act, set
out on a program of modernisation which culminated in 1968, when the last non-
heritage steam service was retired.
The Sheffield region benefited from the London, Midland & Scotland Railway’s
brief pre-war flirtation with electrification, when after the war the Eastern Region
division of British Rail dusted off its plan for electrifying what was by this point
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known as the Woodhead line (previously the Penistone line) across the Pennines
to Manchester: the cramped Woodhead tunnel made steam locos particularly un-
pleasant to work with, and the steep grades up toward Woodhead were present-
ing a challenge to existing engines. The new line opened in stages between 1952
and 1955, with electrified services running between Manchester and Woodhouse
(near Orgreave, approximately halfway between Sheffield and Rotherham), and
was even backwards compatible: while steam was banned from the Woodhead
tunnel, there was nothing to prevent steam locos using the line between Wood-
head and Sheffield, which was still a very busy freight corridor thanks to the
proliferation of heavy industries along the Upper Don Valley (which, the reader
will recall, was never navigable, but which provided water and power in much
the same manner as the Sheaf, as well as somewhere to dump one’s unwanted
industrial byproducts).
While British Rail arguably did sterling work in rebuilding the nation’s shat-
tered network, it was losing money at a rapid rate, and reported its first operating
loss in 1955, the same year the electrified line to Manchester went into full op-
eration. A succession of reorganisations and plans for modernisation followed,
with a focus on further electrification of main lines (particularly in the Eastern
region), continued dieselification, improved rolling stock for both passenger and
freight service, improvements to signalling and to the constitution of the perma-
nent way, modernised freight marshalling yards, and an unspecified number of
line closures. The 1958 reorganisation saw the Sheffield District of British Rail’s
Eastern Region inherit responsibility for all infrastructure east of Woodhead and
between Chesterfield to the south and Darfield to the north, which resulted in a
lot of redundancy: multiple engine sheds, goods yards and control centres, within
many of which the old traditions, loyalties and rivalries of the Big Four (and in
some cases their predecessors) were maintained.
At the same time, the Sheffield district was reckoned to be the busiest stretch
of freight railway in the nation, if not perhaps the entire world at the time, with
a British Rail Board report claiming that 10% of national freight traffic originated
there. According to Chapman (2013, p27), a 1963 working timetable for the district
shows over 800 freight services running every 24 hours, of which “more than 240”
were “local trip” movements between private sidings; these latter movements were
identified as being inefficient, as were the numerous goods yards and sidings
through which they would pass.
As a result, the Sheffield District got its own rail rationalisation plan in 1960,
four years before Dr. Beeching would swing his infamous axe at regional pas-
senger services. With regard to freight services, the important features were the
Chapter 7. Historical analysis C—Competition 187
consolidation of freight handling sites, with dozens of small goods yards across the
region giving way to a sundries and transshipments terminal at Grimesthorpe, a
terminal at what was once Rotherham Masborough for what would later become
the Freightliner intermodal/containerised services, and a vast automated mar-
shalling yard optimised for waggon-load freight at Tinsley, which Dr. Beeching
opened with great ceremony in 1965.
7.4.1 Elements
Protagonist
The protagonist, as always, is essentially stable. However, it is worth recalling the
particularity of freight protagonists in the Sheffield area in the light of previous
moments, and noting the extent to which these predominantly heavy industries
had effectively become completely dependent on the railways not only for bring-
ing in raw materials and shipping out finished goods, but in some cases of moving
around materials which are still in the process of being worked upon. To put it
another way, while there was a clear distinction of organisation and ownership
between British Rail and, for instance, a major steelmaking firm, the functional
distinction is made very unclear by practices such as hotdogging (see section 7.3
above), which represent the extent to which the railways had become embedded
within the industries they served, and how accustomed those industries must
therefore have been to that level of accommodation of their desires.
Note further that this is not only an issue for the very biggest firms working
with heavy commodities: the proliferation of private sidings and the flexibility of
service that the railways had provided for decades meant they were also abso-
lutely integral to the business of much smaller, specialist manufacturing firms, if
not perhaps more so. So while the protagonist’s desires are stable, they are also
historically accustomed to being accommodated by this assemblage: the relation-
ship between rail freight and heavy industry was hegemonic, in other words.
Interfaces
Freight rolling stock started to change quite rapidly during this period, even if
one aspect of its mutation was in fact to return to a principle established on the
tramways, namely that of what we now call containerisation. The rise of the in-
termodal container, more commonly referred to as the shipping container, was
consolidated by the United States armed forces using it as the basis of the inter-
national logistics operation in support of the war in Vietnam, and the interna-
tional ISO standards for containers were established soon after in the late 1960s.
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However, the basic principle went back centuries, as shown above, and was al-
ready showing the potential to unlock the economies of scale necessary to support
the expansion of Western consumerism; as with paved roads prior to the turn-
pike era, the untapped potential would have been obvious to anyone engaged in
the business of logistics. British Rail’s intermodal containerised service, dubbed
Freightliner, began in 1968, but was initially oriented toward connections between
ocean-going freight services.
There were some technical changes to freight trucks in this period which have
some bearing on the way they were bundled into services. These technical changes
are mostly to do with braking—more precisely, with braking simultaneously along
the entire length of a train, or “continuous braking”. Passenger rolling stock had
mostly been switched over to continuous braking by the era of the Big Four (thanks
in no small part to some horrific accidents and the subsequent safety campaigns),
but freight stock—some of which still dated back to the days before the Big Four—
was more poorly covered.
This was not simply laziness or cost-saving, but reflective of the freight ser-
vices on offer, which can be simplified down to two basic types: unit-train, and
waggon-load. A unit-train (or block-train) consists of trucks of the same type car-
rying the same commodity, all of which are going from the same origin to the
same destination; a unit train therefore doesn’t get fiddled with along its jour-
ney. Waggon-load freight, as the name implies, involves the protagonist buying
the use of one or more single waggons for a particular commodity type, each of
which may have a different origin and/or destination; a waggon-load train there-
fore needs to be broken down at each station along its route, in order that waggons
for that destination are switched out, and waggons outbound from that destina-
tion are switched in. (Also available was part-waggon-load, wherein you booked
an allocation of volume or mass on a truck devoted to small individual shipments,
and those shipments would be loaded onto and off of those trucks by porters at
the goods yard of each station.)
Infrastructure
As sketched above, upgrades in the Sheffield district led to a mixture of coal,
diesel and electric secondary infrastructures, with coal fading away by the end of
the 1960s. But as previously discussed, the choice of locomotive has a fairly limited
impact on freight services; the relevant implication here is that of a considerable
increase in the complexity of the system being managed, and the options available
within that system.
The most important infrastructural shift is therefore the move toward cen-
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tralised freight-handling sites. To reiterate, the Sheffield district was perhaps
the busiest freight railway network in the world during this period, and had as
such evolved a complex and wide-spread network of goods yards, depots and
private sidings through which waggon-load and part-waggon-load freight would
move. The district rationalisation plan aimed to address by devoting a location
at Grimesthorpe to transshipment freight (i.e. the sorting and routing of discrete
parcels and part-waggon-load freight), devoting another at the site of Rotherham
Masborough to containerised freight (i.e. what would become the Freightliner
intermodal service), and building a state-of-the-art marshalling yard at Tinsley,
where the slow (and still dangerous) practice of manual shunting would be taken
over by automated systems. Sheffield Victoria station would close in 1970, as the
diminishing fortunes of the Woodhead line—and freight traffic more generally—
were absorbed and compensated for with cutbacks and closures.
7.4.2 Influences
HKJ
As always, the HKJ influence is essentially stable. Note however that the the will-
ingness of protagonists to push for improvements in the services provided by the
rail assemblage has by this point diminished considerably, due to their newly ac-
commodative relationship with the road assemblage (see section 5.5 above): not
only were the roads significantly upgraded with the specific aim of capturing
freight traffic, but the point-to-point flexibility and speed of road freight made it
an appealing alternative for the sorts of businesses that were previously reliant
on wagon-load and part-waggon-load freight services. Bulk producers and con-
sumers in the region (the former still predominantly coal) were more likely to be
running unit-trains, and thus less affected by changes in the interface layer—not
least because, like the railways themselves, many of them were nationalised in-
dustries whose upkeep was considered utterly fundamental. In a sense, this is
the last moment in which the alignment between industry and the rail assemblage
remains close and accommodative, just as it was in the era of the tramways.
DP
The difference between unit-trains and waggon-load trains deserves a little more
unpacking in order to understand how they influence the design of the services
in which they were bundled up. Waggon-load freight trains were continually
being broken down and reconstituted in shunting yards, while a unit train, as
its name implies, worked as a single unbroken unit. As such, in order to apply
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continuous breaking over the whole length of a waggon-load train (in line with
safety regulations which permitted trains thus equipped to go at faster speeds)
it would be necessary for all waggons on that train to have compatible braking
systems.
However, there were numerous variations of four basic types of braking in
use, and one could never be sure quite what sort of truck the central clearing
system might present you with at any given location; and even by the mid-1960s,
a waggon-load train might well have few more than half of its total number of
trucks fitted with any braking at all. In practice, trucks with better braking would
then be clustered nearest to the locomotive, with the poorer or unbraked trucks to
the rear, but putting a waggon-load train together therefore took experience, skill,
and—perhaps most importantly—time.
As indicated by the construction and outfitting of the new marshalling yard
at Tinsley, the Sheffield District Rail Rationalisation plan aimed to accommodate
waggon-load freight services at sustained levels for many years to come: given
that on the date Tinsley was opened, the Sheffield Division of the Eastern Region
was generating more than 24 million tons of originating freight per year, much
of it (~70%) from around 150 private sidings scattered around the network, and
that a majority of said traffic not only had a local origin but also a local destina-
tion (Chapman, 2013, p27, p33), this decision was understandable—even though
it would turn out to be fatal.
I&I
Perhaps the most significant invention or iteration in this particular moment is that
of the intermodal shipping container, the early versions of which were already ex-
erting an influence on global shipping practices—but it is telling that this invention
exerts its pressure from entirely outside the railway assemblage, by way of the rail
assemblage’s connections to international shipping via British port connections,
rather than from within. Much as the collieries of the 1700s had understood the
potential in standardising their trucks for transfer onto the waterways, containeri-
sation offered an obvious path for scaling freight services over long distances, and
thus exerted an influence upon the infrastructural layer in the form of trucks with
a wheel-base sufficiently long to accept standard container sizes.
Otherwise, little has changed since the previous moment: the same old mis-
matched trucks were being formed into waggon-load trains (or into short blocks
to be dispatched on hyperlocal “trips” between private sidings), and the expec-
tation that such traffic would continue at mid-1960s levels provided the push for
improved facilities for waggon-load freight.
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S&R
The response to that push is best represented by Tinsley marshalling yard, though
with hindsight it seems an obvious error, particularly when paralleled by the si-
multaneous moves toward centralised logistics, unit-trains and containerisation:
at a national level, rail freight began losing what would have been waggon-load
traffic to the roads in the late 1950s, and have never significantly regained their
modal share.
However, as mentioned above, Sheffield was still producing a vast amount of
waggon-load freight, much of it of local origin and destination; hence the decision
to maintain waggon-load services, as made manifest by the construction of Tinsley
marshalling yard. But at the same time, the district’s network of goods yards
and private sidings was rationalised down to a few major sites, which effectively
made decades of procedural precedents and institutional knowledge redundant
overnight: with fewer nooks and corners to be found the district network, and
with increasing flows of larger freight trains and passenger services alike, practices
which were highly accommodative of the industries which produced local freight
traffic, such as “hotdogging” (see above) became increasingly untenable.
Furthermore, and despite the deployment of what was considerably cutting
edge technology at the time, Tinsley was dogged by technological complexity and
a savage maintenance schedule, and (perhaps most importantly) could not auto-
matically handle trucks with a longer wheelbase, which therefore had to be hand-
shunted—which was totally counter to the purpose for which the marshalling
yard was intended, namely the automation of shunting and waggon-load train
formation. These insufficient physical standards inevitably pushed longer wheel-
base traffic and early container freight toward the freight depot at Rotherham
Masborough, thus beginning a marginalisation of the Sheffield region in terms
of the national network of bulk freight. And as a response to the 1968 Trans-
port Act, the sundries division of the freight terminal was handed over to a new
state-run haulage company, National Carriers Limited, which was strongly biased
toward road vehicles. As such, small-consignment traffic “for depots outside of
Sheffield, previously moved by rail to and from Sheffield, [were] conveyed direct
by road motor vehicles based at the new terminal” (Chapman, 2013, p30), thus
removing the rationale for sundries and part-waggon-load freight services on the
rails, and in turn encouraging such customers to turn to the use of point-to-point
road freight services instead. This, in combination with the increasingly unaccom-
modative nature of waggon-load services, began to push smaller industries off the
railways and into the arms of the road carriers, while encouraging the proliferation
of unit-trains which predominantly carried coal or steel.
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Less well known was a fundamental change in the regulation of the railways,
ushered in by the 1962 Transport Act: in exchange for the Treasury taking on the
debts accrued by the operational losses of the 1950s and the failed modernisation
plans of the 1960s, it was decided that British Rail was obliged to run the railways
in such a manner that operating profits redeemed all running costs, and more
specifically that each separate service should pay its own way, or at least show the
potential to do so. Furthermore, the yoke of common carrier status was removed,
effectively allowing British Rail to compete in the same marketplace (and on the
same terms) as other private carriers, and redefining its primary duty as the quest
for “efficiency, economy and safety of operation”. Crucially, the suspension of
common carrier status removed the obligation to accept any commission offered
at published rates, which in turn permitted British Rail’s gradual turn away first
from sundries freight, and then from waggon-load freight.
7.4.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 7.6 on page 193.
Incumbents:
British Rail
Not strictly an incumbent, in much that the same way that the Big Four were not
strictly an incumbent, but British Rail is the clear inheritor of the central control-
ling position at the heart of the rail assemblage. And much as with the consol-
idation, the result is a vast improvement in the possibilities for integration and
modernisation of the entire national system, counterbalanced by a process of os-
sification wherein the earlier sources of new technical ideas for railways, namely
the railway engineers community-of-practice, have been subsumed not just into
the assemblage, but into the dominant entity of the assemblage.
To put it another way, there are no longer any significant outside influences for
technological change who might disrupt or distort the vectors of influence with
new ideas (or iterations of old ideas): this makes for a stable assemblage, certainly,
but also creates the preconditions for a sort of sociotechnical myopia, in which
new ideas are assessed only within the context of the organisation and its goals,
rather than within the broader context in which the organisation is operating. In
combination with the 1962 Transport Act’s reorienting of British Rail’s mission
toward efficiency and profit rather than the provision of a service to the nation,
this myopia ensured that, while the formation of a monolithic national monopoly
rail company offered the possibility of solving the worst problems carried over
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Figure 7.6: Articulated trialectic model for section 7.4 (Modernisation)
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from the railroads of old, it could only even consider doing so if taking action
would show a quick return on investment—a situation which, as history shows,
would rarely pertain.
Mining Concerns & Heavy Industry (Nationalised)
In light of the post-war nationalisation projects, and in recognition of the closeness
and scale of the coal and steel industries, these two entities have been merged for
the sake of simplicity, and so as to highlight the growing schism between such
heavy bulk industries and the smaller enterprises working around them.
Manufacturing
The scale of the industries comprising Britain’s industrial base increased very
rapidly through the late 1960s, so that while smaller industries also enjoyed a
period of strong growth, they were gradually outstripped in terms of their abil-
ity to retool their logistics in order to take advantage of the new economies of
scale being offered by British Rail’s modernised freight service offering. At this
point they are still being courted by British Rail, as indicated by the provision of
Tinsley for waggon-load freight and the transshipments terminal for sundries and
parcels—but at the same time, the centralisation of goods handling mandated by
the District modernisation plan began to make trip runs and other special services
even more inconvenient and inefficient than before. But much like their larger
counterparts, these smaller businesses are nonetheless completely entangled with
the railway assemblage: even the latest advances in road freight couldn’t beat the
co-evolved utility of private sidings and bespoke local railway trips.
Central Gov’t; Roads
As a nationalised industry, British Rail is effectively an annexe of the British gov-
ernment by this point, thoroughly regulated with regard to both internal proce-
dures and dealings with protagonists: hence the extensive reach of the govern-
mental entity within the rail assemblage in this moment.
Incoming:
Unions
Nationalisation meant a huge strengthening of labour unions, which in turn meant
that the unions could exert some considerable influence upon operational prac-
tices relating to the infrastructure layer: for instance, British Rail’s keenness to
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move away from old-fashioned manual shunting (a practice which even in the
1960s could involve a lone shunter running alongside moving trucks in the yard,
holding a long pole with which to nudge them at the appropriate moment) can
be attributed at least in part to increased pressures from unions regarding worker
safety. However, unions tend to resist technological change rather than agitate in
favour of it, and as such the rise of the unions likely contributed to the ossifica-
tion of the assemblage. Put simply, there is a huge reservoir of path-dependency
in one’s employees, and when empowered to influence the assemblage, they will
therefore tend to influence it in favour of stasis rather than flux, because flux in
large organisations tends to be accompanied by redundancies.
Due to the rather nebulous and plural nature of the unions entity, it is not
mapped explicitly onto the articulation—put plainly, it’s not found in one clear
position. Instead, it should be thought of as being diffused throughout the spaces
in the articulation where the state (in the form of central government) overlaps
with industrial entities such as British Rail or nationalised mining concerns.
British Rail spinoff firms (e.g. NCL)
Embedded entirely within British Rail at this point are various logistics operations
“spun off” from British Rail’s main rail business; the exemplar in this case is NCL,
the road-oriented courier firm given control of the Sheffield sundries and trans-
shipments terminal. Note how NCL’s closeness to the roads drags their influence
closer to the heart of the rail assemblage: in effect, NCL represents a tacit admis-
sion by the railways that there were certain sorts of job that the railways were no
longer best at, and indeed that they would no longer even attempt to compete on.
Ocean Shipping
The ocean shipping assemblage gets a marginal appearance in this assemblage, as
the first stirrings of containerisation spread their influence via ports and ocean-
going freight services. As mentioned above, intermodality was to a greater or
lesser extent a feature of many freight assemblages prior to this date, but it would
take the incredible top-down influence of global systems (and indeed global trade)
to impose a new universal standard across the national network; here, that process
is just beginning.
Outgoing: Central Clearing
Central Clearing didn’t really disappear so much as it became a major organ
within the greater entity of British Rail. The duties of the Clearing House were
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much reduced during the wars, and following consolidation and nationalisation,
its membership roster had dropped to four companies and then just one, the
British Transport Commission. Most of RCH’s responsibilities were transferred
over to BTC, and the RCH was formally dissolved in 1955 (although BTC contin-
ued performing most of the Railway Clearing House functions under the name
Railway Clearing House, in yet another example of a seeming continuity which is
anything but).
Implicit: Roads
It is now the turn of the railways to experience full-on intersystemic traffic para-
sitism, thanks to the role of the roads assemblage as an implicit articulatory entity
in this moment. Recall that the government is during this period binding itself
ever more closely into the roads assemblage, which since the early 1950s has been
increasingly parasitic upon the railway’s bread-and-butter metabolic flows—and
that the government’s choices of both grand strategy and personnel for the man-
agement of roads and railways alike do little to dispel accusations of deep-seated
but carefully concealed favouritism toward the roads assemblage among politi-
cians of the period, even if that may have been a simple matter of them gravitating
toward that which they found easier to understand:
“The frequent interventions of government, notably in 1962 when the [British
Transport] Commission was abolished by Ernest Marples, and after the Trans-
port Act of 1968, when the [British Railways] Board was encouraged to function
as a top-level planning body along the lines advocated by [management consul-
tancy firm] McKinsey, were a response to a firm belief in Whitehall that railway
managers were inbred, inward-looking, and resistant to change. This belief was
contentious, though there was some truth to it; but in any case, organisational
change could never address the deep-seated confusion about what the railways
were meant to achieve in a mixed economy [...] The Board often displayed a siege
mentality in an environment in which the motor car and the roads-building pro-
gramme enjoyed clear priority, a situation barely disguised by civil servants amd
a succession of transport ministers.” (Gourvish & Anson, 2004, p2, p6)
What is indisputable, however, is that for both assemblages during this period,
the British government had as much control over their configuration as it chose to
exercise—and the exertion of that control was very much to the advantage of the
roads assemblage.
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7.5 Rationalisation: the containment of rail freight (1980—
1991)
While rail freight traffic had been in national decline since the 1960s, the global
economic slump of the 1970s served only to depress it still further. The Beeching
report had recommended that only one cross-Pennine passenger connection be
maintained, and that the connection in question should be the Woodhead line, but
local opposition to the closure of the Hope Valley Line, combined with the advent
of the huge coal-fueled Fiddler’s Ferry power station in Cheshire, meant that the
Woodhead line kept all the freight traffic, and all cross-Pennine passenger traffic
went via the Hope Valley as of January 1970, at which point electric loco services
between Sheffield and Woodhead were suspended, to be replaced with diesels.
Not much more than a decade later, the precipitous decline of coal traffic saw the
route effectively closed down, though the tracks between Penistone and Sheffield
were retained so as to maintain some minimal local passenger and freight services.
Nonetheless, Sheffield district freight traffic was still holding, thanks to a minor
local boom in the production for export to Europe of specialist stainless steels
in the 1970s, as were more national flows of freight. However, the latter were
increasingly routed right around the district, which as a result began to revert to
being a backwater sub-network, rather than the important national freight node
it had once been. At the same time, British Rail was developing the Speedlink
service, which was to be a modernised successor to the old waggon-load services;
Tinsley yard, already obsolete in many ways, was not to be a major node in the
Speedlink service, and instead handled the remaining class 7 and 8 waggon-load
freight trains comprised of older rolling stock. Speedlink’s generous speeds and
regularised timetables proved something of a success, and the service was well
established by the early 1980s.
But the 1980s began with a drastic national recession, and featured the lengthy
tenure of a government which was nakedly hostile toward the old heavy industries
of the north, particularly coal, and furthermore to nationalised industries such as
British Rail. At the same time, having established the more modern Speedlink
service, British Rail moved to finally get rid of all the remaining loose-coupled
and/or unbraked trucks and waggons in the system. Later still, in 1991, Speedlink
would be rather suddenly closed, leaving only the intermodal Freightliner service,
plus a few lingering specials to sustain what little remained of Sheffield’s heavy
industry after Thatcher’s campaign came to an end.
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7.5.1 Elements
Protagonist
The protagonist’s desires, as before, remain essentially stable. Note however the
growing schism of scale between national and international industries, and smaller
local businesses: while their desires for improved performance are essentially the
same, they express themselves differently depending on the volume of goods they
are shipping, with the bulk operators willing and able to spend on consolidation
and last-mile connectivity in order to reap the efficiencies of unit-trains, while
smaller manufacturers remained utterly dependent upon services and practices
that British Rail was keen to abolish.
Interfaces
After decades of minimal changes to freight rolling stock, the 1980s saw a sudden
profusion of new truck and waggon types.
A lot of elderly rolling stock was still in play at the beginning of the decade,
and in particular the classic 16-ton loose-coupled mineral waggon, the direct de-
scendant of the tramway trucks of old. Tough to maintain, prone to derailment,
mismatched or unfitted when it came to braking, and increasingly undersized in
the context of both traffic flows and engine power, British Rail saw these vehicles
as a hindrance to the modernisation of the service in keeping with the efficiency
dictum of the 1962 Transport Act. However, they were also the vehicles around
which the majority of waggon-load freight services were constructed, as shall be
shown.
British Rail’s 1970s like-for-like replacement for old waggon-load rolling stock
and locomotion came bundled up in a new branded service called Speedlink:
they designed a new diesel locomotive specifically for high-speed heavy freight,
and accompanied it with new trucks and waggons (including a coal hopper opti-
mised for rapid loading and unloading) which had a longer wheelbase than earlier
rolling stock, and networked air-braking as standard—the idea being to optimise
waggon-load shunting and marshalling by ensuring all waggons shared the same
standards. Speedlink was also something of a revolution in rail freight service
design: rather than providing bespoke routes and tariffs, Speedlink charged stan-
dardised rates and ran to a regularised timetable like that of a passenger service,
thus offering a more reliable estimate of when goods might arrive at their destina-
tion.
Finally, the 1980s saw the rise of the Freightliner service. Established in 1968
in response to growing international interest in intermodal container shipping,
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Freightliner combined powerful locomotion with long flat trucks large enough to
take a full-size standard shipping container. In effect, Freightliner attempted to
compromise between the logisitical efficiency of the unit-train and the flexibility
of the waggon-load approach, and dial it up to a scale which would match with
the emerging infrastructure of global automated shipping.
Infrastructure
The railways of the 1980s were characterised by systemic underinvestment, with
the Thatcher government doubling down on the decisions made in the days of
Beeching and Marples and pivoting the British economy ever more closely toward
road freight. The Sheffield district suffered particularly, not least due to the evis-
ceration of the coal industry, which—as has been shown—was a crucial actor in
the regional rail freight assemblage for two centuries.
The geographical placement of service-specific infrastructures bears further
consideration, though.
Originally intended to automate (and thereby economise on) waggon-load
shunting, Tinsley marshalling yard was sited centrally within the organisational
context of the British Rail’s Sheffield District. But as noted above, despite be-
ing hailed (fairly accurately) as Europe’s most advanced marshalling yard when
it opened in 1965, by the beginning of the 1980s it was already obsolete, strug-
gling to handle the more modern rolling stock, and hence became what might be
thought of as “the yard of last resort”, where the grubby and dangerous old rolling
stock was shunted into diminishing waggon-load trains of predominantly local
origin and destination. Meanwhile, the parcels and transshipments freight ter-
minal located at Grimesthorpe near Brightside (almost halfway betwixt Sheffield
and Rotherham), which had already been turned over to the road-centric NCL (see
above), burned down in 1984, never to be replaced: part-waggon-load and sun-
dries traffic had diminished to such a point it that it was considered redundant.
Tinsley was also given an allocation of Speedlink rolling stock, particularly the
special coal hoppers. But as noted above, the automatic systems couldn’t handle
the longer wheelbase truck of the Speedlink service, meaning they were shunted
manually on their own subsection of the yard. Furthermore, Tinsley was never
to be a major node on the Speedlink network; with the closure of the Woodhead
line across the Pennines, the Sheffield district had become a freight backwater in
which the main routes in and out were all to the north-east, and thus a poor site
for a major node in the national service.
The same applied to the Freightliner service, whose closest terminal was at
Rotherham Masborough. This meant that for a Sheffield based protagonist, ac-
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cessing its economies of scale meant first getting one’s goods to the depot—and
as only Freightliner could handle full-sized containers, that meant last-mile con-
nections and time-consuming transshipment work, all of which would erode the
efficiencies to be gained by using Freightliner in the first place. In essence, then,
we might say that the topology of the Sheffield district freight rail network had
reverted from the hyperconnectivity of the late 19th century to the comparative
isolation and limited outward connectivity that had prevailed in the earliest days
of the railways: if you wanted to send stuff in bulk by rail in any direction, you’d
probably have to send it north-eastwards toward Rotherham first.
7.5.2 Influences
HKJ
As noted above, there is a schism in the protagonist during this period, between
big bulk-shipping businesses and smaller firms working with smaller quantities.
The bulk shippers seek further marginal gains on economies of scale: if every
truck goes a little bit faster and costs a little bit less, the savings soon start adding
up when you’re dispatching and/or receiving hundreds of them every week. And
big firms have money to spend on lobbying, as well as on infrastructure of their
own that might enhance efficiency further; as such, these large businesses were
much better able to influence the assemblage into which they were connected.
But, as mentioned above, the smaller firms were effectively captive to the
waggon-load services, with which they had co-evolved: these businesses depended
on exactly the short local “trip” journeys and bespoke practices which the district
rationalisation plan had been so keen to get rid of. As a result, after years of re-
cession and industrial unrest they had no one to turn to or exert influence upon
when those services were changed or reduced, and insufficient financial flex to
retool themselves in sympathy with the shifting assemblage.
DP
Service design and actual physical interface design draw closely together during
this moment. As noted above, British Rail was particularly keen to retire all the
classic 16-ton mineral waggons still on the network. This decision turned out to
have a particularly strong effect in the Sheffield district, as the dominant users for
that particular wagon type were scrap merchants all across the nation, who would
use them (via a waggon-load service offering) to send scrap steel to the forges
and furnaces of Sheffield for recycling (Chapman, 2013, p33). British Rail took
the position that any such client would need to purchase their own replacement
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rolling stock in order to continue to use waggon-load services but, for the majority
of the smaller businesses in question, such a move was financially untenable, and
led to something of an uproar.
The deadlock was resolved in 1984, when a leasing deal was set up to build and
provide for rent nearly 300 new 51-ton air-braked box-waggons to waggon-load
customers, thus sustaining a significant amount of that local traffic—but many
smaller businesses were forced to turn to the road carriers, or to close down en-
tirely. Recall that most such businesses, particularly those of the Sheffield district
and the Don Valley, were linked intimately to coal and steel, and that those in-
dustries were being very purposefully driven into the ground by the government
during this period: by 1984, the majority of local freight was steel and scrap,
with some sundries and part-waggon-load work still passing through the not-yet-
burned-down freight terminal at Grimesthorpe, and fruit deliveries running to
Parkway Market near Darnall (Chapman, 2013, p33).
Meanwhile, as already noted, Speedlink appeared to be doing fairly well as
a service offering, but this was of little benefit to businesses who had previously
relied upon the intimate local network that had once spanned the city region, as
the efficiencies of using Speedlink would be countered by the costs in making up
the last mile connection to the nearest depot. The same applied to Freightliner, if
not more so: unless you were a big player, the ante was far too high.
The coup de grace came in 1991 when the British Rail subsidiary running Speedlink
announced its termination, citing massive operational losses. Speedlink waggon-
load customers could either switch over to Freightliner (which would require in-
vestment and increase overheads, particularly in a smaller firm), or save up their
waggon-loads in order to send a less frequent unit-train (which would have meant
considerable cost in either renting or buying the required rolling stock). The es-
sential but much diminished scrap steel traffic was handed over to another British
Rail spin-off firm, but for most other protagonists, the new service offerings effec-
tively influenced them right out of the rail assemblage and into the arms of the
road carriers.
I&I
Due to both Speedlink and Freightliner having been in operation since the 1970s,
that aspect of the I&I influence which we might think of as positive—which is
to say, encouraging of infrastructural enhancement—has already had its effect,
which is manifest in the new centralised freight terminals and marshalling yards
already described. But there is also a negative aspect to that influence, which ap-
plies pressure in favour of the removal of redundant systems. As Speedlink and
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Freightliner became not only more popular but more remunerative for British Rail,
the old waggon-load practices looked ever more slow, costly, dangerous and anti-
quated. And as waggon-load freight diminished still further through the decade
(a mere 5,000 waggons per week passed through Tinsley at the start of the decade,
and that number was reduced by half in the wake of the 1984/85 miner’s strike),
the business case for keeping the old waggon-load services declined in sympathy,
making British Rail’s decision to force an upgrade of waggon-load rolling stock
understandable in the context of its duty to efficiency. With that achieved (and
having in the process jettisoned the majority of small-business protagonists, who
might have continued to influence the rail assemblage somewhat in their favour),
the relative absence of traditional waggon-load traffic sends a signal to the infras-
tructure layer that it need no longer support such services, while the increasing
traffic on Speedlink and Freightliner services sends a simultaneous signal that the
infrastructure layer should optimise toward those services.
S&R
As has been the case almost throughout this analysis of the rail assemblage, the re-
lationship between the interface and infrastructure layers has been predominantly
mutually beneficial, and this is in no small part due to the fact that both layers are
effectively under the control of the same organisation, and hence not competing
for advantage over one another (as was the case with, for example, the contestation
between wainwrights and the early roads). This is not to say that the two layers
do not influence one another: indeed, that mutual influence is inescapable, given
the intrinsic need for technical compatibility between an interface device and the
infrastructure to which it connects. But it is to say that the S&R and I&I influences
in the rail assemblage might, as suggested earlier, be seen as a sort of virtuous
loop, devoid of technical or economic agonisms: when one organisation domi-
nates both layers, it has a fairly free reign to develop either or both in whatever
manner seems most appropriate. As such, during this period the standards of the
infrastructure layer do not actively push for change in the interface layer so much
as they imply the potential for change, and the same goes for the flow of influence in
the opposite direction: as has been shown, when an assemblage is strongly aligned
vertically around a few actors, those actors can effectively impose their will upon
the assemblage and force its reconfiguration, unless there is a sufficiently strong
pressure from another actor (or actors) to encourage the maintenance of the status
quo. In this case, said actor(s) would have been the smaller firms who relied upon
traditional waggon-load services—and they were effectively ejected from the as-
semblage, first by British Rail’s scrapping of the older rolling-stock used by such
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firms, and then by its consolidation and simplification of the freight service offer
in the Sheffield district.
7.5.3 Articulations
The articulatory mapping for this moment is shown in figure 7.7 on page 204.
Incumbents:
British Rail; Unions; Heavy Industry
British Rail still clings on at the heart of the assemblage in 1991, though much
weakened by underinvestment and poor economic circumstances, and under-
mined in the public eye by the relentless discourses of privatisation and union-
bashing that characterised the Thatcher administration and its successors. Histo-
ries of British Rail during this period are quite spectacularly partial, and plentiful
evidence exists to support not only the narrative of a profligate and hide-bound
national industry pouring the tax-payer’s money into the pockets of Marxist trade
union members, but also the narrative of a much-loved national institution which
not only completed the long process of modernisation (on trunk routes, at least)
but also developed some respected rolling stock (such as the feted Intercity 125).
But much of that history is understandably focussed on passenger services,
given that the modal share of freight traffic going by rail had begun its national de-
cline in the late 1950s, never to recover significantly. As noted above, traffic levels
stayed high in Sheffield due to the unique concentration of mutually-supportive
industries in the region and, crucially, to the network’s historically accommoda-
tive relationship with those industries. This moment sees that accommodation
suddenly restricted to only the largest businesses, who can be relied upon to pro-
vide work for the network that is both simple to manage and lucrative: hence
British Rail’s closeness to and overlap with Heavy Industry in the articulation,
and its separation from Manufacturing.
Central Gov’t; International Ocean Shipping
Though British Rail had a fair degree of autonomy, it was still nonetheless a state
property, and central government was not as shy of intervention during this period
as it liked to make out, even if such intervention consisted chiefly of briefing jour-
nalists about wasteful practices on the railways and then claiming nothing could
be done because of the unions. While this project cannot show any explicit influ-
ence from the government in favour of running down the more granular freight
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Figure 7.7: Articulated trialectic model for section 7.5 (Rationalisation)
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services provided by the railways, the Conservative road-building projects of the
late 1980s and early 1990s are evidence of a strong bias in favour of an alternative
assemblage—see again Gourvish and Anson (2004, 2-6)—which amounts to much
the same thing, if only tacitly so.
Likewise unpopular changes to working practices and wharfage technology at
British docks, which sought to both adapt to the rapid growth of containerisation
and break the power of the unions. Indeed, if there can be said to be one dominant
technological vector that propagated the phenomenon we have come to refer to as
“globalisation”, the shipping container (and the ISO standards which specify it)
is surely the best candidate. Since the closure of Speedlink in 1991, rail freight in
the UK is almost exclusively containerised traffic flowing between major ports and
cities, over a network in which Sheffield is no longer a node; with the exception of
the occasional unit-train of coal, oil or cement, all freight in the region now moves
by road.
British Rail spinoff firms (e.g. NCL)
The success of British Rail’s spin-off logistics firms were likely another strong
influence in favour of the withdrawal of granular freight services: after all, if you
can see on your own balance sheets that the margins are better when you use a
different assemblage, it will be hard to justify sustaining a loss-making service,
particularly under conditions of austerity. Not at all incidentally, many of these
firms were subsequently privatised, along with British Rail itself, in or around
1997, and went on to become incredibly powerful and successful businesses: NCL,
for instance, is now known as Exel Logistics.
Outgoing: Manufacturing
Lighter industries as exemplified by Manufacturing have now exited the assem-
blage, in illustration of the rapidity of the severance represented by the elimina-
tion of the old loose-coupled waggon-load services. But note how the entity is
contorted toward the interface layer by comparison with its earlier, more distant
relationship: this illustrates the sudden requirement for such businesses to rent
or purchase their own rolling stock rather than have it provided as part of the




Far less implicit than in the moment before, in truth, the roads assemblage still
haunts the railways during this period, during which almost all rail freight other
than intermodal containers vanished, snapped up by the ever-hungry carrier firms.
This looming and parasitic closeness is further implied by the lurking influence of
NCL, which represents a direct connection to the alternative assemblage, as well
as a tacit admission on British Rail’s part that the roads had triumphed.
7.6 Summary
This chapter has deployed the trialectic model and methodology in order to per-
form a historical analysis of the evolution of freight logistics assemblages based
upon the waterways network in the Sheffield region.
The analysis reveals yet again the topological marginality of Sheffield in terms
of freight transport networks—though in the case of railways, it is more a matter
of being caught in a liminal location where two or more railway companies have
local influence, and the city inevitably being obliged to cleave more closely to
one or the other (though that choice may not be the city’s to make). It further
reveals that there can be a separate topology of service availability atop the base
topology of the network itself, meaning that even a seemingly well-connected
location might nonetheless find itself cut off from affordances or services which are
readily available elsewhere on the same network. Or, more simply: just because
you’re near a station, doesn’t mean that the service you need is necessarily is going
to stop there.
In terms of the trialectic model, we observe the railways to be a predominantly
closed system—which is to say that the railway company has dominant control
over both the interface and infrastructure layers, and hence the complete freedom
to reconfigure the service offer or redesign it from scratch, while a competitor
literally can’t even get themselves onto the network without going through the
railway company which controls it. If the roads are a protocol, a set of rules
and affordances within which third parties can build service offerings, then the
railways are a platform: a suite of predefined and scheduled services within which
the powerful affordances of a closed system are bundled up and concealed.
In terms of the articulation of the assemblage, we observe that a closed sys-
tem is far better able to optimise its service offer through the reconfiguration of
the assemblage, because many (if not all) of the contestations of influence which
prevail in more open systems are here negated. Put simply, the railway can force
the interface or infrastructure layers in any direction it likes, because it is able to
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resolve any agonisms between those two layers without recourse to negotiation
with external third parties; it’s all very much an in-house decision. This makes for
a potentially powerful and purposeful organisation, but may also serve to make it
narrow and inflexible, incapable—or perhaps simply unwilling—to accommodate




In this chapter, the second, speculative mode of the methodology (described in
section 4.3) is applied to the findings generated by the first, historical mode of the
methodology (whose application is described in the preceding chapter). This is in
fulfillment of Research Question 2, whose objective is to use the findings generated
by a longitudinal historical analysis of sociotechnical change as the basis for an
extrapolative exploration of potential future infrastructural assemblages.
In the first section, self-driving vehicles are identified and characterised as
an exemplar disruptive technology with regard to freight logistics practices; this
exemplar technology is then introduced to the trialectic model, the iteration of
which determines the vectors of influence which will be “in play”.
In the second section, a simple quadrant matrix is used to generate a suite of
four divergent futures, with parameters pertinent to infrastructural deployment
defining their sociopolitical and economic contexts.
In the third section, the vectors of influence identified in the first section are
combined with the parameters of each scenario in order to create a “deployment
sketch”, a top-level narrative summary which describes how an attempt at deploy-
ing the exemplar technology might play out in each given context.
Finally, the conclusions section gathers together the dominant challenges to the
deployment of self-driving freight vehicles as depicted in the four prototypes, and
outlines a claim for the unique capabilities of the narrative prototyping process.
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8.1 The exemplar technology: self-driving vehicles
In this section, the exemplar technology—in this case, self-driving vehicles—is ex-
amined more closely, before being introduced into the relevant trialectic model so
that the vectors of influence can be explored. This iterative approach to the model
ensures a thorough appraisal of the exemplar and its prospects for deployment.
8.1.1 Concretising the exemplar
The first task is to concretise the exemplar technology: to unpack the concept a
little, and consider what lies behind the label. This is particularly important when
dealing with a concept such as the self-driving vehicle, which is not so much
a novel technology or innovation in its own right, so much as it is a bundling-
together of multiple extant technologies of a certain maturity: advanced vehicles,
cellular data connectivity, cloud computing, global positioning. The self-driving
vehicle further represents an intensification of the linkage between mobility infras-
tructures and telecoms infrastructures.
These intersystemic linkages mean that, while this project is primarily con-
cerned with a specific practice-as-entity, namely freight logistics, this speculative
phase must incorporate some consideration of the contextual influence of those
infrastructures and assemblages which may appear, at first glance, not to be im-
plicated in the mobility of goods. The historical analysis provides some precedent
for this approach: the carrier networks of the 18th century were dependent on
inns and stables as a communications network and a fuel distribution system, for
instance.
More importantly, communications technology has been explicitly embedded
in transportation systems ever since the earliest railway signalling systems mu-
tated into telegraphy, before spilling out of the railway assemblage and becoming
an infrastructure in their own right. As such, the current ubiquity of networked
IT systems should be considered to be paradigmatic, and there is little sign of the
trend for entanglement slowing, let alone reversing. However, introducing all such
systems into the trialectic diagram would merely make them more cluttered. For
the purposes of analysis, it suffices that their relevance is acknowledged and con-
sidered as a feature of the articulatory context; depiction is unnecessary, much as
with the implicit articulatory entities encountered during the historical analysis.
8.1.2 Imagining infrastructural impacts
Having clarified the essential nature of the exemplar as being a convergence of
existing technologies and systems rather than a technology in and of itself—
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recognising, in other words, that the object of enquiry is not “the self-driving
truck”, but “self-drivingness”, which is to say “the potential capability for any
sort of currently human-controlled vehicle to be fully automated”—the exemplar
is now introduced, in a speculative manner, to the three infrastructure types iden-
tified in the historical analysis as being enrolled in freight logistics practices: rail-
ways, rivers and roads.
It should be noted that the following speculations have avoided considering
the potentially disruptive impacts of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), more
commonly referred to as “drones”. This is in part because the historical analy-
sis which provides support for the speculative mode did not consider air infras-
tructure, and hence there would be little or no precedent on which to base any
speculation; furthermore, it might be reasonably argued that the application of air
transport technology to date, particularly in the UK, has been focussed on long-
distance bulk haulage, with a distribution of nodes far more sparse than even that
of the railway network. To put that in context: it would be all but impossible to
explore the history of air freight in the Sheffield area, because there hasn’t really
been any; airfields have certainly operated in the vicinity, but they have little or
nothing to do with the distribution of goods and materials within the region. This
is not to discount the role of air transport in modern infrastructural configurations,
but rather to note that the situated focus of this particular project means that it is
beyond the scope of this analysis.
Still, the argument might be made that UAVs, being significantly smaller than
traditional aeroplanes and thus more suited to localised distribution work, might
be considered as a potentially imminent disruptor of local and regional freight
distribution. Indeed, that argument has been made, more or less explicitly, by
the increasingly ubiquitous global retail-and-distribution corporation Amazon, by
way of a number of demonstrations aimed at portraying the deployment of drone-
based delivery as being “just around the corner”, both temporally and spatially
(Westcott, 2016)—though it bears noting that the drones being used in such exper-
iments are almost exclusively piloted remotely by humans rather than operating
autonomously, and as such should really fall beyond the remit of “self-driving”
vehicles.
However, there are reasons to believe that these demonstrations, while ar-
guably confirming the purely technological feasibility of drone-based delivery, go
some way to obfuscating the economical, logistical and political obstacles to it be-
ing anything more than a publicity stunt for some time to come. The first issue
is technological, and relates to the limitations of the electric power-train used in
current UAVs:
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“For a 30 minute flight [at speeds necessarily and significantly lower
than 40 miles per hour], a drone’s overall weight [...] must be twenty
times that of the package alone. The batteries’ weight accounts for most
of that [...] The drone will not be able to fly for more than 32 minutes,
and at that time, it will not be able to carry any package whatsoever.”
(Solomon, 2016)
These limitations mean that the distance between the drone-distribution centre
and the destination of the package could be no greater than 16km, even for pack-
ages of just over 2kg in weight, unless there were a significant improvement in
both battery capacity and electric motor efficiency, both of which have remained
stubbornly stable for the last couple of decades, despite considerable research and
investment (Solomon, 2016). The matter of the dropping-off of the package is also
non-trivial, particularly if the “dropping” is literal, as this would present risks not
just to the package, but also to property and people, even in such circumstances
as the recipient has a garden or similar open space to receive it. Solutions to this
problem involving “special landing zones” or delivery to smart lockers have been
proposed (Kobie, n.d.), but these merely serve to highlight the need for drones to
compete with terrestrial delivery systems which already make use of such facili-
ties (and do little to remove the social challenges presented by people choosing to
attack or steal from a drone mid-mission).
Even assuming these problems can be surmounted, the economics of drone de-
livery is nowhere close to scaling up to a level competitive with existing options;
claims of cost parity with “existing technology” tend to use bespoke one-shot ser-
vices such as motorcycle couriering for comparison, which are considerably more
costly than regular mail services and bulk delivery runs (Kobie, n.d.). The eco-
nomics of the “last mile” are governed by two factors, namely route density (the
number of drops on a vehicle’s route) and drop size (the number of packages de-
livered per stop on the route), and drone delivery does poorly on both: “current
prototypes [...] usually carry just one package, and after the drone makes its de-
livery, it has to fly all the way back to its homebase” to recharge and reload (Wang,
2015). With further investment and development, an increase in distribution centre
coverage, and the training and hiring of pilots capable of running multiple UAVs
at once, drone delivery might yet come to compete with road vehicles in urban
and suburban areas, but at present it is only realistically viable for urgent deliv-
eries where all other options are slow (e.g. replacement components flown out to
oil rigs), or for the delivery of high-value low-mass products (such as medicines)
in rural settings with sparse populations and poor existing terrestrial infrastruc-
ture (such as the Australian outback, or parts of sub-Saharan Africa)—and even
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these applications would require a significant increase in range to transcend the
limitations set out above.
Finally, there are the regulatory issues. Despite the UK’s regulatory environ-
ment being more conducive to drone experimentation than that of the US or the
EU (hence Amazon’s pilot programme, mentioned above), there are still plenty
of restrictions in place: exceptions can be applied for, but for the most part they
are restricted to line-of-sight operations (within 500m of the pilot) with a 400-foot
flight ceiling, and effectively forbidden from operating in crowded or built-up
areas (CAP 722: Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance,
2015); provisions exist in theory for operations beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), but
these “will require an approved method of aerial separation and collision avoid-
ance” judged equivalent to that of a regular piloted aircraft (CAP 722: Unmanned
Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance, 2015, Section 3, articles 1.4-
8), which in turn implies the inclusion of a significantly complex and powerful
package of sensors, communications and control systems—which is not an insur-
mountable technological obstacle, but would make each drone considerably more
expensive. As for genuinely autonomous UAVs, the regulations make provision
for the potential certification of such by holding them to similar standards as ap-
plied to BLOS operations, but note that there are “no UAS related systems that
meet the definition of autonomous” (CAP 722: Unmanned Aircraft System Opera-
tions in UK Airspace – Guidance, 2015, Section 3, article 3.2). In summary, while
the technology may be bordering on the possibility of drone-based delivery, it’s a
long long way from being autonomous, and even piloted services “have countless
issues to overcome, particularly around infrastructure, privacy and security, and
avoiding interference with the package” (Calder, 2018). As such, and consider-
ing their position outwith the scope of this project, it seems reasonable to exclude
drone delivery from consideration as a serious competitor in local freight systems
in the Sheffield region, at least in terms of the proximal future.
Rail
The railways are theoretically amenable to automation and driverless operations;
the Docklands Light Railway is testament to the fact. Indeed, partial (human-
overseen) automation is increasingly commonplace in light passenger rail contexts,
but the complete automation of mainline passenger rail is considered a non-starter
in the absence of specially-designed infrastructure to support it (as might be put in
place in a project such as Crossrail, for instance). This means that the UK’s exten-
sive legacy rail infrastructure actually acts as a constraint to automation (Brown,
2014), especially in a context of under-investment like that of the Sheffield re-
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gion. Freight is arguably more amenable to automation than passenger services,
as there are fewer unpredictable human actors in the frame; nonetheless auto-
mated rail freight is still surprisingly rare, with arguably the first truly automated
service being the recent trials of a Rio Tinto ore train in the remote Pilbara region
of Western Australia (Sankaran, 2018). But this is a rare context—isolated, thinly
populated, flat, long distances between stops—in which the standard obstacles
to automation, namely obstacle detection and emergency stoppages, are reduced
to a minimum; by comparison, the Sheffield region’s railways are twisty, involve
frequent stops, and cut through densely-populated areas.
Of course, it would be technically possible to build new freight lines with
automation-friendly infrastructure “baked in”; but there is little appetite, fund-
ing or political willpower for the construction of new freight lines in the country
more broadly; in the Sheffield region in particular, the ultimate failure of the dis-
trict rail rationalisation project, as represented by the short, fading life of Tinsley
marshalling yard (see section 7.4) will serve as an augury against any such invest-
ment for decades to come.
Indeed, the reconfiguration of freight around unit-train and container services
in the same period effectively innoculated the district against a revival of the sort
of freight traffic that might benefit from automation, namely waggon-load traffic.
The bulk of contemporary rail freight in the UK is effectively containerised, re-
liant on economies of bulk scale across long, non-stop point-to-point routes, and
ruthlessly optimised; while there might be other reasons for wanting to remove
loco drivers from the picture, there is little prospect of self-driving technology
making any measurable difference to the cost or speed of these services—which
in turn means there’s little point in antagonising the railway unions by propos-
ing it. Meanwhile, self-driving freight trains might make more sense on a district
network devoted to shuttling components between local businesses, as once pre-
vailed in Sheffield: small, loose or specialist loads; highly variable local and re-
gional itineraries, and one-off special runs. But that sort of traffic is long gone, as
is much of the infrastructure that once supported it: not just the permanent way
itself but the secondary stuff like sidings and engine sheds, which took with them
the multitudinous specialised practices that they once played host to. As such, it
can be concluded that we are unlikely to observe much impact from self-driving
technologies in the freight rail assemblage; the results would not be sufficiently
desirable to encourage the infrastructural reconfigurations required.
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Waterways
Likewise, there’s little to no chance of self-driving technologies causing radical
disruption to the waterways, if only because that network is effectively moribund
nationally, and particularly so local to Sheffield: there’s simply no traffic to op-
timise, and no journey time to trim. Nonetheless, the unused capacity of this
legacy network is still relevant, and should not be discounted: it still represents
the possibility of alternative performances for freight logistics, as do the remaining
mothballed district rail routes. The question is one of plausibility rather than prob-
ability: the more marginal possibilities should not be discarded too early in the
process.
Roads
It is thus the road networks where self-driving technologies are most likely to
make their disruptive mark—and where the majority of proposed interventions
are targetted.
There are a number of problematics around self-drivingness, and around freight
in particular, in terms of realising a successful deployment. In Borenstein, Herkert,
and Miller (2017), the authors catalogue “some of the key system level issues that
need resolution” if self-driving freight vehicles are to become a functional reality:
“... if vehicle-to-vehicle communication becomes the norm, will there
be sufficient standardization in the design of different makes for the
cars to communicate effectively with one another? Will drivers in
hybrid human/autonomous vehicles be permitted to out-maneuver
fully autonomous vehicles by switching in and out of autonomous
mode? Possible responses to such complexities include the develop-
ment of safety and interoperability standards, sophisticated vehicle-to-
vehicle communication systems, and technologies for centralized sys-
tem control (e.g., centralized intersection management). Each of these
responses, however, raises a new set of system complexities, regula-
tory needs, and ethical issues. [These] scenarios only take into account
a relatively finite number of vehicles; in the future, engineers, city plan-
ners, and others may have to predict and manage the behavior of hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of self-driving vehicles along with any other
automated technologies (such as light rail) or entities that may interact
with those vehicles.” (Borenstein et al., 2017)
Likewise, Farah, Erkens, Alkim, and van Arem (2018) note that the biggest
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challenge is the integration of self-driving freight into existing transportation sys-
tems, rather than the technical obstacles of self-drivingness in and of itself, and
furthermore that road operators and policy-makers are starting to raise questions
about how this will work out; their survey reveals that while research on the dig-
ital infrastructure capabilities and capacities required to support self-drivingness
is plentiful, research on the existing capabilities and capacities of the “legacy”
physical infrastructures—which is to say the roads themselves, and the associated
systems—is rather scarce. And what little there is suggests that there’s plenty
of problems to be overcome, particularly in the early stages of any transition to
automation—for instance, the potentially detrimental effects on road surfaces: “...
in the absence of appropriate control, specifically by repeatedly positioning trucks
in the same location, the amount of damage could be highly detrimental, and
noticeable influences may occur at autonomous truck volumes as low as 10%”
(Noorvand, Karnati, & Underwood, 2017). The news on the self-drivingness side
is far from exclusively positive, either, as developments there are mired in ongo-
ing international and intersectoral disputes about standards and regulations for
vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems, bandwidth allocations, and more (Uh-
lemann, 2017).
The social issues surrounding self-driving vehicles are frequently downplayed
or overlooked in popular discussion (and promotion) of the technology—and it
bears noting that this nay-saying is not exclusive to regulators or critics of tech-
nology. For instance, recent qualitative research indicates that people within the
German and Swedish freight sectors appear to be well acquainted with the non-
technical barriers to self-driving freight vehicles: interviews with sectoral actors
(including transport firms, clients, consultants, developers and OEMs) revealed
that all participants saw the state of existing infrastructure as a barrier to adop-
tion, and the majority highlighted ethical and social concerns, with some explicitly
mentioning the risk of job losses, and others highlighting legislative and political
obstacles to adoption; furthermore, the role of human drivers in vehicle security,
communications, “load securing”, document management and customs practices
was highlighted, as well as the question of legal and moral responsibility in the
case of accidents (Neuweiler & Riedel, 2017, pp38-9; it further bears noting that
the condition of both road infrastructure and social safety nets in both Germany
and Sweden is considerably less parlous than in the UK at time of writing).
In a similar vein, Richardson, Doubek, Kuhn, and Stumpf (2017) reports that
“[drivers and fleet managers] are found to be the most concerned about legal
liability issues and the general safety and reliability of [self-driving/automated
freight vehicle] technology”, and Dougherty, Ellen, Stowell, and Richards (2017)
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notes a general anxiety among people who drive for a living about having to avoid
autonomous vehicles: “the nearest-term autonomation [sic] technology with sig-
nificant efficiency improvement, truck platooning, triggered negative responses in
a portion of the study participants instead of reducing the perception of risk. If in-
dividuals have their first exposure to autonomous trucks in the form of platoons,
it may lead to broader opposition than individual autonomous trucks would have
generated.” Finally, an extensive quantitative study of the UK context observes
that “automated driving in commercial applications such as taxis or trucks is likely
to face some political opposition because of the potential for large-scale unemploy-
ment among commercial drivers”, and concludes that it “appears more likely that
high automation in restricted environment (e.g. motorways) will be available be-
fore full automation in urban environments because of the complexity of urban
driving, and mainstream automakers appear to favour this approach” (Wadud,
2017). This bias against non-trunk routes is reinforced by the poor availability of
mobile telecomms bandwidth: Connected Nations (2017) reports that, as of 2017,
only 58% of A and B class roads in the UK have in-vehicle mobile data coverage.
Given these data, it seems reasonable to assume that self-driving freight will:
1. necessitate a substantial investment in new communications infrastructure
on and around those routes where it becomes an option;
2. necessitate interventions in the “legacy” roads infrastructure in terms of both
capability and capacity;
3. necessitate a substantial body of legislature, technical standards and insur-
ance precedents before anything more than limited trials can be put into
action;
4. most likely be instigated as a segregated option on motorway trunk routes
long before being available on urban or more minor/rural routes.
At the risk of belabouring the point, these obstacles are far from insurmount-
able; however, they are costly, time-consuming, and fraught with difficulties due
to their social and political nature. Only if there is the prospect of considerable
cost savings to fleet operators are they likely to invest in the technology—and only
then if there is a solid prospect of the necessary infrastructure being in place prior
to investment, which implies either state-led investment, or the sort of private
(and speculative) investment in radically new infrastructure that hasn’t been seen
in the UK since the Victorian railways boom. All of these things could happen—
but the likelihood of their happening is highly sensitive to the social, political and
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economic context. It is this sensitivity to context, as well as to location, that the
prototyping process is intended to explore: absent any proleptic knowledge of
what will happen, we turn instead to deliberately drastic examples of what might
happen.
Given this project’s focus on freight practices, it makes sense to focus on the
impact of self-driving technologies on freight-focussed vehicles. However, it also
bears noting that self-drivingness is essentially “vehicle agnostic”, which is to
say that it might just as easily be applied to non-freight vehicles as to freight.
Furthermore, the distinction between freight and non-freight vehicles is primar-
ily regulatory, in that non-freight vehicles are often capable of performing (light)
freight logistics, even if their design protocols must be circumvented to do so. In
other words, the possibility of non-freight vehicles being made driverless must
be factored into the following speculation, as must the possibility of non-freight
vehicles (self-driving or otherwise) being “hacked” so as to perform freight roles,
in defiance of both their design and/or the prevailing regulatory framework.
With that said, it is clear that the most important assemblage with regard to
the potential disruption of freight practices by self-drivingness is that of freight-
specific vehicles running on the road network. As such, the final roads trialectic
from the historical analysis (see section 5.5, reproduced below as figure 8.1) is the
starting-point model for the speculative process, and will inform the speculations
to follow.
8.1.3 Vectors of influence
During the historical analysis, tracing the vectors of influence traditionally begins
with HKJ; this is predominantly an aesthetic decision on the part of the author,
intended to emphasise the project’s orientation toward practices, which is to say
toward people doing things. However, the trialectic model is not concerned with
causality, and hence the analysis may begin with any of the four vectors.
When dealing with proposed speculative technologies such as self-driving ve-
hicles, we are working with ideas whose originators believe them to be meeting
a market desire: in the language of the trialectic, the self-driving vehicle is an in-
terface developed in response to HKJ influences, which take the form of a deviant
practice-as-perfomance that exceeds (or at least attempts to exceed) the established
performance parameters. Without knowing which deviant performances in par-
ticular the self-driving vehicle is intended to respond to, the speculative analyst
must instead begin by looking at the design protocols of the proposed technology,
as they offer the best available guide to the problems (or “use cases”) that their
originators see them as solving.
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Figure 8.1: Articulated trialectic model: Roads, late 20th and early 21st century
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Or, to put it another way: the prototyping process relies on making at this point
an explicit assumption that the originators of the proposed disruptor have done
their homework, and are not merely chasing technological rainbows. We assume
that the technology is deliverable as described under ideal laboratory conditions;
it is only by proceeding under such an assumption that the validity of such an
assumption might be effectively critiqued.
Design Protocols
The self-driving freight vehicle is an interesting case for the trialectic, in that it
involves designing the protagonist away from the interface, and almost out of
the picture entirely: the operator (or driver), who would normally be acting as
the protagonist’s proxy, is replaced by IT systems. As such, the design of the
material interface, which is to say the vehicle itself, is geared almost exclusively
toward accommodating the parameter-excession desires of the organisation which
owns and operates it, rather than the more immediate and personal desires of the
(now obsolete) driver. Furthermore, this means that any influence upon the trialectic
from the instigating protagonist must pass through the owner organisation: the end-
user experiences freight logistics almost entirely as a service, and can thus only
interact with the system through the protocols offered by the service provider.
This means that there is little or no opportunity for the development of deviant
and/or excessive protagonist performances: the protagonist simply can’t get close
enough to the components of the system to perform a hack or a kludge, and must
instead give over the execution of the entire performance to the operator. As such,
it is to the operator organisation that we must look for HKJ influences on this
particular trialectic.
Hacks, Kludges & Jugaad
The desires of operator companies for improved performance parameters are man-
ifest in extant deviant practices such as tachometer fraud, and in the hiring of
drivers from low-wage markets such as Eastern Europe; the former is effectively a
regulatory circumvention which increases the number of usable vehicle-hours per
day, while the latter keeps a downward pressure on staff overheads. Like the over-
loading practices of the interwar man-with-van (see section 5.4) these are hacks
performed preemptively by the carrier company on the protagonist’s behalf, with
the aim of making their service offer more competitive as a result. These exces-
sions thus evidence a continuing desire on the part of operator companies to make
yet faster shipments at yet lower costs; these are the only parameters on which it
220 8.1. The exemplar technology: self-driving vehicles
is realistically possible to compete in general freight.
Invention & Iteration
The self-driving vehicle is thus intended to extract improved parameters from the
infrastructure layer: speed and cheapness of journey are those of greatest interest
to freight operators, as they offer concrete business advantage when seen from
the bottom line. Interestingly, while self-drivingness is a distinctly technological
disruptor, it pushes primarily against the regulatory constitution of the infrastruc-
ture: after all, the maximum speed of a self-driving truck will likely be no higher
than that of a regular truck, and thus any increase in delivery speed is achieved
through reducing the number of hours that the shipment is obliged by regulation
to stay motionless.
That said, the self-driving vehicle does place greater demands on the infras-
tructural layer than the manual vehicle, but those demands are not primarily fo-
cussed on the roads themselves: a self-driving truck wouldn’t take up more road
capacity or cause more wear and tear to tarmac than the manual type. However,
it would require much more connectivity and/or bandwidth from the telecoms
network as a condition of deployment—and the same goes, albeit to a lesser ex-
tent, for secondary infrastructures of fueling and fuel distribution, and for the
supporting systems of surveillance and traffic management within which auto-
mated vehicles would need to operate. The point being that, while a single self-
driving vehicle might be easily and safely released onto the road network without
the need for upgrades and improvements, opening up the roads to populations of
self-driving vehicles would necessitate the expansion and integration of multiple
infrastructures.
Standards & Regulations
The question of populations brings us to the real difficulty regarding self-driving
vehicles using the road system: the hundreds of thousands of human-driven ve-
hicles which already use that road system. It is eminently possible to envisage
a road system whereupon each and every vehicle is self-driving; envisaging a
system whereupon self-driving vehicles share the same roads as human-driven
vehicles is rather more of a challenge.
There is a technical aspect to this problem: shared routes would necessitate
the self-driving vehicle being able to predict and respond to the responses of un-
networked human drivers as well as to the more predictable and programmatic
responses of its fellow robots, and this represents a significant increase in the chal-
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lenge.
There is also a legal and regulatory aspect to the problem, which is best
summed up with the question of liability: if a self-driving vehicle kills or injures
someone, who is responsible in the eyes of the law? Is it the passenger (if there
is one), or the operator organisation, or the vehicle manufacturer? What if the
manufacturer had outsourced the development of the software that made the fatal
decision—is the software house then liable? The current lack of legal precedents
around these questions will present a considerable barrier to uptake: until these
questions are answered, few will be willing to underwrite the insurance policies
required to make self-driving vehicles a reality, and until self-driving vehicles are
fully insurable, no one will use them for freight (or indeed for anything else).
There will likely also be political resistance to the deployment of self-driving
vehicles from multiple fronts: labour unions are likely to perceive them as a di-
rect threat to employment, and they will likely be bundled in with other poten-
tially “job-stealing” technologies, in what seems to be a growing discourse of anti-
technological discontent. They will also generate a strong argument in favour of
reinvestment in railways, given they’re a proven technology with almost all of the
advantages (if not more) which accrue to self-driving long-haul road freight, and
also represent untapped latent capacity in the region.
But in order to complete the iteration of the trialectic, it is necessary to as-
sume that the exemplar is deployed, however partially; therefore it is necessary
to consider the compromises which might make deployment possible despite the
challenges outlined above. Considering that the liability challenge is considerably
reduced when route-sharing is taken out of the picture, segregation by vehicle
type seems the most likely compromise: routes, or some lanes of a route, devoted
exclusively to the use of self-driving freight. These dedicated routes might be per-
manent (e.g. always exclusive to self-driving vehicles) or temporally contingent
(e.g. a lane which is reserved for self-driving vehicles between 9pm and 7am).
Such a program of vehicular segregation would not be without its own logis-
tical challenges, and would likely involve some sort of physical intervention in
the roads (fences, crash barriers, surveillance, signage, safety features) as well as
the parallel bolstering of secondary infrastructures, and a whole raft of rules and
regulations around the use of self-driving vehicles. None of this will be cheap, or
quick to deliver.
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8.2 Four divergent futures: building the scenario matrix
The aim of the scenario suite is to provide a set of imaginary worlds or labo-
ratories in which to “test” the exemplar disruptor technology. The prototyping
process starts by taking the disruptive technology at its word (or at the word of its
promoters) and assuming that deployment is a given, if only in terms of its techno-
logical viability; the challenge is then to outline a deployment which is plausible
when considered in the context of the scenario in hand. As such, the parameters which
define the scenarios must be designed to be pertinent to the disruptor under con-
sideration: in the case of freight infrastructure, this necessitates parameters that
capture complexity and challenges at both the national and international scales.
Furthermore, it is necessary that the scenarios be reasonably extreme: plau-
sibility is crucial, but probability, not so much. At this point, it bears reiterating
that, as explained in section 4.3, the scenarios that follow are not meant to be
predictive. They are not meant to be realistic, either—if by “realistic” one means
reflective of the likely turn of events. Likely turns of events are, for the most part,
already baked into the majority of predictive models and strategy generation pro-
cesses; the whole point of the speculative methodology is to simulate the effects of
unlikely turns of events, as a way of “stress-testing” a strategy already developed
with likely outcomes in mind. Unlikely events are by definition impossible to
predict, but they can be imagined, and their consequences extrapolated from that
imagining. It is the consequences, the parameters of the scenarios, that matter for
the prototyping process, not the scenarios themselves; the scenarios are simply a
way of making the parameters “hang together”, a way to make them a little more
“alive” and engaging to the imagination than a table of numbers or values could
ever be. That they are capable of provoking discussion as to their plausibility is, if
anything, to be considered a bonus, as such discussions are indicative of a mindset
that has been opened up to the consideration and evaluation of divergent future
circumstances.
The point is not to test the proposed assemblage against a particular outcome
or outcomes, but rather to use a set of drastic outcomes as a proxy for the pos-
sibility of a discontinuity in context which, by definition, cannot be predicted or
parametricised.∗ If we are unwilling to consider the worst, then we are unpre-
pared for the worst—and so the speculative mode is a deliberate provocation, an
∗If I might briefly break the “fourth wall” of academic objectivity for a moment, by way of
exposing my own positionality on this matter: as I expect is the case for the vast majority of British
citizens, I very sincerely hope that the outcomes of the Brexit negotiations (still ongoing at time of
writing) look nothing like any of the four scenarios that follow—but the enduring and widespread
resistance to considering that said scenarios might be even remotely possible is, perhaps, the best
possible argument for considering them.
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invitation to think the unthinkable: the cost of doing so is minimal (the great merit
of narrative prototyping, from a planner’s point of view, being its cheapness by
comparison with almost all other methods), but the potential cost of not doing so
is incalculable.
To predict the future is impossible—but to engage with unpredictability in
a productive manner is comparatively simple, and that is what the speculative
methodology is designed to do. It is neither a replacement for strategic foresight,
nor a repudiation of it; rather, it is a supplement to it, an extension of the process
which readmits that which has heretofore, by necessity, been externalised. Re-
garding the scenarios which follow, then, the question to ask shouldn’t be “but
what if they’re wrong?”; it’s “but what if they’re right?”
8.2.1 Scenario matrix: axes and parameters
The axes of a 2x2 scenario generation matrix should be selected so as to be per-
tinent to the subject of the enquiry. In the case of this prototyping process the
subject is, broadly speaking, freight logistics and infrastructure. As the histori-
cal methodology has shown, freight logistics has always been important to (and
shaped by) both the regional context and the national; as such, the axes should
be selected so as to express and explore this entanglement of two organisational
scales. The contextual axis (or the reactive axis) should therefore represent external
circumstances affecting the UK as an entity on the world stage, while the systemic
axis should therefore represent the domestic sociopolitical dynamic within that
entity.
Contextual axis: Brexit outcomes
The divergent possibilities of the Brexit process, yet to be formally begun at time of
writing, provide the contextual (vertical) axis. Regardless of one’s feelings about
the result of the referendum, the expert prognosis on its impacts is generally neg-
ative in economic and diplomatic terms, with the current debate using the mod-
ifiers “hard” and “soft” to denote maximum and minumum predicted impacts
respectively. In other words, the open question is not whether Brexit will damage
the nation, but to what extent it will damage it. In order to capture the flavour
of this particular contextual uncertainty, the following infrastructurally pertinent
parameters were assigned to the two ends of the axis:
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/ Hard Brexit Soft Brexit
Regulatory regime looser tighter
Relations with EU more isolated more involved
Domestic political tone more radical/extreme more centrist
Economic damage more damage less damage
Table 8.1: Contextual axis parameters
Systemic axis: domestic policy
The general ideological slant of domestic policy provides the systemic (horizontal)
axis. In contrast to the contextual challenge represented by the outcomes of the
Brexit process (which is effectively an externality for anyone outside Whitehall)
the ideological orientation of policy in post-Brexit Britain—infrastructure policy,
but also policy more broadly—is something closer to a choice, albeit a choice
which manifests as a sociopolitical gestalt. Rather than use the time-worn labels
of Left and Right, whose significance and meaning have become something of a
moveable feast, the modifiers “private” and “public” are used to stand for styles
of state intervention in infrastructure, and styles of social policy more broadly:
/ Public Private
Infra. Investment More state-led More private finance
Inequality Reduce Increase
Cultural tone Collectivist Individualist
Devolution Faster Slower
Table 8.2: Systemic axis parameters
8.2.2 The populated matrix
These two axes combine into a 2x2 matrix, as shown below; each quadrant is
labelled with a title chosen to illustrate the scenario it defines. Scenario parameters
accrue to each quadrant in accordance with the ends of the axes it falls upon. By
way of example, the top left quadrant represents a combination of the Hard Brexit
pole of the Contextual axis and the Public-oriented Policy pole of the Systemic
axis; as such, it inherits all of the parameters from the Hard Brexit column in table
8.1, and all of the parameters from the Public column in table 8.2.
8.2.3 Four scenarios
The following sections are brief sketches of the economic and political timelines
for each scenario, based on an extrapolation of the assigned scenario parameters,
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Figure 8.2: 2x2 matrix with scenario titles












Table 8.3: “Franchise Island” scenario parameters
The libertarian right retains power throughout and beyond an unruly and de-
fiant Brexit, leaving Britain economically weakened, diplomatically isolated from
the continent, and desperate for inward investment on almost any terms. Further
reductions in public spending accompanied by tax cuts and a regulatory bonfire
compound the inequalities of the pre-Brexit austerity program, making for a cut-
throat culture and a growing resentful underclass whose promised utopia has not
been delivered. Infrastructural investment remains focussed on London and the
south-east, and on prestigious big-ticket projects such as HS2; these are increas-
ingly funded by Hinkley-esque arrangements with foreign and private investors,
when they are funded at all.











Table 8.4: “UK PLC” scenario parameters
This is the “liberal continuity future”, wherein the infrastructural status quo
is altered the least. A fairly soft Brexit conclusion limits the economic self-harm
of the process, and a resurgent centrism pushes back against a diminished (yet
still very energised) hard right; the social-democratic left splits from the Corbynist
rump of “Old Labour” in order to prop up the consensus, but the coalition is
fractious, and hence pragmatically technocratic: it’s all about keeping the lights on
and the trains running while the recovery takes hold, and that means neoliberal
business-as-usual when it comes to infrastructure: PFI financing, EU standards
and regulations, and the slow expensive grind of consultancy. But while the lights
may have been kept on, not everyone can afford to use them... and the radical left
is rediscovering protest and street politics, particularly in larger cities.










Table 8.5: “The Frugal Kingdom” scenario parameters
A spectacular and hubristic botching of the Brexit negotiations splits the Tory
party and turns public opinion against them, as well as against what is seen as
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a cruel and vengeful Europe. Seizing its moment, the Corbynist left finally em-
braces patriotism and the monarchy as King William V takes the throne, ushering
in a period of belt-tightening and national introspection. This programme is de-
liberately and repeatedly framed as being comparable to post-WW2 austerity and
rationing: high taxes, careful public spending, the renationalisation of industries
abandoned as no longer profitable. But the actuality is mostly a whole lot of
make-do-and-mend, particularly when it comes to infrastructure: the opportuni-
ties for action implied by devolution and the removal of state-aid restraints are
severely hampered by a lack of funds. Cheap, functional solutions are the order
of the day—particularly ones that might produce economic opportunities at the
grassroots level.










Table 8.6: “Not quite Norway” scenario parameters
Named for an ECB executive’s unguarded assessment of Britain’s post-Brexit
paradigm, “Not quite Norway” sees the centre-left successfully reconsolidating
around their efforts to secure a softer Brexit settlement, whittling away at Tory
credibility by successfully portraying them as having stolen UKIP’s clothes. With
a notionally progressive coalition in power from 2020, EU relations are patched
up as well as possible, and gently Keynesian policies begin pushing pack against
the privatisation paradigm, starting with the railways. Affordable solutions are
very welcome, but the focus of governance is on addressing inequality in the
social fabric, in the hope of keeping the lid on simmering nativist resentments; as
such, new infrastructure comes a very distant second to maintaining or upgrading
existing assets.
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8.3 Prototyping: articulation in context
Having iterated the trialectic model (section 1 above) and defined a suite of four
scenarios (section 2 above), the next phase is the prototyping process. In essence,
this involves placing the trialectic “into” each scenario in turn, and attempting to
come up with a plausible compromise between the promise of the proposed sys-
tem and the obstructions of its circumstances: in other words, having committed
to the assumption that the disruptor is technologically feasible, the prototyping pro-
cess is designed to test the sociopolitical, economic and geographical feasibility of
its being built successfully under unexpected but not unimaginable circumstances.
For each scenario, the quadrant parameters (picked out in bold, for ease of
identification) are used to interrogate the trialectic: how might they aid or ob-
struct the deployment of the technology in question? This process results in a
sketch narrative of the imaginary deployment which, when combined with each
scenario’s sketched “future history” (from the preceding section), serves as a de-
scription of the performance options for freight logistics practices particular to
that scenario—it explains, in other words, what did and didn’t get built, which




The margins on providing freight services are already incredibly thin, as indicated
by the long suppression of fuel duty increases; this means that private-sector in-
vestment in freight infrastructure is only likely to come from the very biggest
players, who can either leverage the sheer volume of traffic to a profitable ad-
vantage or absorb the running losses into profits made elsewhere in the value
chain. Increasing inequality, in combination with what looks to be a global trend
toward trade protectionism, suggests that growth in long-distance (i.e. interna-
tional overland) goods traffic will slow or reverse, while domestic traffic might
increase. An individualist political culture suggests that there will be little en-
thusiasm for protecting the interests of employees or smaller organisations against
agressive business practices. Slower devolution ensures that decisions about ma-
jor infrastructure projects remain under the centralised remit of Westminster: a
continuation of the status quo, wherein the lion’s share of funding goes to London
and the south-east.
Hard Brexit offers the opportunity for a regulatory bonfire... but only around
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those matters where no concessions need be made to Europe, which is likely to
develop its own regulatory framework for self-driving vehicles. A hard Brexit fur-
ther suggests that the margins on continental overland trade will be further eaten
into, which will have the knock-on effect of reducing overland trade flows: fewer
goods will arrive in or leave the UK on trucks, while more goods will arrive or
leave on container ships. A radical tone to domestic politics suggests a theatri-
cal approach to policy, wherein the grand gesture delivered swiftly is assumed to
trump the more cautious technocratic attitudes of the past. Meanwhile, serious
damage to the UK economy ensures a steady stream of discontent and protest,
and the revival of old-school street politics.
Deployment sketch
Online retail giant Amazon, already making inroads into logistics and concrete
infrastructure, cuts a deal with the UK government under which one lane of of
each of the nation’s motorways is permanently segregated (through the use of
security fences etc.) for the use of self-driving freight vehicles; they also cut a deal
with Tata UK to produce the fleet. Quickly eating up the traffic of smaller hauliers
as well as growing their own, Amazon effectively treats this logisitics business as
a loss-leader on its retail business, taking a hit on profitability so as to get closer
to a monopoly position not just in retail but also in long-haul domestic delivery;
international long-haul road freight, long in decline, is now death-spiralling due
to post-Brexit tariffs, while the container ports are getting busier with imports
from other, more distant markets.
In the case of Sheffield, this deployment means that the closest node of the
self-driving freight network would be the M1 at Tinsley/Meadowhall; all last-
mile connections into or out of the city that make use of the self-driving modality
will have to make their way to or from the distribution centres by some other
manually-operated mode of transport. In effect, this deployment changes very
little: self-driving freight might not even be offered with its self-drivingness as
its selling point, and is more likely to just invisibly hoover up a portion of traf-
fic which would previously have taken much the same route, only with a human
driver behind the wheel. But it’s also likely to only be offered on a containerised
or whole-truck basis, as the overheads on coordinating multiple smaller loads are
prohibitive to businesses where profits are a function of volume (compare with
the reorganisation of rail freight in the 1980s; see section 7.5). This leaves the op-
portunity for local independent operators to get in on the last-mile game, with a
loose regulatory regime and lax law enforcement permitting a profusion of “local
carriers” (as found in the pre-turnpike era; see section 5.1), and middlemen dis-
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tribution “businesses” who are actually just running arbitrage on the spare con-
tainer capacity of other operators, rather than running their own fleets. However,
these businesses are just as likely to link up with the rail freight network or with
manually-driven road freight systems, because the motorway network represents
only the trunk routes of the road network as a whole, and in many cases it would
be cheaper to ship directly between origin and destination in a manual vehicle
than it would to book some or all of the space in a self-driving container, and then
arrange last-mile connections at both ends separately: modal shifts have always
been the slowest and most expensive elements of freight logistics. With respect
to the experience of protagonists, most users are unlikely to notice any difference.
This is due to the continuation of the freight-as-service paradigm: because the
interface device (in this case the truck or HGV) is privately owned and operated,
and thus isolated from the influence of the protagonist, the assemblage of freight
dispatch is obscured behind standardised online interfaces, particularly for bulk
users thereof.
Articulations
Figure 8.3 on page 231 shows a speculative articulation for the trialectic under
the Franchise Island scenario. Almost all of the major articulatory actors from the
preceding road freight analysis (see above) are still in play, though there have been
some significant rearrangements of responsibilities and relationships.
Incumbents:
Carriers C-of-P The carriers community-of-practice has seen its area of influ-
ence shrink away from the protagonist; this reflects the increasingly local (and
likely ad hoc) nature of “traditional” (which is to say last-mile) freight carrying
practices under this new regime, in which local carrying work on the last mile
would increasingly be sent out to tender by Amazon, presumably under some
sort of Uber/Deliveroo-esque gig-economy model; a continuation of the deregu-
latory paradigm would enable, if not encourage, this trend. It should be noted
that the carrier’s influence over the assemblage has been reduced in spite of what
might seem to be a fairly immediate connection to the recipient of the delivery; in
a deregulated deliveries market, the recipient has fairly limited powers of influ-
ence by comparison to the sender, who after all pays for the service, and therefore
gets to call the shots and influence the service to their preference and convenience
(as anyone who has spent all day sat at home waiting for a parcel to arrive is
presumably well aware).
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Fuel distribution Fuel distribution infrastructures retain their position, as with-
out them, logistics vehicles are unable to move; however, they too retreat from the
influence over the protagonist as price and availability fluctuations are increas-
ingly absorbed into the service as provided. The assemblage couldn’t function
without it, but its relationships are increasingly oriented toward larger articula-
tory actors.
Central government, local government, vehicle makers The positions of the
two gubernatorial actors remain essentially unchanged: central government still
makes the final decisions over infrastructural standards and regulations, and local
government is still in charge of maintenance and upkeep. (It is assumed that local
government, and hence local and regional taxation bases, will remain on the hook
for the majority of maintenance costs associated with non-trunk roads—another
reason that self-drivingness is likely to stay restricted to major routes.)
Likewise the role of vehicle makers as a community-of-practice is (perhaps a lit-
tle conservatively) presumed to stay stable, on the assumption that self-drivingness
will be “delivered” through engineering partnerships with IT companies that are
for the most part fig-leafed behind the familiar brand identities of the vehicle
manufacturing sector.
Incoming:
Amazon In a low-investment scenario such as this, the only way the infrastruc-
tural investment necessary to support self-drivingness is likely to happen is if pri-
vate money is brought in—and in a situation of desperation, that private money
will be able to set the terms of the deal. Amazon always seeks to control the entire
“stack” (or assemblage) of any sector in which it operates, and would thus insist
on significant influence over the infrastructural layer in exchange for the invest-
ment necessary to upgrade it for driverless services, as well as lobbying hard for
standards and regulations that accommodated its ways of working; however, as
can be seen, this influence would be far from exclusive, and involve a significant
degree of overlap with government responsibilities (both central and local), as well
as with the legacy fuel distribution infrastructures, and the other new entrant to
the freight assemblage, namely the telecoms companies.
Telcos Amazon could get fairly easy access for interventions into the roads, be-
cause they’re the last concrete infrastructure that is still under governmental con-
trol; telecommunications, however, have been controlled by private corporations
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for decades, and would therefore have a significant span of independent influence
over the assemblage given the necessity of telecoms bandwidth for any success-
ful deployment of self-drivingness at scale. The telcos (which, in this particular
diagram, are effectively a black-boxed proxy for another entire infrastructural as-
semblage in its own right) would gain a significant influence over the S&R and I&I
vectors, and over the infrastructure layer; this influence extends into the interface
layer due to the inescapable involvement of telcos in negotiations over standards
for communication systems which use their networks (and hence also over aspects
of vehicle design), but does not extend to the protagonist, from whose perspective
these elements of the assemblage are concealed behind the design of the service,
which is entirely dominated by Amazon.
Outgoing:
Company fleets Amazon’s behaviour has consistently shown that it only ever
enters a market with the intention of eliminating all middle-men and competi-
tors; if we assume a scenario in which Amazon is permitted to intervene in the
freight assemblage by a beleaguered government desperate for infrastructural in-
vestment at any cost, we can also assume that Amazon will treat the freight side
of its operations as a loss-leader with the aim of capturing as many trade flows
as possible by leveraging the economies of scale that the corporations vast cash
reserves make possible. There are further incentives, too, in that the more “old
school” manually-driven freight vehicles Amazon successfully removes from the
trunk routes, the more congenial the trunk routes become for their own driverless
alternative; thus ruthless price-cutting would make the abandonment of remain-
ing in-house company fleets (already significantly diminished by the rise of “just
in time” logistics) inevitable.
8.3.2 “UK PLC”
Prototype parameters
The margins on providing freight services are already incredibly thin, as indicated
by the long suppression of fuel duty increases; this means that private-sector in-
vestment in freight infrastructure is only likely to come from the very biggest
players, who can either leverage the sheer volume of traffic to a profitable ad-
vantage or absorb the running losses into profits made elsewhere in the value
chain. Increasing inequality, in combination with what looks to be a global trend
toward trade protectionism, suggests that growth in long-distance (i.e. interna-
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tional overland) goods traffic will slow or reverse, while domestic traffic might
increase. An individualist political culture suggests that there will be little en-
thusiasm for protecting the interests of employees or smaller organisations against
agressive business practices. Slower devolution ensures that decisions about ma-
jor infrastructure projects remain under the centralised remit of Westminster: a
continuation of the status quo, wherein the lion’s share of funding goes to London
and the south-east.
A relatively light and orderly Brexit means that regulations will largely be
harmonised with those pertaining on the continent—and it is international road
freight which will be most amenable to driverless technology, as it is only over
long routes that the greatest economies can be achieved. As such, continued en-
gagement with EU goals and priorities, particularly with regard to environmen-
tal matters, would see the UK keen to be involved in any emerging continental
system for self-driving freight; however, the same declining demand and systemic
challenges will serve to block anything but a limited, segregated deployment. Fur-
thermore, a return to more centrist political dynamics means classic technocratic
policy-making, particularly with regard to infrastructure: sensible, expensive, and
interminably slow. Lucky, then, that Brexit resulted in minimal economic damage;
given a sense of having dodged the bullet, the bulk of the population is grateful
that things haven’t gotten too much worse.
Deployment sketch
As part of an effort to reconsolidate the EU, create jobs and reduce carbon emis-
sions, a pan-European project for self-driving long-haul freight is instigated, in
partnership with Maersk, Volkswagen and other big private-sector players in lo-
gistics and automotive technology. Segregated lanes for self-driving freight vehi-
cles are permanently established on transcontinental routes where freight traffic
is most intense. The UK, still fairly close to Europe politically and economically
(and hence still dependent on international overland freight for imports) is at one
end of this network, but it is also a long way down the list of priority: by 2032, the
M1 has finally been retrofitted for segregation as far North as York.
The end result is not unlike that proposed in “Franchise Island”, then: self-
driving freight is deployed, but only as an enhancement of the trunk routes of
a pre-existing network. This means that, much as was the case with turnpiking
in the 18th and 19th centuries (see section 5.2), use of the more advanced inter-
face (in this case the self-driving freight vehicle) is restricted to bulk operators on
major network edges, and those connecting to said network from nodes further
out into the “last mile” will this be obliged to make more modal shifts in order
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to do so. Where this circumstance differs from turnpiking is in the extent of the
advantage conferred by the new assemblage: turnpiking was flawed and often
poorly executed, but it still made a huge difference to the availability and capac-
ity of the routes to which it was applied (not least because it was applied to the
entire route, rather than a single lane thereof). However, the scalar advantages
and economies of self-driving vehicles can only be properly realised when they
completely replace the old system of manual vehicles; in any more partial deploy-
ment, the improvements will be marginal, and will accrue only to those covering
the longest routes with the greatest volume of traffic. (It also seems highly likely
that some sort of subsidy will have to be in place to get the project off the ground;
perhaps something tied to carbon credits.) By contrast to “Franchise Island”, how-
ever, stronger regulatory regimes will likely prevent the emergence of local ad hoc
last-mile services and arbitrage: Tinsley/Meadowhall is already a staging-point
for bulk road freight, so little changes in terms of logistical practicalities on the
last mile, and there will be less spare capacity to arbitrage when the bulk of traffic
in the system is international long-haul rather than domestic.
Articulations
Figure 8.4 on page 236 shows a speculative articulation for the trialectic under
the UK PLC scenario. It bears considerable structural similarity to that of the
(preceding) Franchise Island scenario, though there are some crucial differences.
Incumbents:
Carriers C-of-P As in Franchise Island, the carriers community-of-practice has
shrunk away from the protagonist, having largely been displaced as the “face” of
the service by a consortium of transnational haulage firms. The difference is in
the character of the carrier operations represented, which would be less deregu-
lated and ad hoc than under the Franchise Island scenario (though perhaps not a
great deal less). Given the limiting of infrastructure upgrades to trunk routes for
international freight, the carriers will still have a role to play in inter-regional and
last-mile logistics; however, much of this work will be in subservience to the big
hauliers.
Fuel distribution Fuel distribution infrastructures retain their position, much as
described in section 8.3.1 above..
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Figure 8.4: Articulatory mapping for UK PLC scenario
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Central government, local government, vehicle makers The positions of the two
gubernatorial actors and of vehicle makers remain essentially unchanged, much
as described in section 8.3.1 above.
Incoming:
Haulage consortium Under the UK PLC scenario, a consortium of international
haulage firms takes a similar position to that taken by Amazon in the Franchise Is-
land scenario (see section 8.3.1 above). The extent of its influence is essentially the
same, given its assumed role as prime investor in the infrastructural upgrades nec-
essary to make self-drivingness viable on UK motorways. However, the character
of its influence is more beneficent (or perhaps just less rapaciously monomaniacal)
than that of Amazon, due to both its multiplicity and its subjection to continen-
tal laws and regulations (and scrutiny). That said, it is likely to take exactly the
same approach to incumbent competitors as would Amazon, even though the
circumstances are less favourable to complete market dominance than under the
Franchise Island scenario.
Telcos The strong influence of private telcos over the lower half of the assem-
blage emerges for much the same reasons as are described in section 8.3.1. above:
put simply, self-drivingness is a non-starter without considerable involvement
from private telcos, not just in terms of infrastructural investment, but also in
the development and regulation of an emerging set of system standards for self-
drivingness.
E.U. The European Union influence here is, of course, a massive simplification;
it black-boxes a number of institutions, agreements, arrangements and precedents
for the sake of making explicit an influence which was always implicit in UK
affairs through its having been “written into” UK law and trade agreements; post-
Brexit, this influence becomes explicit and (ironically enough) less mediated by
more local actors and institutions, but is nonetheless largely limited to the S&R
and I&I vectors, due to the necessity for the haulage consortium to ensure that
their systems work (pretty much) the same on both sides of the Channel.
Outgoing:
Company fleets Company fleets disappear from the scene for much the same
reasons as outlined in section 8.3.1 for the Franchise Island scenario.
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8.3.3 “The Frugal Kingdom”
Prototype parameters
With a state-led approach to infrastructural investment, direct intervention in
overland freight systems is at least feasible—although the roads are not neces-
sarily the most obvious candidate infrastructure for intervention. Efforts toward
reducing inequality are likely to include tax increases and job-creation measures
as a hedge against automation, which will make driverless vehicles a hard sell
politically as well as technically; however, a more collectivist political culture
means that benefits other than profitability may play a more important role in
decision-making with regard to infrastructure, and an accelerated devolution pro-
cess means that local authorities and communities may be able to propose and
enact projects without seeking approval (or funding) from Westminster.
Hard Brexit offers the opportunity for a regulatory bonfire... but only around
those matters where no concessions need be made to Europe, which is likely to
develop its own regulatory framework for self-driving vehicles. A hard Brexit fur-
ther suggests that the margins on continental overland trade will be further eaten
into, which will have the knock-on effect of reducing overland trade flows: fewer
goods will arrive in or leave the UK on trucks, while more goods will arrive or
leave on container ships. A radical tone to domestic politics suggests a theatri-
cal approach to policy, wherein the grand gesture delivered swiftly is assumed to
trump the more cautious technocratic attitudes of the past. Meanwhile, serious
damage to the UK economy ensures a steady stream of discontent and protest,
and the revival of old-school street politics.
Deployment sketch
Under these circumstances, even a partial deployment of self-driving freight looks
pretty implausible. State-led investment is all well and good, but only when
there’s money to spare, and an isolated UK shouldering a self-imposed auster-
ity is unlikely to look at self-driving freight as the wheel most in need of grease:
it would be simpler (and probably cheaper) to instead re-invest in the newly re-
nationalised railways to improve long-haul domestic capacity, and infrastructural
projects which promise to remove jobs rather than create them are going to be a
hard sell to a bitter, impoverished country.
But the aim of the scenarios is to assume that the disruptor is delivered, so the
parameters can be pushed a little further. Assuming that the austerity project is
comparable to that of the world wars, and that road freight has been renationalised
as well as rail, the opportunity to impose a change of assemblage is theoretically
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available... and rapid devolution (combined with economic desperation) might
well allow locations distant from Westminster to make their own infrastructural
moves.
However, none of this changes the fact that, under these circumstances, all of
the seeming advantages of self-driving freight become disadvantages: it’s an as-
semblage expressly developed to exploit the middleman position (arguably a form
of tech-leveraged rent extraction, particularly given the road network is state-
funded), which makes it anathema to a nationalised set-up, and in any case its
marginal gains on profitability only accrue on long routes (particularly interna-
tional) with heavy traffic. Nonetheless, the romance of the boondoggle will likely
prevail—and loose regulations combined with devolved powers means it might
be just about plausible for a syndicate of city and regional councils in the North
to be trying to kludge together a very crude and low-budget version of a segre-
gated self-driving freight lane running through the East-West corridor across the
Pennines between Liverpool and Humberside; note, however, that such a project
would be in competition with the long-mooted restoration and/or expansion of
the cross-Pennine rail links.
Articulations
Figure 8.5 on page 240 shows a speculative articulation for the trialectic under the
Frugal Kingdom scenario. It represents perhaps the most radical restructuring of
the articulatory actors of the four scenarios
Incumbents:
Carriers C-of-P As in both of the preceding scenarios, the carriers community-
of-practice has shrunk away from the protagonist, though not quite to the same
extent. This shrinkage in general is reflective of the increasing opacity and/or
invisibility of material logistics to both senders and receivers of goods; this is the
continuation of a trend toward logistics-as-a-service that has marked infrastruc-
tural change from its very beginnings, as has been shown throughout sections 5,
6 and 7 of this thesis. However, the shrinkage is less marked in Frugal Kingdom
than in either Franchise Island or UK PLC; this is due to a turn toward more
socialistic or social-democratic policy under conditions of fiscal austerity, which
will serve to slow the rate of change more generally, and in particular impede
the gobbling-up and/or subjugation of smaller hauliers, and carriers focussed on
last-mile work.
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Figure 8.5: Articulatory mapping for Frugal Kingdom scenario
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Fuel distribution, vehicle makers Fuel distribution infrastructures and vehicle
makers retain their entrenched positions, much as described in section 8.3.1 above.
Central government, local government This scenario sees a significant expan-
sion of the remit of responsibility for gubernatorial actors in the freight assemblage—
though this should not be taken to suggest that their control and influence is par-
ticularly effective. (Parallels might be drawn with the Nationalisation phase of the
railways, discussed in section 7.4, wherein control was similarly reasserted from
the centre under conditions of austerity.) Central government gets much more
broadly involved with the interface layer and the I&I and S&R vectors, which will
bring it into an unavoidable agonism with the telcos. But note that the self-driving
freight system realised in this scenario is not a central government project; this sort
of capital expenditure on new or upgraded infrastructure is contraindicated under
the contextual conditions.
Incoming:
Regional government consortium As discussed in the deployment sketch (see
above), the crude deployment of self-drivingness in this scenario is imagined as
being a regional effort cobbled together by devolved local government actors in
the north attempting to upgrade infrastructure on the cheap under conditions of
austerity and economic decline; this consortium might be an evolution of (or even
an antagonist to) the Transport for the North (TfN) body, recently (at time of writ-
ing) granted some (largely toothless and symbolic) statutory powers, if not much
in the way of funds. This consortium has a fairly broad area of responsibility over
the assemblage, but rather than indicating its power or authority, this should be
seen as illustrating the difficulties it will have in trying to achieve its aims: as can
be seen, it has substantial overlaps of responsibility with every other major actor in
the articulation, which implies multiple fronts of negotiation and agonism, some-
times with other state actors at different scales and in different locations (central
government in London, assorted local governments implicated in the proposed
route), and sometimes with privatised industries (telcos, and to a lesser extent ve-
hicle makers). For a small and under-resourced actor operating under austerity,
this will be a highly challenging environment in which to achieve even a crude
proof-of-concept deployment of self-drivingness.
Telcos The strong influence of private telcos over the lower half of the assem-
blage emerges for much the same reasons as are described in section 8.3.1. above:
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put simply, no concession to telco influence means no viable self-drivingness. If
anything, this problem is intensified under the Frugal Kingdom scenario: without
any likelihood of capital investment in the legacy road infrastructure, any de-
ployment of self-drivingness will be utterly dependent on telcos upgrading their
systems, creating a position of influence that is unlikely to go unexploited.
Outgoing:
Company fleets Company fleets disappear from the scene for much the same
reasons as outlined in section 8.3.1: the continuation of a medium-term trend for
logistics outsourcing, albeit a trend slowed by the circumstances (as discussed
above).
8.3.4 “Not quite Norway”
Prototype parameters
With a state-led approach to infrastructural investment, direct intervention in
overland freight systems is at least feasible—although the roads are not neces-
sarily the most obvious candidate infrastructure for intervention. Efforts toward
reducing inequality are likely to include tax increases and job-creation measures
as a hedge against automation, which will make driverless vehicles a hard sell
politically as well as technically; however, a more collectivist political culture
means that benefits other than profitability may play a more important role in
decision-making with regard to infrastructure, and an accelerated devolution pro-
cess means that local authorities and communities may be able to propose and
enact projects without seeking approval (or funding) from Westminster.
A relatively light and orderly Brexit means that regulations will largely be
harmonised with those pertaining on the continent—and it is international road
freight which will be most amenable to driverless technology, as it is only over
long routes that the greatest economies can be achieved. As such, continued en-
gagement with EU goals and priorities, particularly with regard to environmen-
tal matters, would see the UK keen to be involved in any emerging continental
system for self-driving freight; however, the same declining demand and systemic
challenges will serve to block anything but a limited, segregated deployment. Fur-
thermore, a return to more centrist political dynamics means classic technocratic
policy-making, particularly with regard to infrastructure: sensible, expensive, and
interminably slow. Lucky, then, that Brexit resulted in minimal economic damage;
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given a sense of having dodged the bullet, the bulk of the population is grateful
that things haven’t gotten too much worse.
Deployment sketch
Broadly speaking, the deployment in this scenario would likely be similar to that
in “UK PLC” above: a limited, segregated deployment on the major trunk routes
for European overland freight flows, motivated more by systemic efficiency and
reduced emissions than profitability or faster delivery. Better relations with the
continent and better financial circumstances might well mean that the project is
a little more advanced in the UK by 2032, with a number of major motorways
featuring a self-driving lane. In terms of Sheffield specifically, however, the end
result is the same: the nearest node of the enhanced trunk route network is at
Tinsley/Meadowhall, and the last mile is just as much of a challenge as it is today.
The difference is that in this scenario, opportunities exist for the state to in-
tervene in the last mile so as to enhance the viability (and reduce the carbon
footprint) of not only the self-driving system, but the freight network more gener-
ally, in which development has tended to focus on lucrative trunk routes while the
last mile has been left to rot. As such, we can imagine the devolved authorities of
Yorkshire and the East Midlands investing in urban freight distribution systems,
keeping costs low by reviving moribund infrastructures such as the Sheffield Dis-
trict rail loop or the canals, and supporting the development of zero-emission
last-mile carrier services, such as rickshaws and cycle couriers, through an on-line
system (something like Deliveroo) that lets individual operators bid for carrier
jobs in their area.
Articulations
Figure 8.6 on page 244 shows a speculative articulation for the trialectic under the
Not Quite Norway scenario. It bears substantial structural similarities with the
articulation under UK PLC (see above), but there are some important differences.
Incumbents:
Carriers C-of-P The carriers community-of-practice has shrunk away from the
protagonist to a similar extent to that observed under Franchise island and UK
PLC (see above); as discussed, this is the continuation of a paradigmatic move
toward logistical opacity and freight-as-a-service, whereby neither sender nor re-
cipient has much contact with (or interest in, or influence over) the functioning of
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Figure 8.6: Articulatory mapping for Not Quite Norway scenario
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the assemblage; by comparison with Frugal Kingdom, the continuation of techno-
cratic infrastructure policy is likely to sustain this paradigmatic change.
Fuel distribution, vehicle makers Fuel distribution infrastructures and vehicle
makers retain their entrenched positions, much as described in section 8.3.1 above.
Central government, local government This scenario sees some expansion with
regard to the influence of central government over the assemblage, though for
very different reasons to that seen under Frugal Kingdom: here, the influence ex-
tension is largely facilitative, with the state acting as a broker for the relationships
(between the haulage consortium, the telcos, vehicle makes and local government)
necessary to bring a complex “multi-stakeholder” infrastructure project together.
Accelerated devolution accompanied by relatively reasonable economic circum-
stances also suggests the expansion of local government influence and responsi-
bility; whether this turned out to be supportive of or resistant to the deployment of
self-drivingness would likely vary by location, but it seems reasonable to assume
that, once the self-drivingness project was seen to be off the ground, the majority
of local government actors would opt for support in hope of gleaning some of the
economic benefits.
Incoming:
Haulage consortium The role and influence of the haulage consortium actor un-
der Nor Quite Norway is broadly as that outlined under UK PLC in section 8.3.2
above.
Telcos The strong influence of private telcos over the lower half of the assem-
blage emerges for much the same reasons as are described in section 8.3.1. above:
put simply, no concession to telco influence means no viable self-drivingness.
E.U. The (highly simplified) influence of European Union institutions under the
Not Quite Norway scenario is broadly the same as that described under UK PLC
in section 8.3.2 above.
Outgoing:
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Company fleets Company fleets disappear from the scene for much the same
reasons as outlined in section 8.3.1: the continuation of a medium-term trend for
logistics outsourcing, albeit a trend slowed by the circumstances (as discussed
above).
8.4 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the use of the trialectic model as a tool through
which to draw upon and extrapolate from the precedents of historical infrastruc-
turation, so as to engage in informed and grounded speculation about potential
future infrastructuration. In this case, self-driving vehicles were used as an ex-
emplar “disruptor” technology, whose potential impacts upon freight logistics
practices in the Sheffield region were explored against the context of four diver-
gent future scenarios, each of which represents a particular blend of contextual
opportunities and obstacles for infrastructural development. The trialectic model
was reiterated for each scenario, so as to play out a suite of plausible deployments
for the exemplar technology; these speculations then informed the development of
four story synopses, one for each scenario, which—once developed into full-blown
narrative stories—portray the performance of freight logistics practices under the
new sociotechnical regime, from the perspective of a fictionalised protagonist.
The resulting narratives or prototypes illustrate a series of challenges to the de-
ployment of self-driving freight vehicles in the Sheffield region, and by implication
many other regions of Britain. For instance, it is apparent that the economies of
scale which would make self-driving fleets appealing can only be achieved when
the network has achieved significant density, meaning there is no advantage for
“early adopters”, only expense. Furthermore, it is apparent that most of the tan-
gible benefits of self-driving freight accrue to the vehicle’s operator, meaning that
there is little or no reason for anyone else to be particularly supportive of them: no
one else in the assemblage would experience the operation any differently to the
way they do at present (particularly in the Sheffield region, where almost all local
freight already comes in or out of the city via the logistics hubs at Tinsley/Mead-
owhall, which is where any self-driving lorry would end its journey). And of
course, these problems all presuppose a well-executed and politically acceptable
answer to the challenge of integrating (or segregating) self-driving vehicles within
a road network already overburdened with human-driven vehicles—easy enough
on paper, but hard to actualise (especially if self-driving vehicles become a focus
for protests against job losses to technological automation, as seems likely).
It bears noting that these challenges are entangled with one another: for exam-
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ple, the challenges of integrating self-driving vehicles with human-driven vehicles
emerges from the necessity of self-driving capacity being delivered as an upgrade
to a limited network of already-established trunk routes, while the challenges of
finding funding and investment are closely related to to the already narrow profit
margins in the freight sector.
The advantage of the narrative prototyping approach is that it can portray these
unquantifiable difficulties from a human and non-specialist perspective. Other
genres of foresight narrative, such as the feasibility study or the cost-benefit anal-
ysis, are constrained by disciplinary “knowledge siloing”, able to narrate futures
only in the technocratic and quantitative terms of their own enquiry. Narrative
prototyping, by contrast, while incapable of the quantitative rigour of other forms
of foresight, has the capacity to identify and illustrate systemic and inter-systemic
challenges in a rich but accessible qualitative form—and it is that inter-systemic
perspective which is most missing from paradigmatic approaches to infrastruc-
tural foresight. Narrative prototyping is not a tool of prediction or prophecy, but
a sandbox—a low-risk, low-cost space for testing high-risk, high-cost ideas that




This chapter begins by discussing the project’s achievements and outputs in the
light of the three research questions defined in chapter 3. There then follows a
series of reflections on the overall methodology of the project, followed by a look
back at its overall aim. Finally, the author’s personal reflections precede some
possibilities for further research which build outward from the work herein.
9.1 Model behaviour: the trialectic perspective on sociotech-
nical change
The first research question of this project was stated as follows:
Starting from a materialist and practice-oriented perspective, how might one
model and analyse the mutually influential and longitudinal relationships be-
tween everyday consumptive practices and the infrastructures which enable
them?
The model and methodology developed in fulfillment of RQ1 are described in
chapter 4. The model, known as the infrastructural trialectic, features three main
elements:
• the Protagonist, representing the instigating performer of the practice under
analysis;
• the Interface, representing the technological devices and/or commercial ser-
vices through which the Protagonist accesses infrastructural capacities; and
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• the Infrastructure, representing the networks and systems whose functional-
ity is mediated through the use of the Interface.
The three elements are linked by four “vectors of influence”, which represent
the flow of pressures and desires between the elements, which are often (though
not always) agonistic in character: they visualise a contestation for advantage be-
tween the model’s main elements. By populating the model with the interfaces
and infrastructures prevalent during the moment under analsysis, these flows of
influence can be traced and explored more fully, thus revealing the contestation
between layers as an ongoing process through which the sociotechnical assem-
blage(s) underpinning the practice in question is stabilised or destabilised, and
through which its reconfigurations are shaped.
The trialectic model is accompanied by a methodology that allows the re-
searcher to “build outward” from the core elements of the model, and to produce a
map of the other actors and entities involved in the articulation of the assemblage
at any given historical moment. This process of articulatory mapping produces
a unique visualisation of the actor-networks involved in the (re)shaping of prac-
tices, and of the systems which are enrolled in their performance. When applied
to a sequence of historical moments in the evolution of a particular assemblage,
the result is a series of diagrams and analytical accounts that capture the develop-
ment and reconfiguration of infrastructural assemblages over the longue duree of
history. (This process historical analysis also provides the structured knowledge
necessary for the subsequent application of the methodology’s second, speculative
mode.)
The trialectic model and methodology provide a new way of exploring so-
ciotechnical change at the infrastructural scale, and improves upon prevailing
models and theories through three significant achievements. The trialectic ap-
proach provides:
• a manageable materialist model of agency in sociotechnical transition, ac-
companied by
• a situated and systemic methodology, which together produce
• novel and non-heroic narratives of sociotechnical change.
The deeper implications of these achievements in the context of theories of so-
ciotechnical change will discussed in greater detail in section 9.3 of this chapter.
A detailed discussion of the methodological challenges encountered in the appli-
cation of the trialectic (in both the historical and speculative modes) can be found
in section 9.4.
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9.1.1 Going with the flow: workshopping the trialectic model
An opportunity arose through which the trialectic model might be "road-tested"
via exposure to a wide array of practitioners concerned with matters of infras-
tructure and/or sociotechnical change. As such, a workshop-format session was
arranged for the final day (18th May 2018) of the Twenty65 Conference (held in
Deansgate, Manchester, UK), an event aimed at bringing together academics, in-
dustry practitioners and other actors in the water infrastructure sector.
This particular setting offered the opportunity of access to a wide range of
appropriate yet cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary respondents. Furthermore—
given the conference’s focus on water treatment and distribution infrastructures—
it necessitated not only the simplification of the model to fit the workshop format,
but the selection of new discursive examples more appropriate to the sectoral
interests represented at the event. (Or, more simply: it was not possible to simply
reuse examples from the analysis presented within this thesis, so the model had
to be reapplied in a fresh problem-space.)
In order to structure and collect feedback on the trialectic model and its useful-
ness, an anonymised questionnaire was designed (and successfully submitted for
research ethics clearance) ahead of the conference, and copies were distributed to
delegates who attended the workshop. The questionnaire was designed to gather
both quantitative and qualitative responses as to the novelty and effectiveness of
the trialectic model within the broader field of models of socio-technical change,
and the extent to which it functioned as a facilitator for cross-disciplinary (and
cross-sectoral) discussions of the dynamics of sociotechnical change.
The specific questions asked were as follows, with questions 1, 2 and 3 accom-
panied by a row of boxes numbered 1 through 10 for respondents to mark ac-
cordingly, and questions 4, 5 and 6 accompanied by areas in which unconstrained
comments might be provided:
• Q1: By placing a tick in one of the boxes below, how different did you
find the trialectic model to be in comparison to other models or theories of
sociotechnical change with which you are familiar? (1 = “not at all different”,
10 = “totally unique”)
• Q2: To what extent did the trialectic model make you think about systemic
change from a new perspective? (1 = “not new at all”, 10 = “totally new
perspective”)
• Q3: How effective was the trialectic model at facilitating a discussion of the
challenges and dynamics of sociotechnical change between participants from
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different areas of expertise? (1 = “totally ineffective”, 10 = “totally effective”)
• Q4: What aspect or aspects of the model did you think were particularly
good, useful or novel?
• Q5: What aspect or aspects of the model did you think were particularly
bad, difficult or overlooked?
• Q6: Any other comments?
Workshop feedback analysis
Taken in aggregate, the feedback from the workshop was generally positive, though
far from lacking in substantive and valuable criticisms.
The average of all scores provided in answer to Q1 was 5.9 (n=10); given that a
number of respondents identified themselves as being already familiar with (if not
significantly experienced in the deployment of) social practice theory, this would
seem to be a fairly respectable assessment of the trialectic model’s theoretical nov-
elty.
The average of all scores provided in answer to Q2 was 6.6 (n=11); only one
score was lower than 5, and this was from a respondent with considerable expe-
rience in working with models derived from social practice theory, who as such
would presumably be accustomed to thinking in terms and concepts similar to
those that the trialectic deploys, and thus unlikely to find its perspective particu-
larly challenging or provocative.
The average of all scores provided in answer to Q3 was 6.7 (n=11); a wider
spread of scores in response to this question suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly,
the trialectic model works better for some than for others. Rather more surpris-
ingly, however, the four highest scores all came from respondents who identified
as engineering or science academics, while the two lowest scores came from re-
spondents who identified as academic social scientists! (The qualitative feedback
from these latter respondents also expressed the most dissatisfaction with the lack
of clarity in the workshop’s delivery, and with its terminological density.)
The qualitative feedback puts these scores into context, with comments in re-
sponse to Q4 describing the trialectic as “potentially really useful” and praising
it for successfully “expanding out the problem space”, “show[ing] complex sys-
tems in a very simple model” and “driv[ing] complex thinking”. In addition, Q5
generated important criticisms, including the aforementioned complaints regard-
ing terminological density, as well as a series of variations on the theme of the
model’s complexity, e.g.: “unclear as to how responsibility for decision-making
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is distributed”, “hard to understand initially (particularly category distinctions)”,
“difficult to distinguish where things belonged”, “sometimes not a precise distinc-
tion in the fields of the model”.
These critiques, I would argue, speak at least as much to limitations inherent
in the workshop format as to the model itself. As indicated in the Methodology
section, the trialectic is a relational model, with the result that the “belonging-
ness” of any particular element or influence is a function of the context in which
it is being applied; however, it is evidently easy to parse this feature as a bug in
circumstances where there is little prior familiarity with the trialectic or similar
models, and limited opportunity with which to explain it thoroughly. A more
hubristic researcher than myself might even go so far as to claim the comment re-
garding “responsibility for decision-making” as an endorsement of the trialectic’s
success—after all, as this study has shown (and as shall be discussed below), the
precise allocation of such responsibility is all but impossible, as that responsibil-
ity is distributed throughout an assemblage of actors in various relationships of
alliance and/or contestation. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that this
should have been presented as part of the initial framing of the model, rather than
emerging as a conclusion to be drawn from it.
The workshop format was challenging, however, for a number of reasons. As
already mentioned, the water-sector orientation of the host conference necessitated
the provision of alternative examples and case studies to those presented in this
thesis. Furthermore, in the terms of the trialectic itself the contemporary assem-
blages associated with domestic water-consumption practices have been largely
stable for the last five or six decades for the majority of UK citizens, and those
assemblages have furthermore provided a service that has been effectively unlim-
ited in principle and largely uninterrupted in practice: despite privatisation, in
other words, very little has changed from a demand-side perspective, and there
has been little or no incentive for it to do so, resulting in a stable assemblage
with little action in the DP and I&I vectors other than predominantly aesthetic
iterations of interface technologies, or products aiming for efficiencies relating to
infrastructures other than water. Or, more simply still: it turns out to be hard to
discuss the dynamics of innovation in the context of an assemblage where very
little innovation has taken place for half a century or so.
Better results might have been achieved had there been more time with which
to delve into historical examples of water consumption assemblages, thereby es-
tablishing precedents for restructuration and highlighting the dynamics of change
in a manner more akin to that demonstrated in the analysis chapters of this thesis.
However, the ninety-minute opportunity in question left no space for such intro-
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ductory explorations. Nonetheless, the average scores in response to Q1, Q2 and
Q3 are significantly generous, and seen in the light of the qualitative responses (as
well as the circumstantial challenges attendant on the workshop format) I feel that
the trialectic might fairly be said to have made a better showing than might be
expected of an otherwise untested theoretical model—and I further feel that, with
a more temporally generous format (and greater experience in workshop design
and facilitation on the part of its creator), it might do better still in times to come.
However, the ubiquity of comments regarding its theoretical weightiness and rela-
tional ambiguities suggest that it will always do its best work when applied in the
context for which it was developed—which is to say a deep and patient anthropo-
logical engagement with the material manifestations of sociotechnical change in a
particular time and place.
9.2 A sociotechnical sandbox: narrative prototyping for in-
frastructure futures
The second research question was stated as follows:
Drawing on the model and analysis developed in fulfillment of Objective 1,
how might such findings be used as the basis of a speculative exploration of
the advantages and obstacles associated with the deployment of proposed future
infrastructures?
It was answered by the development and application of a second, speculative
mode to the trialectic model and methodology, in which the findings generated by
the application of the first, historical mode (in answer to RQ1) become the basis
data for an imaginative extrapolative process of narrative prototyping. This novel
process involves selecting a proposed disruptive technology with functional perti-
nence to the practice under study and assessing its potential for deployment under
challenging contextual circumstances through the use of narrative prototyping, an
approach that combines features from strategic foresight and critical/speculative
design in order to produce critical evaluations of future infrastructures in an ac-
cessible form
Having identified self-driving vehicle systems as a disruptor technology rel-
evant to freight logistics, the “black box” of self-drivingness was deconstructed,
in order that its applicability to all transport-relevant assemblages might be as-
sessed. Having determined that the technology was most likely to impact upon
the road network, it was then introduced into the trialectic model, through which
the vectors of influence and dynamics of assemblage formation were traced (with
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reference to the precedents captured by the historical mode), and the dominant
relationships and tensions identified.
Next, a variation on the ubiquitous 2x2 scenario matrix methodology was used
to generate a suite of four divergent and deliberately challenging future contexts
against which self-driving technology might be assessed. These scenarios were
then combined with the iterated trialectic in a speculative yet rigorous process
of extrapolation in order to produce deployment sketches—brief narrative sum-
maries of attempts, successful or otherwise, to roll out self-driving freight systems
in the Sheffield area under the conditions stipulated by the scenarios.
9.2.1 On the role for criticism in infrastructural foresight
The deep objective of RQ2 was to develop a deliberately and explicitly critical
futures methodology for working at the infrastructural scale. Scenario matrices
and paper prototypes of all sorts are increasingly commonplace practices, both
within the academy and without, but much infrastructural foresight tends toward
the technical and/or quantitative: feasibility assessments probe technical viability,
while cost-benefit analyses assess the economic case. This is not to dismiss such
work as irrelevant, but to highlight its limitations, which are the limitations of
a positivist-reductionist epistemology: put simply, such an approach assesses an
unbuilt hyperobject as if it were deployed without flaw or error under controlled
conditions (or under an assumed continuation of the status quo, which amounts
to the same thing).
This more critical take on infrastructural foresight should therefore be seen as
a corrective or counterbalance to the inherent techno-optimism of more prevalent
approaches. The world abounds with slick slide-decks and glossy visual render-
ings that extol the glamorous yet sustainable virtues of this technology or that
system; this methodology essentially opts to take the technologists at their word
and assume that their claims of technical and economic viability are valid under
the implicit laboratory conditions of their own assessments, and then subject those
claims to the sort of contextual difficulties that such assessments tend to avoid talk-
ing about. This methodology hence moves the debate about future technologies
from possibility under laboratory conditions to plausibility under the divergent
chaos of the actual—a distinction of great relevance to the development of sys-
tems that take decades to fund and build, in a world where change itself seems to
be the only constant.
It might be argued that a prototyping process in which none of the four imag-
ined deployments is significantly successful would itself be an unsuccessful pro-
cess, but this is not the case. Indeed, the counterargument might take the form
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that a failed deployment has far more to teach us than an easy success, particularly
with regard to infrastructure-scale project. This is a prototyping process, certainly,
but it is also a test-to-destruction—which is a dangerous and/or expensive game
to play with actual infrastructures. This project thereby demonstrates the utility
of narrative prototyping to act as a sort of sandbox or test rig for systems which
are otherwise too large, complex, critical and expensive to experiment with.
9.2.2 On the merits of materialist fictions
It was originally intended that each deployment sketch—which might be con-
sidered as analogous to the part of the writing process that science fiction authors
and critics refer to as “worldbuilding”—be further developed into full-blown short
stories, in which the characters would be depicted interacting with the imagined
systems as part of their everyday lives.
This final stage was left out due to time constraints, and not without some
regret. The author has made the case elsewhere (Raven, 2017b) that prose science
fiction allows for the portrayal of sociotechnical futures in a manner which, done
carefully and thoughtfully, can “despecialise” these complex debates. This in turn
could open up infrastructural futures to non-expert assessment and debate in a
manner almost totally orthogonal to the technocratic “experts only” style of the
feasibility study or cost-benefit analysis, which are highly coded generic docu-
ments that, intentionally or otherwise, exclude the majority of people. Story, by
contrast, can be understood by almost anyone with a reasonable level of literacy,
and thus might form part of a consultative outreach strategy which took “stake-
holder engagement” on new infrastructural configurations as a vital part of the
design process.
However, even the deployment sketches can be shown to fulfil the overall aim
of the project, namely to make infrastructure legible, and to narrate it from a more
human perspective. To some extent, this is a pay-off from the early insistence on a
strictly materialist model, in that a materialist approach results in narratives pop-
ulated predominantly by actual actors (whether human, non-human or hybrid),
as opposed to abstract concepts and categories.
For example, consider this (incomplete) list of actors identified in the first of
four deployment sketches (see section 8.3.1): Amazon; the government of the United
Kingdom; haulage firms; vehicle manufacturers; the M1 motorway. Now, it must be con-
ceded that these are “black boxes” in the strictest interpretation of that term (as it
is used in A-NT and related social theories), but nonetheless, they are empirically
observable entities: if one chose to do so, one could study their actions.
Now compare with this list (also incomplete, but illustrative) of actors iden-
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tified in a more traditional transportation futures scenario sketch (Elzen, Geels,
Hofman, & Green, 2004): traffic; transportation; infrastructure(s); pricing mechanisms;
congestion. There are some concrete actors in there, but abstractions abound, as
does the passive narrative voice (which results in a somewhat surreal genre of
story, wherein broad concepts, insubstantial notions and second-order systemic
phenomena react to one another’s spontaneous and despatialised provocations, as
observed by an omniscient deity with a very weird relationship to time).
The deployment sketches produced in this project, by contrast, tell a story
which could feasibly be passed to a novelist or screenwriter in order to form the
basis of narratives with which an ordinary person might identify and empathise.
While it would be unfair to claim that such is impossible to achieve through the
use of traditional scenario methodologies, it nonetheless seems plain that to do so
would be much harder work: the narrative prototyping process, meanwhile, gets
any would-be producer straight into the action, with a ready-made cast of actors
waiting to be given their lines and stage direction.
But in effect, this is to restate the distinction between a scenario and a proto-
type. Scenarios, as the word implies, outline a scene, a situation; in this case, the
scenarios are just a set of contextual parameters, like the backdrop, set and props
for a drama. Having dressed the stage, many foresight processes then go on to
re-stage the same old stories over and over again, with little or no interaction be-
tween the actors and the set: the scenario becomes little more than wallpaper for
the laboratory of the assessment, a gesture toward verisimilitude.
By contrast, this form of narrative prototyping goes the full distance, drawing
on historical precedents so as to extrapolate actions that are believable in context:
both figuratively and literally, it brings socio-technical transition to life. So while
this is clearly a form of strategic foresight practice, it stands far closer to design-
led methodologies—such as speculative design (Dunne & Raby, 2013) and design
fiction (Lindley & Coulton, 2015)—than to the more quantitative and positivist
approaches of the business-school futures tradition.
Perhaps most importantly, narrative prototyping is well suited to working with
explicitly situated knowledges, in that both are engaged with the specific as a way
of accessing the general: as Haraway (1988) has put it, “The only way to find a
larger vision is to be somewhere in particular”, and this principle has, as far as
has been possible, governed this entire project: situated knowledges provide con-
crete actors, relationships and locations, while “god trick” methodologies can only
provide abstractions and placeless phenomena. This in turn approximates the rig-
orous testing that only the messiness of the actual can provide, and reemphasises
the heterogeneity of infrastructural space.
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By way of example, while self-driving freight systems for Sheffield are de-
picted as effectively still-born or stunted in all four scenarios, the results might
have been very different for a different location, with its concomitant differences
in circumstance and connectivity. Prototyping the very same technology against
the very same scenario parameters in London, for instance, might produce more
positive results, precisely because the situation of London is more conducive: it
is larger, more densely populated, better off, better connected, and closer to the
country’s dominant source of overland freight; as such, funding and industrial
partners might be easier to find, and populations easier to persuade.
With that said, it should go without saying that it would be absurd to sug-
gest prototyping every proposed assemblage in every possible location; but on the
other hand, it seems eminently reasonable to suggest that they at least be proto-
typed in locations where their deployment is actually being proposed, rather than
in the non-space of an unsituated scenario.
9.3 Beyond transitions: theoretical implications of the tri-
alectic model
The third research question is as follows:
How might this methodology improve or expand our understanding of the
concept of sociotechnical transition?
RQ3 can be considered as explicitly orienting this project toward theoretical con-
cerns, and particularly toward conceptualisations of socio-technical change. Seen
in this light, the trialectic model and its associated methodology represent the de-
velopment of a novel framework for the study of socio-technical change, and a
demonstration of its application in a longitudinal case-study.
This project resulted in the development of
• a manageable materialist model of agency in sociotechnical transition, ac-
companied by
• a situated and systemic methodology, which together produce
• novel and non-heroic narratives of sociotechnical change.
This section discusses the implications of these achievements for the study of
sociotechnical change, and for the concept of “transitions” more broadly.
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9.3.1 A manageable materialist model of agency in sociotechnical change
The trialectic model starts with the agency of the protagonist—an individual mak-
ing a technological choice in fulfillment of of the performance of a particular prac-
tice. The great advantage of basing the model on SPT is that its orientation toward
a specific practice provides a teleological basis for the analysis: in other words, we
know the protagonist’s basic motivation from the outset, which—when combined
with the parameters of their existing performance—allows us to infer the improve-
ments which might motivate them to take up a new technology. Of course, those
motivations may be primarily economical: the reduction of overheads is respon-
sible for much technological take-up, particularly in the business sector. But cost
is far from the only factor in play: faster delivery and lower rates of spoilage
in transit can both be seen to influence modal choices throughout the analysis,
with packhorses (somewhat counterintuitively) trumping carts and waggons for
delivery speed in the pre-turnpike era, and with waterway transit trumping road
modalities for the safe and convenient transit of certain fragile or bulky goods
during the same period.
Furthermore, the trialectic is a relational ontology: its elements all interact on
the same conceptual plane, and are not structured hierarchically. At this point, one
might realistically quibble that the arrangement of the elements in the trialectic re-
capitulates a hierarchy of sorts, in that the interaction of the protagonist and the
infrastructure is explicitly mediated by the interface, which implies some kind of
separation. The vertical linearity of the model is perhaps guilty of compounding
this impression, and there is also an argument to be made about the relative ve-
locity of change in the three elements (whereby the performance of a practice can
be changed almost instantly, while the development of new interface technologies
takes time, and infrastructures necessarily change far more slowly).
But what is most important is that none of the elements are seen as necessarily
more important or influential than the others: the trialectic represents a network
of relationships between empirically observable actors, and any importance or
influence for one element or another is a function of the agonisms and linkages
between all of them.
This achievement can be seen as addressing the first critique of the Multi-Level
Perspective as defined in the literature review (see section 2.1.1), namely that of
Agency & Hierarchy, wherein it was shown that the dominant model and method-
ology for the study of transitions obscures the agency of change by burying it in an
ill-defined organisational hierarchy. The accounts generated by MLP-based stud-
ies are populated by inventions and technologies propagating themselves through
a loosely-defined landscape, competing to be the most rational and economically
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viable option available. If there is any agency on display in these accounts, then
it is largely ascribed to the inventions and technologies themselves, thus embed-
ding the implicit (and demonstrably false) assumption that technologies succeed
primarily on their own intrinsic merits; in other words, the MLP and other such
models, while claiming to explore the agency of change, tend to locate the agency
of change in “innovation” itself, which in turn tends to be concretised as a partic-
ular technology or service.
It is thus perhaps the proudest achievement of the trialectic model that it suc-
cessfully portrays the agency of change as emergent from a complex yet consistent
set of relationships between human, non-human and hybrid actors. Each of the
elements has its role to play in the formation of the assemblage, and the vectors
of influence characterise the foundational agonisms from which the necessity of
and desire for change are derived; meanwhile, the articulatory mapping process
extends the web of agency outward, thus not only indicating its absolute reliance
upon a supporting cast of other infrastructures, actors and institutions, but also
visualising the sociotechnical articulations which link them together.
9.3.2 A situated and systemic analysis of sociotechnical change
Perhaps it is more obvious when approached from a practice-oriented perspective,
as in this thesis, but it seems inescapable that geographical variance is in fact the
key to understanding the dynamics of sociotechnical change. The question, put
simply, is “why here, but not yet there?”—and this situated, geographical approach
is an important part of what the trialectic brings to the study of sociotechnical
change that dominant paradigms largely eschew. This strategy is both simple and
profound: simple, in that it only differs from paradigmatic approaches in the de-
cision to situate the analysis in a particular location (as opposed to within a broad
geographical generalisation, such as the borders of a nation-state), but profound,
in that it brings a very abstract notion of change—quite literally—down to earth.
As remarked above, a situated study of change as set out in this methodology
results in analyses populated by empirically observable entities: the actors in the
stories it generates are recognisable and relateable because they are drawn from a
world that we recognise, and it is exactly this particularity of the situated which,
perhaps counterintuitively, gets us closer to the general truth (to whatever extent
there is a general truth to be approached)
This achievement shows that the trialectic approach addresses the critique of
placelessness leveled at the MLP (see again section 2.1.1), which by contrast is
blinded to the actual landscape thanks to its reliance on the abstract notion of “the
(sociotechnical) landscape”. As a result, the MLP cannot help but obscure the vital
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and subtle spatial dynamics of sociotechnical transition behind its own theoretical
architecture; to borrow from Gertrude Stein, the problem with the MLP is that
“there is no ‘there’ there”.
That said, the trialectic approach is far from rigorously spatial in the sense that
GIS-based studies are rigorously spatial (though it could be developed somewhat
in that direction). In its earlier phases of development, the trialectic model was
intended to be married to another form of visualisation which would situate the
protagonist in a dimensionally-crushed map designed to indicate their proximity
to different degrees of infrastructural affordance; this plan was stymied in part
by the selection of freight logisitics as the practice under study (because general-
purpose transportation networks are nodally rich, fully duplex and comparatively
decentralised by comparison with, say, a water distribution system), but also by
the inevitable victory of temporal constraint over intellectual ambition. (It was, in
other words, just too much.)
However, with greater resources, and perhaps with a smaller sample (in tem-
poral terms), the trialectic approach could be more closely and explicitly linked to
geography than it is herein; given the rich seam of findings from network theory
which the situated approach has already revealed, a more rigorously spatialised
iteration of this methodology might open up the possibility of an explictly and em-
pirically spatial understanding of sociotechnical change. The trialectic approach
doesn’t go anywhere near so far as it stands, but in its insistence on situated
knowledges, it nonetheless goes some way to addressing the geographical blind-
ness which is a feature of so much transitions research. Furthermore, the trialectic
approach takes pains to not mistake holistic thinking for systemic thinking, as the
MLP has been accused of doing (see again section 2.1.1).
Thus the trialectic model and methodology, as outlined and demonstrated
in this project, offers an improved perspective on the problem: where the MLP
bounds transitions by geopolitical borders, the trialectic approach insists upon a
situated study that takes explicit account of spatiotemporal variance and the geo-
graphical diffusion of practices; where the MLP incorporates a holistic assumption
in its structure, the trialectic approach eschews causality in favour of a systemic
perpective, in which the agency behind sociotechnical change is assumed to be
emergent from manifold relationships and interactions between all actors, rather
than being imposed, incentivised or managed by a privileged few.
In the process, the very concept of transition starts to look like something
of a tautology, an artefact of its own analytical assumptions: loosely bounded
in both time and space, largely unquantified, loaded with spatial terminology
but otherwise unengaged with the spatiality which is intrinsic to sociotechnical
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change, it acts mostly as a frame within which to assemble historical data into
a particular pre-determined sort of story—which brings us neatly to the third
bundle of critique.
9.3.3 Novel and non-heroic narratives of sociotechnical change
The trialectic approach has demonstrated its ability to narrate sociotechnical change
which falls outside of the established pattern commonly known as “transition”.
While the relationships at the heart of the trialectic are constant across all of the
narratives which it generates, it is notable that this study contains accounts not
only of “successful” transitions (which is to say narratives of change in which the
focal technology “wins”), but of failed or stymied transitions (e.g. the non-event
of steam-waggon freight on roads; see section 5.3), and of declines into redun-
dancy or forced obsolescence (e.g. the buying-up and sidelining of the Sheffield
waterways by local railway interests)—all of which, notably, have very little to do
with the intrinsic merits of the assemblages in question, and a great deal more to
do with the manner in which they fit into the web of situated interests and rela-
tionships. This is in stark contrast with the MLP, which (as discussed in section
2.1.1) is quite clearly described as plot-level heuristic for sociotechnical transitions,
and as such (unsurprisingly) tends to reproduce the same basic narrative over and
over again.
The trialectic model is also a heuristic, but where the MLP might be said to be
applying its rules-of-thumb at the level of structure—which is to say, presupposing
a plot—the trialectic’s rules-of-thumb are applied at the level of agency—which is
to say, the trialectic makes some basic assumptions regarding the sorts of relation-
ships involved in the formation and sustenance of a practice, and then allows a
plot to emerge from agency, by following the developing relationships and ago-
nisms within which sociotechnical change actually takes place. Or, more simply:
the trialectic heuristic locates and traces a narrative in patterns of historical data,
while the MLP imposes a narrative upon historical data.
Of course, both methodologies are fundamentally interpretive, and share some
shortcomings with regard to their necessary reliance on secondary sources. But by
comparison, the MLP’s heuristic is far more deterministic than that of the trialec-
tic, meaning that the trialectic is therefore more broadly applicable to the study
of sociotechnical change: it is capable of narrating stasis and failure as well as
success. And while success is surely preferable to stasis and failure, the path to
the former might be far better illuminated by a more thorough understanding of
the latter.
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Summary: “transition” as tautology
RQ3 asked how the model and methodology developed in this project might im-
prove or expand our understanding of the concept of sociotechnical transition. In
the preceding sections, it has been shown that the trialectic approach highlights
and addresses a number of long-standing critiques of the MLP. Given the MLP’s
paradigmatic status in much future-oriented research on sociotechnical change,
particularly the project of decarbonisation, this thesis may be taken as an indica-
tion that transitions research anchored in the MLP are unavoidably reproducing a
generic narrative of innovation and, in doing so, are overlooking the inescapably
spatial nature of sociotechnical change. Furthermore, through focussing its nar-
ratives on heroic technologies or innovations, the MLP can only gesture vaguely
at the metasystemic interdependencies which underpin the usage (or non-usage)
of particular technologies. Ultimately, the very nature of transition as a bounded
entity has very little theoretical grounding, which may go some way to explaining
its seeming success: when a stereotype is sufficiently broad, you can drape it over
pretty much anything.
This project has shown that if we are to think of transition at all, it is perhaps
better to think of it not as a bounded entity, not as something that somehow hap-
pens to entire populations all at once, but rather as a basic condition of existence
in human society. Transition is not “there, and then”, but ubiquitous and perpetual,
always-already ongoing everywhere, albeit at different rates and in different di-
rections. The transitions of the MLP are stories that only make sense in hindsight,
tautological artefacts of their own analysis; in effect, “transition” is a fairytale that
we repeat in the hope that repetition will make it come true.
If we wish to truly understand the dynamics of sociotechnical change, rather
then merely describe a dynamic which we imagine might be amenable to certain
forms of control or management, then we must abandon the hackneyed plot of
transition and return our attention to the actual actors on the stage. The trialectic
approach certainly cannot claim a more simple account of sociotechnical change
than can the MLP, but the results of this project strongly suggest that the relent-
less search for simple accounts serves only to obscure the ineluctable complexity
of sociotechnical change as it actually occurs. The trialectic approach shows that
“innovation” is not inherent in infrastructures, interfaces, institutions or individ-
uals, nor in influencers, product managers, or “change agents”. Innovation is in
fact a network phenomenon arising from the mediation and (re)negotiation of a
pattern of relationships between human and non-human actors. But at the same
time, it shows that innovation is spatial, in that infrastructural networks propagate
the potential for alternative performances. Armed with these understandings, we
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might begin to approach the questions of historical sociotechnical change without
having predetermined our findings—which in turn might allow us to approach
future sociotechnical change in a similarly open-minded manner.
9.4 Reflections on overall methodology
This section gathers a series of reflections on the application of the project’s model
and methodology.
9.4.1 Breadth: on the matter of metasystemicity
The horizontality of this study—its cross-systemic breadth, if you like—was neces-
sitated by the choice of freight distribution as the practice under study. To reiterate
quickly: freight distribution is a practice-as-entity, which is to say a category com-
prising assorted forms of action which share a common telos or purpose, in this
case the shipping of goods from one place to another; those assorted actions which
comprise the practice-as-entity are practices-as-performance, which is to say that
they each represent one particular way in which the shipping of goods might re-
alistically be made to happen. So, the shipping of goods by whatever means is the
practice(-as-entity), while the shipping of goods by cart or by barge or by train—or
even by some combination thereof—are performances of that practice.
It is painfully obvious with hindsight that one would have been hard pressed to
pick a practice-as-entity more broad and basic than freight distribution—broad in
that in covers everything from small parcels to industrial-scale commodity ship-
ping, and basic in that such logistical distributive practices are a foundational
function of almost every aspect of human civilisation as we currently know it. Or,
more simply: there’s very few things that we humans do that don’t require the
moving around of stuff.
Therefore the upside of studying freight distribution was being obliged to look
closely at the developmental dynamics of what are arguably the most fundamen-
tal infrastructures of all—and in returning to their unglamorous and largely over-
looked beginnings, this project has revealed that contemporary calls for coopera-
tive multimodal linkages between distribution systems should be seen less as calls
for innovation, and more as calls for a return to an operational paradigm which
in fact pertained, in various forms, for almost as long as there have been multiple
modes of transport capable of such cooperation. Even containerisation, sometimes
described as the sine qua non of modern multimodal logistical thinking, is shown
to have precedents that predate powered railways.
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The selection of freight logisitics also presented “the proxy problem”, in that
the instigating protagonist of a freight practice performance (that is, the person
who wishes Article X to be shipped from Location A to Location B) is highly
unlikely to be the performing protagonist of said performance (that is, the person
who loads the goods, drives the vehicle, fills in the paperwork etc.); in essence,
the performing protagonist(s) are agents in proxy for the instigator, tasked with
fulfillment of the performance on their behalf. This presents few problems for
the underlying theory, if any: the diffusion of agency is an explicit assump-
tion all through the methodology, after all, and given the trialectic is a relational
ontology—which is to say that its elements are defined by the relationships they
are in, rather than any intrinsic properties they possess—multiple substitute or
proxy performers are perfectly reasonable; they literally just take one another’s
place in the assemblage. Indeed, the trialectic actually benefits from this in some
regards, as it forces our attention toward the question of ownership and control
over the interface layer, which in the context of freight is often only accessible to
the public as a service.
Furthermore, studying freight logistics draws attention to the role of private
ownership in the systematic undermining of intersystemic cooperation. For in-
stance, the manner in which the Sheffield-area railway interests effectively side-
lined the Sheffield canal system (by buying it up, rigging its tariffs, and stead-
fastly refusing to redevelop the infrastructure in response to changes in interface
technologies) is a form of failed or foreclosed-upon transition which is largely
absent from the literature—perhaps because said literature is predisposed to the
imposition of a standardised heroic narrative of innovation (as discussed above).
However, the depth and breadth of the study was also a limitation, in that
it prevented a more detailed or granular look at specific moments, technologies
and systems. In one sense, that was the entire point of the methodology, which
responded to a desire to get away from modes of analysis which fetishise and con-
flate “innovation” and “technology”—but three centuries deep by three systems
wide was nonetheless an overambitious sample, the richness of which has perhaps
resulted in a de-emphasis of the detailed understanding which this study hoped to
advance; larger nets can let slip the smaller fish. On the bright side, however, and
unintentionally, the sheer breadth of freight distribution ended up providing the
greatest potential insights into metasystemicity and the network phenomenology
of sociotechnical change (for which see below).
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9.4.2 Depth: on the subject of scale
As mentioned above, the trialectic approach is rooted in SPT and A-NT, both of
which—but in particular the latter—have a strong epistemological commitment to
avoiding “black-boxing”. Effort has been made to seek fidelity to these principles
wherever possible, but of course, the refusal of “black-boxing” can only be taken
so far, particularly in the context of a one-person project with a very broad scope
and limited resources.
While there is a strong tradition of system mapping in technical and quantita-
tive disciplines, A-NT is notable for the relative absence of visualisation practices
in its application. It is in some respects surprising that a theory whose central
metaphor is the network so rarely seeks to trace that network with anything other
than words.
Or perhaps not so surprising, given how messy even a fairly simple system
can look on paper—particularly when that system is a flat (i.e. non-hierarchical)
ontology. It is for this reason that system mapping softwares come with tools for
imposing some sort of spatial order on what would otherwise be a tangled cat’s-
cradle of nodes and edges. By centering the articulatory mapping process on the
trialectic model, this methodology accidentally achieves a similar effect, in that it
visually organises a complex network of relationships in a way that allows them to
be traced, and to be compared ot one another. While no element of the trialectic is
ontologically privileged (i.e. none is inherently superior to another), the elements
present at the locus or site of the performance are visually privileged, as they
thereby provide an analytical anchor-point which is consistent across multiple
performances and assemblages in the same study, and a pragmatic way in which
to deploy black-boxing as a tactic in a research strategy which, in theory, eschews
it completely.
The articulatory mapping stage of the process could thus be seen as the point
at which black-boxing becomes necessary, if only because representing the rela-
tionships hidden within those boxes is incompatible with the metasystemic scale
of the enquiry: put more simply, opening up the black boxes on the articulatory
maps would make them unreadable and useless. They are, it must be said, pretty
complex diagrams already—but they represent an attempt to visualise a very com-
plex set of relationships, so complexity is to be expected, if not actually welcomed.
A complex visualisation is surely preferable to no visualisation at all.
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9.4.3 Length: on the topic of temporality
The longitudinality of this study plainly contributed to its challenges, but it is
hard to see how it could have been avoided in this particular deployment. To be
clear, the trialectic and the articulatory mapping process can stand alone: there is
no reason it could not be applied to a single practice at a single historical moment
in a specific place, and indeed it was designed with this sort of portability very
much in mind. For example, the trialectic could be used to study transitions
in urban commuting practices during the second world war, or domestic culinary
practices of the 1980s: these are both consumptive practices underpinned by one or
more infrastructures, and the trialectic was developed with questions of resource
consumption (and its reduction) very much in mind.
But the relationality of the trialectic means that, in theory at least, it could be
applied at different scales, so as to answer different questions. For example, by
treating personal computing hardware as the infrastructural layer and operating
system software as the interface layer, the trialectic should be capable of narrating
transitions in personal computing operating systems from the perspective of the
end user; or, to return to transportation at a different point in the technological
stack, by treating the running gear and drive train of a car as the infrastructural
layer and the controls, dashboard and interior as the interface, a new perspec-
tive on vehicular development and design is opened up—one with people and
practices at its heart.
To repeat: there is nothing inherent to the trialectic model and historical-
mode methodology that necessitates its longitudinal application, in the manner
performed in this project. However, longitudinality is necessary in such circum-
stances as one wishes to deploy the second, speculative mode of the methodology:
put simply, there must be a solid base of historical analysis upon which one’s ex-
trapolations into futurity are to be constructed.
9.4.4 Complexity: a retrospective role for network theory
As discussed in passing above, the situatedness of the trialectic approach had an
extra unexpected advantage, in that by drawing greater attention to spatial rela-
tionships, it allowed for the use of a number of concepts and ideas from network
theory to assist in explaining the dynamics of sociotechnical change. As discussed
in the literature review, the MLP and other theories of change (such as the litera-
ture on innovation diffusion) make some light and gestural use of concepts from
network theory, but rarely get further than a genuflection to “network effects”,
which serve as an easy (if flimsy) way to explain sudden punctuations of what
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had previously been an equilibrium.
At this point it bears reiterating the distinctions between differing disciplinary
perspectives upon networks. As discussed at greater length in the literature re-
view of this thesis (see section 2.1.1), there is a strong tradition of quantitative
and mathematical analysis of networks, which is underpinned by the discipline
known as graph theory. In these traditions, the structure or spatial topology of a
network is treated as being related to but nonetheless analytically distinct from its
dynamics—that is to say, the edges and nodes of a network (which, in the case of
transport networks such as roads, waterways and railways, refer to the physical
infrastructures themselves) are considered as a substrate or platform upon which
the dynamics of agent behaviours (i.e. the movements of vehicles, goods and pas-
sengers around said networks) are acted out; for a more detailed discussion of
graph theory, see e.g. Chartrand (2006). This approach is particularly prevalent
in network modelling, which seeks to predict—or at least to estimate—the dy-
namic phenomena attendant on any given network, such as journey times, traffic
density etc.; it is understood that the structure and dynamics of a network are
necessarily closely related, but from an ontological perspective, network science
nonetheless treats them as being analytically distinct from one another. Or, to
rephrase, network science sees a difference between “the network” and the agents
which communicate, trade or travel using said network as their medium; by way
of illustration, network science would see the roads themselves as “structure”, and
scheduled movements of vehicles around the road system as “dynamics”.
By contrast, sociological approaches to networks such as Actor-Network The-
ory and (albeit less explicitly) Social Practice Theory are rooted in the assumption
of a flat ontology—which is to say that such theories would consider the structural
and dynamic elements of any given network to be of equal ontological status, and
thus analytically inseparable. This thesis takes an approach to network analysis
which is far closer to that of A-NT than to network science: which is to say it
considers the topology of the network and the behaviour of the agents which use
the network as being not just related but mutually constitutive, and thus consid-
ers them side by side. It could be argued that the trialectic model at the heart of
this thesis (see Chapter 4) in fact reiterates the ontological hierarchy of network
science, by way of its distinction between the Infrastructure, the Interface and
the Protagonist—and it might further be argued that such a heuristic distinction
makes the anarchic tangle of a truly flat ontology far more amenable to analysis.
But nonetheless the trialectic does not confer lesser or greater status on any of
its elements, with the arguable exception of its privileging of the perspective of
the protagonist: from the perspective of the trialectic model, the distinction be-
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tween structure and dynamics is not just arbitrary, but actively obstructive to the
understanding which is being sought.
Nonetheless, this is not to deny the truths of network science—merely to ar-
gue that they can be used in a more qualitative and descriptive sense than is
traditional to classical network scientific applications. Indeed, the MLP makes use
of network-theoretical concepts but, as shall be argued in this section, does so in
a gestural manner common to theories of change originating in the Innovation
Diffusion literature, which we might describe as being strongly biased toward the
dynamic side of the network-scientific ontological dichotomy. The trialectic ap-
proach, by contrast, attempts to make qualitative use of both the dynamic and the
structural understandings of networks, so as to avoid the MLP’s tendency to make
a hero of a supposedly innovative interface technology.
Network phenomena are often topological in origin, and the topology of in-
frastructural networks is an unavoidably spatial matter: it’s quite literally all about
where things are in relation to one another. But for the MLP, supporting infras-
tructures are largely treated as contextual externalities to the development of the
technologies which depend upon them; relegated to the unmapped wastes of the
sociotechnical landscape (until such moment as, seemingly apropos of nothing,
someone decides to build or upgrade them), there is little sense of their importance
to the success (or otherwise) of the technology under study. So-called network
effects emerge from the interconnectedness of actors in a system—and that inter-
connectedness is made possible by infrastructural networks, which make possible
the exchange of resources, goods, money and information. Information science
has studied network effects very closely, but while its lessons have been taken up
enthusiastically and used to inform the models of planners working to optimise
transportation networks, they have made few inroads into the study of the evolu-
tion of infrastructural systems, in which transitions and the MLP are arguably the
dominant epistemological paradigm.
To reiterate, the MLP does acknowledge network effects, albeit in the most sim-
ple manifestation thereof, namely that of the “tipping point” at which a given
system has added sufficient nodes and connectivity that joining it becomes an
ever-more-beneficial option. The canonical example is a telephone network: for
“early adopters”, there’s little to gain in terms of functionality, because there are
still very few other users with which to interact. But eventually a sufficient body
of subscribers exists that the advantages of joining are clear and relevant to a sig-
nificant number of the wider population, who then join up as well. This leads to
the classic “S-curve” of network growth (as shown in Figure 9.1 on page 269—
note that the same shape is echoed in the torrent of undefined arrows illustrating
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Figure 9.1: Exemplary “S-curve” of network growth / innovation uptake (Nieto et
al., 1998)
the MLP’s dynamics in Figure 2.1 on page 13), with the near-vertical mid-section
of the plot representing the period during which rapid subscriber growth under-
writes network expansion and/or densification. A second tipping point, less often
discussed, comes at the other end of the curve: at this point, the cost of adding
further nodes and connections—the easiest and cheapest “low-hanging” possibili-
ties for expansion having long since been taken up—is larger than the return to be
gained from the new subscribers thus added, with the result that network growth
slows off to a crawl without significant external intervention. (This growth-killing
tipping point can be observed in long-standing issues, still very much current at
time of writing, regarding the roll-out of high-speed broadband to rural areas of
the UK: no one denies the need to connect that last 5% of the population, but
equally no one is willing to foot the bill for the work required.)
Infrastructural networks such as transportation are a deal more complex than
the abstractions customarily dealt with in network theory, but nonetheless, some-
thing very much like the S-curve can be seen playing out in a plot of transport
network growth in the UK (Albert, 1972, p13). This suggests that network theoret-
ical concepts can speak to the developmental dynamics of infrastructural systems
other than just telecommunications.
And indeed, the MLP marshals network effects to explain tipping points in
the uptake of a technology, albeit in a gestural way. But there is more to network
theory than tipping points, and this project has shown that taking a network per-
spective can illuminate the dynamics of sociotechnical change in a way that the
MLP cannot.
The MLP’s problem with networks is exacerbated by its focus on the innova-
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tion or technology as the “hero” of its analysis: because the generic transition plot
sees the heroic innovation as eventually “winning”, it is therefore unavoidably
seen as being in competition with other technologies that perform a similar func-
tion. This model might be more plausible when applied to innovations lacking
an infrastructural underpinning, as in such a case the two technologies would be
competing on a level playing field with regards to their basic functional viability.
However, technologies not needful of at least one supporting infrastructure are
extremely rare—and an infrastructurally-supported technology cannot compete in
a location devoid of the pertinent infrastructure. You cannot send something by
train if there are no rails between origin and destination; likewise sending by barge
in the absence of waterways, or by van in the absence of well-surfaced roads.
Now, in such circumstances as two different systems both link the same two lo-
cations, direct competition can indeed occur, as seen clearly with the turnpike and
navigation routes between Sheffield and Tinsley. But by looking at the practice of
shipping goods more broadly, rather than focussing on one particular technologi-
cal mode of goods shipping in the manner of the MLP, the trialectic approach can
reveal and explain what looks rather more like a form of cooperation or symbiosis,
such as that prior to the arrival of the railways whereby certain goods (particularly
those with a low value-to-mass ratio) end up going by water, while others (lighter,
higher value) end up going by road: these decisions are influenced by the avail-
ability (or otherwise) of the relevant network, but crucially also by the affordances
offered by the particular interfaces to that network which are on offer (which may
well take the form of services rather than technologies, at least from the perspec-
tive of the instigating protagonist). Such symbioses can also be observed within
the confines of a single system, such as the extensive coexistence of pack-horse
trains and waggons during and long after the turnpike era: it turns out that the
excellence of any given “solution” is very much a function of the particularity
of the performance, and that the supposedly obvious general superiority of, say,
waggons over pack-horses, is revealed to be neither obvious nor general at all.
Furthermore, the situatedness of the trialectic approach allows for further com-
plexity to be revealed in the relationships between seemingly separate, competing
modes of transport, as it forces the analyst toward the consideration of more com-
plex performances of freight shipping. Any given routing of a shipment may
require (or perhaps simply benefit from) using multiple modes to complete the
journey, and the advantages or disadvantages of such multimodality are entirely a
function of how the different modal systems are distributed in space. These admit-
tedly mundane bases for the selection of one mode or another cannot be accounted
for by the MLP thanks to its implicit assumption of infrastructural homogeneity
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over large geographical regions; the MLP can explain why someone might ship by
rail rather than by road, but struggles to explain why someone might send by road
rather than by rail, or by some mixture of road, rail and waterway. Without taking
the time to consider the spatiality of networks, these systemic interconnections are
routinely overlooked or downplayed; through its focus on “winners”, the MLP ig-
nores the more quiet successes of intersystemic stability and cooperation—which,
as shown in the course of the historical analysis documented in chapters 5, 6 and
7, have been a vital feature of sociotechnical change in the UK since the beginnings
of its infrastructural history.
In revealing non-competetive modes of interaction, the trialectic approach leads
inevitably outward to an appreciation of the systemic whole as advocated by La-
tour (see Literature Review), and in doing so manifests another network phe-
nomenon, namely the manner in which seemingly disparate networks or systems
actually function as a system-of-systems, or a metasystem. This project has shown
clearly that, at almost all points in history, the major transport networks of the
UK have evolved alongside each other much like organisms in a large, spatially
heterogeneous ecosystem—and indeed, they are vital members of that ecosystem,
neither its subjects nor its object. Ontologically and functionally speaking, the
three major systems—roads, waterways and rail—are one big system for the dis-
tribution of goods; the elements of that metasystem which are enrolled into a par-
ticular performance are as much a function of the geography of that performance
as they are a rational choice or preference, if not perhaps more so.
Figure 9.2: Mocked-up regional transport network
272 9.4. Reflections on overall methodology
By way of illustration, consider the mocked-up regional transport network
shown in Figure 9.2 on page 271. There are three different systems or modes
represented here, but all of them fulfil the basic function of being able to carry
goods between nodes; as such, from the network perspective, this counts as a
single packet-switching network comprised of three sorts of edge-connector, the
properties of which differ with regard to which sorts of goods they handle best,
how much they cost, and how fast they move; therefore selection of the final
route (and as such, selection of the mode or modes employed) is governed by the
spatial availability of infrastructure in relation to origin and destination (because
one can’t make use of an infrastructure which isn’t there), but also by a swathe of
other parameters influenced by the particularities of the performance, dominated
in this case by matters such as the mass, quantity and fragility of the goods to be
shipped.
To appreciate the full variability of performances, then—to consider all the
possibilities of fulfilment, rather than just the most obvious or most popular—it
is clearly necessary to look across the systemic divisions, because the interconnect-
edness of infrastructures results in their influencing one another’s development,
and because the constitution of the metasystem varies geographically. The situat-
edness of a performance is a vital clue to the composition of that practice, as one’s
location dictates not only what tools and devices (interfaces) are available to you,
but also which infrastructures are accessible through them.
This is brought further into focus through the network-theoretical notion of
“the last mile”. In communications network theory, the last mile is the final con-
nection between a local exchange and the subscriber’s home; because the last mile
is only of use for routings in which the client is either origin or destination, it
is the part of the network where economies of scale are hardest to achieve (by
comparison with busy trunk routes, where bulk traffic can be handled with bulk
efficiencies). If we consider freight shipping as a metasystemic or multimodal net-
work, as above, the last mile is (and indeed was) almost invariably a road, and
most likely a minor one (which is to say a low-bandwidth connection); anything
shipped to that address by rail or waterway would therefore have to travel to or
from the nearest railhead or waterway basin using a road-based mode.
The notion of the last mile helps resolve what seem initially to be paradoxes
regarding technological transition. For example, it is widely understood that by
the start of the 20th century, the steam engine (in the particular modal form of the
train) was a vastly superior option for the shipping of freight by comparison with
all the others—but yet during this period there were more horse-drawn vehicles
in use than in any period prior. The last mile makes it obvious: the train has the
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advantage right up until the rails run out, at which point goods must proceed
to their final destination by the older, cruder and (crucially) more flexible mode
of cart or waggon. Again, the two modes, far from being in competition, are in
fact interdependent upon one another; indeed, each acts as a source and a sink of
traffic for the other.
But metasystemicity is not limited to the symbiosis of transportation networks
alone, as the analysis of this project illustrates. All but the most simple routine
shipments of goods require exchanges of information to make them happen: they
must be organised, in other words. Hence there is another network of commu-
nications which must run in parallel with the network of freight—and it must
carry information more swiftly than the freight can move, if it is to provide any
organisational advantage.
Prior to the advent of rail, information moved by road: sometimes as freight
(such as the turnpike-era gazettes of local prices and factors, delivered between
towns by carriers), but urgent managerial messages regarding the mobilisation
of stock went by the far faster means of a horse- or foot-post. As such, any un-
derstanding of the freight metasystem must also include an understanding of the
communications network by which it is organised.
That’s fairly simple when the communication system uses the same infrastruc-
tures as the distribution system, as was the case in the time of the carriers. But the
advent of the telegraph—initially a subsystem of the railways, which eventually
metastasised in the most spectacular fashion—effectively dematerialised commu-
nications traffic over all but the the last miles of the network (where a message
would rematerialise so as to be carried to the recipient)... then later, the telephone
took over the last mile, and now the bundle of protocols known as “the internet”
has upped the bandwidth of the last mile beyond imagining. The point being: the
practice of shipping freight inevitably involves the use of systems which seem at
first glance to have nothing to do with the shipping of freight. The MLP can only
acknowledge this truth as a contextual condition of the sociotechnical landscape,
focussed as it is on its heroic innovation, the systems whose existence makes the
innovation viable are left outside the analytical frame, meaning that its account
of change is partial and incomplete. By contrast, the trialectic approach—with
its A-NT-informed commitment to following actors and relationships rather than
recapitulating predetermined plots—reveals these metasystemic connections, and
thus provides a more complete (if, admittedly, more complex) account of the dy-
namics of sociotechnical change.
Obviously, there are limits to this metasystemic approach: for starters, utterly
unbounded research can only exist in the context of utterly unbounded budgets!
274 9.4. Reflections on overall methodology
But there is the more obvious and self-enforcing limiting factor of complexity
itself—meaning that, while proudly rooted in Latourian opposition to “black-
boxing” in sociological research, this methodology necessarily indulges in black-
boxing (in the form of the articulatory mapping process), because when working
outward from the practice perspective to the systemic perspective—an analytical
move analogous to zooming out slowly from the centre of an image—an excess of
detail around the edges serves only to muddy the clarity of the relationships at the
centre of the analysis. Pragmatic compromise is perfectly acceptable, and indeed
inevitable; the strength of the trialectic lies in its anchoring the study at the point
of performance, meaning that no matter how far one follows the web of relation-
ships, one can always find one’s way back to the performance—to someone doing
something.
To give an example of how this might play out for a different consumptive
practice, consider the possible performances related to the use of potable water
for cooking or drinking in a large city with a significant favela/slum sector. The
obvious infrastructure to study here would be whatever passes for a local water-
delivery network: wells, pumps, standpipes, mains distribution. But for many
people in such a city, those systems may be non-functional or unavailable; for
them, water might come on a tanker truck (perhaps state-provided, perhaps pri-
vate and for profit), or it might come in branded bottles in the back of a rickshaw
or the bed of a handcart, or simply carried on foot. And so, all the roads and
road vehicles of the city are also potentially part of its water delivery network...
and those roads, as we have seen, are dependent on railways and waterways, on
electricity and communications, and so on.
Flat ontologies and their implications tend to bring a certain sort of positivist
out in hives: if everything is potentially relevant, they will say, then we could be
“following the actors” until the heat death of the universe! The words of Haraway
are rarely a comfort to such commentators, but she speaks the truth nonetheless:
“nothing is connected to everything, but everything is connected to something”
(Haraway, 2016b). The point is not that every performance of a practice must
be considered in the context of every single element comprising the entire global
metasystem; it would be improvement enough were they to be considered in any
systemic context at all.
9.4.5 Thickness: on the subject of secondary sources
The methodology for this project stipulated a historical method based upon the
use of secondary sources, and it should be acknowledged that this is not entirely
unproblematic; indeed, reliance upon secondary sources is another critique lev-
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elled at applications of the MLP (see again Geels, 2011). However, that critique
is specifically concerned with the uncritical reappropriation of top-level narratives
of change and their application to inappropriate analytical scales; it’s not that they
use secondary sources, in other words, but that they use poor secondary sources
in the wrong way.
The trialectic methodology, by contrast, clearly specifies the need to seek out
sources as specific to the site of study as possible, so as to avoid the implicit ho-
mogenisation produced by the MLP. Critics of anthropologies of technology—and
of interpretive methods more generally—might argue that what results is descrip-
tion rather than explanation, and there is an extent to which that is true. However,
the trialectic model itself serves simultaneously as theoretical lens and sampling
strategy, and therefore drives the researcher toward relevant data; the result may
be more descriptive and less explanatory than the output of an MLP study, but
it has nonetheless produced a variety of detailed and situated narratives of so-
ciotechnical change, which not only highlight the MLP’s reproduction of generic
narratives but also undermine the very concept of "transition" itself.
Nonetheless, the paucity of sources for the earlier analytical moments bears
noting, particularly with regard to the roads, with almost every author of a sec-
ondary source bemoaning the lack of primary materials from which to work: the
records and accounts of the majority of navigation companies and turnpike trusts
were lost long ago, for example, meaning that much has to be inferred from what
little data remains.
Furthermore, sources with a suitable focus—-which is to say studies with
an interest in the specifics of design and usage, rather than the generalities of
statistics—are rarer still, and those covering Sheffield and/or the surrounding re-
gions are of a certain vintage. Fortunately there is sufficient generalisable detail
available regarding the early roads that the necessary conjecture can be performed
with confidence.
The opposite problem pertains to sources covering more recent periods and
systems—sources on the railways, for instance, are plentiful. The story of rail
in Britain is often well treated (and indeed well referenced) at the national scale
for a popular audience (see e.g. S. Bradley, 2015), but regional and local studies
remain the province of the enthusiast presses rather than the academic presses.
As such, one is obliged (and not without good reason) to consider the curation of
such sources as, say, Chapman (2013) to be well below scholarly standards, poorly
referenced and frequently anecdotal.
With that said, the issue is somewhat ameliorated by the nature of the data
required for the trialectic approach, because the telling details of functional design
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and service set-up are fairly objective: while an author may have an opinion on the
scheduling of services or the standards for braking, the facts of those phenomena
are not changed by their opinion, and hence retain their value for this sort of
research. (It is also fortunate that these tend to be exactly the sort of details which
enthusiast authors delight in sharing.)
In summary, while the necessity of relying on secondary sources is less than
ideal, it is also all but unavoidable—which is why it is such a commonplace in an-
thropologies of technology. However, the situated and design-focussed approach
at the heart of the trialectic methodology makes the best of this necessity, and
through insisting on the seeking out of the most locally specific sources available,
addresses this potential shortcoming directly—and in doing so demonstrates a
rigour regarding that the MLP is unable to match.
9.5 Aim
The aim of this project was to make infrastructure legible. This phrasing was cho-
sen for its particular sociological meaning, whereby “legibility”—to oversimplify
hugely—implies a new, comprehensive and systemic understanding of a hereto-
fore occluded ontological entity, but also for the more prosaic meaning, wherein
that which is hard to parse is made less so.
Quite how comprehensive an understanding of infrastructure the trialectic ap-
proach has achieved is impossible to determine, but the understanding developed
herein is: a novel contribution to scholarship in the relevant fields; inherently sys-
temic by design; and demonstrably more comprehensive than that of the MLP,
which—as has been shown—can only narrate one particular genre of innovation
story.
With regard to making infrastructure easier to parse, the speculative mode of
the methodology demonstrates a clear and rigorous route through which the com-
plexities of sociotechnical change might be represented not just at the human level,
but from a human perspective: this is achieved through the use of fiction, which
is less a new technique for thinking about the future than a rehabilitation of the
oldest technique known to humankind. By applying the trialectic model to histor-
ical data, and through deploying narrative and speculative strategies, this project
has advanced our understanding of how infrastructures evolve and entangle over
time—and, crucially, provided a tool-set with which to test tomorrow’s proposed
infrastructures against that new understanding of the obstacles to sociotechnical
change and the propagation of new practices.
Chapter 9. Discussion 277
9.6 Personal reflection
To describe the process of taking a PhD as a journey of (self-)discovery is almost
beyond cliche—but cliches are born of deeper truths.
I was greatly privileged to be able to design my own project from scratch,
and the central aim thus reflects a genuine curiosity which the past four years
have served only to sharpen. Before joining the academy, I had spent about as
much time thinking about infrastructure as the average person, which is to say
hardly any. But working as an RA on two EPSRC “sandpit” projects from the
infrastructure theme, while also writing a Master’s dissertation which used science
fiction storytelling as a way to explore the relationship between the fabric of a city
and its citizens, brought me to a point of wanting to understand how it was that
I could have spent so little thought on infrastructure. What did it mean? How
did something so essential, so ubiquitous, somehow nonetheless slip from public
view, hiding in plain sight? How did it—did we—end up this way? And how
might it end up in another twenty, fifty, hundred years?
With the benefit of hindsight, experience and the extensive comparison of notes
with other postgrads, I’m not surprised that many of those early questions remain
unanswered—they appear to me now as high-level markers of a rich, fascinating
and complex problem domain that it is far beyond my abilities or capacities to ever
exhaust. Indeed, those questions still exercise me now, despite four years spent
trying to answer just one aspect of them. This sense of having barely scratched
the surface of a subject is commonplace among newly minted PhDs, I’m told;
I consider myself fortunate that this feeling is not accompanied in my case by
frustration and/or ennui (though I would quite like to not have to think about
networked freight logistics for the next six months or so, if at all possible).
As a mature student from an arts background, I had a great deal to learn
about academic work in general, and about sociological work in particular. Cre-
ative writing is most definitely a discipline, in the sense that it can be taught and
it must be practiced, but it is a solitary discipline with considerable teleological
headroom—which is to say that while you have to discipline your writerly back-
side into the chair (and the words onto the page), there’s little in the way of ob-
stacles to doing whatever seems needful at whatever pace feels appropriate, with
the obvious exception of one’s final deadline; in terms of project management, the
variables are almost all under your own control. By contrast, an interdisciplinary
PhD positioned somewhere between civil engineering and urban studies turns out
to be a deal more complicated, not least because one is denied the fiction writer’s
greatest prerogative, namely that of simply imagining one’s way out of a tricky
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corner. Reality, by contrast, while far from being as objectively real as the label
implies, sorely lacks the fertile tractability of the blank page, and has a knack for
disrupting the most careful and lapidary plotting (as “change agents” and “tran-
sition managers” everywhere are doubtless aware). And while only a madman or
a braggart would claim writing fiction is easy—because it’s never easy if you want
it to turn out any good—I will claim with some confidence that writing a thesis
is harder, because it has to do so many different things at once. (And, if truth be
told, fiction always wins on the fun factor... after all, it’s the closest you can get to
playing god without getting involved in politics or investment banking.)
That said, I have observed many similarities between the phenomenology of
large research projects and the phenomenology of large fiction projects—most no-
tably the manner in which, toward the end, they end up keeping you occupied in
a very literal sense. There have been weeks of working on this thesis when I have
been all but unable to see the world without seeing it as a theatre or laboratory in
which theories and models of change spool themselves out before me; weeks when
I’ve been unable to tell whether the project is inhabiting my mind, or my mind
is somehow inhabiting the project. I used to never see infrastructure for looking;
now it feels rather more like I can’t see anything other than infrastructure.
I was also pleased to find that science fiction scholarship had done more to
prepare me for becoming a social scientist than I had expected it to. In part, this
is because science fiction criticism has always been strongly engaged with theory,
and in particular with theories of technology and sociotechnical change; I was
thereby exposed to some basic ideas and applications, which I hope have been
shown to serve me well. But there is also a sense—utterly unquantifiable and self-
reported, to be sure—that thinking with social theory and doing the work that
we writers of genre fiction sometimes refer to as “worldbuilding” are strangely
similar; they seem to exercise the same sets of imagination-muscles, so to speak.
And so perhaps the greatest self-discovery of all is that there was a frustrated
social theorist trapped inside of me, seeking release through science fiction... and
while I look forward to (re)establishing a regular fiction writing practice in the
wake of my PhD, I also hope to also develop this new, related skill, and put it to
good use. (The irony here, of course, is that social theorists are only marginally
more employable than are science fiction writers.)
On a more personal level, I’ve learned a great deal about how the academy
functions (not all of which I’m happier for knowing, in truth); I’ve learned a great
deal about mental illness, and how it interacts with stressors over which you have
some control (e.g. one’s thesis project) as well as those over which you effectively
have no control at all (e.g. national and global socioeconomics in the dog days
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of neoliberal capitalism); I learned that the right sort of exercise regime actually
makes you less tired, not more; I learned that the world of academic research is
full of opportunities to do interesting things and write interesting work, and I
learned that if you try to do all of them at the same time as trying to finish your
PhD, you’ll be insanely busy and quite possibly make yourself ill more than once
(but will have nonetheless managed to do a bunch of interesting things that you
might never have had the chance to do otherwise).
But perhaps most importantly, I saw a fundamental finding of my research
being mirrored back at me from the process of the research itself. This project has
shown that “innovation”—which is, after all, just a fancy B-school word meant
to frame change and difference as a marketable product—is not inherent in indi-
vidual actors or objects, but is instead a function of the networks of relationships
between actors. And while the ideas and theories herein are very much my own
work, I could not have developed them into this project without being embed-
ded in a network made up of the support, knowledge and criticism of my fellow
academics.
I thereby tentatively conclude that people, perhaps, are the ultimate infrastruc-
ture.
9.7 Where next?
Having developed and demonstrated a methodology for making infrastructure
legible, it would be good to see how well it works at different scales, and in
different contexts.
For example, this project’s chosen practice-as-entity, freight logistics, was de-
liberately picked for its breadth and fundamentality; it is also, as discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.3, a proxy practice, meaning that the practice is performed on the behalf
of the instigating protagonist by one or more proxy actors. In order to assess how
effectively the trialectic methodology can work at different scales, then, it would
interesting to deploy it into a project with a tighter focus; this could be achieved by
selecting a more personal practice with a domestic setting (such as dishwashing,
for example), and using the speculative mode to explore the reconfiguration of
such practices around new technologies touted as sustainable alternatives. Such a
project might also adapt the speculative mode into a more participatory process,
whether through enrolling other researchers into the scenario development and
prototyping processes, or even engaging directly with citizens through workshops
and other forms of action research.
It would also be interesting to see how well the trialectic model holds up in
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other contexts, and whether it might serve as a truly generalisable model of so-
ciotechnical change. The trialectic has been developed within and applied to the
British context of infrastructural development, but how would it fare in a location
where infrastructural history is not 300 years deep but only 100 years deep, or
shallower still? Will it be capable of narrating the rise and fall of assemblages in
countries that have experienced infrastructural "leapfrogging", such as the African
nations that skipped over landline telephony and went straight to cellular? In light
of the funding opportunities emerging from the Global Challenges Research Fund,
there might also be justifications for not simply applying the trialectic approach
in developing countries, but also retooling it for specific contexts in collaboration
with local researchers. So, rather than use the trialectic to describe how innovation
happens in other countries, one might instead teach researchers in other countries
how to (re)use the trialectic to work it out for themselves—which would be in




In this chapter, conclusions are drawn regarding the fulfilment of the aim and
objectives of the project. As captured in its title, the underlying aim of the project
was to make infrastructure legible; this goal was given more concrete expression
in three defined objectives, which took the form of research questions. Those
research questions are restated in the sections below, accompanied by conclusions
drawn from the preceding chapters, which represent answers to the questions. In
the the final section, conclusions are drawn regarding the fulfillment of the overall
aim of the project, and its unique contributions to knowledge are identified.
10.1 Conclusions in fulfillment of RQ1
The first research question of this project was stated as follows:
Starting from a materialist and practice-oriented perspective, how might one
model and analyse the mutually influential and longitudinal relationships be-
tween everyday consumptive practices and the infrastructures which enable
them?
This objective is fulfilled through the description of the trialectic model and the
accompanying methodology for its application to longitudinal case studies, a pro-
cess referred to as “articulatory mapping” (see chapter 4).
The Trialectic Model
The trialectic model is in itself a unique contribution to infrastructure scholarship,
and arguably also to the literature on innovation. Its novelty consists primarily
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in its being a fully materialist model of socio-technical change which traces the
mutual influences of practices and infrastructures upon one another, as mediated
by an evolving array of intermediary technologies. The main advantages of the
trialectic model are as follows:
• it is a relational materialist ontology—which is to say that, while it neces-
sarily relies on conceptual categories (protagonist, interface, infrastructure),
those categories emerge from clear relationships (hence ’relational’) between
empirically observable entities (hence ’materialist’), as opposed to emerging
from arbitrary hierarchies of scale or abstract theoretical constructs; or, more
simply, it is a theoretical model that deals only with things that actually
exist(ed);
• it represents sociotechnical change as an emergent function of multiple com-
plex relationships, as opposed to the result of linear and/or hierarchical
causalities—which is to say that, in stark contrast to prevailing models such
as the Multi-Level Perspective, it explicitly embeds aspects of network the-
ory in its account of how networks develop, thus enhancing its explanatory
power by reference to a highly relevant but oddly overlooked field of study;
• it substitutes the prevalent economic models of human behaviour with the
more generous and humanist model of social practice theory, which bet-
ter reflects cutting-edge qualitative understandings about how consumptive
practices are shaped, and reframes consumption reduction challenges (e.g.
grid decarbonisation) as being distributed across a complex network of ac-
tors, rather than resting solely on the shoulders of “the consumer”.
In summary, the trialectic model builds upon social practice theory so as to repre-
sent sociotechnical change in a manner that explicitly rejects abstract sociological
concepts and hierarchies, favouring instead a longitudinal close focus on the things
people do, and on the technologies and systems which they use in the course of
doing them.
Articulatory Mapping
The articulatory mapping methodology is a novel application of network-centric
social theory (such as Actor-Network Theory) to a materialist model of sociotech-
nical change rooted in social practice throry. Taking the trialectic model (see above)
as its foundation, articulatory mapping serves to further explore and visualise the
tangle of organisational and institutional actors which mediate the agonistic rela-
tionships of the trialectic, which in doing so serve to articulate and stabilise the
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sociotechnical assemblages which underpin consumptive practices. Or, in other
words: articulatory mapping explicitly situates the action and agency of people
doing things with technology within the web of objects and organisations which
make doing those things possible. The main advantages of the articulatory map-
ping methodology are as follows:
• it produces a relational visualisation or “map” of a given sociotechnical as-
semblage at a given historical moment and location; useful in its own right,
such a map might also serve as the outline for a project of more detailed
research into a given technology at a particular historical moment;
• it thus allows for the comparison and contrast of the developmental histo-
ries of seemingly different infrastructural systems across different historical
epochs and locations; this in turn opens up the possibility of drawing con-
clusions regarding sociotechnical change which are system-agnostic, if not
necessarily universal;
• it reveals (and also, in truth, is somewhat hampered by) the inescapable
interdependency of infrastructural systems, as it traces the ways in which
such systems have competed, cooperated, compromised and collapsed with
the passing of time.
In summary, the articulatory mapping methodology allows for the visualisation of
the full extent of a given sociotechnical assemblage at a given historical moment,
which further allows for the comparison of seemingly disparate assemblages, and
for loosely generalizable conclusions regarding the dynamics of sociotechnical
change over the long term.
Both the trialectic model and the articulatory mapping methodology have been
shown in this project to draw on archival, academic and other sources so as to suc-
cessfully capture historical moments of sociotechnical change associated with one
specific practice-as-entity (namely freight logistics) across three different infras-
tructures, and to analyse them in terms which are largely context-independent.
While applied here only to a single practice-as-entity, the results imply that
that the combined model and methodology should be equally capable of han-
dling other consumptive practices in the same way—indeed, freight logistics may
have been among the practices least amenable to this approach, given the analyti-
cal complications arising from the “[x]-as-a-service” business models which have
dominated it historically; it seems likely that practices with a more domestic locus,
wherein interface technologies are predominantly under the direct control (if not
the ownership) of the protagonist, will present fewer explicatory challenges.
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10.2 Conclusions in fulfillment of RQ2
The second research question was stated as follows:
Drawing on the model and analysis developed in fulfillment of Objective 1,
how might such findings be used as the basis of a speculative exploration of
the advantages and obstacles associated with the deployment of proposed future
infrastructures?
This objective is fulfilled through the description of a specifically future-oriented
“speculative mode” (see section 4.3) of the model and methodology developed in
response to Objective 1, and its use as the front end of a process of scenario cre-
ation and narrative prototyping adapted from futures studies and critical/specu-
lative design practices (as documented in chapter 8).
While neither the scenario generation process or the notion of narrative proto-
typing are novel in and of themselves, it is unusual for such methods in combi-
nation to draw upon situated longitudinal qualitative studies as input data; and
while scenario-based exercises are not uncommon in research oriented toward
infrastructural strategy, both the explicitly narrative form of this project’s final
outputs and its explicitly critical teleology mark it out as a clear advance from
the academic and consultative status quo in this sector. The advantages of the
narrative prototyping process are as follows:
• it enables the use of longitudinal studies of sociotechnical change as the basis
of informed speculation regarding the challenges attending the deployment
of proposed future infrastructures;
• it allows for the “stress testing” of a proposed future infrastructure against a
suite of differing and deliberately extreme contextual circumstances, thus
highlighting worst-case outcomes which more “reasonable” or “realistic”
scenarios would never reveal;
• both the process and its final outputs can inform strategic planning and
decision-making regarding future infrastructures at local, regional and na-
tional scales;
• it can represent speculative future assemblages in a ’despecialised’ form,
thus broadening the potential audience for such representations, which in
turn might open up discussion and debate around future infrastructures
to audiences beyond the academy and the policy circuit: the Cost-Benefit
Analysis report is a highly specialised genre, whereas almost anyone can
understand a story.
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In summary, the narrative prototyping process fulfills Objective 2 by synthesis-
ing the findings of a longitudinal study (the definition and application of whose
parameters and methods represent the fulfillment of Objective 1) and extrapolat-
ing them into four different futures through the medium of narrative prose; this
process allows for an informed and, most importantly, accessible exploration and
critique of proposed future infrastructures, and the difficulties in deploying them
under uncertain sociopolitical circumstances.
10.3 Conclusions in fulfillment of RQ3
The third research question was stated as follows:
How might this methodology improve or expand our understanding of the
concept of sociotechnical transition?
Current UK and EU research into sociotechnical change at the infrastructural scale
is dominated by the literature on transitions, and by the Multi-Level Perspective
model at its heart. In the literature review (see section 2.1.1), the following short-
comings were identified in this framework:
1. the MLP relies on theoretical abstractions and arbitrary hierarchical struc-
tures which presuppose the nature of the articulatory relationships which
stabilise sociotechnical assemblages, making its explanations somewhat tau-
tological;
2. despite its reliance on geographical metaphors (e.g. niche, landscape, regime),
the transitions model is frequently applied with little or no consideration to
the spatial distribution of the phenomena with which it is concerned—it is a
placeless, universalising theory;
3. despite its interest in infrastructural networks and the technologies which
depend upon them, the MLP (and the transitions literature more broadly)
has little or no regard for network theory.
It is concluded that this project addresses these issues, albeit incompletely, as
follows:
1. the trialectic model and its associated articulatory mapping methodology
has no hierarchies, only relationships—it is a “flat ontology”, and entirely
materialist in its formulation (which is to say that it deals only with empiri-
cally observable entities);
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2. the explicitly situated application the trialectic and the articulatory mapping
process replaces the idealised conceptual landscape of the MLP with the
more contingent and problematic landscapes of history and geography, in
which practices (much like infrastructures and technologies) are unevenly
distributed: in doing so, it reveals the concept of transition as an over-
reductive population-scale description of a complex, highly granular phe-
nomenon which actually emerges from countless individual relationships
and transactions;
3. the trialectic and its associated methodology are intimately informed by
network theoretical concepts (e.g. bandwidth, availability, “the last mile”),
which serve to reveal and explain some of the obduracies, failed innova-
tions and systemic declines that the transitions literature has struggled with,
ignored or glossed over.
In summary, the trialectic model and its associated articulatory mapping method-
ology are shown to address three significant shortfalls in the dominant approach
to sociotechnical change at the infrastructural scale: theoretical idealism (and the
false objectivity which is its product), placelessness, and network illiteracy.
10.4 Fulfillment of aim and contributions to knowledge
The core aim of this project was defined as follows:
It is the aim of this thesis to make infrastructure legible: to narrate it
from a more human-centric perspective than that which prevails in the
majority of contemporary research in the field. In less lyrical terms,
the project aims to understand how infrastructures develop, how they
evolve and entangle over time.
It is concluded that the aim is fulfilled: as indicated above, the trialectic model
and its associated methodology are rooted in social practice theory and informed
by the flat ontologies of Actor-Network Theory, which provide a more human-
centric perspective on innovation and sociotechnical change than the managerial
“god’s-eye view” of prevailing approaches to such questions; the outputs of the
case studies to which the trialectic model were applied, and the outputs of the
narrative prototyping process concretise that perspective, and in doing so provide
a vivid, grass-roots account not only of the infrastructural reconfigurations of the
past, but the potential reconfigurations of the future.
As regards contributions to knowledge:
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• the trialectic model is an entirely novel and original contribution to the litera-
ture on sociotechnical change, and arguably also to the innovation literature;
• the articulatory mapping methodology, while based on established branches
of social theory, represents a novel combination of social practice theory with
Actor-Network Theory, and is capable of producing a novel visualisation of
the relational structure of sociotechnical assemblages;
• the narrative prototyping process is largely comprised of established tech-
niques from futures studies and speculative/critical design (albeit deployed
in somewhat off-label ways), but the application of such techniques to data
produced by situated longitudinal qualitative case studies is distinctive, as
is the insistence on narrative prose stories as the final form of the outputs.
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